Concepts–themed posts engage in inherently somewhat speculative analysis. I contend that any serious analysis must engage with the world both as it is and as it can be. Avoiding mindless empiricism requires cognizance of what is and what is not within the realm of possibility. Concepts-themed posts engage in this type of analysis.

Maps depicting the maximum range of Chinese maritime strike capabilities, including the country’s anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and similar, tend to depict range rings that extend from China’s borders or coastline out to a distance of x kilometers for Chinese anti-ship munition y and so forth. Such maps tend to be unrealistic for, if nothing else, two reasons:

• China is unlikely to launch longer-range terrestrial strike or maritime strike munitions from positions along the country’s borders or coastline.

• Attacking a moving target in the form of a ship places immense demands on maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, even in a context in which high-speed short time-to-target maritime strike munitions such as the DF-26 ballistic missile mitigate the inescapable reality of target location error.

While China has developed a dense multi-phenomenology sensor array, including multiple space-based sensor architectures that not only offer redundant coverage but also, with respect to non-geostationary ISR satellites, inherently “global” coverage, China’s ever-improving maritime strike capabilities are primarily oriented toward the Western Pacific. Even so, China is surprisingly well-positioned to target ships—including American warships transiting toward the Western Pacific during a crisis or war—as they traverse two distant but very important maritime chokepoints, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz.

The Strait of Hormuz, which constitutes a bona fide maritime chokepoint that is the entry and exit to and from the Persian Gulf, is around 2100 kilometers from China and around 2300 kilometers from the western city of Kashgar in Xinjiang. For context, the American island territory of Guam is some 3100 kilometres from China, and Tokyo is some 1750 kilometers from Shanghai. The Suez Canal is some 3900 kilometres from China, and some 4050 kilometers from Kasghar in Xinjiang. Stated differently, both the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz—two of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints—are, in principle, within the nominal maximum range of the Chinese DF-26, which the latest annual American China Military Power Report (CMPR) characterizes as being 3000-4000 kilometers.

A curious fact about what is publicly known about the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force’s (PLARF) order of battle is that there exists a DF-26 launch brigade garrisoned near Korla, also in Xinjiang. The Korla DF-26 garrison, which is likely deployed in Xinjiang to bring Moscow with range—the DF-26 is a nuclear-capable ballistic missile, is “just” ~3200 kilometers from the Persian Gulf, which is to say a shorter distance than DF-26 ballistic missiles targeting Guam from launch positions elsewhere in China are likely to cover. The Korla garrison, which is, of course, equipped with wheeled self-propelled DF-26 launchers that can relocate as required, is, however, situated some 4900 kilometres from the Suez Canal.

Anyone familiar with Iranian maritime strike capabilities and the Iranian-supplied maritime strike capabilities employed by Ansarallah in Yemen will recognize the important role that permissive maritime geography can play in enhancing maritime strike capabilities, including lowering the requirements for effective maritime ISR against moving targets in the form of ships. Maritime chokepoints not only make it easier to discern the presence of ships to target, but also make it easier to directly track the movement of a ship or, at the very least, plot its projected future position. This is how Ansarallah has been able to target ships not only in and around the Bab al-Mandeb—a maritime strait—but also in the open/less confined waters of the Gulf of Aden.

Merchant ships and warships transiting the extremely narrow Suez Canal and even the much wider Strait of Hormuz have, in effect, nowhere to hide should China seek to selectively extend the reach of its maritime strike capabilities in a westward direction.

This is particularly the case with respect to the Suez Canal, as the 2021 obstruction of the canal by the large container ship Ever Given so memorably put on public display.

With respect to targeting ships, including American warships, that may transit the Suez Canal during a crisis or conflict in the Western Pacific, it bears emphasis that China does not need its exquisite and increasingly space-centric multi-phenomenology maritime ISR sensor array. Ground observers—and unattended cameras—with internet access will likely do just fine over a 20 or so minute flight time for the likes of a DF-26 launched from a position to the west of Kasghar.

The intent of this post is not to suggest that China will target ships transiting the Suez Canal and/or the Persian Gulf, but to highlight the importance of grounded but nevertheless creative analysis that deals with the world as it can be and not just as it currently is. China may well enter a crisis or war without having either the desire or the ability to target ships transiting these distant maritime chokepoints, but the highly stylized analysis found in this post suggests that China is likely to face quite low barriers to entry should it proceed in this direction. This post more generally serves as a reminder to observers and military analysts focused on the Western Pacific that the territory of the People’s Republic of China extends some 4500 kilometers west of the country’s coastline—the Earth’s equatorial circumference is “only” ~40,075 kilometers.

News analysis-themed posts typically focus on recent developments. These posts tend to be much shorter and less detailed than analysis-themed posts.

According to military media outlet Naval News, the nuclear-powered submarine that China recently launched at the Bohai Shipyard near Huludao along the Bohai Sea is not yet another Type 093B-class (U.S. ONI: Shang-class) nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) but the first completed hull of the long-anticipated next-generation Type 095-class SSN. Much rests on the maturity and competitiveness of China’s Type 095-class SSN design, which may become a major inflection point in the evolution of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and herald a very different era of naval and undersea warfare dynamics in the 2030s and beyond.

Supposing that this claim is accurate, it is analytically productive to think about some of the many uncertainties concerning the future of the Chinese submarine fleet. In the absence of information, observers tend to speculate, but serious analysts identify important areas of uncertainty and raise questions to be answered as new information is uncovered and rendered available. The following questions and the underlying analytical issues are worth considering as additional information becomes available on the new Chinese Type 095-class SSN.

• How many Type 095-class SSNs—and other SSNs more generally—does China plan to build and deploy?

• Will an expanded SSN fleet come at the cost of a smaller diesel-electric submarine fleet (SSK)? Many older SSKs will need replacing over the coming five to ten years, including both Russian-built Kilo-class (Project 636) SSKs and Chinese-built Type 039 (U.S. ONI: Song-class) SSKs.

• Where does the reported Type 041-class (U.S. ONI: Zhou-class) submarine fit into Chinese fleet planning? The Type 041—which is notably not built at the now-expanded shipyard near Huludao along the Bohai Sea in the manner of the Type 095-class SSN and all previous Chinese nuclear-powered submarines—reportedly includes a small nuclear reactor to extend the range-endurance of the submarine. It bears emphasis that the Type 041-class is far too small to substitute for the likes of the Type 095-class SSN and is likely to either supplant or complement SSKs in the PLAN.

• Will Chinese shipyards continue to build standard SSKs, including the latest Type 039C-class (U.S. ONI: Yuan-class mod), for the PLAN—as opposed to export customers? If so, will there be a new Chinese SSK design? Other countries, especially South Korea, are expanding the envelope of what an advanced SSK can offer. The appeal of larger, more complex, and more expensive SSKs for the PLAN may or may not be affected by the introduction of not just the recently launched new Type 095-class SSN but also the new Type 041-class.

• In the 2010s, the PLAN was rumoured to have a requirement for an SSK design optimized for operations in shallow littoral waters, which the widely deployed Type 039A-class (US ONI: Yuan-class) and the succeeding Type 039C-class are not. There have, to date, been no indications of developments in this area, with the caveat that some large uncrewed underwater vehicle designs—uncrewed/unmanned submarines—may be used to at least partially address this capability gap, which the PLAN may or may not care much about as of 2026 and going forward.

It is possible to raise additional questions that will need answering.

• How many reportedly forthcoming Type 096-class ICBM-equipped nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) does China plan to build and deploy? What will Type 096-class SSBN production and deployment mean for the existing Type 094-class (U.S. ONI: Jin-class) SSBNs, which reportedly leave much to be desired? Will the Type 094-class SSBN be repurposed for use as conventionally-armed strike munitions launchers in the vein of a subset of American Ohio-class SSBNs?

• Supposing that the new Type 095-class SSN is optimized for use as an attack submarine—optimized for use against enemy ships, will China develop and deploy a follow-up design in the vein of the stretched/larger American Virginia-class Block V submarines, which can be equipped with a significantly larger number of vertically-launched terrestrial strike and/or maritime strike munitions?

• Will China emulate the Soviet-Russian concept of a missile-centric and maritime strike-optimized nuclear-powered submarine design in the vein of the Project 949 (U.S. ONI: Oscar-class) submarines? It bears emphasis that the recently unveiled Chinese ship- or submarine-launched YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20 long-range anti-ship missiles are all indicative of the direction of travel in this key capability area.

As indicated earlier, observers tend to speculate in the absence of information, but serious analysts try to identify important areas of uncertainty and raise questions to be answered as new information is uncovered and rendered available. Suffice to say, much is uncertain about China’s new Type 095-class SSN in the public domain. There are, more generally, a great many areas of analytical uncertainty of both a qualitative and quantitative nature concerning the future of China’s submarine fleet and undersea warfare capabilities. The long-expected launch of a new Chinese SSN design at the much-expanded—to what end, one must ask—Bohai Shipyard amounts to an important development, but the proverbial analytical glass is nowhere near being even half full.

The following post from October 2025 broached the potential for a Chinese naval base in the general vicinity of the southern coast of Africa, which will help facilitate a hypothetical much-expanded Chinese SSN fleet operate in the Atlantic Ocean, including off the eastern coastline of North America. Suffice to say, no such Chinese naval base currently exists, and the following post highlighted the implications of endemic political instability across much of Sub-Saharan Africa for the PLAN.

Analytical extensions-themed posts expand on material that has appeared in another newsletter/section and other parts of this website more generally.

China-related commentary expanding upon the post published in another section/newsletter:

The Iranian experience with the U.S. military in general and the U.S. Navy in particular is highly salient to anyone interested in Chinese military capabilities. In times of crisis and war in the Pacific, American naval vessels operating in the Indian Ocean and its marginal seas, such as the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, will have to transit the Malacca, Sunda, or Lombok straits—or else navigate around Australia—so as to rendezvous with American warships operating in the Philippine Sea and elsewhere in the Pacific Ocean. This presents risks for the United States and multifaceted opportunities for the Chinese military. It bears emphasis that American warships homeported at ports along the eastern coast of North America encounter similar dynamics, and may even have to transit into the Indian Ocean via the southern coast of Africa in the event that Iran and Ansarallah in Yemen continue to constrain American transits of the Bab al-Mandeb—following transits ofthe Mediterranean and the Suez Canal—into the Indian Ocean. The United States’ nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are too large to transit into the Pacific Ocean via the Panama Canal. The alternative for American aircraft carriers homeported along the eastern coast of North America is to reach the Pacific Ocean by navigating around the southern tip of South America.

Commentary-themed posts are intended to broach or highlight a specific issue, not limited to recent and ongoing events. These posts will typically be much shorter and less detailed than analysis-themed posts.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my 𝕏/Twitter account. The original post may be expanded upon and edited for grammar and style in this here post. Link

It is interesting to see Japanese reports that two of the China Coast Guard’s (CCG) large new patrol ships—a Type 052D-class destroyer derivative and a Type 054A-class frigate derivative—are patrolling around the Senkaku/Diaoyudao Islands amid ongoing tensions between China and Japan.

These large CCG patrol ships—the attached file images of the vessels in question are for reference—are part of what is best characterized as the CCG’s “high seas fleet”—large and well-equipped patrol ships that are well-suited to spearheading a ~blockade-type action against Taiwan that is backstopped by the PLA Navy (PLAN). These large CCG ships can also be used to extend the CCG’s presence to more distant waters, including patrols in the North Pacific and perhaps the Indian Ocean. Chinese decision-makers have, however, so far dispatched the CCG’s expensive new large patrol ships to undertake fairly menial patrol duties in disputed waters in both the East China Sea and the South China Sea. It remains to be seen whether these—by current CCG standards—(literally) extraordinary patrol ships will be tasked with—by current CCG standards—(literally) extraordinary missions going forward.

It bears emphasis that the new large patrol ships built for the CCG’s “high seas fleet,” which are quite heavily downgraded and minimally armed derivatives of PLAN warship designs, are equipped with acquisition/air search radars. This allows these CCG vessels to independently detect Japanese aircraft, whether those of the formally civilian Japan Coast Guard (JCG), the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF), or the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). These CCG ships are also equipped with data links that will likely allow the CCG patrol ships to share their radar sensor data with PLAN vessels and vice versa. For Japan, the JMSDF and JASDF, and the formally civilian Japan Coast Guard in particular, the presence of armed radar-equipped CCG patrol ships in the East China Sea introduces a new form of risk.

The original J-15, as opposed to the CATOBAR J-15T deployed on the Fujian alongside the low-observable CATOBAR J-35, is a short take-off, barrier-arrested recovery (STOBAR) aircraft deployed for use with China’s first two operational aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and Shandong, both of which are STOBAR aircraft carrier designs. All fixed-wing aircraft operating from STOBAR aircraft carriers do so in a necessarily degraded capacity relative to operations from a longer terrestrial runway or a CATOBAR aircraft carrier as a result of the restrictions of maximum take-off weight imposed by the use of a short runway featuring a ski-jump. This is manifested in terms of a lowered maximum take-off weight, a dynamic that particularly affects the J-15, which is, like the underlying Soviet Su-27 design, a large and exceptionally heavy fighter aircraft even in an unladen and minimally fuelled configuration.

Despite the inherent limitations of the STOBAR J-15 as deployed on the STOBAR aircraft carrier Liaoning and Shandong, the PLANAF decided to develop a carrier-borne aerial refuelling capability very early in the history of Chinese carrier-borne naval aviation. The STOBAR J-15 is the Chinese derivative of the Sukhoi T-10K, a member of the Su-27 design family and the prototype for the STOBAR Su-33 operated by Soviet Naval Aviation and later Russian Naval Aviation on the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, which is the sistership of the Chinese Lioning (ex-Varyag) and the direct design ancestor of the Chinese-built Shandong, which is essentially an extensively modified version of the underlying Soviet STOBAR aircraft carrier design. The Soviet Su-33 was developed to use the Soviet UPAZ “buddy” refuelling pod, which extends a drogue through which a refuelling probe-equipped aircraft can receive fuel.

The original STOBAR J-15 was trialled and later deployed first on the Liaoning and then the Shandong with such a “buddy” refuelling pod, which is carried on a centerline station. It bears emphasis that the STOBAR J-15 has a greatly restricted maximum take-off weight when operating from a STOBAR aircraft carrier, so the transferable fuel load of a STOBAR J-15 taking off from an STOBAR aircraft carrier is very limited, as is its range-endurance.

The PLANAF is likely to have developed an aerial refuelling capability for the original STOBAR J-15 despite its limitations for a variety of reasons that will be discussed later in this post. Suffice it to say, the PLANAF was focusing on long-term capability development such that it is now on the fast track to deploying and regularly employing this capability a more a decade later.

With the advent of the CATOBAR J-15T and CATOBAR aircraft carrier Fujian, the PLANAF can now make full use of J-15T aircraft in an aerial refuelling role. When operating from the Fujian, CATOBAR J-15T fighter aircraft face minimal restrictions in terms of maximum take-off weight and can be used to refuel other J-15T fighters, J-35 fighters, as well as the KJ-600 CATOBAR airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft if and when the KJ-600 is equipped with an aerial refuelling probe.

This approach to aerial refuelling, in which fighter aircraft are equipped with a “buddy” refuelling pod to refuel probe-equipped carrier-borne aircraft, is also practiced by the United States Navy, the French Navy, and the Indian Navy. It is worth noting that while the United States Air Force primarily uses the very different flying boom method of aerial refuelling, the fixed-wing carrier-borne and ship-borne aircraft operated by the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps exclusively use the probe and drogue refuelling method, which is the only aerial refuelling method currently used by the Chinese military. While there are trade-offs associated with each aerial refuelling method, which employ mutually incompatible hardware on both the transferring and receiving aircraft, the probe and drogue method is the only approach that is practical for use with smaller fighter-sized refuelling aircraft and is perfectly suitable for then PLANAF’s needs even in a context in which the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) would increasingly benefit from emulating the flying boom method that the United States Air Force heavily relies on. As things stand, the PLANAF’s carrier-borne fighter aircraft can be refuelled by PLAAF fighter aircraft equipped with a “buddy” refuelling pod and vice versa, and PLANAF carrier-borne fighter aircraft, among others, can be refuelled by the PLAAF’s Il-78, YY-20A, and Y-20B/YY-20B aerial refuelling aircraft.

While aerial refuelling is often viewed as a means of extending the range of an aircraft, aerial refuelling is best understood as extending the range-endurance of an aircraft. Simply stated, aerial refuelling can be used to allow carrier-borne aircraft to attack more distant targets and allow carrier-borne aircraft to undertake a combat air patrol around the host aircraft carrier for several more hours than would otherwise be the case. It bears emphasis that the physiological endurance of human pilots is greater than the maximum flight endurance of most fully loaded non-bomber crewed combat aircraft (absent aerial refuelling). Given this, aerial refuelling is increasingly important for air forces and navies alike, as it concerns extending endurance, given the imperative of squeezing as much as possible from each aircraft sortie. While flight hours undoubtedly affect maintenance needs and are ultimately restricted more by human physiological constraints than fuel availability, provided that aerial refuelling is undertaken, the number of sorties, which encompass take-off and landing sequences and the mechanical and structural effects thereof, is a particularly important logistical consideration as it concerns carrier-borne aircraft.

A carrier-borne aerial refuelling capability is also important for several other reasons. First, aerial refuelling allows a CATOBAR aircraft to take off at the highest possible maximum take-off weight (MTOW), which is determined by the catapult launch system (an electromagnetic, as opposed to a steam, design on China’s first CATOBAR aircraft carrier, the Fujian). Stated differently, aerial refuelling will allow a CATOBAR aircraft to carry the maximum possible munitions load with a reduced fuel load in order to meet MTOW restrictions, with the aircraft having its fuel tanks topped off following take-off.

Second, a carrier-borne aerial refuelling capability is extremely important when it comes to landing operations, and this is likely to be why the PLANAF originally pursued “buddy” refuelling with the original STOBAR J-15 despite the heavily restricted MTOW of the J-15 when operating from the STOBAR aircraft carriers Liaoning and Shandong. There are times when a carrier-borne aircraft cannot land on the host aircraft carrier. This can be due to a situation on the flight deck, such as a crash, an immobilized aircraft, or a fire. It can be due to local environmental conditions, such as heavy seas, prohibitively high wind speeds, and so forth. Whatever the cause, any airborne aircraft that cannot land will eventually run out of fuel, flame out, and ultimately crash into the planet’s surface. Unless there is a suitable nearby terrestrial runway that can be reached with the remaining amount of fuel, a carrier-borne aircraft that runs out of fuel will crash into the sea. When it comes to crewed carrier-borne aircraft, not only will the aircraft certainly be lost, but the crew may also be lost, particularly in inclement weather conditions that hamper search and rescue efforts, including shutting down helicopter operations. By maintaining at least one aircraft capable of refuelling other aircraft during landing operations, it is possible to lower such risks, extend the endurance of airborne aircraft, and top off the fuel of other aircraft so that these can divert to the nearest possible terrestrial runway as required.

Third, pilots are sometimes unable to successfully approach their aircraft carrier within the required flight parameters and/or capture the arresting gear for any number of reasons, which can result in a critically low fuel situation in which the aircraft may be forced to ditch into the sea even if other aircraft are able to take off and land on the aircraft carrier. With the capacity to undertake aerial refuelling, another CATOBAR aircraft, including one that was not originally airborne, can be used to refuel the affected aircraft that is unable to land for whatever reason.

While the J-15T has a demonstrated capacity to be equipped with a single “buddy” refuelling pod mounted on a centerline station in much the same manner as the American F/A-18E/F and the French Rafale M, which are both CATOBAR carrier-borne fighter aircraft, the J-15T differs in one major and very consequential way: there is no public indication that the J-15T can be equipped with external fuel tanks/drop tanks.

The only member of the Soviet-designed Sukhoi Su-27 fighter aircraft family to be equipped with fuel tanks is the Su-34, which is a heavily modified and more recently introduced Russian-built strike fighter that reflects the greatest level of divergence within the Soviet-Russian Su-27 design family. None of the Chinese-built derivatives of this design lineage, namely the PLAAF’s J-11B, a Su-27 derivative, the PLAAF’s J-16, a Su-27 and Su-30 derivative, and the PLANAF’s original STOBAR J-15 and CATOBAR J-15T, which are T-10K prototype/Su-33 derivatives, are publicly known to be capable of carrying external fuel tanks/drop tanks.

Given the above, a J-15T equipped with a “buddy” refuelling pod can only transfer its internal fuel, the maximum volume of which is fixed, even as a J-15T with full internal fuel tanks will remain far below its maximum take-off weight when operating from a CATOBAR aircraft carrier such as the Fujian. As a result, the J-15T is, all things considered, poorly suited to serving as a carrier-borne aerial refuelling aircraft unless and until it is capable of carrying external fuel tanks/drop tanks that will allow the PLANAF to make the most of the high maximum take-off weight of the J-15T when operating from the Fujian and forthcoming Chinese CATOBAR aircraft carriers.

It is worth mentioning that the Soviet Su-27 design family was developed for use by both the Soviet Air Force and the (separate) Soviet Air Defence Forces (i.e., the PVO Strany), neither of which looked at the Su-27, a very large, high maximum take-off weight fighter aircraft with an essentially unrivalled internal fuel capacity, as lacking in terms of range. As a result, the original Su-27 design, as opposed to the Su-30 and later versions of the Su-27 design family, such as the Su-35, was deployed by the Soviet Union without a nose-mounted refuelling probe. The Chinese-built J-11B, which is deployed in large numbers by the PLAAF and will likely remain in service for another one to two decades, cannot be refuelled in flight, a shortcoming that was only corrected with the Chinese-built two-seat J-16 fighter, which is also deployed in large numbers by the PLAAF, and the J-11D prototype, which was developed as a successor to the J-11B but was superseded in terms of PLAAF procurement by the J-16. The PLANAF’s original STOBAR J-15 was, however, first deployed with a retractable nose-mounted refuelling probe.

While the possibility of modifications to the J-15T airframe, perhaps on the reportedly forthcoming two-seat J-15TS combat-capable training aircraft, which will inherently incorporate other structural modifications much like the J-15DT electronic warfare aircraft to which it is related, to facilitate the use of external fuel tanks cannot be ruled out, a more likely scenario is that the PLANAF will instead deploy an uncrewed CATOBAR aircraft in the vein of the American MQ-25 that will be primarily, but likely not exclusively, employed as an aerial refuelling aircraft. The United States Navy pursued the MQ-25 to both extend the range-endurance of its carrier air wings and, no less importantly, unburden its F/A-18E/F fighters that are regularly tasked with this fairly straightforward undertaking, one that essentially amounts to the wasteful consumption of the flight hours of an expensive fighter aircraft that has an airframe designed for speed and maneuverability and is equipped with many millions of dollars of advanced avionics that are not used in aerial refuelling missions.

Chinese industry has developed and continues to develop a staggering array of quite high maximum take-off weight uncrewed aircraft, at least some of which are likely to be deployed by the PLAAF and may be deployed on China’s CATOBAR aircraft carriers should these uncrewed aircraft designs be adapted into a CATOBAR configuration. If and when the PLANAF deploys a CATOBAR uncrewed aerial refuelling aircraft in the vein of the MQ-25, the PLANAF will finally have a well-adapted carrier-borne aerial refuelling capability.

All things considered, the single most important implication of the existence of a refuelling capability, however currently imperfect, for the Fujian and forthcoming Chinese CATOBAR aircraft carriers in the military-geographical context of the Western Pacific is that the likes of the J-15T and J-35, as well as reportedly forthcoming uncrewed CATOBAR aircraft, will be able to undertake longer endurance flights, such as combat air patrols, within a radius of, say, 300-500 kilometers from the host CATOBAR aircraft carrier and its accompanying escorts. Beyond the Western Pacific, the implications in terms of extending the maximum range of the PLANAF’s CATOBAR carrier-based aircraft are likely to be more consequential than extending the endurance of said aircraft. The ability to, for example, extend the combat radius of a J-15T or J-35 by even 500 kilometers can facilitate delivering munitions on a distant target several hours earlier than would be the case even if a Chinese aircraft carrier was heading toward the target at a maximum speed of around 30 knots, which is to say around 55 km/h.

If and when Chinese CATOBAR combat aircraft are equipped with long-range strike munitions along the lines of the American AGM-158B JASSM-ER long-range subsonic cruise, the closest publicly known Chinese analogue to which is the shorter-range KF-98, Chinese aircraft carriers may operate far out in the Indian Ocean while remaining capable of, for example, attacking targets in northwestern and western Australia even as the aircraft carrier remains beyond the practical engagement range of the Australian military. Over a longer time horizon, it is possible that China may aspire to employ its CATOBAR aircraft carriers, specifically its reportedly forthcoming nuclear-powered CATOBAR aircraft carriers, in a similar manner across the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean.

Furthermore, a carrier-based aerial refilling capability will likely play a critically important role if and when the PLANAF deploys a CATOBAR transport/cargo aircraft in the vein of the American C-2 Greyhound, which is derived from the airframe of the American CATOBAR E-2 Hawkeye AEW&C aircraft, the Chinese analogue to which is the KJ-600 CATOBAR AEW&C aircraft. The existence of such a CATOBAR transport/cargo aircraft will enable Chinese CATOBAR aircraft carriers to undertake distant overseas operations and operate far out in the open ocean.

Some related posts:

AEW&C aircraft like the E-2 and KJ-600 elevate an acquisition/search radar up to an altitude of around 25,000 feet, which results in a major expansion of radar coverage against high-flying aerial objects, low-flying aerial objects, and objects on the ocean surface. While fighter aircraft are also equipped with nose-mounted radars, those are optimized for fire control, operate in the X-band, and have a quite small antenna aperture. The E-2 and KJ-600, in contrast, are equipped with acquisition/search radars optimized for long-range detection and house a quite large radar antenna—presumably an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar on the KJ-600, as with the latest version of its American analogue, the E-2D—in a rotating radome. There is no substitute for a carrier-borne AEW&C type aircraft, and there is a case for an aircraft carrier of some type even if it is exclusively used to launch an AEW&C type aircraft at sea. It bears mentioning that the KJ-600 and E-2 are not merely flying radar antennas; these aircraft also serve as an aerial command post and, even more importantly, an airborne radio relay. In an age of advanced radio frequency datalinks that can exchange sensor information and integrated fire control, the existence of a CATOBAR aircraft that is simultaneously a high-elevation sensor node and a high-elevation radio relay can significantly enhance naval capabilities, including the capabilities of surface warships.

Although the KJ-600 constitutes a considerable upgrade for the PLAN, all publicly known specimens, including prototypes, have a surprising and significant omission: unlike the most recently built American E-2D AEW&C aircraft, the KJ-600 does not feature a refuelling probe.

While aerial refuelling is often viewed as a means of extending the range of an aircraft, aerial refuelling is best understood as extending the range-endurance of an aircraft. That is, a KJ-600 may be orbiting around the Fujian at a radius of just 200 kilometers from its host aircraft carrier but will be able to remain airborne for several more hours if it it can be refuelled by a CATOBAR aircraft launched from the Fujian, whether crewed or uncrewed, or even a ground-based aerial refuelling aircraft that takes off from the Chinese mainland or China’s runway-equipped reefs-turned-islands in the South China Sea. As the above four images show, the American E-2, which only received an aerial refuelling probe—the E-2D is refuelled through the probe and drogue method in the same manner as all aerial refuelling-capable Chinese aircraft, can be refuelled by a diverse array of aircraft, including CATOBAR crewed F/A-18E/F fighter aircraft equipped with a “buddy” refuelling pod and uncrewed CATOBAR MQ-25 aircraft equipped with much the same that can take off from the same aircraft carrier as the E-2D. China’s J-15T fighters can also be equipped with an analogous “buddy” refuelling pod on a centerline station.

Aerial refuelling is increasingly important for air forces and navies alike, given the imperative of squeezing as much as possible from each and every aircraft sortie. While flight hours undoubtedly affect maintenance needs and are ultimately restricted more by human physiological constraints than fuel availability, provided that aerial refuelling is undertaken, sorties, which encompass take-off and landing sequences as well as the pressurization and depressurization of the cabin, are a particularly important logistical consideration as it concerns carrier-borne aircraft. This is especially the case with CATOBAR AEW&C aircraft like the E-2 and KJ-600, which occupy a very large footprint even with their folding wings.

Given the limited surface area available on the flight deck and in the hangars of an aircraft carrier, only so many aircraft of the size of the E-2 and KJ-600 can be carried without a major and very consequential decrease in the number of embarked fighter aircraft. A total of 4-6 embarked AEW&C aircraft is essentially all that can be realistically expected of even the largest aircraft carriers—the Chinese Fujian is considerably smaller than the latest American Nimitz-class and Ford-class aircraft carriers—and sustaining even a 70% serviceability rate at sea will be respectable. It bears emphasis that such a serviceability rate is not necessarily the same as having the embarked AEW&C aircraft be fully mission capable in terms of the functioning of all the electronic and mechanical systems. With the Fujian likely to have no more than two or perhaps three KJ-600 aircraft ready for flight at a given time, the ability to squeeze several more hours of endurance from an airborne KJ-600 via aerial refuelling will shape whether, for example, the Fujian and future Chinese CATOBAR aircraft carriers will be able to maintain at least one KJ-600 in flight on a constant basis in times of crisis and war, and whether Chinese CATOBAR aircraft carriers will be able to simultaneously employ a KJ-600 to watch over the carrier group while having another KJ-600 accompany a formation of CATOBAR combat aircraft on an air-to-air and/or air-to-surface mission over a radius of 500-1000 kilometers from the host Chinese aircraft carrier.

The PLAN’s CATOBAR carrier air wings are undoubtedly a work in progress, and observers operating with publicly available information are unlikely to have seen all the aircraft types that may operate on the Fujian and forthcoming Chinese CATOBAR aircraft carriers over the next decade or so. It is possible, even likely, that the KJ-600 will receive an aerial refuelling probe in the near future. Until then, the air wings of the Fujian and future Chinese CATOBAR aircraft carriers will constitute a profound expansion of Chinese military capabilities, with a curious and consequential omission as it concerns the inability of the KJ-600 to refuel while airborne.

Some related posts:

While the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has undergone a dramatic modernization and expansion drive over the past fifteen or so years, the massive investments in new warships have not to date been matched by comparable investments toward various types of naval auxiliaries, including replenishment ships. As of this writing, the PLAN’s capacity to replenish and refuel its surface ships at sea is primarily concentrated in a fleet of just twelve replenishment ships. This total is composed of:

• Two Type 903-class replenishment ships (commissioned 2004-2005).

• Seven Type 903A-class replenishment ships (commissioned 2013-2019).

• Two much larger Type 901-class fast replenishment ships (commissioned 2017-2018).

• One Soviet/Ukrainian-built Type 908-class replenishment ship (commissioned in 1996).

As of this writing, reports indicate that at least four new Type 903A-class replenishment ships, or a new variant of this longstanding design, are under construction, with two of these new replenishment ship hulls being at a very advanced stage of construction.

While the PLAN’s replenishment ship fleet is fast expanding, the ratio of replenishment ships to large surface warships—destroyers and frigates—remains quite low, and the PLAN’s replenishment ship needs are only increasing, with three aircraft carriers and four large landing helicopter docks (LHDs) in service, as well as one large LHD/aircraft carrier at an advanced stage of construction. Surface groups centered on each of the three aircraft carriers and four LHDs will require the support of one replenishment ship, and the PLAN will also need additional replenishment ships to support expeditionary operations, training events, and, not least, to support surface groups that are centered on destroyers and frigates, not aircraft carriers and LHDs. The most important replenishment ships in the PLAN’s current fleet are the two Type 901-class fast replenishment ships, which are powered by gas turbines in order so as to be fast enough to support China’s aircraft carriers and accompanying escorts. The Type 903A-class replenishment ships and the four additional Type 903A-class hulls/derivatives thereof currently under construction cannot truly substitute for the two Type 901-class fast replenishment ships in supporting the operations of a PLAN surface fleet that is increasingly focused on forming surface groups centered on an aircraft carrier or LHD.

Given the above, the PLAN’s combat capabilities are heavily reliant on the existence and availability of a surprisingly small number of replenishment ships. It bears emphasis that while the capabilities offered by replenishment ships are often thought in terms of extending the maximum range of accompanying surface ships, replenishment ships are best thought of as expanding the range-endurance of accompanying surface ships. The presence of a replenishment will, in other words, determine how long a PLAN carrier group, amphibious group, and surface group can, for example, operate in the western Philippine Sea without having to return to port to refuel and resupply. While a Chinese blockade of Taiwan is likely to be spearheaded by the paramilitary China Coast Guard’s expanding “high seas fleet” prior to the start of high-intensity combat operations, China Coast Guard vessels operating around Taiwan are likely to be not only backstopped by PLAN vessels but also screened by PLAN surface groups operating in the western Philippine Sea. This may well include every operational aircraft carrier in the Chinese fleet and multiple surface groups composed of destroyers and frigates.

Despite the importance of the PLAN’s replenishment ship fleet, these vessels, including the critically important and unsubstitutable two Type 901-class fast replenishment ships, feature very modest sensors and air defences. Each Type 901-class fast replenishment ship is equipped with four radar-directed H/PJ-13 rotary 30 mm cannons and a very modest Type 364 C-band search radar. Each Type 903A-class replenishment ship features either four twin-barrel 37 mm cannons or four single-barrel 30 mm autocannons. The PLAN’s replenishment ships are, therefore, almost entirely reliant on the air defence capabilities of PLAN warships in their immediate vicinity and are functionally defenceless on their own in an operating environment that is characterized by the rapid quantitative and qualitative expansion of adversary maritime strike capabilities.

The PLAN’s combat capabilities will be significantly degraded if even several of its replenishment ships are either sunk or so heavily damaged as to be forced to limp back to port. While it is not customary for navies to arm their replenishment ships or equip said ships with particularly notable search radars, there is considerable scope to do so given the generous space, weight, and cooling available on large and low-density replenishment ship hull, superstructure, and deck. It is worth noting that during the Cold War, the United Kingdom originally planned to equip its Fort Victoria-class replenishment ships with Sea Wolf short-range surface-to-air missiles so that its replenishment ships could independently intercept anti-ship cruise missiles without relying on what were originally conceived as low-cost frigates optimized for anti-submarine warfare in the North Atlantic. The Netherlands recently commissioned the Den Helder, a replenishment ship that notably features a Thales NS100 S-band search radar, which supports the use of a 76 mm gun and a 21-cell RIM-116 RAM short-range surface-to-air missile launcher. While the United States Navy’s older Henry J. Kaiser-class replenishment ships and newer John Lewis-class replenishment ships tend to be minimally armed in peacetime, these are fitted-for-but-not-with radar-directed rotary cannons and RIM-116 RAM short-range surface-to-air missile launchers. Notwithstanding the perennial and universal issues of cost and the imperative of prudently allocating scarce resources, there is considerable scope for the PLAN to bolster the air defences of its replenishment ships so that these critically important naval auxiliaries are more survivable in light of the escalating threat posed by adversary maritime strike capabilities.

For the Type 901-class fast replenishment ships, there is scope to replace, or perhaps complement, the four H/PJ-13 rotary cannons with two or more HQ-10 launchers, which are the Chinese analogue to the American RIM-116 RAM. The PLAN currently operates eight-cell and twenty-four-cell HQ-10 launchers, while Chinese industry has previously offered launchers of an intermediate capacity that may be more suitable than either of the existing HQ-10 launchers. The installation of Type 1130 rotary cannons, which are now standard on the PLAN’s aircraft carriers, LHDs, and destroyers and are far more capable than the quite modest H/PJ-13 design, in lieu of the four existing H/PJ-13 rotary cannons, is also an option, but the Type 1130 requires considerable deck penetration and is more difficult to install on any given ship. Given the critically important role that the Type 901-class fast replenishment ships play in supporting the operation of Chinese carrier groups, there is a case to be made to installing either a single-faced budget S-band search radar along the lines of the new design of unknown designation that is installed on the China Coast Guard’s new waterjet-powered armed patrol ships, or the two-faced H/LJQ-368 X-band search radars that are increasingly standard on new PLAN warships of different types. The single most consequential change that the PLAN can make is to install datalinks on the Type 901-class fast replenishment ships that allow for the two-way exchange of sensor data and the use of sensor data from nearby warships to direct the armaments installed on the replenishment ships.

As for the Type 903A-class replenishment ships, there is also scope to install one or more HQ-10 launchers. It is worth noting that the PLAN commissioned twenty-two Type 056-class corvettes in the 2013-2016 timeframe, only to retire these vessels and transfer them to the China Coast Guard in the 2021-2022 timeframe. The Type 056-class corvettes operated by the China Coast Guard were stripped of, among other things, their four YJ-83 subsonic anti-ship cruise missile launchers, two triple 324 mm torpedo tubes, and their single eight-cell HQ-10 short-range surface-to-air missile launchers. This is to say that the PLAN should still possess 22 minimally used eight-cell HQ-10 launchers that can be installed on the Type 903A-class replenishment ships. As for a search radar, there is also scope to install one of the radars mentioned in the context of the Type 901-class, but the more consequential investment will go toward the installation of datalinks that allow for the two-way exchange of sensor data and the use of sensor data from nearby warships to direct the armaments installed on the replenishment ships.

While this text primarily focuses on the threat posed by adversary anti-ship cruise missiles, it bears emphasis that the threats posed to PLAN surface ships are also rapidly evolving in other areas. As things stand, essentially every PLAN vessel will require defences against adversary armed uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) that operate as surface-running torpedo analogues. Replenishment ships are large and quite slow vessels that cannot rapidly undertake evasive maneuvers in the manner of most warships and cannot, in any event, evade a USV that is capable of sustaining a 30-40 knot maximum speed. Given the size of replenishment ships, at least four heavy machine guns or, preferably, autocannons are required to put in place an absolute minimum of an organic counter-USV capability. In an ideal world, each heavy machine gun and/or autocannon will be stabilized, remotely controlled, and feature at least a medium-end accompanying electro-optical sight and preferably a thermal sight.

To counter the fast-evolving threat posed by armed multirotor drones and armed fixed-wing strike drones, which encompass the likes of both the fairly small Russian Lancet loitering strike drone and the much larger Iranian Shahed-136 strike drone, and other types of unarmed and armed uncrewed aircraft more generally, replenishment ships and other naval vessels will require, among other things, a hard kill defence capability that is best provided by remotely controlled autocannons, preferably of the dual feed variety, that can make use of programmable airburst ammunition. While the likes of the H/PJ-13 and Type 1130 rotary cannons can be effectively used against larger uncrewed aircraft designs, these are optimized for putting a large spread of tungsten carbide or depleted uranium armoured piercing discarded sabot (APDS) projectiles downrange to collide with large anti-ship cruise missiles and are not very well suited to intercepting much smaller and nimbler uncrewed aircraft. In any event, the likes of the H/PJ-13 and Type 1130 rotary cannons rapidly deplete the supply of loaded, ready-to-fire ammunition and can be readily overwhelmed if and when, for example, ten or more inexpensive uncrewed aircraft simultaneously approach a ship.

While suitable armament is required to effectively defend against attacks by USVs and uncrewed aircraft, the PLAN’s replenishment ships will also require suitable sensors to detect such threats in the first place. This can be done through various means, including passive electronic sensors, automated electro-optical sights, and high-frequency—generally X-band or higher—search radars. While some of the PLAN’s latest warships are better equipped to counter such threats, this cannot be said of most of the PLAN’s surface warships, let alone its auxiliaries, including its replenishment ships. The challenge faced by the PLAN is shared with other navies worldwide: countering the threat posed by USVs and uncrewed aircraft to surface ships increasingly requires a new and quite different set of armaments and sensors that must be installed in addition to more established types of armament and sensors that can be used to defend against anti-ship cruise missiles.

It is worth mentioning that the PLAN’s surface ships, including its replenishment ships, also face an expanding threat from anti-ship ballistic missiles and large-caliber guided artillery rockets—a form of ballistic missile by another name—with anti-ship targeting modes. The task of intercepting anti-ship ballistic missiles is, however, best left to nearby warships, and the most practical way forward for navies worldwide is to have high-end warships focus their sensors and armament—included the finite number of loaded missiles per warship—on higher end threats while other vessels in the formation can more or less independently draw upon the likes of the RIM-116 RAM and HQ-10 to defend against leakers. A replenishment ship can never practically substitute for a dedicated warship and vice versa, but there is a world of difference between replenishment ships and other naval auxiliaries, that are wholly defenceless, and one in which replenishment ships become more like large amphibious ships as LHDs, which are also critically important and highly lucrative targets that cannot be left defenceless against leakers that evade and/or overwhelm the defences of nearby warships.

While the PLAN benefits from immense resource allocations, its resources are nevertheless finite and must be allocated across a very wide range of areas. Every Yuan available to the PLAN cannot be allocated toward procurement, and it bears emphasis that the PLAN faces an immense modernization mountain over the coming decade or so, as a rapidly growing number of increasingly outdated warships need to undergo midlife modernization. As a result, the PLAN is unlikely to make very major investments toward enhancing the survivability of its replenishment ships, even though this quite modestly sized and gradually expanding fleet of naval auxiliaries plays critically important logistical support roles in times of peace, crisis, and war. Although the PLAN may be unwilling and/or unable to allocate considerable procurement Yuan toward upgrading the sensors and armaments of its replenishment ships, the upcoming midlife upgrades to the PLAN’s destroyers and frigates may result in the removal and replacement of various sensors and armaments that the PLAN may decide to refit onto its replenishment ships. Some options worth considering are the Type 382 S-band search radars, Type 364 C-band search radars, and the older Type 730 rotary cannons installed on the PLAN’s many Type 054A-class frigates. The use of “second-hand” systems removed from PLAN warships is not always ideal, particularly as it concerns older non-phased array radars that lack low probability of intercept modes, but will nevertheless amount to a major upgrade for the PLAN’s replenishment ships, provided that space, weight, cooling, and, of course, modernization Yuan, are available.

This post is an example of an analytical approach that is best understood as inference through absence. While China may decide not to address this shortcoming in its military capabilities, the failure to do so will have major implications for the survivability of the PLAN’s replenishment ships and, as such, for the durability of Chinese military capabilities in times of war in an operating environment that is characterized by the rapid quantitative and qualitative expansion of adversary maritime strike capabilities.

The above images capture Indian Su-30MKI fighter aircraft, which are of Soviet-Russian origin in the same manner as the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s (PLAAF) J-16 fighters, being refuelled from Airbus A330 MRTT aerial refuelling/tanker aircraft. There is, at this time, no public indication that any PLAAF fighter aircraft, including the J-16, have ever been refuelled by a foreign tanker aircraft, although the practice of PLAAF aircraft being refuelled by Russian Air Force and Pakistan Air Force aerial refuelling aircraft cannot be ruled out.

There are two primary methods to aerial refuelling: the use of a flying boom, in which the aerial refuelling aircraft is equipped with the rigid telescoping pipe that transfers fuel while the receptacle-equipped receiving aircraft maintains a steady course, and the probe and drogue method, which requires the receiving aircraft to maneuver so that the probe equipped on the receiving aircraft connects with the drogue that is extended by and trailing behind the aerial refuelling aircraft via a flexible hose through which fuel is transferred. The former method, the flying boom, is almost exclusively used with American-designed military aircraft, particularly those operated by the United States Air Force. The latter method, the probe and drogue, is widely employed worldwide but, in the American context, is almost exclusively associated with aircraft operated by the United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, and United States Army. There are pros and cons to each method, with the flying boom offering a higher flow rate, which is an important consideration when it comes to refuelling bomber aircraft, military transport aircraft, and similarly large and heavy aircraft that need to receive a much greater amount of fuel than the likes of a fighter aircraft.

The PLAAF exclusively makes use of the probe and drogue method to refuel its J-8, J-10, Su-30, J-16, J-20, and J-35A fighter aircraft, as well as its H-6N bombers and some its its KJ-200 and KJ-500 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft. While some foreign aerial refuelling designs, such as some configurations of the A330 MRTT, can refuel aircraft through both methods, this is not the case with the PLAAF’s Il-78, YY-20A, and Y-20B/YY-20B aerial refuelling aircraft, which are exclusively configured to refuel aircraft through the probe and drogue method given that these are not equipped with a flying boom. As a result, PLAAF aerial refuelling aircraft cannot, for example, refuel Pakistan’s American-built F-16 fighter aircraft, which are equipped with a receptacle for a flying boom, but should be capable of refuelling Pakistan’s French-built Mirage aircraft, which are equipped with a refuelling probe (through which these are regularly refuelled by Pakistan’s Soviet-Russian Il-78 aerial refuelling aircraft, which can also refuel probe-equipped PLAAF fighter aircraft just as Pakistan’s Il-78s refuel the country’s Chinese-designed JF-17 and J-10CE fighter aircraft).

As of this writing, there is only one publicly known instance in which a PLAAF aerial refuelling aircraft has refuelled a foreign military aircraft. In April-May 2025, China and Egypt held a bilateral military exercise, which was hosted by Egypt, for which the PLAAF deployed not only J-10 fighter aircraft but, among other things, a YY-20A aerial refuelling aircraft that was recorded refuelling Egypt’s Russian-built MiG-29M fighters. While the Egyptian Air Force operates probe-equipped French-built Rafale and Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft that should have been able to receive fuel from the Chinese YY-20A, Egypt’s French-built fighter aircraft are not understood to have participated in the bilateral China-Egypt military exercise in the same manner of the country’s large fleet of American-designed F-16 fighters, which can only be refuelled through the use of a flying boom.

While the PLAAF’s aerial refuelling aircraft should be able to refuel most of the probe-equipped aircraft operated by foreign air forces, aerial refuelling is not haphazardly undertaken and some testing—without the actual transfer of fuel—is typically conducted to verify the safety of the approach and establish the correct procedure for aircraft type A to receive fuel from aircraft type C, as opposed to aircraft type B. This is not something that the PLAAF can do itself without the cooperation of foreign militaries and their non-Chinese origin aircraft. Until such compatibility is demonstrated, such as in training events with foreign air forces, Chinese aerial refuelling aircraft, namely the YY-20A and Y-20B/YY-20B, are unlikely to be seriously considered by foreign militaries. Similarly, Chinese fighter aircraft such as the J-10C, J-20, and J-35A will likely be less competitive on the export market unless they have a demonstrated ability to receive fuel from foreign aerial refuelling aircraft, such as the Airbus A330 MRTT. Should China demonstrate the ability of Chinese-designed aircraft to receive fuel from foreign-designed aerial refuelling aircraft and the ability of Chinese-designed aerial refuelling aircraft to provide fuel to foreign-designed aircraft, potential export customers such as Indonesia will likely be more willing to consider procuring Chinese military aircraft.

While the ability of PLAAF aerial refuelling aircraft to refuel foreign military aircraft is important in the context of Chinese armament exports and bilateral and multilateral training events, the non-demonstrated ability of PLAAF aircraft to receive fuel from foreign aerial refuelling aircraft is also a liability for the PLAAF. If PLAAF aircraft could receive fuel from, for example, an Emirati or Saudi Airbus A330 MRTT aerial refuelling aircraft, the PLAAF could more readily deploy aircraft for bilateral or multilateral training events with foreign countries in the Middle East or, for example, deploy to Djibouti, which is home to a Chinese military base. Similarly, if the PLAAF is to ever undertake joint combat operations with a foreign military other than Pakistan, it will need to verify the ability of Chinese-designed fighter aircraft to receive fuel from foreign military aircraft. As with so many areas of Chinese military capabilities, aerial refuelling remains a work in progress, even though it is a mundane undertaking for most major militaries, including a country like India that operates a very diverse fleet of military aircraft with a demonstrated capacity to receive fuel from foreign aerial refuelling aircraft.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has immense manpower needs and must, therefore, constantly train new personnel to replenish its ranks. To do so, the PLAN possesses two purpose-built training ships, an auxiliary training ship, as well as a tall ship/sailing ship. While it is customary for Chinese and foreign training ships to undertake solo deployments that entail stops at foreign ports, the PLAN has, in recent months, bolstered its ability to train its midshipmen by assigning a Type 071-class landing platform dock (LPD)—a large amphibious warship—to accompany its purpose-built training ships on training deployments in an around the South China Sea. Beyond the novelty of employing Type 071-class LPDs in this role, these deployments notably do not feature the assignment of one or more PLAN destroyers or frigates, or even a modest PLAN Type 056A-class corvette, as an armed escort.

The Chinese military recently announced that a three-ship formation composed of the purpose-built training ship Zheng He (81), the Type 071-class LPD Chang Baishan (989), and the large troopship Xu Xiake (88) with over 2100 embarked sailors and midshipmen—naval officers in training—departed Qingdao for a training deployment that will include ports of call in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. This follows the recently concluded 45-day training deployment of the purpose-built training ship Qi Juguang (83) and the Type 071-class LPD Yimeng Shan (988) to the South China Sea that included ports of call in Hong Kong, Cambodia, Thailand, and Singapore.

The PLAN’s willingness to dispatch such large numbers of personnel on minimally armed ships on fairly distant deployments without armed escorts is suggestive of muted Chinese threat perceptions in and around the South China Sea. While these multi-ship training deployments are formally characterized as such, in June 2025, a solitary Type 071-class LPD made a solo trip across the South China Sea to Brunei after having participated in a bilateral training event with Cambodia, which itself constituted a solo trip to a foreign port. It remains to be seen whether the PLAN’s eight large Type 071-class LPDs, which have ample berthing to accommodate hundreds of midshipmen, will regularly undertake such training deployments, which will inherently affect the readiness of the PLAN’s LPDs and associated Type 075-class landing helicopter docks (LHDs) to quickly sortie out to sea with a full complement of embarked PLAN Marine Corps personnel in times of crisis and war.

As for the PLAN’s fleet of training ships, it remains to be seen whether the large troopship Xu Xiake (88) and its sistership Lee Daoyuan (89) will become a regular presence at foreign ports in support of training deployments. These troopships have historically been primarily used to provide accommodations for personnel involved in the development of China’s growing aircraft carrier force. More generally, the purpose-built training ship Zheng He (81) was commissioned 38 years ago and may be replaced in the near future. It is possible, even likely, that one or more new training ships will be built to operate alongside the much newer purpose-built training ship Qi Jiguang, which was only commissioned in 2017. If and when such a development comes to pass, the PLAN will be able to maintain its LPDs in reserve so as to fulfill their primary function of undertaking rapid sorties out to sea with a full complement of embarked PLAN Marine Corps personnel in times of crisis and war.

The HQ-13 appears to be related to a Chinese system that has been offered to prospective export customers under the industry/export designation FB-10A. Marketing material for the FB-10A suggests that the HQ-13 has a nominal maximum range of 17 kilometers, which makes it a somewhat high-end short-range air defence system and a major improvement over rudimentary short-range air defence systems that rely on vehicle-mounted but otherwise shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles. Marketing materials for the FB-10A suggest that the HQ-13 employs both radio frequency command guidance and an imaging infrared seeker.

While the long-range surface-to-air missile systems and other Chinese air defence systems operated by the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) receive the most attention, the PLAGF operates the bulk of the PLA’s short-range and medium-range air defence systems. These air defence systems are operated by the air defence brigades assigned to each of the PLAGF’s thirteen group armies, as well as the air defence battalions that are part of each of the PLAGF’s combined arms brigades. The peacetime division of resources and responsibilities suggests that the PLAAF will be responsible for territorial air defence in wartime, while the PLAGF’s air defence systems will be primarily deployed to forward locations in support of the PLAGF’s ground combat formations. It is, however, possible that China’s joint theater commands will use some of the PLAGF’s air defence capabilities to bolster the PLAAF’s air defence capabilities. The single most important sector in which such a dynamic is likely to transpire is the Fujian coastline, where PLAGF formations will have to concentrate so as to undertake amphibious landings and/or heliborne air assaults on the island of Taiwan. PLAGF staging areas along the Fujian coastline are likely to be high priority and very lucrative targets for not just Taiwan but also the United States.

One of the many consequential quirks of the PLA is that there is very little overlap between the air defence systems employed by the PLAGF and the PLAAF. This includes short-range air defence systems that China will likely have to deploy in extremely large numbers in wartime. As with so many other areas, China and the PLA have their own particularistic inefficiencies alongside the usual inefficiencies that are common to militaries worldwide.

Some relevant posts:

If China had attempted to undertake an invasion of Taiwan circa 2010, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) infantry that landed on the island of Taiwan in amphibious landings and air assaults would have had limited anti-armour capabilities. With the increasingly widespread deployment of the HJ-12 anti-tank guided missile, however, this is no longer the case, and even small PLA infantry units can readily defend against attacks by Taiwanese mechanized and motorized platoons, companies, and battalions.

The HJ-12 is the Chinese analogue to the American FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank missile. These are fire-and-forget lock-on-before-launch line-of-sight anti-tank missiles with top-attack modes. The high performance of such anti-tank missiles is enabled by, among other things, a fairly expensive imaging infrared seeker, which makes the HJ-12 one of the more expensive anti-tank missiles in existence. Anti-tank missiles such as the FGM-148 and HJ-12, which can be deployed down to the squad/fireteam level, offer infantry a highly credible means of knocking out, if not destroying, most armoured vehicles in existence with a single munition. This includes all of Taiwan’s armoured vehicles and, in the right circumstances, including Taiwan’s latest American-built M1 tanks. When equipped with the likes of the HJ-12, otherwise lightly equipped PLA air assault infantry can independently defend against attacks by Taiwanese mechanized and motorized units against which PLA light infantry would otherwise be at a very significant disadvantage in terms of firepower.

While the HJ-12 is an impressive system that is likely to remain in frontline use with the PLA for many years to come, it is neither the only approach to a highly effective anti-tank missile nor is it necessarily the best approach for use in a Taiwan invasion scenario. The primary alternative approach is exemplified by the Israeli Spike family of anti-tank missiles as well as its Iranian, French, Turkish, and even North Korean emulations. As with the HJ-12 and FGM-148 Javelin, the Spike family also relies on imaging infrared seekers to provide a fire-and-forget capability when used in line-of-sight direct fire mode, but most members of the Israeli Spike family also incorporate a spool of fiber-optic cable. This facilitates a non-line-of-sight indirect fire mode in which the human operator does not require a line-of-sight on the intended target. This allows the human operator to launch the missile while remaining under cover and to fire over terrain, whether hills and trees or buildings, to attack targets situated 5-10 kilometers away. It is worth noting that Taiwan’s quite narrow western coastal plain typically extends over a depth of just 25-35 kilometers.

Given the widespread deployment of the Chinese HJ-10, the PLA is no stranger to this particular class of anti-tank missiles. The HJ-10 is, however, a larger, heavier, and longer-range vehicle-launched anti-tank missile analogous to some of the largest members of the Israeli Spike family, and the PLA is not known to operate a human-portable non-line-of-sight anti-tank missile in the vein of the smaller and lighter members of the Israeli Spike. Should China develop and deploy such an anti-tank missile, which is, in a world of limited resources, best used to complement, not replace, the HJ-12, PLA infantry that land on the island of Taiwan will be able to undertake short time-to-target non-line-of-sight indirect fire attacks on Taiwanese armoured vehicles and other battlefield targets, while PLA infantry equipped with the HJ-10 in the forward-most positions would be able to independently knock out, if not destroy, Taiwanese armoured vehicles that close in on their positions.

The HJ-10 is emblematic of one of the many changes to the PLA’s combat capabilities that are likely to strongly affect how a Chinese invasion of Taiwan will play out, but which nevertheless tend to receive little attention. How adeptly Chinese infantry are trained, equipped, and employed in a Taiwan invasion scenario is increasingly one of the more important questions for analysis. While the scope for an “unmanned” Chinese invasion of Taiwan is fast-increasing, so is the plausibility of parallel fairly small-scale Chinese air assaults along Taiwan’s coast that put on the ground PLA special operations forces and elite light infantry to direct air, missile, and drone strikes against Taiwanese targets in their vicinity. If the PLA is to pull off such fairly small-scale air assaults, PLA infantry units will have to be generously equipped with and assigned high-performance armaments in the vein of the HJ-10 anti-tank missile.

Some relevant posts:

Analytical extensions-themed posts expand on material that has appeared in another newsletter/section and other parts of this website more generally.

The Ukrainian military news website Militarnyi recently disclosed the existence of leaked documents indicating that Russia has ordered 32 new Izdeliye-506 nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles for delivery in the 2024-2026 timeframe. According to Russian state media, the subsonic nuclear-armed Izdeliye-506, which is also known as the Kh-BD, has a maximum range of over 6000 kilometers, although this remains to be confirmed. Beyond its implications for prospective Chinese nuclear-armed subsonic land-attack cruise missiles for use against targets in North America, the Kh-BD constitutes an example of the type of strike munition that China may pursue to attack very distant targets with conventional high explosive warheads.

One the the greatest challenges that the Chinese military is likely to face in a major war involving the United States is the difficulty of attacking very distant targets located on islands across the Pacific Ocean, as well as targets in Australia. All else being equal, conventionally-armed strike munitions become prohibitively expensive for use against most targets located several thousands of kilometers away, not least when China will likely need to target hundreds, if not thousands, of discrete aim points. Although it is likely to have a unit cost of several million dollars, a very long-range subsonic land-attack cruise missile in the vein of the Russian air-launched Kh-BD can be used to attack targets over a distance of 4000-6000 kilometers. There is, however, a major trade-off: such a land-attack cruise missile will have a payload-range design optimization that results in a quite small conventional high explosive warhead of around 100 kilograms.

Subsonic land-attack cruise missiles were originally developed and deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union as a means of delivering nuclear warheads over long distances. When adapted for the purposes of delivering conventional high explosive warheads, such land-attack cruise missiles, which were powered by quite fuel-efficient and high power density turbofan engines, were typically used to deliver a 400-500 kilogram warhead over a distance of 1500 or so kilometers. The considerably lower maximum range of a conventionally-armed version of a nuclear-armed cruise missile is reflective of the low weight of the nuclear warheads installed on cruise missiles, which typically weigh around 100 kilograms. The claimed maximum range of 6500 kilometers for the Russian Kh-BD is reflective of this; the maximum range will be much lower should a conventionally-armed version of the Kh-BD be deployed with a fairly standard 400-500 kilogram high explosive warhead. Ultimately, designers select a payload-range optimization, and there is some scope to trade payload for range and vice versa, which is to trade some amount of high explosives for a larger amount of fuel.

While a hypothetical Chinese conventionally-armed very long range subsonic land-attack cruise missile in the vein of the Russian Kh-BD will, all else being equal, have a lower destructive radius and less destructive effects than a cruise missile equipped with a fairly standard 400-500 kilogram high explosive warhead, such a strike munition will allow China to attack very distant targets across the Pacific and in Australia. Provided that the munition in which it is installed exhibits high precision and accuracy, a 100-kilogram high explosive warhead and even a 50-kilogram high exposive warhead are nothing to dismiss. These can be effectively employed against, among other things, air search radars, satellite ground stations, fuel storage tanks, port cranes, non-hardened munitions stores, as well as hydrocarbon extraction, processing, and maritime transport infrastructure.

As Iran and, later on, both Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated by following the conceptually innovative Iranian approach, a large quantity of fairly inexpensive low payload strike munitions can have a quality all of its own. This is particularly true in the case of China and very distant targets across the Pacific Ocean and across Australia, which are otherwise very difficult, but not impossible, to attack. A hypothetical Chinese conventionally-armed very long-range land-attack cruise missile in the vein of the Russian Kh-BD will not be effective against all target types and is unlikely to independently bring about Chinese victory in a major war. It will, however, enable China to attack many disparate and discrete aim points that would otherwise likely avoid physical damage in a major war.

See also:

Given the above, any discussion of the role of China’s “military reserves,” loosely defined, needs to draw a distinction between the wholly discharged/demobilized reserves of the PLA, the discharged/demobilized part-time reserves of the PLA, and the very large pool of manpower that exists outside the PLA in the Communist Party of China’s Militia. In a major war, particularly a major protracted war between China and the United States, which will most plausibly revolve around the political fate of Taiwan, Chinese decision-makers are likely to mobilize every entity of the complex party-state apparatus to support the country’s war effort. This includes the Militia, a large organization that is uniquely well-positioned to support the PAP, PLA, and other parts of China’s internal security apparatus in rear area security roles, including rear area air defence roles.

All militaries, including the PLA, are manpower constrainted, and military service tends to be economically unproductive. There is a case to be made that the most capable militaries are those that squeeze the most out of not only the mass of persons that they are allocated, but also the society/larger population from which that pool of manpower is drawn. Some of the most successful examples in recent history include two very different militaries: those of Israel and the United States.

The Israeli military is heavily reliant on not just conscription but a very long, by contemporary standards, term of service. Israel’s total force structure largely exists on paper, short of the rapid and highly tailored selective mobilization of specific parts of the large pool of reservists, which encompasses much of the country’s adult male population.

The American military does not rely on conscription but, similar to the Israeli military, has a total force structure that requires the highly tailored selective mobilization of specific parts of the very large pool of different types of part-time volunteer (paid) reservists. This includes not only reservist personnel who can be used to bring regular/active duty formations to full strength, but, in the case of the United States Army and the United States Air Force, formations, including combat formations, that are almost entirely composed of part-time volunteer (paid) reservists.

Through these very different manpower systems, both Israel and the United States selectively draw upon the human resources that reside outside of their active duty militaries to greatly enhance their military capabilities, including their combat capabilities as and when required.

While PLA service branches and “arms” can tap into ample reserves of recently discharged/demobilized personnel as and when required, China does not currently have widespread part-time military reservists in the manner of the American military or a highly tuned selective mobilization of discharged/demolibzed personnel in the manner of Israel, which is, of course, only practical with a much smaller and more densely concentrated population. The Communist Party of China’s Militia does, however, have an elaborate apparatus in place to locally raise and organize manpower across China. The Militia is, therefore, particularly well-positioned to support the PAP, PLA, and other parts of China’s internal security apparatus in rear area security roles.

While the Militia refers to a specific part of the party-state apparatus, it is important to note that the Communist Party of China also has a presence in workplaces across China, whether state-owned enterprises (SOE) or privately owned companies. Should China ever be subject to large-scale attacks involving the likes of single-use propeller-driven strike drones in the manner that both Russia and Ukraine are on a daily basis, the party apparatus, including the Militia, will offer an existing human infrastructure through which to, for example, train some of the workers at a facility to stop their work to serve as part-time air defence personnel should the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) issue an air raid alert in a given area. This would allow China to avoid the inane situation that Russia finds itself when a handful, sometimes just one, very slow Ukrainian propeller-driven strike drones fly into a military factory or oil refinery while dozens of (unarmed) able bodied workers spectate and record the attack using their mobile phones, which results in videos that regularly offer no indication of even the use of small arms to try to shoot down.

While there are multiple reasons as to why such scenes transpire in Russia, one is that Russia’s current leaders lack the ability to organize and mobilize everyday persons across the country in the manner that members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union could in the past even in the absence of uniformed military personnel in a given town, village, small city, or remote industrial site. China’s all-encompassing party-state apparatus has many downsides, but it does allow Beijing to, in principle, rapidly establish passive defences and short-range defences around potential targets of adversary strike munitions, bolster local security around potential targets, and so forth.

All things considered, militaries do not need to maintain everything in-house and do not require all personnel to work full-time. Air forces, including the PLAAF, for example, benefit from organizing, equipping, and training minimally staffed engineering units at most airbases that can be activated as required to repair runways following an enemy attack. Such a task can, for example, be undertaken by a small number of regular/active duty military personnel who are supplemented by (paid) part-time reservists, and a larger pool of personnel who are only mobilized to undertake such roles if and when required. In China, the latter grouping may formally fall under the Communist Party’s Militia, which can, for example, draw upon the trained pool of labour found in the local construction industry.

As a paramilitary organization, the CCG is no stranger to armed patrol ships, with armament typically amounting to some combination of machine guns, autocannons, and, on larger CCG ships, a medium caliber naval gun. CCG patrol ships are not equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles, a type of armament that the United States Coast Guard notably planned to deploy on its largest patrol ships in the 1990s prior to the end of the Cold War, or surface-to-air missile systems. As a result, the CCG’s new patrol ships derived from the PLAN’s 052D-class destroyer and Type 054A-class frigate designs are heavily downgraded in naval terms. This notably includes the complete removal of the all-important vertical launch system (VLS) cells.

While the CCG’s new 052D-class destroyer and Type 054A-class frigate derivatives are largely stripped of military-grade equipment, these are notably equipped with dedicated air search/acquisition radars, which is very unusual among coast guard vessels, with the primary exception of the United States Coast Guard’s Legend-class patrol ships and its preceding Hamilton-class patrol ships.

The CCG’s Type 052D-class destroyer derivatives are equipped with a Type 382 air search/acquisition radar, which is primarily installed on the PLAN’s large fleet of Type 054A-class frigates. In addition to the removal of the two clusters of VLS cells, the CCG’s Type 052D-class destroyer derivatives do not feature the destroyer design’s distinctive four large Type 346 phased array radar antennas. The Type 382 is not an advanced radar design by contemporary standards, and the CCG’s Type 052D-class destroyer derivatives would amount to a very significant downgrade even if these white-painted hulls were equipped with the 64 VLS cells found on the PLAN Type 052D-class destroyers.

The CCG’s Type 054A-class frigate derivatives are equipped with a Type 360 air search/acquisition radar. This is a very outdated but widely deployed radar design that is, in terms of the numbers deployed, primarily associated with the PLAN’s Type 056A-class corvettes. It is worth noting that the CCG operates 20 ex-PLAN Type 056-class—not Type 056A-class—corvettes that were stripped of much of their armament when decommissioned from the PLAN. All things considered, the Type 360 amounts to the bare minimum of an air search/acquisition radar for any Chinese vessel, whether painted gray in the manner of PLAN ships or white in the manner of CCG ships. The CCG’s Type 054A-class frigate derivatives, therefore, amount to a very significant downgrade even if these white-painted hulls were equipped with the 32 VLS cells and eight deck-mounted anti-ship cruise missiles found on the PLAN’s Type 054A-class frigates.

Given the above, the CCG’s Type 052D-class destroyer and Type 054A-class frigate derivatives amount to major downgrades relative to the underlying PLAN warship designs. The CCG is, however, also receiving a new class of waterjet-propelled patrol ships that are not only exclusive to the CCG but also feature an air search/acquisition radar, one of the phased array variety, unlike the Type 382 and Type 360, that has so far not appeared on any PLAN warship.

As with the CCG’s Type 052D-class destroyer and Type 054-class frigate derivatives, the CCG’s new waterjet-powered patrol ships feature an air search/acquisition radar but have minimal anti-aircraft capabilities. These CCG patrol ships are, therefore, equipped in this manner to detect aircraft and surveil airspace, not to intercept aircraft or extend air defence coverage over other CCG vessels and the vessels of the China Maritime Militia in the disputed waters of the South China Sea and East China Sea. Stated differently, the CCG remains reliant on the PLA in general and the PLAN in particular for air defence coverage, although a growing part of the CCG can contribute to the PLAN’s sensor coverage should CCG patrol ships be equipped with suitable datalinks.

The installation of air search radars on the CCG’s latest new-build patrol ships raises questions about the future trajectory of the CCG and its role in supporting PLAN operations. While this primarily concerns the subset of the highly heterogeneous fleet of CCG vessels that constitute its “high seas fleet,” the entire CCG fleet is likely to be subordinate to the PLAN in a major conflict in the Western Pacific. Although CCG vessels are likely to serve as escorts in wartime, the CCG’s current fleet, including its Type 052D-class destroyer and Type 054A-class frigate derivatives, is not well suited for this role. Consider, for example, how the CCG’s Type 052D-class and Type 054A-class derivatives do not appear to be “fitted for but not with” VLS cells, which is to say that these white-painted CCG patrol ships derived from PLAN warship designs cannot be readily “converted” into warships on relatively short notice in wartime.

While there is scope for the expedient wartime installations of short and even medium-range air defence systems, land-attack munitions, and anti-ship missiles on CCG patrol ships in wartime, the CCG’s patrol vessels will always remain vulnerable to underwater attack. As of this writing, there is no indication that the CCG’s latest large patrol ships, including its Type 052D-class destroyer and Type 054A-class frigate derivatives, are equipped with, or even fitted for, anti-submarine sensors (beyond a possible box sonar) or armaments. It bears emphasis that these CCG patrol ships have heavily modified stern sections, which are where towed array sonars and variable depth sonars are installed on the underlying PLAN warship designs. As things stand, the CCG’s wartime role remains unclear, and China is not equipping CCG vessels in ways that make the most of either the sustained presence of so many vessels at sea on a given day or the inherent potential of a large fleet of escort ships in wartime.

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Helicopters are complex machines that are very expensive to build and operate. While procurement and operating costs vary by design, a lighter and less expensive helicopter will still need an aircrew of two and several maintenance personnel assigned in much the same manner as a much larger and heavier helicopter that costs more to procure and operate. Although militaries have an incentive to procure larger helicopters, the differences in procurement and operating costs quickly add up when fleets are composed of hundreds of helicopters. As a result, large militaries have major incentives to acquire smaller/lighter and less expensive helicopters to operate alongside larger/heavier and more expensive helicopters. These can be used in utility and liaison roles as well as in training support roles. If deployed to rear areas, such helicopters do not require expensive to procure and operate, as well as upgrade, countermeasure systems.

Given the above dynamics, the American army operates over 450 UH-72 helicopters, which are the (modestly) militarized version of the civilian EC145/H145 light helicopter. The PLA has so far not procured something along the lines of the UH-72, even though it would unlock a wide range of capabilities that the PLA does not currently have. The vast majority of PLAAF airbases, including those in sparsely populated areas, for example, are not assigned even a single search and rescue helicopter to quickly recover a potentially injured trained pilot who cannot be quickly replaced. In peacetime, this can result in a prolonged period of recovery before surviving aircrew can return to service. In wartime, this can result in the permanent loss of potentially impossible to replace—during a war—trained military personnel. Beyond search and rescue roles, a PLA analogue to the UH-72 can be used in utility and liaison roles in China’s mountainous and often densely vegetated south, as well as in the Tibetan Plateau and the vast sparsely populated expanses of Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria. Such helicopters can also be used in rear area security roles in times of war, and will likely play an important part in patrolling the Chinese coastline and bolstering security teams on the ground around potential high-value targets.

The PLA does not currently have a suitable helicopter for such roles. The Z-9 is an increasingly outdated design. The HC-120 and Z-11 are far too light and limited in terms of payload for most roles. A helicopter in the vein of the UH-72 and the underlying EC145/H145 will be far more suitable. There is a candidate Chinese-built helicopter undergoing testing, the AC332, that may, in fully Chinese (component) form, be used by the PLA in roles for which the much larger/heavier and more expensive to procure and operate Z-20 and Z-8D/Z-8L/Z-18 are unsuited.

If and when it is (modestly) militarized, the Chinese AC332 will be broadly analogous to the American UH-72. Such a helicopter may even be automated in much the same manner as the UH-72’s manufacturer has proposed to the American military. In PLA service, an automated uncrewed AC332 can be used to not only deliver supplies to remote positions in the Tibetan Plateau but also undertake high-risk resupply sorties to the island of Taiwan in support of PLA special operations forces and air assault infantry in a Taiwan invasion scenario. This otherwise unimpressive Chinese light helicopter design or something similar may, in time, take on outsize importance.

Commentary-themed posts are intended to broach or highlight a specific issue, not limited to recent and ongoing events. These posts will typically be much shorter and less detailed than analysis-themed posts.

While the American military in general and the American navy in particular are no strangers to operating in the southern stretches of the Caribbean Sea, it nevertheless bears mention that the United States’ ongoing military standoff with Venezuela is facilitated by the existence of basing infrastructure in the Caribbean. This includes ports and airports, some of which were in the distant past quite heavily used by the American military, situated on the American island territory of Puerto Rico. The United States military is also making use of facilities in the nearby United States Virgin Islands, which were acquired from Denmark in 1917, and can also make use of the American military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

While American warships can operate off the coast of Venezuela for weeks, if not months, on end with the support of replenishment ships, most types of fixed-wing military aircraft require a runway to land and refuel located within 500-1000 kilometers of the intended operating area. San Juan, Puerto Rico, which is situated some 1660 kilometers from Miami and around 900 kilometers from Caracas, fits the bill. The existence of nearby ports also eases the strain on the finite number of replenishment ships available to any military and is of increasingly critical importance in terms of allowing warships to rearm, given the enduring challenges associated with reloading vertical launch system (VLS) cells at sea. All things considered, the existence of such basing infrastructure allows the American military to maintain a quite robust military presence off the coast of Venezuela without drawing too heavily on American military capabilities, including American aircraft carriers.

There is a productive analogy to be made with China’s three largest reefs-turned-islands in the South China Sea, which can similarly serve as forward bases for Chinese military aircraft and refuel Chinese warships. Subi Reef is situated some 950 kilometers from Sanya, Hainan, while Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef are situated some 1050 and 1130 kilometers from Hainan, respectively. These Chinese reefs-turned-islands are situated some 860, 1050, and 790 kilometers from Manila, respectively. Where this analogy breaks down is that the Philippines is not Venezuela. While both the Philippines and Venezuela lack long-range terrestrial strike and maritime strike capabilities to hold at risk and, if required, target such fairly proximate ports and airports/airbases that their respective adversaries can employ in times of crisis and war, the Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States and the United States can readily hold at risk whatever military capabilities China deploys to reefs-turned-islands. Even so, the scope for Chinese military coercion short of war in the South China Sea has never been greater, and China’s largest reefs-turned-islands can play an important enabling logistical role should Beijing pursue such an approach akin to that being undertaken by the United States against Venezuela.

Concepts–themed posts engage in inherently somewhat speculative analysis. I contend that any serious analysis must engage with the world both as it is and as it can be. Avoiding mindless empiricism requires cognizance of what is and what is not within the realm of possibility. Concepts-themed posts engage in this type of analysis.

One of the more interesting developments in the Russia-Ukraine War has been Ukraine’s development and deployment of several low-cost land-attack cruise missiles, namely the Peklo, Bars, and Palianytsia. There is nothing ground-breaking about any of these three Ukrainian land-attack cruise missile designs, which employ commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components, and it bears emphasis that low-cost cruise missile designs were hardly without precedent prior to the development and introduction of the aforementioned Ukrainian designs. Ukraine is, however, the first country to employ such low-cost land-attack cruise missiles in large numbers, and the Ukrainian experience is instructive in terms of highlighting one of the many ways that China can sustain a high-intensity extended strike campaign against Taiwan.

Land-attack cruise missiles were originally developed and deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union as a means of delivering nuclear weapons over long distances. When adapted for the purposes of delivering high explosive warheads, such land-attack cruise missiles, which were powered by quite fuel-efficient and high power density turbofan engines, were typically used to deliver a 400-500 kilogram warhead over a distance of 1500 or so kilometers. By the late 1990s, a new generation of air-launched land-attack cruise missiles, primarily of the air-launched variety, were in development to deliver a 400-500 kilogram high explosive warhead over a distance of 400-500 kilometers.

While such cruise missiles amounted to performance benchmarks that other countries, China included, sought to emulate, designers worldwide always had other options. Countries that did not have access to suitable compact turbofan engines, for example, were forced to rely on less fuel-efficient turbojet engines, which resulted in a lower maximum range, or, more accurately described, a lower payload-range. This posed a particular challenge for one country, Iran, which sought a land-attack cruise missile with a maximum range of at least 1300 or so kilometers to target Israel from Iranian territory. Iran eventually developed and deployed such a land-attack cruise missile, the Paveh, by the late 2010s, even though it did not have access to a suitable compact turbofan engine.

The Paveh, which is best characterized as an evolving family of land-attack cruise missiles that is also known as the Quds in the hands of Ansarallah in Yemen, offers Iran the ability to attack targets located 1000 or more kilometers way. The Paveh’s design, particularly its quite modest turbojet engine, however, results in a considerably lower payload-range than the likes of the American Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile. The Paveh can only be used to deliver a much smaller warhead over a comparable maximum range and exists in several versions configured for different range-payload optimizations, which is to say that shorter-range versions of the Paveh are equipped with a larger warhead than the longest-range versions, which are equipped with a much smaller warhead (and additional fuel). Ansarallah in Yemen appears to operate a reduced-payload, extended range version of the Paveh with a maximum range of 1800 or so kilometers to attack the most distant targets in the Arabian Peninsula and Israel.

While the Iranian Paveh constituted a template for a low-cost and long-range, albeit low payload—low payload-range—land-attack cruise missile that Ukraine could have pursued, it instead pursued smaller, lighter, and lower payload-range land-attack cruise missiles in the form of the Peklo, Bars, and Palianytsia. These Ukrainian designs use COTS turbojet engines, including some of Chinese manufacture, which are much lower maximum thrust designs than even the quite modest turbojet installed on the Iranian Paveh, let alone the much higher-end land-attack cruise missiles deployed by the likes of the United States, Russia, China, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, among others. As a result, the Ukrainian Peklo, Bars, and Palianytsia can only be used to deliver a high explosive warhead weighing just several tens of kilograms over a distance of 500-1000 kilometers. As with the Iranian Paveh, there is some scope to trade payload for range and vice versa, but the use of a low-cost COTS turbojet engine, which results in a quite low maximum take-off weight cruise missile, inherently offers little scope for making such a trade with the aforementioned Ukrainian land-attack cruise missile designs without severely reducing the destructive effects of the warhead.

The Taiwan Strait is just 130-180 kilometers wide at its narrowest points. The entirety of the island of Taiwan lies within 350 kilometers of the Chinese coastline. With cruise missiles often following complex flight paths to avoid high elevation terrain and known concentrations of air defences, a Chinese land-attack cruise missile with a maximum range of 500 kilometers will be more than adequate to attack essentially any target on the island of Taiwan. Most of Taiwan’s population, and most of the potential targets for Chinese strike munitions, are, however, located on Taiwan’s quite narrow western coastal plain, which typically extends over a depth of just 25-35 kilometers, and are therefore much more proximate to the Chinese coastline. As a result, a notional Chinese land-attack cruise missile with a maximum range of just 250-300 kilometers will be able to attack most of the potential targets for Chinese strike munitions on the island of Taiwan.

While China can deploy something in the vein of the Ukrainian Peklo, Bars, and Palianytsia, it can pursue such designs with a different payload-range configuration, which is to say a land-attack cruise missile that carries a substantially larger payload over a shorter difference or, alternatively, an even smaller and, all else being equal, less expensive, lower payload-range land-attack cruise missile design. A 350-kilometer maximum range analogue to the aforementioned Ukrainian designs should be able to deliver a 90-kilogram class warhead to attack a target located along Taiwan’s western coastal plain. Alternatively, a substantially smaller and, all else being equal, less expensive land-attack cruise missile can be used to, for example, deliver a 30-40 kilogram class warhead to attack a target located along Taiwan’s western coastal plain.

As of this writing, there is no public indication that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has pursued, let alone deployed, low-cost and low payload-range land-attack cruise missiles of this type. Such notional land-attack cruise missiles are, of course, nothing like the high-end strike munitions that the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) increasingly focuses on, and do not appear to be in accordance with the Central Military Commission’s preferred approach(es) to waging a cross-strait conflict. However much Chinese decision-makers may prefer a short and sharp war, China is, absent its own capitulation, likely to end up in a protracted war with Taiwan, the United States, and perhaps other countries. Should a Chinese amphibious invasion of the island of Taiwan be indefinitely postponed or fail, China will likely seek to force Taiwan into submission through an extended strike campaign alongside what amounts to one formulation or another of a maritime blockade. In such a scenario, large numbers of low-cost land-attack cruise missiles along the lines of what has been discussed in this post constitute one way that China can prosecute such a strike campaign.

A protracted conflict is not, however, the only scenario in which China may use such munitions. While more expensive than, for example, unpowered guided glide bombs or propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones, low payload-range cruise missiles can be launched in large salvos against high-value targets so as to induce the depletion of Taiwan’s finite stocks of on-island surface-to-air missiles, including shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles that the PLARF high-end strike munitions cannot be used to degrade or neutralize in the opening hours and days of a conflict. Depending on the PLA’s preferred basing modes, ground-launched land-attack cruise missiles of this type can even be launched in large salvos at very short notice in the opening hours and days of a war alongside the PLARF’s higher-end munitions. It bears emphasis that if and when Taiwan’s large but nevertheless finite stocks of on-island surface-to-air missiles—including those that are necessarily located in targetable storage sites—are depleted, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) will, in effect, have a free hand when it comes to undertaking extensive air-to-ground sorties with standoff and non-standoff munitions alike. As a result, low-cost and low payload-range land attack cruise missiles are not simply something that China can pursue if its preferred approaches to a cross-strait war fail; these can also be used to facilitate China’s preferred approaches to a cross-strait conflict.

While low-cost land-attack cruise missiles can be readily intercepted, it is important to keep in mind that Taiwan will only have a finite number of on-island surface-to-air missiles, including shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, at its disposal. Wartime resupply is not impossible, but is unlikely to result in the delivery of hundreds, let alone thousands, of surface-to-air missiles in wartime. There is, as such, merit to an air defence interceptor depletion strategy that runs in parallel to the CMC and PLARF’s preferred air defence system neutralization strategy, which requires high-end systems that will always be available in far more limited numbers than low-cost land-attack cruise missiles. While China can also use other types of strike munitions, such as even less expensive (single-use) propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones to attack targets on Taiwan, cruise missiles are, alongside ballistic missiles and large-caliber guided artillery rockets, more generally, among the subset of candidate strike munition types that can be used to more readily induce the expenditure of Taiwan’s surface-to-air missiles. Unlike slow propeller-driven strike drones, cruise missiles, even those that are equipped with a fairly low thrust COTS turbojet engine, are difficult to intercept using small arms and manually aimed machine guns, and a higher flight speed inherently reduces the interception window for such short-range, low-cost, and widely deployed (in wartime) air defence capabilities.

Any serious analysis of China’s prospects in various cross-strait conflict scenarios must engage with the world both as it is and as it can be. This requires cognizance of what is and what is not within the realm of possibility in terms of PLA capabilities that exist on the first day of a major conflict or PLA capabilities which only arise in wartime for use in an increasingly plausible protracted conflict scenario. Low-cost and low payload-range land-attack cruise missiles constitute one of several possible approaches that China may use to attack targets on Taiwan or, failing that, to deplete and degrade Taiwan’s air defence capabilities so as to enable other Chinese strike capabilities to attack targets on Taiwan.

The three ships of the PLAN’s 48th escort task group will eventually reach the Gulf of Aden and will be able to make use of the very modest naval facilities that are part of the Chinese military base in Djibouti—Chinese warships can also make use of Djibouti’s civilian port infrastructure as required.

The transiting of the Miyako Strait into the Pacific Ocean, followed by a westerward transit of the Luzon Strait/Bashi Channel into the South China Sea to reach the Indian Ocean via the Strait of Malacca, initially appeared to be unusual. The PLAN warships could, of course, have transited the Taiwan Strait, which is not an irregular practice for the PLAN. According to the X/Twitter user Song’s Defence Watch, however, the examination of years of Japanese military press releases indicates that PLAN escort groups transiting the Miyako Strait while en route to the Indian Ocean via the Strait of Malacca is not without precedent. Even so, the PLAN’s 48th escort task group’s transit of the Miyako Strait and underway replenishment somewhere in the South China Sea—the area in which the underway replenishment took place is, of course, fully discernible through various means but is not readily available public information at this time—is notable in several respects. It indicates that:

• The PLAN chose not to have the three ships homeported in Qingdao stop to “top off” their fuel tanks at PLAN bases further south, including the naval facilities located on Hainan.

• The PLAN chose not to have the three ships homeported in Qingdao stop to “top off” their fuel tanks at China’s three largest reefs-turned-islands in the South China Sea.

• It also suggests that the PLAN may not have refuelled the underway Type 903A-class replenishment ship Taihu (889). Such an (underway) refuelling/replenishment could have been undertaken at sea, whether by another gray-hulled PLAN replenishment ship, a suitably converted Chinese merchant-crewed oil tanker, or a suitably converted Chinese oil tanker crewed by PLAN personnel and/or merchant sailors serving as naval auxiliaries (in the manner of the American Military Sealift Command and the British Royal Fleet Auxiliary).

While I do not contend that the PLAN should have, let alone must have, refuelled the three ships of the 48th escort task group as these headed south from Qingdao prior to transiting the Strait of Malacca, this minor episode draws attention to the following:

• The fairly limited number of replenishment ships, whether purpose-built and gray-painted or otherwise, available to the PLAN, which are as vital in increasing the endurance of PLAN warships in, for example, the Philippine Sea, as they are in enabling long-distance deployments to the Indian Ocean and beyond.

• The apparent non-use of China’s three largest reefs-turned-islands in the South China Sea as refuelling stations for larger PLAN warships undertaking longer-range and longer-duration deployments.

• The unavailability of any high probability of access port, even a civilian port, for use in refuelling Chinese warships in between Fierry Cross Reef, the southernmost of China’s three largest reefs-turned-islands, and Djibouti.

It bears emphasis that Chinese access to ports in Myanmar and/or Pakistan means little for the present purposes, given how much of a detour such out-of-the-way northward transits will entail when the ultimate destination is the Gulf of Aden. Relatedly, access to the Omani port of Duqm may be important to sustaining PLAN operations in the western half of the Indian Ocean, but it does not help in supporting deployments to the western half of the Indian Ocean in the first place. It also bears emphasis that transiting to Cambodia’s fairly small Ream naval base and Cambodia’s larger civilian ports more generally, also entails a major detour when the objective is to transit the Strait of Malacca.

Given the inescapable facts of geography, the PLAN requires access to a port either in Sri Lanka or in southern India. The latter amounts to an impossibility for the foreseeable future. While a Chinese-built port exists in Hambantota, which is situated along Sri Lanka’s southern coastline, and while PLAN warships and state-owned non-PLAN ships of military importance (i.e., oceanographic research ships and similar) visit the port facilities in Colombo to refuel and resupply, the state of China-India relations and Indian pressure on Sri Lanka make a regular Chinese naval presence in Sri Lanka, even one of a purely logistical nature, unlikely for the foreseeable future. As things stand, the PLAN continues to face non-trivial challenges in reaching, let alone operating, in the Indian Ocean and beyond. Leaving aside Sri Lanka, the countries that are in the best position to change that are Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as Singapore. Absent a major reorientation of the foreign and military policies of these three Southeast Asian countries, the PLAN will likely have to, in effect, go it alone for the foreseeable future and rely on ad hoc naval diplomacy visits to enable its standing naval deployments in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

While this post focuses on naval/marine logistics, it is worth broaching the related challenges that the PLA faces in deploying aircraft beyond the South China Sea. Unless Chinese aircraft are permitted to transit the airspace of Southeast Asian countries or, a de facto impossibility, Indian airspace, PLA aircraft, including both the PLAN’s maritime patrol/anti-submarine warfare aircraft and the PLAAF’s military transport aircraft, must fly to airbases in Xinjiang and afterward fly over the Karakoram Mountains to reach the Indian Ocean by way of Pakistan. If the PLA hopes to ever operate in the Indian Ocean in the manner of the American military, it will either have to heavily rely on transits via Pakistani airspace and, all things considered, have a permanent presence at Pakistani airports/airbases, or, it will require access to airports in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, given the range restrictions faced by most aircraft.

Commentary-themed posts are intended to broach or highlight a specific issue, not limited to recent and ongoing events. These posts will typically be much shorter and less detailed than analysis-themed posts.

The rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group against the Russian state in June 2023, which unfolded in a context of a much-anticipated Ukrainian offensive and cross-border raids by Russian citizens in Ukrainian military units subordinate to Ukrainian military intelligence, amounted to the first time in the Russia-Ukraine War that the future of the Russian state, with or without Vladimir Putin at its helm, was even in question. Around the time, the head of Ukrainian military intelligence rationalized his organization’s establishment of such (renegade) Russian-manned Ukrainian military units as a part of a gambit through which Ukraine could, in effect, indirectly occupy stretches of territory on the Russian side of the international border in the event of a collapse in Moscow’s power and authority across the Russian Federation.

While the unsuccessful June 2023 Wagner rebellion is, as of this writing, the closest that Russia has approached state collapse over the course of the Russia-Ukraine War, it nevertheless bears emphasis that there was and remains no indication that Prigozhin, a quite extreme Russian nationalist, had any intention of weakening Moscow’s control over its expansive territory, or that Putin loyalists had any intention of initiating a civil war had Wagner Group columns reached Moscow and ousted Putin from the Kremlin. Even so, the June 2023 episode catalyzed thinking as to the possible implications of the collapse of the Russian state for Ukraine and Europe more generally. Far less attention has, however, been given to the possible implications of the collapse of the Russian state for East Asia.

Oleg Kozhemyako, the governor of Russia’s Primorsky Krai, a Russian province which borders China, North Korea, and the Sea of Japan and has the port city of Vladivostok as its capital, recently made minor headlines for publicly warning about possible Chinese irredentism about the Russian Far East, which was formally part of Qing China until ca. 1860. As things stand, such irredentism appears to be found more among Chinese netizens than the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist Party, and there is presently no indication of a rupture in bilateral relations, not least while both Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping remain in power, that would be required for Chinese irredentism toward Russia’s far eastern territorial holdings to become state policy. This does not, however, necssarily mean that Beijing will seek to preserve Russia’s current borders, the far eastern sections of which are evidently a product of “unequal treaties” imposed upon Qing China by the Russian Empire over the course of the 1800s, in the event of the collapse of the Russian state under the rule of Vladimir Putin or his eventual successors.

I am not a political analyst, and I have no intention of getting into the weeds of this complex and inherently hypothetical topic. As a military analyst, however, I cannot help but notice that China is separated from the Sea of Japan by just ~10.3 kilometers in orthodromic terms/as the crow flies and that the Tumen River flows for another ~16.5 kilometers from the easternmost point of the China-Russia border until it reaches the Sea of Japan. In other words, China may not border the Sea of Japan and has no direct port access to the Sea of Japan, but just a small amount of land, which was formally part of Qing China until ca. 1860, determines this.

In the hypothetical event of the collapse of the Russian State, it does not strain credulity to imagine a scenario in which Chinese decision-makers must make—not necessarily mutually exclusive—choices between:

• Facilitating the restoration of Moscow’s control in the Far East in accordance with border treaties signed by the Russian Empire and Qing China.

• Supporting any Russian breakaway provinces in their attempt(s) to secure either independence or greater autonomy from Moscow and power centers in western Russia more generally, provided, of course, that such Russian breakaway provinces fall under the influence of Beijing.

• Actively intervening in a power struggle, which may turn into a Russian Civil War, at least in some parts of that expansive country, with the aim of restoring Beijing’s control over territories that were formally part of Qing China until ca. 1860. Whether China would then establish a puppet state—something (ironically) in the vein of Manchukuo, or formally incorporate such territory in the People’s Republic of China is another matter.

Why even undertake a cursory discussion about a hypothetical set of events that is, all things considered, unlikely to come to pass, given how Vladimir Putin’s Russia and its successor(s) will likely still have control over thousands of nuclear weapons, analytically worthwhile? While much remains uncertain about the trajectory of the fast-evolving military-technological competition between China and the United States, I would make the argument that some of the most consequential areas of uncertainty on this matter are only partially about China and the United States. These include the status of the Korean Peninsula, the status of the Sea of Japan, and, of course, the status of the Russian Federation in the event of a major war, particularly a major protracted war, between China and the United States.

The Status Of the Korean Peninsula

This includes the impossible-to-know question of whether any potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula during a major war between the United States and South Korea will even involve the United States, let alone China. Should China intervene in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, Chinese intervention is unlikely to be limited to the movement of Chinese ground forces across the Yalu and Tumen rivers in the manner of 1950. It bears emphasis that South Korea is highly exposed to Chinese strike capabilities to a far greater degree than Japan by virtue of geographic proximity to China. Should China intervene in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula that transpires in a major war between China and the United States, China will also presumably be able to make use of North Korean airspace to attack targets in Japan.

The Status Of The Sea Of Japan

Related to the status of the Korean Peninsula is the status of the Sea of Japan in a major war, particularly a major protracted war, between China and the United States, in which Japan is also a belligerent. It bears emphasis that present-day China can, should Chinese decision-makers make the decision and allocate the requisite resources, activate the “Sea of Japan threat axis/threat vector” through which to target Japan, including the entirety of Honshu and Hokkaido, with shorter-range and, all else being equal, less expensive and, as such, likely more plentiful, strike munitions than is presently the case when Chinese munitions are primarily launched toward Japan from the southwest. Simply stated, the activation of the “Sea of Japan threat axis/threat vector” is likely to profoundly undermine Japanese security and greatly expand the challenges that both Japan and the United States face in terms of air and ballistic missile defence.

The Status of the Russian Federation

The status of the Russian Federation in a major war, particularly a major protracted war, between China and the United States. While there has recently been public discussions about the possibility of war between Russia and European NATO countries while a major war transpires between China and the United States in the Western Pacific, less attention has been given to the possibility that China may, directly or indirectly, participate in a war between Russia and European NATO countries (during a war between China and the United States), and, not unrelatedly, whether Russia will have any part to play in support of China during a war between China and the United States. Beyond selling natural resources to China and serving as a conduit through which wartime China, which is likely to be subject to a fairly effective long-distance maritime and aerial blockade, can access the rest of the world, Russia may formally or informally provide China access to its airspace over the Russian Far East. This will affect the viability of Chinese polar bomber flights that can be used to target American airbases and associated critically important logistical facilities in Alaska, as well as the viability of Chinese nuclear-armed bomber flights to attack targets in North America. It also has implications for the viability of Chinese aerial and naval operations in the North Pacific aimed at interdicting supplies and reinforcements heading to Japan from North America.

Yevgeny Prigozhin is long dead, his Wagner Group is fully subordinate to the Russian state with Vladimir Putin as its ultimate leader, and Russia appears unlikely to undergo state collapse any time soon, notwithstanding uncertainties as to what will follow Putin’s eventual and ultimate death. Even so, the very possibility of the collapse of the Russian state, which came into clear view in June 2023 and has, in effect, recently been resurrected by the governor of Russia’s Primorsky Krai province, is something that anyone interested in the evolving military balance in the Western Pacific should pay attention to. A fairly small sliver of land currently results in a situation in which the “Sea of Japan threat axis/threat vector” is, all things considered, presently inactive. This not only has major implications for Japan’s security but also shapes military dynamics in the North Pacific, an area of water that most ships and aircraft travelling between North America and northeastern Asia, including Japan, transit, given the orthodomic/great circle distances. A Chinese port in the Sea of Japan—or at least Chinese access to a port in the Sea of Japan, regular Chinese naval operations in the Sea of Japan, and Chinese aircraft and ships operating in the Northern Pacific via the Sea of Japan may be neither a present-day reality nor a likely forthcoming reality, but it is not an impossibility.

Some related posts:

Analytical extensions-themed posts expand on material that has appeared in another newsletter/section and other parts of this website more generally.

In a recent post, I briefly discussed Russia’s limited ability to engage in a proxy conflict against the United States and European countries in response to and in retaliation for their military support for Ukraine. As I explained in said post, Russia is not, however, without options, given reports of Russian technical support and material assistance to North Korea in the interrelated areas of (nuclear-armed) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology and nuclear-powered submarine technology. While such reported Russian technical support and material assistance to North Korea may not result in the injury or death of any American citizens, including American military personnel, it does inflict very grave long-term negative military effects on the United States.

China will have to deter foreign military intervention in a major conflict over the political fate of Taiwan. While observers of Chinese military affairs are familiar with the notion of Chinese “counter-intervention capabilities,” raising the projected cost of military intervention by the United States and, to a lesser degree, Japan, on the side of Taiwan is a quite narrow conception of what deterring military intervention in a major conflict over the political fate of Taiwan is likely to entail. Simply stated, China will likely require a deep and diverse policy toolbox—not simply military capabilities of one sort or another—to deter foreign intervention on the part of other countries, such as Australia, India, and even South Korea, and, more generally, keep likely neutrals, such as Southeast Asian countries and European countries, in check. Deterring foreign intervention is not only something that China will have to do on the first day of a war, but over the weeks, months, and, quite possibly, years that a major conflict over the political fate of Taiwan may well play out.

How will China go about this? How will it induce as a benign form of neutrality as possible from Southeast Asian countries (excluding the Philippines, which has, in effect, cast its lot with the United States)? How will China deter the likes of Singapore from providing access to American warships and aircraft, including damaged warships that require repair, in wartime? How will China induce a country like Indonesia to sustain trade with China—supply China with critically important natural resources—despite likely American and Australian pressure, and how will China pressure Indonesia such that it actively works to prevent American and Australian aircraft, warships, and munitions from transiting through Indonesian airspace and waters (both territorial and archipelagic)? How will China deter India from intervening in a war on the side of the United States, a dynamic which may or may not entail ground combat operations in the Himalayas? How will China deter India from providing military access, including overflight access, to the United States such that, for example, American military aircraft can readily attack China from a southwestern direction via Myanmar, a likely neutral country that will, in time of war, be in no position to “close” its airspace for the foreseeable future?

While I have some thoughts about the above questions—I have, for example, covered China’s long-range strike capabilities against distant targets in Australia and the South Pacific in several recent posts with such thoughts in mind, I do not have answers to all these complex, if interrelated, questions. I think it is fair to say that Russia’s limited capacity to retaliate via proxy against the United States and European countries serves as a cautionary tale for China in a cross-strait conflict, particularly a protracted cross-strait conflict. While China’s resources, diplomatic weight, economic gravity, and military capabilities are far greater than those of Russia, Beijing will likely be hard-pressed on multiple fronts, military and otherwise, in a cross-strait conflict and certainly does not have enough long-range strike munitions to keep all potential adversaries and erstwhile neutrals at bay with (credible) military threats alone. As a major conflict over the political fate of Taiwan extends into weeks, months, and possibly years, China’s ability to deter foreign intervention and regulate the conduct of neutrals is likely to wane, particularly if China faces major military reversals and if a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan is successful.

Given the above, observers would do well to develop a truly holistic conception of Chinese military capabilities and broaden the analytical aperture far beyond narrow conceptions of the cross-strait military balance and the state of Chinese military capabilities vis-a-vis the United States.