Minimal comment-themed posts are used to introduce data points for use in other posts going forward. Posts of this theme will typically feature minimal analysis and commentary.

Observers of military dynamics in South Asia will have likely noticed the steadily increasing prevalence of not just multirotor drones, including armed multirotor drones, in the images and videos released by the Indian and Pakistani military, but also the steadily increasing prevalence of images and videos that show the development and deployment of countermeasures thereto. Consider, for example, the following recently released images of Indian tanks that are equipped with additional armour that is primarily intended to counter multirotor drone-dropped munitions.

While so far primarily associated with the Russia-Ukraine War, there is no reason to assume that armed multirotor drones, including those of the so-called “first-person video” (“FPV”) variety, cannot or will not proliferate elsewhere, including South Asia. Indeed, such proliferation has been well underway for several years, and both the Indian and Pakistani militaries are actively preparing for the large-scale employment of such uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions.

One of the key challenges that both India and Pakistan face is that the vast majority of armoured combat vehicles that exist in South Asia are poorly positioned to withstand the potent all-aspect threat posed by the combination of multirotor drones and shaped charge warheads. This includes the predominantly Soviet-derived tanks operated by both India and Pakistan, which are reflective of a design philosophy which, among other things, was more suitable in a now bygone era in which threats to armoured vehicles primarily impacted the frontal aspect. Simply stated, essentially every armoured combat vehicle that is presently in the service of the Indian and Pakistani militaries is a veritable death trap should these be used against an opponent that is equipped with the (fairly basic) quality and, more importantly, quantity of armed “FPV” multirotor drones operated by both Russia and Ukraine. Given this, the current South Asian military dynamic is one in which both India and Pakistan are likely to be subject to extremely high and ultimately unsustainable vehicular losses and associated casualties among the crew and embarked personnel.

Observers should bear in mind dynamic is unlikely to change for at least a decade or more, given the very large numbers of new, better-equipped and more heavily armoured vehicles that will be required to complement and ultimately replace the existing fleets of predominantly poorly protected—relative to current and fast-emerging threats—of armoured combat vehicles. This dynamic is likely to have implications far beyond the narrow area of ground combat capabilities. It may, for example, result in both India and Pakistan placing greater emphasis on long-range “standoff” capabilities in an environment in which first Pakistani “tactical” nuclear weapons and now the all-aspect shaped charge threat are making high-intensity large-scale ground combat operations ever less viable in South Asia.

This extensions-themed post is an extension of material that has appeared in another newsletter/section and other parts of my website more generally. My newsletters/sections are primarily categorized by region and my posts can only appear in one newsletter/section at a time given how the Substack platform is configured. Extensions-themed posts are intended to highlight content posted in other newsletters/sections that may be highly relevant to readers who are primarily interested in other parts of the world.

In several recent posts that appear in my China newsletter/section, I have discussed some of the externalities of the intensifying military-technological competition between China and the United States, a dynamic that is likely to leave many countries behind in the dust. The externalities of this intensifying military-technological competition are likely to be found in South Asia in the context of both China-India military dynamics and India-Pakistan military dynamics. In two recent posts, I discussed the implications of China’s unveiling of six new anti-ship munitions at the recent military parade in Beijing. The first post focuses on the implications for Southeast Asian countries, while the second focuses on the implications for Japan. While India and Japan are not in the same situation—India is actually in a somewhat better position than Japan for reasons that are rooted in the idiosyncrasies of Japanese naval force planning in recent decades—I think the Japanese experience will be instructive as to the challenges every country that is not named the United States of America is likely to face amid intensifying military-technological competition between China and the United States.

It remains to be seen whether China is willing to export any of these new anti-ship munitions to Pakistan. The new YJ-15 supersonic ramjet-powered anti-ship cruise missile is, I think, a likely candidate for transfer to Pakistan. Should any of the longer-range anti-ship munitions, namely the YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20, be transferred to Pakistan alongside the requisite maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, India may be forced to rethink how it plans to employ its aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea. More generally, India needs to rethink how it plans to employ its aircraft carriers in the eastern half of the Indian Ocean and perhaps the South China Sea. China has already secured a major qualitative advantage over India in carrier-borne naval aviation. Five of the six new Chinese anti-ship munitions are carried by carrier-borne aircraft, warships, or submarines, and are therefore relevant to China-India naval dynamics.

In a third post, I discussed how the intensifying China-United States military-technological competition in the area of fighter aircraft technology risks leaving essentially every other country behind in the dust. This is a dynamic that is already reshaping military dynamics in South Asia. Pakistan is reportedly interested in China’s low-observable J-35A fighter, which has recently entered service with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force—the catapult-launched carrier-borne version, the J-35, is in service with the People’s Liberation Army Navy. The deployment of increasing numbers of low-observable J-35 and J-20 fighter aircraft, among other systems, is fast reshaping air combat dynamics in the Himalayas and may soon also reshape India-Pakistan air combat dynamics beyond what the presence of JF-17 Block III and J-10CE fighter aircraft, as well as PL-15/PL-15E long-range air-to-air missiles, in the Pakistan Air Force’s arsenal has already brought about.

It is important to recognize that all of the aforementioned Chinese-designed air combat systems are lagging indicators of Chinese military technology and Chinese military capabilities. China and the United States are locked in an intensifying military-technological competition in fighter aircraft technology, one that threatens to leave India behind in the dust alongside many other countries unless India can, in effect, replicate China’s performance in rapidly closing the technological gap with the United States over a several-decade timeframe. While the India of 2025 is in a far better position to do so than the China of ca. 1990, this is likely to be a long-term and uphill struggle, a dynamic that observers of the subcontinent will likely be very familiar with, given ongoing challenges and delays in India’s indigenous fighter aircraft and jet engine development and manufacturing. Leading indicators of Chinese air combat capabilities, namely the provisionally and unofficially designated J-36 and J-50, underscore the scope of the challenge that India now faces at a time when additional non-low-observable Tejas and Rafale fighter aircraft—new-build aircraft that enter service now will likely remain in service well into the 2050s—are being pursued as the answer to the Indian Air Force’s long-rooted shortcomings.

This post is an extension of material that has appeared in another newsletter/section and other parts of my website more generally. While my newsletters/sections are primarily categorized by region—you can either subscribe to specific newsletters/sections or subscribe to the entire website/all of my writings—many posts can be readily placed in multiple newsletters/sections—but only appear in one newsletter/section given how the Substack platform is configured—and may be highly relevant to readers who are primarily interested in other parts of the world. Posts dealing with ongoing conflicts or advances in military technology, for example, may highlight developments and dynamics that may be be of consequence to other countries. Similarly, posts that deal with the military capabilities of one country may be relevant to readers who are primarily interested in the military capabilities of other countries. My Extensions themed posts will be used to highlight content that I think subscribers of other newsletters/sections may find interesting. I hope that my Extensions themed posts help rationalize my peculiar comparativist analytical approach, one that results in my website covering a very wide range of military-related topics and much of the world.

In a recent post, I addressed some of the military implications of the increasing availability of Starlink’s low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite communication (SATCOM) service across the Middle East. Commercial LEO SATCOM providers like Starlink offer low-latency and high-bandwidth satellite internet service to users located in essentially any part of the coverage area, which is determined not by technology but by the ability of individual governments to regulate the use of radio frequencies on and above their territory under the provisions of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). While LEO SATCOM can be used to access the internet, it can also be used as a datalink for military purposes. LEO SATCOM can be used to:

• Remotely pilot uncrewed systems, including uncrewed aircraft.

• Access the real-time feed of the sensors carried by uncrewed systems.

• Provide uncrewed systems with accurate and reliable positioning data as an alternative to Global Positioning System (GPS) and other global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) more generally.

• Remotely activate pre-positioned munitions and other forms of military equipment more generally.

• Support the operations of adversary special forces, intelligence operators, and local collaborators more generally.

The two countries that were the focus of my recent post, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have not yet granted Starlink approval to offer commercial satellite internet service in and above their territory. Two other countries that have also not yet granted Starlink regulatory approval are India and Pakistan, a very significant fact in itself, given the two countries’ combined population of over 1.7 billion and the quite low internet penetration rate across South Asia. While LEO SATCOM has clear-cut benefits for the economies of India and Pakistan and the lives of their inhabitants, it also has the inherent potential of substantially enhancing adversary military capabilities.

All things considered, LEO SATCOM-enabled internet service is likely to be a key part of the telecommunications infrastructure of all countries going forward. However much some countries around the world may dislike the fact that Starlink is an American company with close ties to the American government, the military implications of commercially available LEO SATCOM do not, for the most part, vary much with the country in which a commercial satellite internet provider is based. For India, the military implications of an American-owned commercial satellite internet service are little different than the military implications of an Indian-owned commercial satellite internet service or even a Chinese-owned commercial satellite internet service. Much the same can be said of Pakistan. As a result, LEO SATCOM is likely to reshape the India-Pakistan military balance at some point in the future.

To be clear, the potential threat posed by the availability of Starlink and LEO SATCOM more generally to India and Pakistan should not be exaggerated and should be viewed in its proper context. As with most areas of government policy, Indian and Pakistani decision-makers face trade-offs and may come to the conclusion that the benefits of commercially available low-latency and high-bandwidth satellite internet outweigh the costs and risks to their countries. Even so, observers must be mindful that these costs and risks are of the non-zero variety.

If you find this topic interesting, consider reading my post dealing with the increasing availability of Starlink’s satellite internet service across the Middle East:

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

Naval shipbuilding has long been something of a rare success story for India's longstanding efforts toward developing a more self-reliant military industry. Even so, India's naval shipyards remain highly reliant on imports of—or at least the licensed production or assembly of—a wide range of critically important components of foreign origin. This includes the propulsion systems—marine diesel engines and marine gas turbines—that differentiate a barge-like unpowered hull and a sea-going ship.

While much can be said of the peculiarities of recent Indian approaches to warship design and the Indian Navy's approach to fleeting planning more generally, for the present purposes, it suffices to say that Indian naval shipbuilding is heavily reliant on a steady supply of marine gas turbines that India does not itself manufacture. India's Nilgiri-class frigates have a combined diesel and gas (CODAG) propulsion system that pairs two marine diesel engines of German origin (MAN) with two marine gas turbines of American Origin (GE), both of which are assembled under licence in India. The Indian Navy's Visakhapatnam-class destroyers have a combined gas and gas (COGAG) propulsion system that uses two marine gas turbines of Ukrainian manufacture (Zorya-Mashproekt).

The supply of the Ukrainian-built marine gas turbines—which are manufactured in the southern Ukrainian city of Mykolaiv at a facility that is located some 60 kilometers northwest of the Ukrainian city of Kherson and Russian forces on the other side of the Dnieper River—has been in question since February 2022. Continued reliance on the very popular General Electric LM2500 marine gas turbine design, the components of which are built in the United States but assembled under license in India to meet the Indian Navy's localization requirements, binds India's shipbuilding plans to the United States. While India's has longstanding ambitions to develop a more self-reliant military industry, the recent supply shock concerning Ukrainian-built marine gas turbines and increasing recognition that reliance on the United States can come at the cost of New Delhi's much valued "strategic autonomy" have likely led Indian decisionmakers to redouble their efforts to wean India off its reliance on imported marine gas turbines (whether imported in whole or as in form of components that are assembled under licence in India).

Recent reports indicate that India has put into motion a project that is intended to result in Indian-built marine gas turbines with a target power output in the 24-28 megawatt range. Such an Indian built marine gas turbine will facilitate a major advance in India's longstanding pursuit of a more self-reliant naval shipbuilding industry. Time will tell whether India can develop the means to align with such ambitious ends and, more importantly, whether India can design, test, and manufacture indigenous marine gas turbines in a timeframe that will allow India to keep up with a fast-evolving naval balance in the Indo-Pacific.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

Satellite imagery recently highlighted by Indian media indicates that much of the Pakistan Navy relocated westward to the port of Gwadar, which is located close to the Iran-Pakistan border, from the Karachi area, which is home to the Pakistan Navy's main operating base during the May 2025 India-Pakistan War.

While much remains uncertain about the brief May 2025 India-Pakistan War, the conflict raises questions about the prudence of Pakistani naval planning and force modernization efforts in a context in which the Pakistani surface fleet was too weak vis-a-vis India to have left port to undertake patrols in the Arabian Sea during a brief but high-intensity and high-stakes crisis-turned-conflict. Given how the naval dynamic of the May 2025 India-Pakistan War appears to have played out, Pakistan faces strong incentives to refocus its efforts and limited resources toward its submarine force and its ground- and air-launched maritime strike capabilities more generally.

The third of Pakistan's eight planned Chinese-designed Hangor-class diesel-electric submarines, which is the Pakistan-specific export version of the Type 039B-class submarine used by the People's Liberation Army Navy—was recently launched in Wuhan, China. Four submarines—including the three that have been launched to date—will be built in China, while the remaining four will be built in Karachi. Pakistan has previously built French-designed Agosta-90B-class diesel-electric submarines under licence in Karachi and is not, therefore, without experience in submarine construction. Even so, the Hangor-class program has experienced significant delays, and all eight boats may not be operational by 2030 as originally envisaged. A decade after Pakistan ordered the Hangor-class, not one of these submarines, including the four boats that will be built in China, is operational.

Pakistan's Hangor-class diesel-electric submarines are widely expected to have a significant, if not a primary, nuclear weapons delivery role. In the absence of discernible modifications to the Hangor-class, namely the presence of one or more vertical launch cells that can accommodate a submarine-launched ballistic missile, the Hangor-class submarines tasked with nuclear patrols, which may or may not amount to a subset of the serviceable submarines that are at sea/ready to leave port on short notice, will likely be limited to nuclear-armed land-attack cruise missiles. Pakistan is likely to use a nuclear-armed version or derivative of the Babur-3 land-attack cruise missile.

Diesel-electric submarines—even those equipped with an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system in the manner of the Hangor-class and the underlying Chinese Type 039B-class, which are equipped with a Stirling closed-cycle heat engine—have very limited submerged range-endurance. These submarines are, as such, poorly suited to a continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence role, which is likely what Pakistan requires given the very limited strategic depth and early warning afforded by the country's geography in the current technological environment. It goes without saying that any Pakistani submarines—and surface ships more generally—that remain in port—whether Karachi or Gwadar, which is about as far west as one can go along Pakistan's coastline—will be highly vulnerable to Indian air and missile strikes, a dynamic that was vividly on display across Pakistan in May 2025. The patrol duration of nuclear-armed Hangor-class submarines is likely to be limited—20 or so days when wholly reliant on the AIP, unless the Hangor-class is fitted with higher energy density/specific energy lithium ion batteries—and 3-4 of the planned 8 Hangor-class submarines are likely to be tied up with sustaining a single nuclear-armed submarine at sea on a constant basis.

Given the above and with the naval aspect of the May 2025 India-Pakistan War in mind, there is a case to be made that Pakistan will likely have to deploy a significantly larger—larger than the 8 planned Hangor-class boats—submarine force. This is difficult for any country to do, not least a country in Pakistan's perennially precarious economic and fiscal state. While Chinese largesse—which is ultimately self-interested given the scope for the growth in Pakistani military capabilities vis-a-vis India to offset and even throttle the growth of Indian military capabilities vis-a-vis China—in this area is a possibility, the more prudent approach will be for Pakistan to fundamentally rethink how it goes about modernizing its surface fleet and the roles that its qualitatively and quantitatively inferior surface fleet can realistically play in times of peace, crisis, and war vis-a-vis India.