Minimal comment-themed posts are used to introduce data points for use in other posts going forward. Posts of this theme will typically feature minimal analysis and commentary.

One of the most unusual sets of armament trade relationships can be found in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan, a longtime customer of both Russian and Israeli military equipment, has increasingly diversified its military purchases away from Russia by turning to Turkiye and Pakistan alongside Israel, which remains one of Baku’s most important armaments suppliers. The sale of Pakistani-built JF-17 fighter aircraft to Azerbaijan ultimately amounts to an indirect sale of a Chinese-designed military aircraft and associated Chinese-built components and munitions to Azerbaijan. While it amounts to the first sale of Chinese-origin fighter aircraft to a post-Soviet country, China has, however, exported other types of military equipment to Central Asian countries, as well as Belarus.

The Pakistan air force recently deployed five JF-17 fighter aircraft to Azerbaijan in a deployment that is likely intended to both facilitate a bilateral exercise and help the Azerbaijani air force prepare for the eventual delivery of its Pakistani-built JF-17 fighters.

According to a press release, the Pakistani JF-17 fighters and the accompanying Il-78 aerial refuelling/tanker aircraft undertook a non-stop 2600-kilometer flight from Kamra airbase, which is in Pakistan’s Punjab province, to Baku, Azerbaijan. Given recent clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which likely resulted in the purposeful avoidance of Afghan airspace notwithstanding Taliban-ruled Afghanistan’s non-existent air defences, and the claimed flight distance, which is grossly excessive if the Pakistani aircraft transited Iranian airspace, the six Pakistan air force aircraft appear to have transited over the Karakoram Mountains to enter Chinese airspace and then flown over Kazakhstan, and perhaps Uzbekistan, and ultimately the Caspian Sea, to reach Baku.

While Azerbaijan has developed a close military relationship with Pakistan, Baku retains close ties with its longstanding armaments supplier, Israel, ties that have also notably not derailed bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Turkiye despite tensions between Israel and Turkiye over the war in Gaza and Pakistan’s official position on the matter. Strengthening military ties between Pakistan and Turkiye, a decade-long dynamic, are likely to have facilitated the sale of Pakistani-built JF-17 fighters to Azerbaijan.

Strengthening Pakistan-Turkiye military and military industrial ties, which are primarily manifested in terms of Turkish armament sales to Pakistan, have caught the attention of India, not least in the aftermath of the brief May 2025 India-Pakistan War, a conflict in which Pakistan is reported to have made extensive use of Turkish-origin strike drones. India is, for its part, exporting armaments to Armenia, Azerbaijan’s long-time adversary and co-belligerent in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is possible, even likely, that New Delhi views the sale of armaments to Armenia with Turkish support and, to a lesser degree, Azerbaijan’s indirect support, for Pakistan in mind. India’s armament sales to Armenia are, however, also explained by New Delhi’s broad-based push to export armaments to essentially any country not named China or Pakistan. It also reflects, of course, Armenia’s search for a supplier of Soviet-pattern equipment compatible and, more generally, fairly inexpensive armaments, following Russia’s inability and/or unwillingness to intervene in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in its 2020-2023 iterations as well as Russia’s unavailability as a reliable supplier of armaments for the duration of the Russia-Ukraine War. This has also led to Armenia’s procurement of armaments from France, a dynamic that is, of course, also reflective of European efforts to wean Armenia out of Russia’s previously tight embrace in the context of the Russia-Ukraine War.

All things considered, the present-day Caucasus is a microcosm of larger diplomatic and military changes underway in many parts of the world. Pakistan’s export of a fairly small number of Chinese-designed JF-17 fighter aircraft to Azerbaijan would, in normal times, barely register, but it is worth noting given how it is indicative of an armaments trade in a state of flux.

Minimal comment-themed posts are used to introduce data points for use in other posts going forward. Posts of this theme will typically feature minimal analysis and commentary.

The used armaments market is undergoing a highly consequential but widely overlooked period of flux largely as a result of the multifaceted dislocations brought about by the Russia-Ukraine War. This post focuses on the recently finalized sale of twelve ex-British air force C-130J-30 turboprop-powered military transport aircraft to Turkiye, which is particularly notable in that it amounts to a fairly uncommon transfer of quite expensive military equipment well in advance of what would have otherwise been the end of its decades-long service life.

While widely overlooked, the used armaments market plays a key role in enabling budget-strapped militaries to, with a considerable lag, somewhat keep up with advances in military technology. From the end of the Cold War through early 2022, there tended to exist a glut of used armaments across market segments that allowed militaries worldwide to modernize on a budget. While there is variance across market segments, the post-Cold War used armaments market is essentially over. Leading militaries are likely to sustain and, in some cases, expand force structure, and in-service equipment is likely to remain operational throughout its service life. When it comes to Western countries, some types of retired military equipment are likely to be held in reserve, and what is transferable may be allocated toward allies and close partners. As a result, militaries worldwide will have to either cut force structure while modernizing or undertake increasingly large capital expenditures to buy new-build equipment at a considerably higher unit price.

While leading militaries are rarely buyers in the used armaments market, other than to purchase equipment as a source of spare parts for ageing in-service equipment, better-resourced militaries, such as that of Turkiye, sometimes turn to the used armaments market when good deals are available (following the end of the Cold War, Turkiye was for a time a major buyer of used armorued combat vehicles). The recently finalized sale of twelve ex-British air force C-130J-30 turboprop-powered military transport aircraft to Turkiye amounts to a fairly uncommon transfer of expensive military equipment well in advance of what would otherwise have been the end of its decades-long service life. Such opportunities are not only out of the ordinary but are likely to become ever less common in a time of intensifying military competition worldwide.

The United Kingdom received a total of twenty-five new-build C-130J transport aircraft—ten standard-length aircraft and fifteen of the stretched C-130J-30 variant—from 1998 onward. Budgetary pressures and the United Kingdom’s acquisition of twenty-two Airbus A400M military transport aircraft led to the early retirement of the British C-130J/C-130J-30 fleet by 2023. The Turkish air force currently operates an increasingly fatigued fleet of eighteen C-130B and C-130E military transport aircraft, as well as ten fairly new A400M aircraft. The Turkish C-130B and C-130E fleet(s) requires replacement in the near future, and the twelve ex-British C-130J-30 aircraft will, once delivered, likely result in a Turkish air force airlift capability that operates at a considerably higher rate of readiness. The savings—relative to the procurement of new-build C-130J-30 aircraft—will allow Turkiye to make greater investment toward other areas of its military capabilities.

The C-130J-30 remains in production, and its manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, has a fairly robust order book. While the specifics of the agreement between Turkiye and the United Kingdom are not public knowledge, this was a missed opportunity for other existing C-130J/C-130J-30 operators, existing operators of older C-130 variants, as well as other countries with airlift needs more generally to receive C-130J-30 aiframes with a lot of remaining service life at what is likely to have been a considerable discount. The United Kingdom is the only former operator of the C-130J/C-130J-30, a military transport aircraft design that is likely to remain in active service worldwide well into the 2060s, if not the 2070s, and no additional used C-130J/C-130J-30 airframes are likely to be available on the used armaments market for the foreseeable future.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

This image of a laser-guided bomb of the American Paveway series (the second munition from the top with the two sets of cruciform/x-shaped wings) with what appears to be a wing kit—range-extension kit—highlights an interesting but non-surprising development. The use of external laser designators (i.e., not mounted on the aircraft carrying and releasing the laser-guided bomb) is an established practice. It is now possible to use uncrewed aircraft, including small, light, and fairly inexpensive multirotor drones (see images 2-3 and the video), to illuminate/paint targets with a laser designator. A wing kit for the ubiquitous Paveway series of laser-guided bombs will allow aircraft to employ a munition that is not heavily, if not wholly, reliant on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS/GPS positioning data to attack distant targets even in the face of extensive adversary—and friendly—electronic warfare activity. A laser-guided Paveway series bomb equipped with a wing kit converts the Paveway laser-guided bomb into a guided glide bomb. This particular version of the Paveway series may be compatible with the internal weapons bay found on the likes of the F-35 and F-22, among other crewed and uncrewed existing and prospective aircraft.

It is worth noting that the French AASM, which is a powered/boosted guided glide bomb design that is equipped with a solid-propellant rocket motor, is available in a version that is equipped with a semi-active laser homing (SALH) seeker. The South African Denel Dynamics Umbani, which is now produced by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as the al-Tariq, is similarly available with a SALH seeker. The Israeli Spice family of guided bombs, in contrast, are equipped with an electro-optical seeker and a radio frequency datalink that offers the remote human operator feedback and does not, therefore, require external illumination in the manner of the American Paveway series and other SALH guided bomb designs more generally.

It will be interesting to see whether RTX offers this apparent glide kit for use with the Paveway IV, which is a UK-specific evolution of the longstanding American Paveway design that is also used by Saudi Arabia. The Paveway IV is notably equipped with both an INS+GNSS guidance system and an SALH seeker. A Paveway IV with a wing kit will offer the United Kingdom a guided glide bomb capability that it does not currently have and may become the primary armament for the UK's F-35B—and future F-35A—fleet(s). Note that this image is from DSEI 2025, a major military industrial exhibition that is currently underway in the United Kingdom.