Commentary-themed posts are intended to broach or highlight a specific issue, not limited to recent and ongoing events. These posts will typically be much shorter and less detailed than analysis-themed posts.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my 𝕏/Twitter account. The original post may be expanded upon and edited for grammar and style in this here post. Link

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/02/01/iran-missiles-persian-gulf-trump-military-buildup/

Why do many seem to think that Iran's 23 June 2025 retaliatory strike against American forces at al-Udeid airbase was a "symbolic barrage?" As best as I can tell through publicly available information, Iran launched a total of fourteen ballistic missiles against American forces in Qatar, at least one of which impacted near a very large American satellite communications antenna. What were the intended target(s)—the discrete aim points/coordinates of the intended point of impact—for the thirteen other ballistic missiles that Iran launched? Without knowing the answer to this question, on what basis can anyone operating with publicly available information confidently claim that Iran only launched a "symbolic barrage"? Is this an inherently problematic post hoc outcomes-based determination?

To be clear, I don't know what the intended targets of the fourteen Iranian ballistic missiles were on 23 June 2025, and I will go so far as to say that there exists a low but nevertheless non-zero probability that the observed impact near the American satellite communications antenna may reflect chance/luck. Note that we do not know what type(s) of ballistic missiles Iran launched, why one of the fourteen Iranian ballistic missiles ended up as a leaker that by definition evaded American and Qatari Patriot ballistic missile defence interceptors, and, among many other things, whether any qualitative variance in the types of Iranian ballistic missiles employed explains why there was only one observed impact.

Perhaps all fourteen ballistic missiles launched by Iran were aimed at the American satellite communications antenna. Perhaps the thirteen other Iranian ballistic missiles were aimed at other, potentially more consequential and less "symbolic" targets. I do not know, and I imagine that most of the people who are calling Iran's 23 June 2025 retaliatory strike "symbolic" don't know either. If nothing else, it is fair to say that greater intellectual humility and analytical rigour are in order. Explicating what we do not know and the uncertainties of what we think we know is a very good place to start.

Commentary-themed posts are intended to broach or highlight a specific issue, not limited to recent and ongoing events. These posts will typically be much shorter and less detailed than analysis-themed posts.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my 𝕏/Twitter account. The original post may be expanded upon and edited for grammar and style in this here post. Link

One of the more curious dynamics currently at play concerns how the interplay of geography and Iranian maritime strike capabilities has divided the American naval presence in the Middle East into three separate components that are risky to concentrate into a single more capable force. The United States Navy now finds itself in a situation that is broadly similar to the everyday reality of the Russian Navy: subunits that cannot readily concentrate as a result of the interplay of geography—and, in the American case, Iranian maritime strike capabilities deployed in Iran itself as well as in Yemen through the services of Ansarallah.

There are three Independence-class littoral combat ships and two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers that are, in effect, "trapped" inside the confined, narrow, and shallow waters of the Persian Gulf. The Strait of Hormuz is a bona fide maritime chokepoint—it is the only way in and out, and Iran is very well positioned to threaten any ship that attempts to force a transit.

All things considered, and notwithstanding the formidable air and ballistic missile defence capabilities of the two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers in the Persian Gulf, these warships are best extricated from that confined body of water and are ideally sent to the Arabian Sea so that they can operate alongside the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and the three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers that serve as that aircraft carrier’s escorts. This will require these two American destroyers currently in the Persian Gulf to run the proverbial Iranian gauntlet when undertaking an outbound transit of the Strait of Hormuz.

The Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Delbert D. Black recently made an unpublicized transit of the Suez Canal from the Mediterranean into the Red Sea, with its most recent port of call being the southern Israeli port of Eilat. This destroyer is likely to stay put in the northern half of the Red Sea to intercept ballistic missiles launched against Israel from Iran and/or ballistic missiles launched against Israel by Ansarallah in Yemen, alongside the two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers that remain in the eastern Mediterranean to do the same. Even so, the U.S. Navy encounters a parallel risk should it dispatch the USS Delbert D. Black to transit into the Arabian Sea via the Bab al-Mandeb, which will entail running the gauntlet established by Ansarallah's primarily Iranian-supplied maritime strike capabilities.

If the United States is going to send additional warships to join the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and its three escorts in the Arabian Sea, it will have to decide whether American warships will force the Bab al-Mandeb and run Ansarallah’s gauntlet. The aircraft carrier USS George Bush—which is currently undertaking training activities off the American east coast—is one of the carriers that may be sent to reinforce the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Arabian Sea. Another candidate is the USS Gerald Ford, which continues to operate near Venezuela. Transiting to the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility via the Mediterranean in the shortest possible time will necessitate a transit of the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb. The alternative is for the aforementioned aircraft carriers to take a very lengthy detour around the southern tip of Africa so as to avoid running Ansarallah's gauntlet, not least in the event of open war with Iran and its non-state allies, including Ansarallah in Yemen. Alternatively, the United States can dispatch an aircraft carrier from the American West Coast, although that entails a very long journey across the Pacific.

While the United States has many options, and the American naval presence near Iran remains formidable, the de facto forward deployment of Iranian terrestrial and maritime strike munitions in Yemen through the services of Ansarallah has fundamentally transformed military dynamics in the region in ways that the current crisis is putting on public display.

Minimal comment-themed posts are used to introduce data points for use in other posts going forward. Posts of this theme will typically feature minimal analysis and commentary.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my 𝕏/Twitter account. The original post may be expanded upon and edited for grammar and style in this here post. Link

A newly released video seemingly offers documentary evidence of Iranian ballistic missiles—of the (very) short-range variety—in the hands of Iran's Iraqi non-state allies. The timing of this deliberate disclosure amid the ongoing crisis between Iran and the United States is unlikely to be a coincidence. While American military forces are reported to have recently departed from all facilities in the parts of Iraq controlled by the federal government in Baghdad, American forces remain in the parts of Iraq controlled by the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government.

It is important to note that documentary evidence already exists for Iran's Iraqi non-state allies being in the possession of Iranian-supplied long-range cruise missiles and propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones. Both of these types of strike munitions—but not ballistic missiles—were launched against Israel over the course of 2024.

While Iran’s Iraqi non-state allies have previously claimed to operate a different Iranian short-range ballistic missile design (the above image to the right) under the designation al-Quds 1, the missile seen in the above video appears to be an Iranian-made Ababil/Arman, and the sole publicly available image of the al-Quds 1 may not have even been photographed in Iraq.

The newly unveiled Qare’e would likely have been deserving of the name “Al-Asad shekan“ before the very recent withdrawal of American forces from al-Asad airbase, which was subject to an Iranian retaliatory ballistic missile attack in January 2020 following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani by the United States.

Minimal comment-themed posts are used to introduce data points for use in other posts going forward. Posts of this theme will typically feature minimal analysis and commentary.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my 𝕏/Twitter account. The original post may be expanded upon and edited for grammar and style in this here post. Link

Iran hosted the "Security Belt 2025" naval exercise, which included a Chinese and Russian naval presence, at the southeastern port of Chabahar in March 2025. A forthcoming trilateral naval exercise was reported well in advance of recent events in Iran and the current crisis with the United States. Any forthcoming Chinese presence off the Iranian coast will almost certainly entail the presence of ships from the PLA Navy's 48th escort group, two of the three ships of which recently participated in a multinational naval exercise hosted by South Africa. Any forthcoming Russian presence off the Iranian coast will entail the deployment of a corvette and accompanying logistical support ship from the Baltic Fleet that recently participated in the same multinational naval exercise hosted by South Africa and/or will require the frigate Marshal Shaposhnikov, which recently made an appearance at a naval exhibition in Qatar, to make a port of call in Iran instead of returning home to the Pacific Fleet. The attached images are from the 2025 naval exercise.

Commentary-themed posts tend to deal with recent developments. These will typically be much shorter and less detailed than my analysis-themed posts, for which commentary-themed posts may serve as “building blocks.”

The Iranian exhibit at the recent Partner-2025 military-industrial exhibition in Belgrade, Serbia, marked the first presence of the Iranian Ministry of Defence delegation at a foreign military-industrial event since the June 2025 Iran-Israel War. Iran previously promoted a diverse array of military equipment at military industrial exhibitions held in Iraq, Malaysia, and Belarus earlier this year. The Iranian exhibits at such foreign events offer a window into what Tehran is and is not comfortable with exporting to paying customers, a dynamic that is of particular importance given the damage that Israel inflicted on parts of Iran’s military industrial capabilities.

The Iranian exhibit was used to promote:

• Small arms.

• Anti-tank guided missiles. This notably includes the Almas-1, which employs a fiber-optic cable for communication uplink/downlink so as to enable a lofted, non-line-of-sight, and top-attack human-in-the-loop mode. The Almas family was employed by Hizballah in Lebanon against Israel from early 2025 onward to seemingly good effect, albeit at what appears to have been a very limited scale. Israel notably targeted a facility associated with the production of the Almas family, a purposeful targeting decision which likely reflects how seriously Israel takes the threat that this particular type of surface-to-surface missiles/anti-tank missiles—which are the reverse-engineered Iranian derivatives of the Israeli Spike family that Hizballah reportedly captured in 2006—pose should they appear in very large numbers in the hands of Hizballah in Lebanon.

• Small guided glide bombs.

• A guided 120 mm mortar shell equipped with a semi-active laser homing seeker.

• Air Defence radars. Even though Iran is promoting its air defence radars to prospective export customers, it is unlikely to be in any position to deliver such systems any time soon, given the large-scale losses of this essential type of military equipment in the June 2025 Iran-Israel War.

• Surface-to-air missile systems. This notably includes the Majid, which is a passive short-range air defence system that is best used against higher-flying and larger fixed-wing ISR drones. Short-range air defence systems like the Majid were notably either not deployed in western Iran in meaningful numbers at the outset of the June 2025 Iran-Israel War or were neutralized by Israel in that sector at the outset of the conflict. Given the threat posed by Israeli armed fixed-wing ISR drones to Iranian ballistic missile launchers and launch operators in the war, the promotion of the Majid and other surface-to-air missiles more generally to prospective export customers is somewhat surprising.

• Coastal defence systems, including subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles. Serbia is, of course, a landlocked country, and Iran’s subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles hardly stand out as largely undifferentiated, essentially commoditized systems in an increasingly crowded market segment.

• Two short-range—sub-300 kilometer range—ballistic missiles. Iran promoted the BM-120, which is a 368 mm diameter solid-propellant design that can deliver a 150 kilogram warhead over 120 kilometers, and the BM-300, which is a 610 mm diameter solid-propellant design that can deliver a 450 kilogram warhead over 300 kilometers. BM-120 and the BM-300 are the respective export designations for the Fath-360 and the Fateh ballistic missiles. It is worth noting that missiles of this range class are reported to have been transferred to Russia at some point during the Russia-Ukraine War, but this cannot be independently confirmed.

Iran notably did not promote the Shahed-136 propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drone at Partner-2025 in Serbia in the same manner that it did at the IQDEX-2025 and LIMA-2025 military-industrial exhibitions that were respectively held in Iraq and Malaysia earlier this year. While this may reflect sensitivities concerning the promotion of the Shahed-136 in Europe at a military-industrial exhibition that was attended by many Western delegations, it may also reflect Iranian efforts to stockpile propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones following the large-scale use thereof in the Iran-Israel War and, perhaps more importantly, disruptions to ballistic missile production as a result of the damage that Israel very purposefully inflicted.

This extensions-themed post is an extension of material that has appeared in another newsletter/section and other parts of my website more generally. While my newsletters/sections are primarily categorized by region, these can only appear in one newsletter/section, given how the Substack platform is configured, even as these may be highly relevant to readers who are primarily interested in other parts of the world.

I have long been of the view that Iran and Ansarallah in Yemen prematurely activated the latter’s Iranian-supplied strike munition arsenal against Israel in October 2023. That is, Ansarallah went to war with Israel with the strike munition arsenal it had at hand, not necessarily the strike munition arsenal that the Yemeni armed group and its Iranian sponsor envisaged had more time been available for further transfers of armaments. Much can be said of this widely overlooked dynamic, which highlights the role of contingency in military planning—carefully thought-out plans are often upended by real-world developments. I have covered Ansarallah’s Iranian-supplied ballistic missiles, which the Yemeni group regularly launches in quantities of one and two against Israel, in several writings posted on this website.

Anyone following current events in the Middle East will likely be familiar with Ansarallah’s regular use of Iranian-origin propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones to travel distances of 1800 or more kilometers in order to target the southernmost Israeli city of Eilat, which lies along the Gulf of Aqaba, as well as other locations in Israel—Tel Aviv included—more generally. Ansarallah has recently conducted several successful strike drone launches—successful in the sense that these somehow bypassed Israel’s forward defences as well as its point defences despite the heavy concentration of air defence capabilities that Israel has deployed to the Eilat area since October 2023. While I may get around to uploading one or more posts covering such attacks, which I hold to be useful data points for other countries around the world, this extensions-themed post is intended to highlight an approach that Ansarallah is not publicly known to have so far pursued, but one that it may come to pursue and perhaps one that it had planned to pursue with Iranian support prior to the premature activation of its strike capabilities against Israel in October 2023.

In several recent posts, I have discussed how China can use uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) and/or uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) as forward launch platforms for various strike munitions for use against not only Taiwan but also far more distant targets, such as Papua New Guinea, Australia, and the South Pacific more generally. The second of the following posts notably gives mention to what appears to be an Iranian encapsulated submerged-launch capable propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drone/loitering strike drone, a design that is seemingly intended for use with Iranian submarines and perhaps Iranian UUVs.

Ansarallah operates both USVs and UUVs, which are likely to either be designs of wholly Iranian origin or designs that have been built in Yemen with considerable Iranian assistance and Iranian-supplied components, and has used both against shipping in the Bab al-Mandeb area. Ansarallah also operates a wide range of Iranian strike munitions, including propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones and loitering strike drones of various range-payload classes and cruise missiles. Much of what is publicly known about the scope of Iranian arms transfers to Ansarallah since circa 2022 comes from Ansarallah’s occasional disclosures and the interdiction of shipments being sent from Iran to Yemen.

It does not take much imagination to envisage how Ansarallah may launch some of its strike munitions from vessels such as USVs. In its simplest form, a sea launch capacity for (some of) Ansarallah’s strike munitions can entail the use of a (crewed) fishing boat or perhaps a (crewed) dhow. With USVs and, to a lesser degree, UUVs already constituting parts of Ansarallah’s arsenal, it does not require much of a leap of imagination to envisage the use of USVs as a forward launch platform. Should such USVs be used in the Red Sea, Ansarallah can significantly reduce the range requirements for its propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones against Israel. This will facilitate the launch of much larger salvos than is possible when the distance to the southernmost Israeli city of Eilat is over 1800 kilometers if Saudi airspace is avoided. The forward launch of propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones will also facilitate the targeting of Israel from the west along its Mediterranean coastline with a more diverse array of strike munitions. Ansarallah is understood to currently rely on the Iranian-origin extended-range Yafa propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones to attack very distant targets such as Tel Aviv.

It is important to recognize that none of this is beyond the realm of possibility. A USV along the lines of those that Ukraine is employing against Russia in the Black Sea, which is to say USV designs with a maximum range of 800-1000 kilometers—Ukrainian designs that are optimized for a high maximum speed—can follow the Sudanese coastline to a launch position that is more or less across the Red Sea from Jeddah. Eilat is some 1000 kilometers from such a notional launch position, while Tel Aviv will be around 1350 kilometers from such a notional launch position, providing that the propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drone flies over the Sinai Peninsula to reach the Mediterranean. Should Ansarallah and, by association, Iran pursue such an approach, they will be able to reshape the regional air defence environment once more.

While this post focuses on Ansarallah’s strike capabilities, it is very much intended to highlight how we are dealing with nothing other than universal dynamics, which is not incidentally the title of this website. Technological change and the diffusion of knowledge and capacity to develop and build many types of armaments, more generally, is fundamentally reshaping military dynamics worldwide. It is inaccurate to say that we are approaching a situation in which essentially anyone and everyone may possess some form of long-range strike capability, given that this is essentially the world as it currently exists, not least at a time when commercial satellite internet providers such as Starlink are dramatically lowering the technological hurdles encountered to developing a long-range USV, a long-range propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drone, or a long-range USV that can be used to launch a long-range strike drone.

Iran is not the only country other than Belarus and Russia to participate in Zapad-2025—the presence of foreign military attaches as observers is customary and an altogether different matter than formal participation, however small and limited, in a military exercise such as Zapad-2025. It is worth noting that India is known to have sent a fairly large—that is, non-token—military contingent to actively participate in—not merely observe—Zapad-2025, specifically in the activities held at the training facilities deep inside Russian territory, such as Mulino.

One of the most notable and oft-overlooked characteristics of Iran’s military is how insular it is. Iranian military personnel have had very little exposure to any of their foreign counterparts since the 1979 Islamic Revolution that brought Iran’s American-aligned monarchy to an end. While military attaches represent Iran in many countries, very few Iranian military personnel train with their foreign counterparts, whether on foreign or Iranian territory, and the bilateral or multilateral activities that the Iranian military does occasionally participate in tend to be very performative, public relations-oriented events. There is a case to be made that Iranian military thinking and practices have, in most respects, stagnated as a result. Training events serve as conduits for the diffusion of lessons learned, including the hard-earned lessons that stem from combat experience and which are paid for in blood. The scope of Iranian participation in Zapad-2025 remains to be seen, as does the scope of military cooperation—beyond the now two-way transfer of armaments and the components thereof—between Iran and Russia going forward.

To entice customers, Starlink offers fairly inexpensive antennas, which are required to communicate with one or more of the ever-expanding number of Starlink satellites in LEO, as well as fairly inexpensive subscription plans. While Starlink can be used to access the internet from remote locations—in jurisdictions that formally permit the American company to make use of the relevant parts of the electromagnetic spectrum on and above their territory—Starlink antennas can also be used as a SATCOM datalink to monitor, if not directly control, various types of military equipment, including both fixed-wing and multirotor drones. Starlink can also be used to help aircraft, whether crewed or uncrewed, navigate if and when global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals, such as the American Global Positioning System (GPS), are inaccurate or unreliable. As a result, the advent of Starlink and other LEO SATCOM constellations more generally has profound implications for governments and militaries worldwide. Governments, including those of the Gulf Arab countries that are the focus of this post, have to decide whether the benefits of commercially available LEO SATCOM outweigh the inherent threat that these can pose when utilized by state and non-state adversaries alike.

As the above maps indicate, Starlink’s LEO SATCOM service is not currently available in much of the Arabian Peninsula. All commercially-motivated LEO SATCOM providers face an inherent incentive to find as many paying customers as possible in every part of the world, given how the capacity to offer satellite internet over essentially the entire planet is an intrinsic attribute of any large satellite constellation in LEO—satellites in LEO do not remain stationary relative to a given position on the planet in the manner of GEO communications satellites. The Gulf Arab countries also amount to a potentially lucrative market for Starlink and other commercial LEO SATCOM providers, given how these are characterized by quite high disposable incomes, high internet utilization rates, and, in the case of the larger countries, a proclivity of a substantial part of populations to spend time outdoors in remote areas that are often beyond the coverage areas of mobile/cellular phone providers. Whatever the incentive structures that Starlink and other commercial LEO SATCOM providers encounter, the governments on Earth, not the companies that own the satellites in orbit, regulate the use of the electromagnetic spectrum on and above their territories under the regulatory frameworks of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which is a specialized agency of the United Nations. As a result, the above maps ultimately reflect the fact that Starlink has not yet received regulatory approval from the governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

While I am not privy to the deliberations among decision-makers in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, it is important to recognize that the relevant decision-makers are likely to be concerned about the inherent threat that Starlink and commercially available LEO SATCOM more generally will pose if and when it is employed by Iran and Iran’s non-state allies across the Middle East. Much as Ukraine has equipped both multirotor and fixed-wing drones, as well as uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs), among other military systems, with Starlink LEO SATCOM antennas for use against Russia, Iran and its non-state allies can readily make use of Starlink’s satellite internet service to greatly improve the accuracy of their strike munitions—when flying over countries in which Starlink is readily accessible—to target the Gulf Arab countries.

As things stand, Starlink and LEO SATCOM more generally hold the potential to greatly enhance the accuracy of Iranian strike munitions. The core components of Iran’s regional strike capabilities are the country’s ballistic missiles, its land-attack cruise missiles, and its propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones. All three core components of Iran’s regional strike capabilities—especially the country’s propeller-driven strike drones, which likely constitute the bulk of its strike munition arsenal—are heavily reliant on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data, which can be denied through GNSS jamming and/or spoofing using electronic warfare systems. Like other countries, Iran employs GNSS signals to augment the onboard inertial navigation system (INS)—which are built to different price points and, as such, different levels of sophistication and accuracy—given how INS systems are subject to drift—compounding inaccuracy—over time. This is a particular challenge when it comes to the employment of fairly slow propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones like the Shahed-136, which is powered by a small 50-horsepower four-cylinder piston engine and has a cruise speed of just ~170 kilometers per hour while having a nominal maximum range of ~2000 kilometers. This results in a maximum flight time of around 12 hours and a lot of scope for inaccuracy when the INS is not corrected by accurate and reliable GNSS signals over the flight path.

Countries which encounter adversary strike munitions that are heavily reliant on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data have an incentive to invest in electronic warfare systems that can be used to jam and/or spoof GNSS signals. Jamming and/or spoofing GNSS signals, however, tends to be highly indiscriminate and has increasingly profound fratricidal effects in a world in which so many consumer devices and pieces of industrial equipment and similar are reliant on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS signals, which notably provide Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT). As a result, governments must decide when and where to jam and/or spoof GNSS signals. Facing a major threat from Iranian-supplied strike munitions in the arsenal of Hizballah in Lebanon and, to a lesser extent, Iranian-supplied strike munitions in the arsenals of Iran’s various Iraqi non-state allies as well as Ansarallah in Yemen, Israel decided to jam and spoof GNSS signals as part of its (ongoing) air defence efforts from October 2023 onward. As a consequence, Israeli civilians and the country’s economy more generally have been operating in a degraded GNSS environment. This has negatively affected the Israeli economy, given the everyday reliance of residents and companies on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data for PNT, including fairly mundane tasks such as navigating roads and requesting a taxi. The fratricidal effects of Israeli electronic warfare efforts have notably extended to neighbouring countries, including Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt.

Despite the above dynamics, the Gulf Arab countries appear to be unwilling to readily undertake wide-area GNSS jamming and/or spoofing efforts, at least not short of an all-out conflict with Iran. The accuracy and reliability of GNSS signals appear to have been largely unaffected in the Gulf Arab countries during the June 2025 Iran-Israel War. This notably includes Qatar, which was the target of a one-off and very brief Iranian ballistic missile attack directed against American military forces garrisoned at al-Udeid airbase. Qatar appears to have decided that the costs of denying Iranian strike munitions accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data—the fratricidal effects on its inhabitants and economy—outweighed the benefits, at least given the threat posed by what is understood to have been a limited-scale Iranian ballistic missile attack for which advance notice was given.

When it comes to Starlink and LEO SATCOM more generally, the Gulf Arab countries encounter a broadly similar dynamic even as the stakes are in important respects much greater. LEO SATCOM is not merely a potential substitute for accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data; it can enable the employment of existing strike munitions in entirely new ways. Not jamming and/or spoofing GNSS signals will mean that an Iranian Shahed-136 propeller-driven strike drone will, for example, be able to accurately navigate a fairly complex pre-programmed flight path of some 1500 kilometers from Iran to Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coastline or a less complex flight path of some 400 kilometers from Iran toward the southern coast of the Persian Gulf. Enabling Starlink, however, will not only offer the Shahed-136 accurate and reliable positioning data while flying over the Gulf Arab countries but also allow Iranian military personnel to remotely monitor and, if required, directly control the Shahed-136 so as to attack a target of opportunity, attack moving/mobile targets including air defence systems, and more generally detect and avoid air defences. In other words, readily available LEO SATCOM is a much greater threat when integrated onto strike munitions than readily available PNT through GNSS could ever be.

As with all actively emitting radio frequency systems, Starlink and other LEO communication satellites more generally can, in principle, be jammed and spoofed. In practice, this is far more complicated than jamming and/or spoofing GNSS signals, not least as a result of the higher power signals being emitted by satellites located some 550 kilometers from the planet—in LEO—as opposed to over 20,000 kilometers from the planet. When it comes to Starlink and other LEO SATCOM systems more generally, governments that have good relations with both Starlink and its parent company SpaceX and, above all, the United States government, are likely to prefer something in the vein of a “kill switch” that allows governments to terminate availability of LEO SATCOM over their territory, at least to non-government users/receivers, when required. Such measures will, of course, have fratricidal effects on civilian life and the economy, especially as Starlink and other commercial satellite internet providers come to play an increasingly central role in a country’s telecommunications infrastructure. Without such a “kill switch,” the Gulf Arab countries are likely to face a significantly enhanced threat from Iranian strike munitions, including those operated by Iran’s various non-state allies across the Middle East.

While this post focuses on the Gulf Arab countries, it is important to recognize that the implications of Starlink and LEO SATCOM more generally are much the same worldwide. Countries that allow Starlink to offer satellite internet service to paying customers on and above their territory are assuming non-zero risk. For most countries, the risks are fairly small, given that the threat posed by strike munitions operated by state and/or non-state adversaries is also very small. The use of Starlink in the Russia-Ukraine War, including Ukraine’s use of Starlink to remotely operate USVs to target Russian warships at sea in the manner of a remotely piloted surface-running torpedo, should serve as a cautionary tale to decision-makers worldwide. Unlike cellular data services through which mobile phones connect to the internet, which can be readily disabled on demand, governments have very little control over the availability of LEO SATCOM internet services on and above their territory beyond the formalities of the ITU, and LEO SATCOM is also accessible in international airspace and international waters, which presents its own set of challenges.

PS: While Starlink’s satellite internet service is available in Bahrain and Qatar, it is important to recognize that these are not “transit countries” when it comes to Iran’s employment of strike munitions such as the Shahed-136, and Iran can readily target these countries with strike munitions that only fly over the Persian Gulf. These countries also lack the territorial depth of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. If Starlink and LEO SATCOM more generally become available across the Arabian Peninsula, then Iran can send the likes of the Shahed-136 on very circuitous routes to, for example, target Abu Dhabi (UAE) and the Dammam metropolitan area (Saudi Arabia) from the ~south, following lengthy transits over primarily unpopulated desert.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

A new Wall Street Journal article offers additional information on how Israel targeted HAMAS' political leadership in Qatar. Israel appears to have launched air-launched ballistic missiles from F-15I strike fighters over the Red Sea, seemingly without flying through Saudi airspace. Unsurprisingly, the WSJ article claims that the U.S. military detected the infrared signatures of these ballistic missile launches through its space-based infrared system (SBIRS) satellites. There is no mention of the American-built Qatari UHF-band AN/FPS-132 ballistic missile early warning radar. It is also worth noting that publicly available videos are not indicative of ten or more (as originally reported by Israeli media) munition impacts. It is therefore unclear whether there was a target other than that particular compound used by HAMAS' political leadership. Perhaps one or more of the Israeli missiles failed in flight. While it is possible that one or more of the Israeli missiles were intercepted, people on the ground in the region would have likely noticed ballistic missile defence interceptor activity.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

Some observations regarding the reported Israeli airstrike in Qatar earlier today:

Israeli media reports indicate the use of 10+ Israeli air force fighter aircraft of unknown type and 10+ munitions of unknown type. Available images and videos suggest the use of smaller/lighter munitions. One candidate munition is the (American-built) GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), which has the advantage of offering a considerable standoff range, or even smaller/lighter. Note that while we do not currently know, the Qataris will likely find out—if they have not already—as there will be debris from the munitions used in the attack. Candidate aircraft are F-15I strike fighters and F-35I low-observable fighters. The F-16I fleet is also a possibility, but that aircraft type is more limited in terms of payload-range. Assessing the performance of Qatari air defences and those of other Gulf Arab states more generally requires information on the munitions and aircraft employed in the reported Israeli airstrike, as well as information on the flight path of Israeli aircraft—more to follow.

Supposing that Israeli media reports—which are, of course, sourced from the Israeli military and the Israeli government more generally—are accurate, I am unsure of the advantage of using 10+ fighter aircraft to release what appears to have been a small number of small/light munitions. The two-way flight distance from Israel to Qatar is immense—more to follow— and this reduces the practical payload of Israeli fighter aircraft even with aerial refuelling en route. We are likely dealing with a situation in which multiple Israeli fighter aircraft—of unknown type—were primarily, if not exclusively, equipped with a small number of air-to-air missiles to escort the aircraft equipped with the air-to-ground munitions. Note, however, that Israeli planners likely built some redundancy into the strike package. I would not be surprised if a larger percentage of involved Israeli fighter aircraft flew part of the route and turned back, likely while within Syrian or possible Iraqi airspace—more to follow.

There is a lot of discussion as to what the United States and Donald Trump did and did not know and when, and what the United States and Donald Trump did/did not do—or try to do—about it, supposing that Israel provided advance notice. In any event, today's incident reflects poorly on Qatar's military despite the tens of billions of dollars Qatar has spent on providing it with a (rather irrationally) diverse array of the latest armaments primarily sourced from the United States and Europe. While I will wait for additional information as to how Israel carried out this apparent airstrike against such a distant target, I am inclined to think that Israeli aircraft launched munitions over the Persian Gulf, which is to say from a direction/threat axis that should have been surveilled and covered by Qatar's air and ballistic missile defences.

Supposing that Israeli aircraft were flying over the Persian Gulf, these should have also been detected by Iraqi, Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Bahraini air defences, as well as by forward-deployed American military units based in the Gulf Arab states (independent of the timing and nature of the advance notice that Israel is reported to have provided the White House). Note that we do not know what the United States did with any advance notice, including whether American military units—including both air defence systems and fighter aircraft—based at al-Udeied Airbase outside Doha were placed on alert. If this incident had happened a decade or so earlier—especially in Doha, Qatar, given the aerial blockade-type situation that Qatar encountered for a time—there would have been limited coordination among the Gulf Arab states. In recent years, however, the Gulf Arab states are reportedly to have greatly increased coordination in air and ballistic missile defence—through United States Central Command's (CENTCOM) 609th Air Operations Center (AOC), which is located at al-Udeid Airbase in Qatar, which serves as the hub for these arrangements. It should be noted that American and Israeli reports in the aftermath of Iran's single-day April 2024 cruise missile, propeller-driven strike drone, and ballistic missile attack on Israel indicated that there was some level of coordination—at least the sharing of sensor coverage—between at least some Gulf Arab states and Israel via CENTCOM. This was, in part, made possible by the transfer of Israel from the United States European Command (EUCOM) to CENTCOM in 2021 following the 2020 Abraham Accords, which did not include Qatar.

What route did Israeli fighter aircraft take? Supposing that Israel did not fly through Jordanian and Saudi airspace without permission—and supposing that neither Jordan nor Saudi Arabia would have permitted Israeli fighter aircraft to fly through their territory, the most likely flight path was northern Israel-->Syria-->Iraq. I am inclined to think that Israel would have avoided Kuwait airspace—Kuwait is also home to a considerable American military presence—but hosting American military forces does not appear to carry much weight these days. Israeli aircraft may have flown over the narrow section of Iraqi territory with access to the sea and thereafter flown over the Persian Gulf. We do not know which munitions were used and, as such, the standoff range of said munitions. It is, therefore, currently difficult to say whether Doha was attacked from the west, north, or east. In any event, such a route would entail over 1900 kilometers of flight. Depending on the munitions used, the flight distance would have been reduced to some extent or another.

Unless Israel employed air-launched ballistic missiles or very long-range air-launched cruise missiles, the primary alternative to the above flight path would entail flying in Saudi airspace, including highly surveilled and—ordinarily—well-defended sections of Saudi airspace—most of Saudi Arabia's oil and natural gas extraction facilities are in the country's east and relatively close to the Persian Gulf. Note that we are still dealing with a flight distance of over 1800 kilometers. Another possibility is a flightpath that originated in southern Israel and included transiting through both Jordanian and Saudi airspace. Not that we are still dealing with a flight distance of over 1700 kilometers.

As with most events, we know very little about what transpired at this time. Anyone operating with publicly available information encounters considerable uncertainty. As I said in a recent post on another subject, it can take weeks if not months to (imperfectly) reconstruct what transpired, let alone divine the immediate and longer-term implications of what little is known about recent/ongoing events. Sobriety, cognizance of uncertainty, and intellectual humility are in order.

Update:

There is new information on the Israeli air/missile strike targeting HAMAS' political leadership in Doha, Qatar, from the Wall Street Journal. Key points for anyone interested in the military aspect of the Israeli operation:

• "More than 10 Israeli jet fighters fired long-range munitions at the house, causing explosions heard across the capital."

• "Israel assigned at least 10 warplanes to the operation, each carrying long-range “over the horizon” missiles that could hit their targets from a safe distance."

• "The distance from Tel Aviv to Doha is well over 1,000 miles. But the jets could get close enough to use long-range guided missiles without flying directly over the sensitive airspace of Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates."

• "As the jets moved in to strike, Israel’s military told their American counterparts that an attack on Hamas targets was coming minutes before missiles were launched but didn’t disclose an exact location, according to U.S. officials. The U.S. military officials saw the missiles launch and inferred the target."

• "The Israeli planes launched more than 10 missiles at Hamas’s Doha offices from outside Qatari airspace."

There are multiple candidate long-range "over the horizon" standoff munitions that Israel could have used—Qatari officials will have likely made a determination based on debris at the impact sites. Given how the Wall Street Journal characterizes the United States' ability to "see" the missiles launch, I would not be surprised if Israel used air-launched ballistic missiles—broadly defined—of one sort or another that were detected by American Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites, which have infrared-band sensors that can detect the infrared signatures of highly energetic missile boosters. It is worth noting that Qatar is home to a very high-end American-built AN/FPS-132 UHF-band ballistic missile early warning. This radar is understood to be highly integrated with United States Central Command's (CENTCOM) Combined Air Operations Center, which is located at al-Udeied airbase outside Doha.

There are at least two ways to interpret the following text: "But the jets could get close enough to use long-range guided missiles without flying directly over the sensitive airspace of Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates." The first option is that Israeli aircraft flew over the Persian Gulf, which would allow launches against Doha without flying directly over Saudi (let alone Emirati) airspace. The other option is that Israeli aircraft flew over the Red Sea and targeted Doha from the ~southwest. Depending on which air-launched munition the Israeli aircraft launched, such an operation may have entailed flying over Saudi territory.

Future reporting may reveal the flight path taken by the Israeli fighter aircraft and which countries' airspace was transited, whether wittingly or unwittingly. This will, in turn, allow us to eliminate some of the candidate—publicly known—Israeli air-launched munitions that may have been used in this very long-range aerial operation.

Additional points that I made in the comments:

• Qatar does not currently operate THAAD batteries—only the UAE and Saudi Arabia have received THAAD batteries at this time. I suspect most of Qatar's Patriot batties and associated MPQ-65 radars are oriented toward Iran following the June 2025 Iranian ballistic missile attack on American forces at al-Udeid Airbase, and given the limited threat posed by Ansarallah in Yemen to Qatar relative to other Gulf Arab countries.

• Qatar's AN/FPS-132 ballistic missile early warning radar has three faces offering a 360° field of view. Any air-launched ballistic missiles used in the attack were presumably detected by the AN/FPS-132 radar. The extent of early warning will have been determined by the distance at which any air-launched ballistic missiles were launched.

The baseline Kheybar Shekan is a single-stage solid-propellant ballistic missile design that is optimized to target Israel from western Iran. The baseline Kheybar Shekan lacks the range required to target Israel from Ansarallah-controlled territory in northwestern Yemen. The southernmost Israel city of Eilat is over 1600 kilometers away, the Jerusalem metropolitan area is over 1800 kilometers away, and the Tel Aviv metropolitan area is over 1850 kilometers away. While Ansarallah's arsenal includes the longer-range Toufan, which is a rebranded Iranian liquid-propellant Ghadr ballistic missile, it appears to be regularly using an extended-range version of the Filisteen to target Israel (alongside an extended-range version of the smaller-diameter Zulfiqar liquid-propellant ballistic missile, which appears to be a rebanded extended-range version of the Iranian Rezvan).

While Iran's pursuit of submunitions dispensing payloads for its ballistic missiles has been public knowledge for over a decade, these were thought to have been associated with Iran's larger diameter and greater payload liquid-propellant ballistic missile designs. The first public indication of the existence of a Kheybar Shekan ballistic missile version equipped with a submunition dispensing payload emerged during the June 2025 Iran-Israel War. This particular Iranian version appears to have been used to release a smaller number of larger and heavier submunitions as opposed to a much larger number of much smaller and lighter submunitions. The number and size/weight of submunitions—and the design of the submunitions more generally—carried by a munition reflects the target classes against which it is optimized.

Ansarallah's apparent employment of an extended-range version of the Filisteen—extended-range so as to have the range required to target Israel when launched from northwestern Yemen—capable of dispensing submunitions raises questions about the nature of this modification to the Kheybar Shekan-2 design and the scope of Iranian involvement in this adaptation. The simplest way to increase the range of a ballistic missile and other munitions more generally is to decrease the mass of the payload. A larger fuel tank is ideal, but that is a complex undertaking when it comes to solid-propellant—as opposed to liquid-propellant—ballistic missile designs (it is a far simpler process when it comes to cruise missiles and propeller-driven strike drones).

Although there is presently no indication that Iran has itself deployed the extended-range version of the Kheybar Shekan-2 deployed by Ansarallah in Yemen as the Filisteen, one of the lessons that Iran's IRGC Aerospace Force likely learned from its disappointing performance in the June 2025 Iran-Israel War is the importance of having ballistic missiles that can target Israel from bases in central Iran and, ideally, in eastern Iran, so as to greatly reduce the exposure of ballistic missile launchers and bases to Israeli combat aircraft. The extended-range version of the Kheybar Shekan-2—the Filisteen in Ansarallah's service—amounts to one option that Iran may pursue. The apparent availability of the extended-range version of the Kheybar Shekan-2 with a submunition dispensing payload is something else that Iran may pursue going forward.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

This newly released video from Tasnim News features, among other things:

• Footage of the nose-mounted sensor version of the Shahed-136.

• A Shahed-136 with a radio antenna that is indicative of a human-in-the-loop operating mode, which makes sense if/when the version with the nose-mounted sensor is used.

• Lots of Shahed-131 launch footage, which indicates that the Shahed-131 remains deployed to attack more proximate targets.

• Multiple instances of a Shahed-131/136 being launched from a pickup truck speeding down a runway.

• An underground facility storing a large number of Shahed-131/Shahed-136, simple rail launchers, and the pickup truck-based launchers.

It is unclear whether the smaller, lighter, and shorter-range Shahed-131 properller-driven fixed-wing strike drone—which forms the basis for the larger, heavier, longer-range and better-known Shahed-136—remains in production. While the Shahed-131 can be productively employed in a niche role of its own, Iran—specifically the IRGC's Aerospace Force—may have turned to a reduced-range, heavier-payload version—with a 90 kg vs. a 50 kg warhead—of the Shahed-136 for use against more proximate targets. It is, therefore, possible that the Shahed-131 specimens featured in the video merely reflect the presence of "legacy" equipment in Iran's arsenal.

The challenge that Iran—and every else—faces is that measure-countermeasure dynamics are driving up the cost and complexity of what used to be very inexpensive low-end strike munitions, with the cost growth being primarily driven by the need for GPS/GNSS antenna arrays that are more resilient to evolving electronic warfare capabilities (i.e., more resilient against GNSS jamming and spoofing). If the guidance system used on a Shahed-131 costs as much as the guidance system used on a Shahed-136, the appeal of the larger, heavier, longer-range strike drone design increases, not least in a context in which there is considerable scope to trade range for payload—install a 90 kg vs a 50 kg warhead. With the Shahed-136 likely to have been built in much larger numbers than the preceding Shahed-131, Iran may well have determined that economies of scale and much greater operational flexibility—as well as a substantially greater payload-range—justify the procurement and deployment of the Shahed-136 for use against more proximate targets even if it is likely to be somewhat more expensive than the Shahed-136.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

Iran is currently undertaking a two-day naval exercise. Day 1 has been uneventful in terms of the systems and capabilities that have been publicly displayed—the full scope of the exercise is not, however, public knowledge. The naval balance in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea has been transformed over the past five or so years in ways that do not receive adequate attention. While this reflects in part developments in the military capabilities of Iran vis-a-vis the collective military capabilities of the United States and the Gulf Arab states (not necessarily to Iran's advantage), it is, for the most part, reflective of what is now a very limited presence of U.S. Navy ships in the Persian Gulf following the withdrawal of most American forces from Iraq and, more recently, the total withdrawal of American forces fom Afghanistan.

Simply stated, American aircraft carriers and large amphibious warships are no longer a regular presence in the confined waters of the Persian Gulf, and Iran's naval capabilities have to evolve in response to the unavailability of such lucrative "captive"—but extremely formidable—targets located within 300 or so kilometers from the Iranian coastline. While Iran's so-called sea denial capabilities in the Persian Gulf are often treated as a given, the situation is a lot more complex than it used to be, and there is a case to be made that the growth in Iran's naval—including maritime strike—capabilities has lagged well behind the growth in Iran's short-, medium-, and long-range terrestrial strike capabilities, which are afforded by its long-range guided artillery rockets, ballistic missiles of various types and range classes, cruise missiles, and propeller-driven strike drones of various types. It is important to note that there is some overlap between Iran's terrestrial strike and maritime strike munitions.

While there is a lot more to fielded military capabilities than the technical particulars of munitions and other military systems, it is nevertheless worth noting the capability areas that do not appear to have been displayed or tested on the first day of the ongoing naval exercise:

• Iran's very slowly evolving submarine force.

• Iran's reportedly operational supersonic anti-ship cruise missile.

• The use of Iran's expanding array of loitering strike drones in maritime strike roles.

To match evolving adversary capabilities and advances in naval technology more generally, Iran needs to significantly enhance its maritime strike capabilities. The systems and capabilities that have been publicized on day 1 of the ongoing two-day naval exercise are, however, little different than what Iran deployed throughout the 2010s. With the credibility of Iran's terrestrial strike capabilities undermined following the two single-day operations against Israel in 2024 and the June 2025 Iran-Israel War, Iran will likely have to heavily lean on its naval capabilities to coerce and deter its adversaries. That will likely require a major qualitative expansion of naval and maritime strike capabilities that Iran has not publicly displayed so far.

This large-scale maritime interdiction has notably taken place in the aftermath of not only the June 2025 Iran-Israel War, which has left Iran more reliant on Ansarallah than ever before, but also the aftermath of Ansarallah’s direct military standoff with the United States, which began in October 2023 and peaked in intensity during the United States’ March-May 2025 Operation Rough Rider. Simply put, both Iran and Ansarallah are likely to have desperately wanted this and other shipments—the denominator of dispatched shipments of similar, smaller, and/or greater size and significance is not public knowledge—to uneventfully bypass the webs of maritime interdiction efforts, and the timing of the interdiction is likely to be viewed as particularly inopportune. This post will cover some of the highlights from the display of interdicted munitions and other pieces of military equipment organized by the Yemeni National Resistance Forces, a display that was notably publicized in turn by the United States military.

Shahed-107 Strike Drone (Iranian designation)

While the interdicted shipment included many Iranian systems that Ansarallah has long been known to operate and longstanding Iranian systems more generally, it also included some systems that Iran has only recently unveiled. One such system is the Iranian Shahed-107 single-use propeller-driven strike drone, which amounts to an enlarged derivative of the preceding Shahed-101 strike drone design. The Shahed-107 is distinguished by the cruciform—X-shaped—tail fins, which are V-shaped on the Shahed-101.

It is important to note that Iran only unveiled the Shahed-107 during the June 2025 Iran-Israel War. The Shahed-107 offers Ansarallah yet another means of targeting Saudi Arabia and American military bases in Djibouti, but lacks the range required to target Israel from northern Yemen. The specimens interdicted en route to Yemen may or may not have been configured and intended for use in a maritime strike role.

Small Piston Engines For Fixed-Wing Drones

The interdicted shipment included a large number of small piston engines for use with propeller-driven fixed-wing drones, a grouping that includes both strike drones and unarmed ISR drones. Ansarallah is known to operate a variety of Iranian single-use propeller-driven drones and has been reportedly assembling, if not manufacturing, one or more strike drone designs within Yemen. According to reports, local assembly, if not manufacture, within Yemen draws upon imported commercially-sourced piston engines built by Chinese companies. While unconfirmed, this shipment may have included piston engines built in Iran, which may perhaps have been intended for drone designs that are not assembled, if not manufactured, in Yemen.

Noor/Ghader/Ghadir Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (Iranian designations)

Several disassembled specimens of Iranian Noor/Ghadr/Ghadir family anti-ship cruise missiles were included in the display of interdicted munitions. While built in Iran, the underlying design is the Chinese C-802, which Iran initially produced under licence until it absorbed the technology to such a level as to build upon the C-802/Noor design and develop the larger and longer-range Ghader and Ghadir. The Ghadir is designated al-Mandab-2 in Ansarallah’s service.

Sejjil Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (Ansarallah designation)

The Sejjil is a turbojet-powered anti-ship cruise missile that is equipped with an active radar homing seeker. It is reported to have a nominal maximum range of 180 kilometers while equipped with a 100-kilogram warhead, which is fairly small for a ground-launched anti-ship cruise missile. Ground-launched cruise missiles that use air-breathing turbojet engines are typically launched with a solid-propellant rocket booster. The Sejjil’s booster can be seen installed on the interdicted specimen. Note the air intake, the distinctive control surfaces on the Sejjil, and the cruciform fins on the solid rocket booster.

Ansarallah previously displayed the Sejjil at a parade in Sana’a.

It is important to note that this Iranian anti-ship cruise design has not been publicly displayed within Iran and first showed up in the hands of Ansarallah in Yemen. The Sejjil has a very curious design and is notable as a small and presumably low-cost anti-ship cruise missile that is better optimized for harassment strikes, given that the warhead is too small to sink most major warships, let alone very large merchant ships. The existence of an air intake integrated into the fuselage is also notable, given that Iranian designers do not hesitate to mount turbojet engines outside of the fuselage in order to maximize the internal fuel load and, as such, range. This is the case with the Iranian Paveh cruise missile design, which is known as the Quds in Ansarallah’s service. Ansarallah notably operates anti-ship cruise missile versions of the Quds that it designates the Sayyad and Quds Z-0.

Kowsar-222 Short-Range Anti-Ship Missile (Iranian designation)

The presence of the Iranian Kowsar-222 anti-ship missile, which is better characterized as a short-range multi-role surface-to-surface missile with a possible secondary surface-to-air mode, amounts to a new development, given that the presence of this missile in Yemen was not public knowledge. The Kowsar-222 is a peculiar rocket-powered missile that was only recently publicized in Iran, where it is primarily used to arm small naval vessels.

The Kowsar-222 is far too small to severely damage, let alone sink, a warship or a large merchant ship. It does, however, enable highly targetet close up attacks on vessels of all sizes, such as a strike against the radar, bridge, or main gun of a warship, or the bridge and armed security guard positions of a merchant ship. Supposing that the Kowsar-222 has a surface-to-air mode, it can also be used against helicopters—it doesn’t take much to outrange the machine guns and/or autocannons used to arm helicopters or pod-mounted unguided rockets launched from a low altitude. This small and unassuming Iranian missile may, as such, play an outsized role in Ansarallah’s maritime strike and coastal defence capabilities going forward.

Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile/Guided Rocket Seekers

While discussions of anti-ship ballistic missiles typically refer to ballistic missiles that are equipped with active radar homing seekers in much the same manner that most anti-ship cruise missiles are equipped with active radar homing seekers, Ansarallah’s anti-ship ballistic missiles/guided rockets are primarily equipped with electro-optical seekers. This is a uniquely Iranian practice that takes advantage of the typically high-visibility atmospheric conditions encountered in the Persian Gulf and the Bab al-Mandeb. While fairly rudimentary electro-optical seekers can only be used in daylight—use at night requires the presence of a more expensive imaging infrared seeker—both Iran and Ansarallah are well positioned to take advantage of short flight times and predictable movements by the target ships in narrow and confined bodies of water.

Taer-2 Surface-to-Air Missile (Iranian designation)

Ansarallah deploys what is best characterized as a “guerrilla air defence” capability set that makes use of remaining former Republic of Yemen stocks captured during the Yemeni Civil War and various systems supplied by Iran. This “guerrilla air defence” capability set capitalizes on the mountainous geography of northwestern Yemen and Ansarallah’s preferred approach to warfare.

While Iran has supplied Ansarallah a variety of entirely passive sensors and surface-to-air munitions, it has also supplied Ansarallah radar-guided surface-to-air missile systems. Among the interdicted systems on display is the seeker of an Iranian Taer-2 medium-range surface-to-air missile. The presence of just a Taer-2 seeker on display raises the question of where the rest of the surface-to-air missile is. The Taer-2 uses a solid-propellant rocket motor. While Iran is understood to have helped Ansarallah establish the industrial capacity required to produce some components of various missiles and other munitions, even the most basic surface-to-air missiles are fairly complex designs. While unconfirmed, the presence of just a Taer-2 seeker may indicate that Ansarallah can produce a suitable solid-propellant rocket booster within Yemen.

Quds Land-Attack/Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (Ansarallah designation)

Included among the many interdicted non-assembled munitions components were turbojet engines associated with the Iranian Paveh land-attack cruise missile, which Ansarallah designates Quds. It is important to note that Ansarallah operates anti-ship cruise missile versions of the Quds that it designates Sayyad and Quds Z-0.

Relative to the Taer-2 surface-to-air missile, Ansarallah is far better positioned to assemble the Quds from a combination of more complex components shipped from Iran, including the turbojet engine, and less complex components manufactured in Yemen. While unconfirmed, shipments of components are likely indicative of the establishment of a final assembly “line” within Yemen that may or may not draw upon some components that are built in Yemen.

Ballistic Missile Components

Included among the many interdicted non-assembled munitions components were various ballistic missile components, including an inertial navigation system and many fins. While the presence of such components suggests the existence of a—at a minimum—final assembly “line” within Yemen, it is important to note that ballistic missiles tend to be far too large to be shipped on a dhow. The multifaceted challenges encountered in attempting to ship fully assembled ballistic missiles of various range classes are likely to have been Iran’s original impetus for helping establish production—or at least final assembly—facilities and capacities within Yemen.

Qaem-118 Surface-To-Air Missile (Iranian designation)

Perhaps the most exotic of the interdicted munitions and munitions components is the Qaem-118, a small turbojet-powered surface-to-air missile that Iran only unveiled earlier in 2025.

The Qaem-118 is either a reverse-engineered American Coyote Block 2 turbojet-powered surface-to-air missile or a very close emulation of this very distinct American design, which primarily exists to intercept propeller-driven strike drones and similar aerial threats.

The presence of the Qaem-118 in the interdicted shipment may indicate how important Iranian decision-makers consider Ansarallah’s military capabilities to be for Iran’s own security. All countries assume risk in transferring armaments beyond their borders, and Iran is no exception. The Qaem-118 appears to be a very new design, and it is possible that this interdiction amounts to the first time that Iran’s adversaries have been able to put their hands on a real-world specimen, a dynamic that is likely to drive countermeasure development and thereby diminish the effectiveness of the Qaem-118 in its current configuration.

While the interdicted shipment included Qaem-118 surface-to-air missile specimens, there is no indication that the shipment included the launcher, launch cannisters, and radars with which the Qaem-118 is associated within Iran. It is possible that there are multiple ways to employ the Qaem-118 and/or that Iran has developed a different approach for Ansarallah to employ the Qaem-118 as part of its “guerrilla air defence” capability set. It is worth noting that the wheeled Iranian Aras-3 based launcher seen in the above image set is understood to also be capable of launching Ra’ad-2 loitering strike drones, a system that I have covered in the past:

Various Pieces of Air Defence Equipment

Passive sensors of various types appear to be the backbone of Ansarallah’s “guerrilla air defence” capability set, which is notably designed to take full advantage of northwestern Yemen’s mountainous terrain. This includes electro-optical and imaging infrared sensors as well as signals intelligence/electronic intelligence sensors, which also have applications for Ansarallah’s maritime strike capabilities. The interdicted shipment included many such systems.

Almas Fiber-Optic Non-Line-of-Sight Surface-to-Surface/Anti-Tank Missiles (Iranian designation)

While the Iranian systems that were indicted have received a lot of attention, it is also important to reflect on the fairly long list of Iranian systems that are not publicly known to be deployed by Ansarallah or included in this interdicted shipment. Simply stated, Iran appears to be very selective in terms of what it supplies Ansarallah. In part, this may reflect Iran’s prioritization of its own needs in some areas and the suitability of a given system for Ansarallah’s purposes. Other considerations are also likely to be at play, above all the needs of Hizballah in Lebanon. It is notable that there is no indication in the public sphere that Iran has transferred any specimens from its Almas fiber-optic guided non-line-of-sight (NLOS) surface-to-surface/anti-tank missile design to Ansarallah.

The Almas family refers to the Iranian derivation of the Israeli Spike family of NLOS surface-to-surface/anti-tank missiles, which Iran is understood to have accessed following the capture of several specimens by Hizballah in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War. As of this writing, the Almas has only appeared within Iran and in the hands of Hizballah, which employed Almas family missiles against Israel over the course of 2024. Israel notably targeted the factory in Iran that builds Almas missiles during the June 2025 Iran-Israel War, a data point that likely reflects how seriously Israel appears to be taking the difficult-to-counter threat posed by these small NLOS surface-to-surface missiles against not just Isreali military vehicles but also stationary sites/facilities near the Israel-Lebanon border.

While Ansarallah does not encounter anything like the Israeli Merkeva Mk4 tanks that Hizballah encounters along the Israel-Lebanon border, the Almas family is best understood as a family of NLOS surface-to-surface missiles. NLOS missiles are very well suited to areas with mountainous terrain, which includes northwestern Yemen. The Almas family is, however, likely to be quite expensive, limited in supply, and prioritized for Hizballah. While this is speculative, it is possible that Ansarallah remains below Hizballah on the pecking order in areas in which Hizballah also has need. Consider, for example, how Hizballah does not, in effect, compete with Ansarallah for deliveries of Iranian long-range ballistic missiles but likely competes with—and comes out on top of—Ansarallah for deliveries of the likes of the Almas family.

While Iran’s ballistic missiles regularly make headlines, Iran is hardly the only country in the Middle East to deploy ballistic missiles and several countries in the region are capable of manufacturing ballistic missiles. Included in this grouping is Turkiye, which is not only capable of designing and manufacturing conventionally-armed ballistic missiles but is also developing and seemingly deploying conventionally-armed ballistic missiles with a maximum range approaching 1000 kilometers while planning to ultimately deploy ballistic missiles with a maximum range of 2000 or more kilometers.

Most operators of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles tend to focus on designs with a maximum range of no more than 300-500 kilometers for various reasons. Turkiye has much grander ambitions and appears intent on developing a conventionally-armed ballistic missile force of unknown size that will, in purely qualitative terms, likely be akin to the arsenals of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force. Although Turkiye’s development of ballistic missiles is hardly breaking news—we are simply witnessing the fruits of over thirty years of concerted investment and research and development activity—the expanding reach of Turkish ballistic missiles is likely to be a contributing factor to the collision course that Israel and Turkiye are currently on following recurring Israeli attacks on the Turkish-aligned new Syrian government in Damascus and in light of the restructuring of power dynamics in the region following the Iran-Israel War. During the Iran-Israel War, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan notably announced that his country would be accelerating its efforts to deploy medium- and long-range missiles.

Turkiye’s dynamic and fast-evolving military industry recently displayed its latest products at the biennial IDEF military industrial exhibition in Istanbul. One of the highlights at IDEF 2025 was the unveiling of Tayfun Block 4 ballistic missile. According to its manufacturer Roketsan, the Tayfun Block 4 weighs 7200 kg, has a length of 10 meters, and, importantly, has a diameter of 938 mm. The solid-fuelled Tayfun Block 4 is a large ballistic missile by any standard, and likely has a maximum range in the region of 750-1000 km.

It is important to note that the Tayfun Block 4 is a much larger ballistic missile than the J-600T Yıldırım, a Turkish-made solid-fuelled 610 mm diameter ~2000 kg ballistic missile design of Chinese origin, as well as the newer 610 mm Bora/Khan ballistic missile.

When it is deployed by the Turkish military and supposing that it has a maximum range in the region of 750-1000 km, the Tayfun Block 4 will allow Turkiye to readily target all of Israel, the western half of Iran, and much of southwestern Russia. Reports indicate that Turkiye is developing an even larger and longer-range ballistic missile called the Cenk, which appears to have a target maximum range of 2000 kilometers. Such a ballistic missile will allow Turkiye to, among other things, target Moscow.

Appreciating the implications of Turkiye’s development of a long-range conventionally-armed ballistic missile arsenal requires a holistic appraisal of Turkiye’s military-geographical context. Turkiye, a NATO member state, is not only in a complex neighbourhood, but it also has limited strategic depth on its north-south axis. The country’s peculiar geographic layout shapes the implications of the Tayfun Block 4 and prospective longer-range Turkish ballistic missile designs. Two particularly important points to consider are that Tel Aviv is just ~450-475 kilometers from Turkiye, and that a Turkish ballistic missile with a maximum range of just ~700-750 kilometers can reach the southernmost Israeli port city of Eilat. The following map features range rings in 250-kilometer increments.

A Turkish conventionally-armed long-range ballistic missile force is likely to complicate Israeli military planning, independent of the fact that Turkiye is a NATO member state. To appreciate why this is the case, it is important to recognize that all individual radar antennas have a field of view of no more than 120°. This includes the individual highly specialized radars that Israel uses to detect incoming ballistic missiles. Simply stated, Israel requires ballistic missile detection radars with different orientations to detect ballistic missiles launched from various countries.

The following map features three wedges that illustrate the fields of view required from Israel’s network of ballistic missile detection radars to detect ballistic missiles that are respectively launched from Lebanon and Syria, Iran, and Ansarallah-controlled areas in Yemen. Note that the following map does not show the actual real-world coverage offered by Israel's various ballistic missile detection radars or the American AN/TPY-2 radar that is permanently forward-deployed in Israel (Turkiye is itself home to a permanently forward-deployed American AN/TPY-2 radar, which is understood to either directly or indirectly transmit sensor data on ballistic missiles launched by Iran to Israel). Should Turkiye deploy ballistic missiles in the western half of its territory, Israel will have to reorient its existing ballistic missile detection radars—or simply expand its network of such radars—to first detect and then—in very short order—intercept ballistic missiles approaching Israel from this new and previously unthreatened direction.

Although Turkiye's development of progressively longer-range ballistic missiles predates is hardly a new phenomenon driven by the recent Iran-Israel War, the war has nevertheless reshaped regional security dynamics and appears to have expedited the collision course that Israel and Turkiye were previously primed for.

Despite over two decades of effort, Iran has only made eleven successful orbital satellite launch attempts, placing into LEO a total of just fourteen small satellites in the process. As the following chart highlights, Iranian launch attempts have been sporadic, and the country’s space launch efforts only took off in 2024, which is to say fifteen years after Iran successfully placed its first satellite in orbit.

The effects of the June 2025 Iran-Israel War—which included the targeting of industrial sites associated with the production of both liquid-propellant rocket engines and solid-fuelled rocket motors used on Iranian ballistic missiles and SLVs alike—are unclear, and Iran’s dual-use space launch program(s) may have been dealt a major blow that will result in further delays. While the Iran-Israel War offers a proximate explanation as to why Iran may be unable to reliably place even small satellites into LEO, let alone beyond, over the coming years, Iran’s reliance on Russia to place larger satellites into the higher bands of LEO is reflective of longstanding dynamics and Iran’s continued inability to realize its ambitions in space despite years of sustained effort.

A Brief History of Iranian Satellite Launch Vehicles

Although the origins of its space program remain unclear, Iran has been pursuing an independent space launch and satellite design capability for over two decades. In 2004, Iran formally established the Iranian Space Agency (ISA) and began adapting its then recent breakthroughs in long(er)-range ballistic missile technology toward a civilian space program. In 2008, Iran began suborbital tests of an SLV with a first stage derived from the liquid-propellant Shahab-3/Ghadr long-range ballistic missile that was later unveiled as the Safir. In February 2009, a Safir SLV placed Iran’s first satellite into orbit.

Much like the Soviet Union’s Cold War-era Sputnik satellite, Iran’s first satellite, the 27-kilogram Omid, was a technical achievement but had very little practical value for either civilian or military purposes. The small size of the Omid reflected Iran’s limited satellite design and manufacturing capacity as well as the fact that the two-stage Safir SLV was incapable of placing substantially larger or more useful payloads into LEO, let alone beyond. The outdated liquid-propellant first-stage used on the Safir, which was derived from the 1960s-origin technology found on Soviet R-17 Elbrus “Scud” ballistic missiles by way of North Korea, offered little scope for performance growth, making it an evolutionary dead end. Iran, therefore, began to develop the Simorgh, an SLV built around a cluster of four liquid-propellant rocket engines derived from the Shahab-3/Ghadr for its first stage.

At the time of its unveiling in 2010, the Simorgh SLV appeared to offer Iran’s space program a path toward placing larger and more useful satellites, whether civilian or military, into orbit. The development of the Simorgh SLV was, however, beset by technical challenges. While a Simorgh SLV undertook a successful suborbital flight in 2016, it proved to be an unreliable design, with all known orbital launch attempts failing between 2017 and 2024. Following years of troubleshooting, Iran conducted its first successful Simorgh SLV orbital launch in January 2024 and conducted the second-ever successful Simorgh SLV orbital launch in December 2024. A February 2025 orbital launch with what is reported to be an experimental payload and a very different orbital target did, however, fail. As of late July 2025, there have been no reports of additional Simorgh SLV launch attempts.

Notwithstanding the two breakthrough successes of the Simorgh SLV in 2024, Iran’s space program appeared to be in trouble by the turn of the decade. At the time, it looked like neither the Safir SLV nor the Simorgh SLVs were likely to offer Iran a reliable and militarily useful space-launch capability. Iran had, after all, spent years regularly announcing new satellite projects that it could not independently place into orbit, all in a context in which international sanctions and diplomatic dynamics more generally essentially cut Iran off from commercial space launch services. While Iran had the option of outsourcing its satellite launches to Russia and perhaps China by the mid-2010s, Iranian decision-makers were hesitant to become wholly dependent on either of these highly self-interested and highly transactional countries that had exhibited little hesitation in treating their bilateral ties with Iran as a bargaining chip with the United States and other countries. Iran, therefore, doubled down on developing its indigenous and sovereign space launch capabilities, and the results became public knowledge from 2020 onward.

In April 2020, Iran unexpectedly announced that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—and not the ISA—had placed a military imaging satellite, the Noor-1, into orbit using a new, previously unknown three-stage SLV developed by the IRGC’s Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (SSJO), the Qased. While the Qased SLV, like the Safir SLV and Simorgh SLV, used the outdated but functional and readily available liquid-propellant rocket engine from the Shahab-3/Ghadr ballistic missile for its first stage, it used new IRGC SSJO-developed solid-propellant rocket motors for its second and third stages. As of this writing in late July 2025, the Qased SLV has been used in three known orbital launch attempts in 2020, 2022, and 2023, all of which successfully placed small and light—CubeSat class—military imaging satellites into LEO. Iran notably undertook a suborbital experimental launch of a Qased SLV on 21 July 2025. This is the first publicly known launch of an Iranian ballistic missile or SLV launch since the formal end of the June 2025 Iran-Israel War.

Building off the surprise breakthrough in Iranian solid-propellant rocket motor technology that was unveiled in the form of the Qased SLV, in November 2022, Iran undertook a suborbital test of a related new SLV design, the Qaem-100, which was notably also developed and operated by the IRGC’s SSJO and not the ISA. Whereas the Qased SLV is equipped with a liquid-propellant first stage in the same manner as the Safir SLV and Simorgh SLV, the Qaem-100 SLV employs a new solid-propellant first stage, thereby making it an exclusively solid-propellant SLV and, as such, an SLV design with far greater practical military applications and implications—for use in a longer-range ballistic missile—than either the Safir SLV or the Simorgh SLV. As of late July 2025, the Qaem-100 SLV has been launched in a successful suborbital test flight in 2022, an unsuccessful orbital launch attempt in 2023, and two successful orbital launches in 2024, which were used to place an imaging satellite as well as an experimental technology demonstrator satellite into LEO.

The unveiling of the Qased SLV and Qaem-100 SLV received considerable international attention, not least because both these SLVs were developed and are operated by the IRGC’ SSJO and not the ISA, meaning that Iran has parallel space-launch and satellite programs. While the extent to which the ISA and IRGC’s SSJO share technology, expertise and industrial capacity is unclear, there are indications that the IRGC, which operates Iran’s ballistic missiles, is undertaking an independent technology development which, as previously noted, has far greater practical military applications and implications than preceding Iranian SLV designs. Attesting to the apparent absence of coordination between the ISA and the IRGC’s SSJO, in February 2021, Iran unveiled the Zoljanah, a new three-stage SLV design with a solid-propellant first and second stages that appears to be a partial replacement for the ISA’s unsuccessful liquid-propellant Simorgh SLV. As of this writing in late July 2025, the ISA’s Zoljanah SLV is understood to have only undertaken two suborbital test flights—in 2021 and 2022—and no orbital launch attempts, which is to say that the ISA’s Zoljanah SLV seemingly remains in development and is not operational.

Iran’s Qased SLV and Qaem-100 SLV, as well as the refined Simorgh SLV version(s) used in the only two successful orbital launch attempts using that cumbersome SLV design, have provided Iran’s civilian and military space programs a renewed lease of life to move beyond the decade plus of disappointment that followed the placement of the Omid, Iran’s first satellite, into LEO. That said, the satellites that Iran has independently placed into (low Earth) orbit to date are small and light designs, and Iran’s operational SLVs other than the unreliable Simorgh SLV are unsuited to placing more meaningful payloads to the higher bands of LEO. Furthermore, Iran’s operational SLVs are limited in terms of the payload fairing diameter, which restricts the dimensions of the satellites that Iran can independently place into orbit.

The Qased SLV, for example, has been used to place three CubeSat-class imaging satellites in orbit (in three successful orbital launches). The largest of the three satellites, the Noor-3, has a reported mass of just 24 kilograms. As a result of this very small size, the Noor satellites are equipped with small and light low-end imaging sensors that can only capture low-resolution imagery. Because these satellites are so small and light, it is not practical to install an onboard power source to counteract orbital decay in LEO. As a result, these small and light Iranian satellites have a short service life that amounts to a waste of a fairly expensive SLV such as the Qased. While CubeSat-class imaging satellites are very popular worldwide, these are primarily economical to place into LEO when there is an opportunity for placement as a secondary—in practice often tertiary—payload on a large payload SLV such as the Russian Soyuz that is primarily paid for by other customers.

The Nahid-2 communications satellite, which was launched by a Russian Soyuz SLV in July 2025, was placed into LEO as a secondary payload. Despite having a mass of just 110 kilograms and being placed into LEO at an altitude of 500 kilometers, Iran was unable to independently launch the Nahid-2 in the absence of a reliable refined version of the troubled Simorgh SLV. Satellites are not inexpensive, and Iran cannot afford to risk losing satellite payloads to an unreliable SLV. For context, consider that the January 2024 Qaem-100 SLV launch placed the 50-kilogram Sorya satellite into LEO at an altitude of 750 kilometers while the September 2024 Qaem-100 SLV launch placed the 60-kilogram Chamran-1 satellite into LEO at an altitude of 550 kilometers.

Iranian decision-makers and engineers are well aware of the limitations of the country’s currently operational SLV designs. While the IRGC SSJO’s Qaem-100 offer a greater payload capacity than its smaller Qased, the payload fairing diameter remains the same. Although the ISA’s Zoljanah SLV has a larger diameter payload fairing and greater payload capacity, it has not undertaken a successful launch attempt since its first suborbital test flight in January 2021. Iran’s ambitions in space, therefore, remain dependent on the still unreliable Simorgh SLV.

In recognition of the limitations of the aforementioned Iranian SLV designs, Iran’s two parallel space programs have set ambitious targets that have not yet been realized. The ISA has previously announced grand plans to develop much larger and more powerful SLVs designated the Sarir, Soroush-1, and Soroush-2 so as to offer Iran a sovereign means of placing large and heavy satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO), which is to say an orbital altitude of around 36,000 kilometers. In so doing, Iran will be able to independently place communications satellites into GEO—communications satellites that will, among other things, offer the Iranian military reliable access to a sovereign beyond-line-of-sight communication capability.

The IRGC’s SSJO, meanwhile, has announced plans to build upon the success of the Qaem-100 with the introduction of an as-yet veiled higher payload SLV designated the Qaem-105. In so doing, the IRGC’s SSJO will also develop an SLV with far greater practical military applications and implications. Unlike the ISA’s future SLV designs, the IRGC’s SSJO is likely to continue down the path of developing solid-propellant SLV designs that have far greater practical military applications and implications—for use in a longer-range ballistic missile. This development trajectory is, of course, at a greater risk of being curtailed by Iranian decision-makers due to concerns about military and diplomatic sensitivities, not least in the aftermath of the Iran-Israel War.

While the July 2025 placement of the Nahid-2 satellite by a Russian Soyuz SLV draws attention to Iran’s reliance on Russia to place larger and heavier satellites into the higher bands of LEO, it is important to note that Iran also remains limited in terms of its ability to design and manufacture militarily useful satellites, independent of its ability to place said satellites in orbit. This is underscored by the fact that the most capable Iranian-owned satellite currently in operation, the Khayyam, is Russian-built and was placed into orbit using a Russian Soyuz SLV in August 2022. The Khayyam is a dual-use imaging satellite, which reportedly offers a resolution of one meter, has a mass of 600 kilograms, and is situated at an orbital altitude of 500 kilometers. Not only was Iran incapable of independently designing and building such a satellite—which could have still been placed into orbit using a Russian Soyuz SLV—but Iran could not have placed the Khayyam satellite or its hypothetical Iranian equivalent into orbit even if the Simorgh SLV were a proven and reliable design.

In February 2024, Iran marked the fifteenth anniversary of the successful placement into orbit of the Omid satellite. Even with a record four successful orbital satellite launch attempts in 2024, which placed a total of eight small satellites into LEO, Iran’s space program had a long way before the country can place militarily useful satellites into LEO, let alone beyond, and do so in a consistent manner. Iran’s grand ambitions for its interrelated civilian and military space program(s) largely remain unfulfilled, and Iran is reliant on Russia to place larger, heavier, and more militarily useful satellites in orbit. Short of major breakthroughs in Iranian SLV development, Iran is, as such, likely to turn to the Russian Soyuz SLV to place larger and heavier satellites into higher altitude orbits for the foreseeable future.

When a long-expected but hitherto forever deferred war involving both Israel and the United States finally materialized, Iran found itself subject to a decisive Israeli surprise attack. For reasons that are not public knowledge, Iranian decision-makers appear to have decided against the activation of Iran’s Iraqi non-state allies against Israel and/or the United States. In part, this decision may have been shaped by the American decision to preemptively evacuate its embassies in Iraq and Jordan in anticipation of potential Iranian retaliatory action against American personnel. In a similar vein, the United States evacuated most of its military aircraft from locations such as al-Udeid Airbase in Qatar in anticipation of potential Iranian retaliatory action against American military personnel during an Iran-Israel War. At the same time, President Donald Trump appeared to be ambivalent about intervening for most of the Iran-Israel War, and ultimately authorized a limited-scale one-and-done set of air and missile strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities.

For decision-makers in Tehran, “preemptively” targeting the United States following the Israeli surprise attack would have only guaranteed total American involvement in the Iran-Israel War while unrestricted retaliatory strikes—following the targeting of Iran’s nuclear facilities by the United States—against American personnel and interests in the region similarly risked total American involvement in what remained for the most part a war between Iran and Israel. With no realistic path to any meaningful victory over Israel, not least in a context in which the United States had already extended to Israel a formidable ballistic missile defence backstop, Iranian decision-makers seemingly decided against activating Iran’s Iraqi non-state allies and the strike capabilities that Iran has, in effect, forward-deployed on Iraqi territory in much the same manner as they seemingly decided against activating Ansarallah in Yemen and Hizballah in Lebanon despite Iran’s rather precarious military position. Ultimately, the Iran-Israel War is likely to have played out in a manner that Iranian military planners and Iranian decision-makers never intended: with Iran fighting Israel alone, with Iran’s non-state allies on the sidelines, and, not least, with the United States refraining from an extensive and sustained strike campaign against Iran in a manner that would amount to an all-out Iran-America War in which Iran would have every incentive to both activate its non-state allies and also undertake unrestricted strikes against the Gulf Arab states.

While Iran’s Iraqi non-state allies remained on the sidelines during the Iran-Israel War, significant latent and residual regional strike capabilities appear to have remained in place within Iraq and Iran remains well-positioned to quickly transfer additional munitions across the international border. In the areas of central and western Iraq in which Iran’s Iraqi non-state allies have a regular presence, Iran has access to a series of de facto forward deployment areas through which Iranian strike munitions that may otherwise have insufficient range to target Israel from Iranian territory can be productively used against Israel. Additionally, Iran’s Iraqi non-state allies can employ shorter-range Iranian strike munitions against American personnel and interests in Iraq itself and do so in a manner that offers Tehran a modicum of plausible deniability.

Although Iran retains the option of activating its Iraqi non-state allies to target Israel in retaliatory strikes at a time when Iran’s longer-range strike munitions arsenal has been depleted and many of the relevant production facilities taken offline following Israeli attacks, Iranian decision-makers appear to have activated Iran’s Iraqi non-state allies for a different purpose: to target oil facilities in parts of Iraq under the control of the (Iraqi) Kurdistan Regional Government, including oil facilities that are owned by or associated with American financial interests. It is possible, even likely, that these operations amount to an undeclared Iranian campaign against an (Iraqi) Kurdistan Regional Government for, as Iran has long alleged, harbouring Israel’s Mossad and, in so doing, enabling Israeli covert operations across the border in Iran. Iran is no stranger to openly targeting what it considers to be hostile actors and interests in Iraq’s Kurdish region and undertook single-day operations involving ballistic missile launches in both September 2018 and January 2024.

Whatever Iran’s exact motives, several days of strike drone launches in July 2025 are reported to have temporarily taken some 200,000 barrels per day of oil production offline in parts of Iraq controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (including oil production voluntarily taken offline at undamaged facilities). Iran’s regional strike capabilities, including the strike capabilities in the hands of Iran’s non-state allies across the Middle East, may be inadequate for use against the combination of Israeli and American air and missile defences, but nevertheless remain potent against more proximate targets that do not benefit from such a high density of fully-alerted defences.

The above two videos highlight the potential for destruction in a context in which strike drones—and other strike munitions—do not encounter many, if any, air defences or global navigation satellite system (GNSS) jamming and/or spoofing. While these Iranian-built strike drones are not difficult to shoot down, basic anti-aircraft capabilities, which can be as simple as a manually directed machine gun or autocannon, have a maximum effective range of no more than two or four kilometers and must be deployed in very large numbers to protect each and every site. Whereas many types of industrial facilities tend to be concentrated in one area, oil extraction facilities can be dispersed over a large area and can, therefore, be very difficult to uniformly protect.

The strike drone in the above video, which notably features an X-shaped (cruciform) tail, is either an Iranian-built Meraj-532 or a larger and longer-range Shahed-107. The Shahed-107, which was employed by Iran against Israel in the Iran-Israel War, is understood be be a development of the Shahed-101, which has a V-shaped tail.

The Shahed-101 and Shahed-107 are much smaller strike drone designs than the better-known Shahed-136 and its smaller predecessor, the Shahed-131, which are both cropped delta wing designs. While all of these designs originate from Shahed Aviation Industries, the Shahed-101 and Shahed-107 occupy a peculiar and so-far distinctly Iranian niche of delivering a 10-15 kg payload over a distance of 1000 or more kilometers. The Shahed-136, in contrast, is reportedly capable of delivering a 50-kilogram warhead over a nominal maximum range of 2000 kilometers in its baseline configuration.

Although Iran is understood to operate both the Shahed-101 and Shahed-107 within Iran, these and other smaller and lighter Iranian strike drone designs are primarily associated with Iran’s non-state allies across the Middle East. In the hands of Iran’s non-state allies and in what amounts to de facto forward deployment areas for Iranian strike munitions, the Shahed-101, Shahed-107, and several conceptually similar designs constitute low-cost and relatively compact long-range strike munitions that can be more readily concealed and transported than much larger long-range strike munitions capable of delivering a significantly larger payload. While the small warheads carried by the Shahed-101 and Shahed-107 result in limited destructive effects and a limited destructive radius, 10-15 kilogram class high explosive-fragmentation warheads are suitable for harassment strikes against oil and gas facilities and other forms of fixed/stationary critical infrastructure. This allows Iran to undertake highly calibrated long-range strikes in a manner that cannot be done with, for example, a cruise missile or ballistic missile equipped with a 400-500 kilogram-class high explosive-fragmentaiton warhead. When the primary objectives are deterrence and coercion, it can pay to have strike munitions that are unlikely to destroy most potential targets.

Iran’s own “sub-conventional war” strike arsenal has only previously been tested once—against Saudi oil facilities in 2019—when Shahed-131 strike drones were employed in a limited-scale surprise attack alongside Paveh land-attack cruise missiles. The current small-scale campaign seemingly undertaken by Iran’s Iraqi non-state allies highlights Iran’s capability to undertake limited-scale and fairly low signature strikes against distributed oil and gas facilities that are very difficult to defend against. Because the maximum potential for damage is limited, Iran has an element of escalation dominance—which target is willing to risk general war and even more damage when the damage inflicted is primarily of nuisance value? With Iran’s non-state allies seemingly carrying out such strikes, Iran can also claim a modicum of plausible deniability and offers its services as a “peacemaker” capable of telling its non-state allies to stand down.

The recent strike drone attacks on oil facilities in parts of Iraq controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government highlight the latent and residual regional strike capabilities that remain in the hands of both Iran and Iran’s non-state allies. The Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” may be down and will likely remain quite impotent against the combination of American and Israeli military power for the foreseeable future, all while remaining a potent threat to everyone else in the region.

The subscale Shahed-136 model on display at LIMA 2025 notably had the “136A” designation inscribed on the wing stabilizers. The full-scale Shahed-136 on display at the IQDEX 2025 military industrial exhibition in Iraq, which was notably displayed alongside an official specification sheet, did not feature the Shahed-136A subdesignation.

The previously unseen subdesignation of Shahed-136A notwithstanding, the sub-scale model on display at LIMA did not feature any discernible changes of the airframe or the installation of sensors in the nose section, which Iran has previously unveiled on both the Shahed-136 and its original jet-powered derivative, the Shahed-238 (which may have evolved into a substantially different design that Iran appears to simply designate as the “Shahed-136 jet”.) It is, therefore, possible that the designation “Shahed-136A” reflects internal changes, with one option being the trading of range for greater payload.

With Russia not requiring the reported nominal maximum range of 2000 kilometers of the baseline Shahed-136 for use in the Russia-Ukraine War, an unknown percentage of Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya specimens employed against Ukraine are coming off production lines with larger 90 kilogram-class warheads—instead of 50 kilogram-class warheads—installed. Although this results in a reduction to the nominal maximum range, it results in a far more appealing strike munition design that can be productively used against a broader set of target types. While Iran is likely to deploy one or more versions of the Shahed-136 that are equipped with a heavier warhead—and perhaps an extended-range version that is equipped with a lighter warhead and carries additional fuel—there is no public indication of this as of this writing. The subscale model designated Shahed-136A on display in Malaysia may or may not reflect a reduced range, heavier payload member of the Shahed-136 design family.

Another possibility is that “Shahed-136A” reflects a rebranding of the Shahed series of strike drones. While the subscale model on display in Malaysia marks the first publicly known use of the Shahed-136A designation, Iran unexpectedly unveiled a very different single-use propeller-driven strike drone design with the designation “Shahed-136B” at a major military parade in September 2024. The Shahed-136B does not share the cropped delta wing airframe associated with the Shahed-136 and its smaller predecessor, the Shahed-131, and appears to be a much larger and longer-range design in the vein of something intended to target Diego Garcia and perhaps the Saudi Red Sea coastline when launched from southeastern Iran.

It is possible that Iran is intent on capitalizing on the brand recognition of the Shahed-136, not least at a time when it seemingly wants to monetize on both the design and the brand before a growing number of competitors flood the market with analogous if not superior strike drone designs—there is little scope for product differentiation in the world of low-cost armaments and Iran does not benefit from any intellectual property protections. Much as the jet-powered Shahed-238 appears to have evolved into the “Shahed-136 jet,” Shahed-136A may be a post-hoc formulation intended to justify the unusual designation of Shahed-136B for a wholly unrelated strike drone design.

The IRGC, which is known as the Sepah in Persian, exists in parallel with Iran’s regular military, the Artesh, and amounts to a second and highly politicized military force that has, among other things, its own ground force, aerospace force, and navy. While primarily tasked with internal and regime security, the IRGC has for decades used its outsize political influence to not only replicate much of the regular military’s capability set, such as mechanized ground forces and rotary aviation, but also establish a monopoly on Iran’s long-range strike capabilities. For decades, Iran’s long-range strike capabilities have primarily been within the purview of the IRGC Aerospace Force. This has bolstered the standing of the IRGC in Iranian decision-making in a context in which Tehran leans heavily upon its long-range strike capabilities to coerce and deter its adversaries. It bears emphasis that Iranian decision-makers have no real alternative to the long-range strike capabilities operated by the IRGC Aerospace Force, not least in a context in which the regular military’s air force is grossly under-resourced and operates a low-readiness fleet of increasingly obsolescent combat aircraft that are, for the most part, 30-50 years old.

As of this writing in early 2025, the IRGC Aerospace Force only retains a monopoly over a specific albeit very important subset of Iran’s diverse arsenal of strike munitions: ballistic missiles with a maximum range exceeding 500 or so kilometers. When it comes to shorter-range ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles of all types, and strike drones of all types, the IRGC Aerospace Force remains the dominant player by a large margin but has nevertheless lost its monopoly over Iran's strike capabilities. Iran’s regular military, the Artesh, is deploying long-range strike munitions in its ground, air, and naval forces. This includes some strike munitions—designs that are often not deployed by any part of the IRGC—that overlap with the strike munitions employed by the IRGC Aerospace Force in terms of range. Other parts of the IRGC are also deploying long-range strike munitions of their own. This includes the IRGC Ground Force, which not only operates helicopters as well as both armed and unarmed reusable runway-dependent uncrewed ISR aircraft but also ballistic missiles with a maximum range of at least 250 km, cruise missiles with a maximum range of at least 450 km, and propeller-driven strike drones with a maximum range that likely approaches 1000 km.

This briefing, which is intended to be the first part of a two-part series, examines the expansion of the IRGC Ground Force’s strike capabilities. Part I examines some of the winged cruise missiles and propeller-driven single-use strike drones displayed at a recent exhibition held by the IRGC Ground Force. Part I offers a fairly technical analysis that will help readers better understand the capabilities that these long-range strike munitions do and do not offer the IRGC Ground Force and Iran more generally. A prospective second briefing—Part II of this two-part series—will focus on possible inter- and intra-service rivalry in Iran’s highly fragmented military landscape, the inefficiencies of seemingly uncoordinated procurement in a highly fragmented military industry, as well as some of the logistical and command and control challenges that the IRGC Ground Force and the rest of Iran’s two parallel military organizations are likely to face in effectively employing long-range strike munitions in times of crisis and war.

While the focus of this briefing is on Iran and Iranian military capabilities, the Iranian experience serves as an important case study that is relevant to other countries around the world. Although Iran’s military industry rarely expands the global technological frontier in a meaningful way, the country has not only previously been a trendsetter but in important respects remains the pacesetter when it comes to developing and deploying lower-end long-range strike munitions, particularly those that make extensive use of off-the-shelf components.

Iran, of course, developed the Shahed-131 single-use propeller-driven strike drone by the early 2010s—it was discreetly on display at a 2014 exhibition—and used the Shahed-131 to undertake an audacious surprise attack on Saudi oil facilities in 2019. Iran also developed the larger and longer-range Shahed-136, which it appears to have deployed well before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Iran’s transfer of the Shahed-136 to Russia not only dramatically raised the profile of Iranian propeller-driven single-use strike drone technology but also drove Ukraine to emulate the Iranian approach and develop and deploy a diverse array of propeller-driven strike drone designs of its own. Other countries have taken notice, and propeller-driven strike drones, as well as low-cost cruise missiles and turbojet-powered single-use strike drones/winged cruise missiles that Iran has also pioneered, are increasingly part of the threat landscape worldwide. While Iranian strike munition designs are increasingly familiar to observers worldwide, Iran appears to be reorganizing its two parallel militaries to facilitate a major quantitative and, more importantly, qualitative expansion of its strike capabilities in a manner that will likely be of interest to other observers worldwide.

The Golaleh: A Winged Cruise Missile/Turbojet-Powered Single-Use Strike Drone

Perhaps the highlight of the recent IRGC Ground Force exhibition is what appears to be a new and previously unknown member of Iran’s well-known Shahed-131/136 family of cropped delta wing single-use strike drones. Whereas the Shahed-131 and Shahed-136 are propeller-driven uncrewed aircraft equipped with a piston engine, this newly unveiled design, which the IRGC Ground Force designates the Golaleh, is equipped with a small turbojet engine. The Golaleh is, therefore, a cropped delta-wing cruise missile or, phrased differently, a turbojet-powered single-use strike drone.

Iran has previously displayed turbojet-powered versions, or derivatives, of the well-known Shahed-136. This includes the Shahed-238, which appears to be a modified Shahed-136 airframe adapted to incorporate a turbojet engine in the rear of the fuselage. Unveiled in late 2023, the Shahed-238 incorporates an air intake as well as revised control surfaces and is not, therefore, a simple modification that can be undertaken in the field. The Shahed-238 appears to be closely related to, if not the same as, the M-237, the designation the Russian manufacturer of the Shahed-136/Geran-2 has given to a turbojet-powered derivative of the Iranian cropped delta-wing strike drone design. In September 2024, Iran unveiled another turbojet-powered member of the Shahed-136 design family under the confusing designation of “Shahed-136 jet.” The specimens of the “Shahed-136 jet” included in the September 2024 military parade held in Tehran are not identical to the Shahed-238 that Iran previously unveiled. It is unclear why this distinct design was not given a new designation. It is possible that Iran has not settled on a final design configuration for a turbojet-powered version or derivative of the underlying Shahed-136 design. The distinctive design features found on the recently unveiled, much smaller Golaleh, which is to date only associated with the IRGC Ground Force, offer some evidence in support of this hypothesis.

While a specification sheet was taped to one of the Golaleh specimens at the exhibition, it was placed in a sheet protector, and the text is not clear in the pictures and video that have been released to date. Uncertainties notwithstanding, the Golaleh is likely to be closer in size to the Shahed-131, the propeller-driven strike drone design from which the larger and better-known Shahed-136 is derived. This is a notable development given that the older—original—Shahed-131 appears to have fallen out of favour with the IRGC Aerospace Force following the deployment of the larger, longer-range, and heavier-payload Shahed-136.

The Golaleh has a distinctive pointed nose section, which is an unusual feature for what the IRGC Ground Force has characterized as a subsonic uncrewed aircraft. In itself, this aspect of the Golaleh’s design makes it stand out from the Shahed-238 and “Shahed-136 jet,” which retain the rounded nose section of the propeller-driven Shahed-131 and Shahed-136. Another distinctive feature of the Golaleh is that it incorporates a set of vertical wing stabilizers that are different from those found on the Shahed-136 and Shahed-238, as well as the publicly disclosed models of the Russian M-237. This wing stabilizer design has to date only been seen on the “Shahed-136 jet” specimens on display at the September 2024 military parade in Tehran. While the Golaleh is likely to be closer in size to the Shahed-131 than the Shahed-136, the vertical wing stabilizers extend both above and below the wing, as is the case with the Shahed-136 as well as the Shahed-238 and “Shahed-136 jet.” The smaller propeller-driven Shahed-131, in contrast, has vertical wing stabilizers that only extend above the wing.

The Golaleh also features different control surfaces than the Shahed-131, Shahed-136, Shahed-238, and “Shahed-136 jet.” The contrast is particularly notable with the Shahed-238, which appears to be a comparatively simple adaptation of the Shahed-136 airframe into a turbojet-powered uncrewed aircraft. Last but not least, the Golaleh has a small turbojet engine installed on top of the rear section of the fuselage. The Shahed-238 and “Shahed-136 jet,” in contrast, are equipped with a turbojet engine that is contained within the fuselage. That is, these designs have an air intake built into the airframe. Had the Golaleh been equipped with a turbojet engine that was rather crudely installed on top of the fuselage, this could suggest that the Golaleh is perhaps a conversion of existing Shahed-131 airframes or a low-cost adaptation of the Shahed-131 design that does not require major changes to the production line. The Golaleh, however, incorporates multiple distinct design features that collectively suggest a fully-fledged development process and a new-build design that is delivered to the IRGC Ground Force in this exact configuration.

It is important to note that Iranian designers and the Iranian military are strikingly accepting of designs that place a turbojet engine outside of the fuselage, which contributes to an increase in an aircraft’s radar signature and reflects zero effort toward shielding the infrared signature of the turbojet engine. With respect to the widely deployed Paveh family of land-attack cruise missiles, a turbojet engine appears to have been mounted on top of the fuselage in order to lower the complexity and cost of the design while also maximizing its range by increasing the volume of fuel that can be contained within the fuselage. It is possible that the Golaleh reflects a similar design compromise. While the specifications of the Golaleh are not currently known, it is likely to be equipped with a low-cost turbojet engine that delivers a maximum thrust of at least 400-500 newtons.

Iranian media reports that the Golaleh has a nominal maximum range of 450 km while equipped with a 50 kg warhead. As with all aircraft designs, there is some scope to increase range at the cost of payload or, alternatively, to increase payload at the cost of range. Observers should be open to the possibility that one or more versions of the Golaleh may be equipped with a heavier payload (internal volume permitting). Consider that Russia has installed heavier 90 kg, as opposed to 50 kg, class warheads on its Shahed-136/Geran-2, which is to say that Russia has traded range for greater payload. Given that the IRGC Ground Force, not the IRGC Aerospace Force, operates the Golaleh, it would not be surprising if a heavier payload is valued more than longer range.

Like the baseline Shahed-136 versions widely deployed by Iran and Russia, the Golaleh lacks a discernible onboard sensor and is therefore likely to be equipped with a guidance system using INS and GNSS. This makes the Golaleh dependent on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data and, therefore, makes it vulnerable to GNSS jamming and spoofing.

A Twin Turbojet Winged Cruise Missile/Turbojet-Powered Single-Use Strike Drone of Unknown Designation

The Golaleh was not the only turbojet-powered design on display at the IRGC Ground Force exhibition. Another design, the designation of which is not currently known, employs not one but two small turbojet engines and appears to be the first Iranian winged cruise missile/turbojet-powered single-use strike drone with this peculiar propulsion configuration. With two small turbojets mounted in the rear of the fuselage, this design of unknown designation has a distinctive T-tail configuration primarily associated with certain types of passenger aircraft with rear-mounted engines, as well as military transport aircraft equipped with high wings.

The IRGC Ground Force and Iranian media have so far only made limited disclosures about the specifications of this peculiar design. While it is reportedly equipped with a 50 kg warhead, no figure has been provided for its maximum range. As with all aircraft designs, there is some scope to increase range at the cost of payload or, alternatively, to increase payload at the cost of range.

This undesignated twin-turbojet design lacks a discernible onboard sensor and is therefore likely to be equipped with a guidance system using INS and GNSS. This undesignated design is therefore dependent on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data and is, therefore, vulnerable to GNSS jamming and spoofing.

An Iranian media report on the exhibition records an IRGC officer saying that this undesignated T-tail design was set to be used in a live fire exercise the next day. The IRGC and Iranian media have, to date, not released additional information as to whether this design was used in a live fire test. If taken at face value, this data point may indicate that this undesignated t-tail design is at an advanced stage of development and may already be deployed by the IRGC Ground Force. With a reported payload of 50 kg, which is the same as the figure associated with the Golaleh, and in the absence of disclosure as to the range of this design, it is not clear why the IRGC appears to be pursuing both designs or what design objective justifies the peculiar and not inexpensive use of two small turbojet engines.

Dalahu/Hadid-110: A Winged Cruise Missile/Turbojet-Powered Single-Use Strike Drone

Another peculiar design on display at the IRGC Ground Force exhibition is a relatively small turbojet-powered winged cruise missile/single-use strike drone designated the Dalahu. This design was recently unveiled at another IRGC exhibition under the designation Hadid-110. It is possible that the Dalahu is the IRGC Ground Force’s internal designation for this design, and/or that the new designation may refer to a specific version of the underlying design.

According to the IRGC Ground Force, the Dalahu has a maximum range of 350 km, carries a 30 kg payload, and can sustain a cruise speed of 510 km/h. As with the Hadid-110, the Dalahu has a very distinctive airframe, one that is carried over to the peculiarly shaped non-rectangular containers in which it appears to be stored and transported. The Dalahu/Hadid-110 has design characteristics that are typically associated with target drones. It is possible that use as a target drone is what this airframe was originally developed for prior to adaptation for use as a winged cruise missile or turbojet-powered single-use strike drone. In January 2025, the IRGC released imagery of two Hadid-110 specimens, one of which was painted bright red in the manner of a target drone.

The Dalahu/Hadid-110 lacks a discernible onboard sensor and is therefore likely to be equipped with a guidance system using INS and GNSS. This undesignated design is dependent on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data and is, therefore, vulnerable to GNSS jamming and spoofing.

A Carbon Fiber Propeller-Driven Single-Use Strike Drone of Unknown Designation

While the recent IRGC Ground Force exhibition indicates the service’s interest in faster turbojet-powered designs, the exhibition also featured several propeller-driven strike drones. As with the rest of the Iranian military, the IRGC Ground Force is likely to continue deploying propeller-driven single-use strike drones due to the lower cost and complexity associated with this propulsion configuration.

One of the propeller-driven designs on display, the designation of which is not known, employs a carbon fiber airframe. According to an IRGC officer recorded in an Iranian media report, this design can carry a payload of 30-60 kg and is equipped with a piston engine. The rear sections of the two specimens of this design on display were, however, covered in publicly available images and video of the exhibition. It is not clear why this was the case, and the operational status of this undesignated design is unclear.

The primary benefit of using carbon fiber in an airframe is weight reduction. All else being equal, the lighter the total weight of the airframe, the greater the maximum range with a given fuel weight and volume of fuel or, alternatively, the greater the payload (volume permitting) that can be carried relative to another aircraft of similar dimensions and internal volume. The issue that Iran and other countries face is that the most desirable attributes of propeller-driven single-use strike drones are lower complexity and lower cost of manufacture. This facilitates the deployment and use of hundreds, if not thousands, of such strike drones in a world in which few states can afford to purchase large numbers of strike munition designs with a unit cost of half a million to a million U.S. Dollars if not significantly more.

While a carbon fiber design has advantages, it is not a design characteristic that is likely to be conducive to cost reduction or mass production in wartime conditions. It is worth noting that Russia has reportedly made various changes to the design of the Shahed-136/Geran-2 with the aim of reducing complexity and cost and supporting mass production in wartime conditions. Given these considerations and the fact that an IRGC officer introducing the various strike drones on display was rather enthusiastically pointing out how the Golaleh turbojet-powered winged cruise missile employs a foam-like material in its construction, this undesignated carbon fiber propeller-driven strike drone may be more of a research and development project or technology demonstrator than a design that is set to be produced in large numbers and widely deployed as part of the IRGC Ground Force arsenal.

This carbon fiber propeller-driven strike drone design of unknown designation lacks a discernible onboard sensor and is therefore likely to be equipped with a guidance system using INS and GNSS. This undesignated design is dependent on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data and is, therefore, vulnerable to GNSS jamming and spoofing.

Ketral Propeller-Driven Single-Use Strike Drone

One of the more unusual designs on display at the IRGC Ground Force exhibition is the Ketral, a propeller-driven single-use strike drone design that has its piston engine placed at the front of the fuselage in a tractor configuration.

Most propeller-driven strike drone designs, including other Iranian designs, employ a pusher configuration with the engine located at the rear of the fuselage. According to an IRGC Ground Force officer recorded in an Iranian media report, an individual who is not an aerospace engineer, the designers selected a tractor configuration for improved air cooling. While this may be a valid reason for pursuing a tractor configuration over a pusher configuration, it results in a design that cannot readily incorporate an onboard sensor, which would ordinarily be mounted in the nose. While the baseline versions of the various propeller-driven strike drone designs that Iran deploys, including the Shahed-136, are equipped with guidance systems using INS and GNSS, several designs have at least one version that is equipped with a nose-mounted sensor. Given the tractor configuration, this is not an option for the Ketral.

An additional consequence of a tractor configuration is that it creates challenges in terms of warhead design and fusing. While the Ketral is unlikely to be employed as an anti-armour munition, a highly directional shaped charge warhead, should one be used, will have to perforate the engine in order to reach the target. Although this is not a concern if the Ketral is equipped with a high explosive-fragmentation warhead optimized for use against a wider range of target types, the tractor configuration impedes the installation of an impact fuse in the nose and, more generally, forces designers to place the warhead further behind in the fuselage. This, in turn, will affect the center of gravity of the Ketral. All of this is to say that there are reasons why propeller-driven strike drones typically employ a pusher configuration and that the Ketral’s design reflects distinct trade-offs and limitations that its designers and the IRGC Ground Force appear to have accepted.

Iran’s military industry and its multiple military services have a lot of experience with propeller-driven strike drone designs and are unlikely to have been ignorant of the limitations of a tractor configuration design. The declared selection of a tractor configuration in pursuit of enhanced air cooling is indicative of a long range-endurance design that is set to spend many hours in flight. The Ketral is indeed a quite large—very long—design with a large wingspan, which is to say it is nothing other than a propeller-driven strike drone intended to fly several hours to its intended target. While a specification sheet was taped to one of the Ketral specimens at the IRGC Ground Force exhibition, it was placed in a sheet protector, and the text is not clear in the pictures and video that have been released to date. Uncertainties notwithstanding, the Ketral is likely to have a nominal maximum range approaching 1000 km (maximum range is, of course, determined by the flight profile and the weight of the payload, among other factors) if not more, and is therefore likely to spend five to ten hours in flight.

Several Ketral specimens were mounted on a simple tripod launch rail at the IRGC Ground Force exhibition. As with other propeller-driven strike drones, the engine’s power output is insufficient for the drone to attain flight without a lengthy take-off run, and the Ketral therefore has a jettisonable solid rocket booster attached to the rear of the fuselage for rocket-assisted take-off (RATO). Many Iranian drones employ the RATO launch method, including the Shahed-136 and much smaller loitering strike drone designs. One advantage of a tractor configuration is that it facilitates the use of RATO on an airframe that seemingly requires nothing more than a very simple launch rail for take-off. Strike drones with a pusher configuration typically feature jettisonable RATO canisters underneath the fuselage and require somewhat more complex launchers.

The Ketral lacks a discernible onboard sensor and is therefore likely to be equipped with a guidance system using INS and GNSS. This undesignated design is dependent on the availability of accurate and reliable GNSS positioning data and is, therefore, vulnerable to GNSS jamming and spoofing.

Although the diverse array of strike munitions on display at the recent IRGC Ground Force exhibition was far from groundbreaking or indicative of an expansion of the global technological frontier, these nevertheless herald a major expansion of the strike capabilities of the IRGC Ground Force and Iran more generally. As a result, the recent IRGC Ground Force exhibition amounts to yet another data point indicating a major quantitative and qualitative expansion of Iran’s long-range strike capabilities and the unmistakable end of what had for several decades amounted to the IRGC Aerospace Force’s monopoly over Iran’s long-range strike capabilities.

Leaving aside the carbon fiber propeller-driven strike drone design of unknown designation, which may well be a technology demonstrator, the other designs on display effectively complement the strike munitions that the IRGC Ground Force is already known to operate. This includes the likes of the Meraj-532, a propeller-driven single-use strike drone with a claimed maximum range of 450 km while carrying a 50 kg payload. The turbojet-powered designs on display are likely intended to complement the Meraj-532 and similar designs with a faster and shorter time to target strike munition. That said, it is important to note that there is considerable overlap in the claimed performance of the three distinctive winged cruise missiles/turbojet-powered strike drones on display—the Golaleh, the twinjet of unknown designation, and the Dalahu/Hadid-110.

While there is little that is ground-breaking in the design of the Ketral propeller-driven strike drone, the presence of this design indicates that the IRGC Ground Force intends to possess strike munitions through which to attack even more distant targets. The IRGC Ground Force can, of course, simply deploy the Shahed-131 or the larger and longer-range Shahed-136—or any number of other Iranian strike drone designs—if it wanted to merely expand the reach of its formations with propeller-driven strike drones but instead appears to be interested in a smaller and more portable design that can be more readily deployed by small IRGC Ground Force units and, no less importantly, by those of Iran’s non-state allies across the Middle East.

A prospective SPAS Consulting briefing—Part II of this series—will focus on possible inter- and intra-service rivalry in Iran’s highly fragmented military landscape, the inefficiencies of seemingly uncoordinated procurement in a highly fragmented military industry, as well as some of the logistical and command and control challenges that the IRGC Ground Force and the rest of Iran’s two militaries are likely to face in effectively employing long-range strike munitions in times of crisis and war.

Iranian single-use propeller-driven strike drone designs, above all the Shahed-136, are increasingly well-known worldwide. While often inaccurately characterized as loitering munitions, uncrewed aircraft designs like the Shahed-101, Shahed-131, and Shahed-136 are primarily deployed in a baseline configuration that, among other things, lacks an onboard visible band electro-optical and/or infrared band sensor. As a result, these are not loitering strike drones, with loitering here referring not to the mere act of repeatedly flying over a specific area—which essentially any uncrewed aircraft can be programmed to undertake—but an uncrewed aircraft equipped in a manner that allows it to loiter in search of potential targets such that the loitering strike drone, which is a single-use system, can attack a non-pre-programmed target by detonating upon impact with said target.

While Iran has been a pioneer in developing single-use propeller-driven strike drones—without necessarily expanding the global technological frontier—that allow it to attack stationary targets at range, it has, until recently, exhibited a far more limited interest in single-use loitering strike drones capable of attacking both stationary and mobile targets over shorter distances. This dynamic gradually changed in the late 2010s as Iran closely emulated, and in some cases seemingly reverse-engineered, foreign loitering strike drone designs. Having been primarily developed by countries focused on low-intensity counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations, these small, light, and often quite expensive loitering drone designs did not closely align with Iranian requirements and priorities. What Iran’s military and Iran’s non-state allies needed were loitering strike drone designs that would, in effect, facilitate the devolution of Iran’s long-range strike capabilities to lower echelons for use against more proximate stationary and mobile targets.

This SPAS Consulting briefing examines four recently unveiled Iranian single-use propeller-driven strike drone designs: the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and Ra’ad-3 loitering strike drones, a submerged launch capable encapsulated strike drone of unknown designation, and the Saeghe-1 loitering strike drone. As a collective, these mark a new direction in Iranian uncrewed aircraft technology and herald a significant enhancement of the military capabilities of Iran and its non-state allies across the Middle East.

While the focus of this SPAS Consulting briefing is on Iran and Iranian military capabilities, the Iranian experience serves as an important case study relevant to other countries around the world. While Iran’s military industry rarely expands the global technological frontier in a meaningful way, the country has not only previously been a trendsetter but, in important respects, remains the pacesetter when it comes to developing and deploying lower-end long-range strike munitions, particularly those that make extensive use of off-the-shelf components. Iran, of course, developed the Shahed-131 by the early 2010s—it was discreetly on display at a 2014 exhibition—and used the Shahed-131 to undertake an audacious surprise attack on Saudi oil facilities in 2019. Iran also developed the larger and longer-range Shahed-136, which it deployed well before Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. Iran’s transfer of the Shahed-136 to Russia not only dramatically raised the profile of Iranian propeller-driven single-use strike drone designs but also drove Ukraine to emulate the Iranian approach and develop and deploy a diverse array of propeller-driven strike drone designs of its own. Other countries have taken notice, and propeller-driven strike drones, as well as low-cost cruise missiles and turbojet-powered single-use strike drones/winged cruise missiles that Iran has also pioneered, are increasingly part of the threat landscape worldwide. This SPAS Consulting briefing focuses on a different area of Iranian uncrewed aircraft technology in which much smaller and lighter designs have the potential to facilitate high-accuracy strikes against targets located within several dozen kilometers of a frontline or an international border. Going forward, such designs are likely to become increasingly common worldwide.

Iran’s Pursuit of Larger and Longer-Range Loitering Strike Drone Designs

While Iran’s military industry has developed a diverse array of long-range single-use propeller-driven strike drones, Iran has until recently not allocated as much effort and resources toward developing and deploying shorter-range strike systems for use on the battlefield. Iran has, to be clear, developed a small number of short-range human-portable propeller-driven single-use loitering strike drones. This includes the Sina, which is an analogue to the original American Switchblade in terms of the design of its airframe. Iran has unveiled a similar design under the designation Meraj-521. There is also the Zhubin, which is an analogue to the Polish Warmate-1. These are very small and light human-portable designs primarily intended for use by the lowest echelons in ground combat units (i.e., at the level of a platoon, company, and in some cases at the battalion level). Being human-portable, the aforementioned designs also have very small warheads. As of this writing, there is no indication that any of the aforementioned small loitering strike drones, which at the very least closely imitate foreign designs, have been produced in large numbers or deployed beyond perhaps a small number of elite, better-equipped, and high-readiness Iranian ground combat formations.

Iran also has access to a range of Iranian-developed loitering strike drone designs that appear to be primarily, if not exclusively, operated by Iran’s non-state allies, namely Hizballah in Lebanon and Ansarallah in Yemen. This includes the Mirsad, which is Hizballah’s designation for the loitering strike drone version of the decades-old Ababil-T design, and the Khatif-1 and Khatif-2 deployed by Ansarallah. These likely amount to low-cost designs but are, in effect, (non-loitering) strike drone designs adapted for use as loitering strike drones as opposed to purpose-built loitering strike drones designed to operate over the battlefield, identify potential targets, particularly mobile targets, and crash into one and detonate upon impact.

In February 2024, Iranian media released a video containing a few seconds of footage that captured the launch sequence of a previously unknown propeller-driven loitering strike drone analogous to the Israeli HERO family and the Russian Lancet family. Iran appeared to have finally developed a loitering strike drone capable of attacking both stationary and mobile targets beyond the immediate frontlines.

This loitering strike drone design of unknown designation has a distinctive double cruciform wing configuration that it shares with the HERO and Lancet families. Designers in multiple countries have converged upon this double cruciform wing configuration for loitering strike drone designs, as opposed to a conventional monoplane used on most uncrewed aircraft, because it is conducive to undertaking the fine-tuned maneuvers required to accurately deliver a munition equipped with a relatively small 3-10 kg class warhead in a terminal dive against a moving target.

A cruciform wing configuration is not without disadvantages, however. Most importantly, it results in very large and cumbersome designs if the cruciform wings are fixed and do not fold, as is the case with the Iranian loitering strike drone of unknown designation that was informally unveiled in February 2024. Folding wings are an option and, in practice, require an encapsulated design that is launched from a capsule. Encapsulation adds to the cost and complexity of any uncrewed aircraft design. Iran did not release any information about this loitering strike drone of unknown designation at the time, but the single brief video indicated that it employed electric propulsion to cruise in flight while reliant on a solid rocket booster for rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO) from a simple launch rail. While some observers were quick to claim that this Iranian loitering strike drone of unknown designation was related to the Russian Lancet family, the Iranian design is distinct from all known members of the Israeli HERO family, all known members of the Russian Lancet family, as well as an encapsulated North Korean cruciform wing loitering strike drone design of unknown designation that was unveiled in the summer of 2024.

In January and February 2025, Iran formally unveiled several cruciform wing propeller-driven single-use loitering strike drone designs. Notably, these appear to be part of at least two design families, but the full extent of commonality within each design family in terms of hardware, software, and control interfaces cannot be discerned through an examination of the imagery and videos that have been released to date. It bears emphasis that commonality in software can be as important, if not more important, than commonality in hardware among airframes. A common control unit, for example, will allow operators to be readily cross-trained on different members of a loitering strike drone family even if the airframes share little in the way of components.

The first loitering strike drone design that Iran formally unveiled is the Rezvan, which is an encapsulated design with folding cruciform wings that is distinct from the design that was informally unveiled in February 2024.

Several weeks later, the Rezvan appears to have been presented at a different exhibition under the designation Ra’ad-2, which is to say as a member of a new Ra’ad family of single-use propeller-driven loitering strike drones. Iran formally unveiled the Ra’ad-3 at the same exhibition, and this appears to be the designation of the fixed cruciform wing design that was informally unveiled in February 2024. It is unclear why the Rezvan appears to have been redesignated the Ra’ad-2, but it is possible that Rezvan is the designation given to this design by the IRGC Ground Force, which appears to be its primary, if not only, operator. Ra’ad may be the designation given to the design family by its developers and/or the IRGC’s procurement office.

The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 Encapsulated Loitering Strike Drone

According to Iranian officials, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is electrically powered and carries a 5 kg warhead. Iran has not disclosed the loitering strike drone’s take-off weight or the weight of a loaded, ready-to-launch capsule. The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 has a claimed—suspiciously low—maximum range of 20 km and a maximum endurance of 17 minutes.

The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 has folding cruciform wings to facilitate integration into the launch capsule. Although the specific folding wing configuration on this Iranian design is not unique, the airframe is not a direct copy of any known existing design. In other words, not only is the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 unrelated to the Russian Lancet family, but it is also not a reverse-engineered copy of any known foreign loitering strike drone design.

That the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is a distinctively Iranian design can be seen in its peculiar launch method. The encapsulated members of the Israeli HERO family of loitering strike drones utilize a pneumatic system to eject the uncrewed aircraft from the launch capsule. This results in a so-called soft launch that allows operators to be situated next to the launch capsule at the time of launch and for a loitering strike drone to be launched from an enclosed space. The Russian Lancet family, which is primarily, if not exclusively, deployed to date in versions with fixed cruciform wings that do not fold and therefore do not fit inside capsules, employs a pneumatic catapult and a launch rail in much the same manner as many ISR drones. While it is an encapsulated design, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 does not appear to have a soft launch capability. It is, rather, equipped with a jettisonable solid rocket booster for RATO and therefore has a significant backblast.

Unsurprisingly, the videos of Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 launches that have been released to date depict a seemingly unsafe area around the launcher that is devoid of any personnel.

Given its use of RATO without a pneumatic ejection soft launch capability, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 cannot be launched from an enclosed space, at least not with any humans nearby. A launch crew can, however, remotely launch one or more of these encapsulated loitering strike drones from some distance and will ultimately control the uncrewed aircraft through a radio frequency data link following launch. As a result, the primary benefit of this particular approach to encapsulation is that the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is a more compact design that a crew of two to four personnel can transport and quickly prepare for launch. The encapsulated nature of its design may also make the Rezvan/Ra’ad something of a ready-to-fire all-up-round, but this cannot be confirmed with currently available information.

Although the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 has major limitations as a loitering strike munition transported, emplaced, launched, and operated by mobile infantry, the design can be readily employed as a vehicle-launched strike munition. Iran has unveiled a version of the Aras-3 tactical vehicle adapted to serve as a launcher carrying at least five and possibly up to six of these loitering strike drones. It is worth noting that the very same, or perhaps a very similar, Aras-3-based launcher is also used to launch encapsulated Ghaem-118 missiles, which is a turbojet-powered loitering surface-to-air missile that closely emulates the design of the American Coyote developed by RTX (formerly Raytheon). Hence, a single Aras-3 launcher may be equipped with both loitering strike drones and surface-to-air missiles with which to intercept loitering strike drones (use of the Ghaem-118 will, however, require the launcher to be accompanied by another vehicle equipped with a suitable radar and/or electro-optical sensor to detect aerial targets).

As with the Israeli HERO family of single-use propeller-driven loitering strike drones and the Russian Lancet family, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 employs electric propulsion. This contributes to a reduced acoustic and thermal signature, which is important in a strike drone design intended to loiter over a battlefield home to potential armed targets before diving to detonate upon impact with one such target, preferably without alerting said target of an impending attack. This is in stark contrast to a design like the Iranian Shahed-136 single-use propeller-driven strike drone, which employs a small piston engine as a low-cost propulsion system and one that, relative to even the latest in electric battery technology, utilizes a higher energy density and higher specific energy petroleum-based fuel. The Shahed-136 is, of course, now infamous for the acoustic signature of its moped-like two-stroke engine (any psychological effects on targets and nearby civilians are incidental). The electrically-powered Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, in contrast, has a much lower acoustic signature, and the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 has a smaller infrared signature than would be the case if it were equipped with a small piston engine.

Like all loitering strike drones, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 requires an onboard sensor to locate targets. While a highly automated loitering strike drone with adequate onboard automated target recognition capacity is a possibility, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is more likely to be a less complex and lower-cost human-in-the-loop design in which an enhanced autopilot relieves the remote human operator of the need to directly fly the uncrewed aircraft to a designated area or the designated point of impact. That is, the remote human operator is essentially a sensor operator who directs the loitering strike drone to fly in a particular direction and altitude. When the remote human sensor operator selects a specific target, the loitering strike drone’s enhanced autopilot handles the necessary calculations to plot the trajectory required to intercept the target—impact the target—at a specific location selected by the remote sensor operator. This is in contrast to an armed first-person view (FPV) uncrewed multirotor drone in which the remote human operator directly flies the aircraft and has full control authority (throttle, pitch, roll, and yaw) as if it were a radio-controlled hobby aircraft (i.e. an “RC plane”) with an onboard sensor providing feedback to the remote human pilot.

It is important to note that it is incorrect to suggest that there are only two types of loitering strike drones: fully autonomous loitering strike drones, which require no human-in-the-loop to operate, and less complex conventional human-in-the-loop loitering strike drones in which the remote human operator primarily controls the onboard sensor and identifies a target with the enhanced autopilot flying the aircraft toward a designated area or the designated point of impact. In the world of uncrewed aircraft technology, automation exists on at least one spectrum—the latter ideal type and the currently prevalent form of automation in loitering strike drones is evidently far more automated than the approach undertaken in most armed FPV multirotors, in which the remote human operator directly flies the aircraft and has full control authority. There is, moreover, an intermediate set of approaches to automation that have existed for some time in various munitions and have also been recently integrated on otherwise remotely piloted armed FPV multirotors. This requires sufficient onboard automation to allow a loitering strike drone to lock on to a target selected by the remote human operator, an approach best characterized as automated target lock. Once a target is locked by the remote human operator, an enhanced autopilot takes over and plots a trajectory to intercept the selected stationary and perhaps even a moving target. It bears emphasis that an automated target lock capability may or may not be accompanied by automated target recognition, which requires onboard image processing to identify potential targets for a remote human operator to select, or an automated target selection mechanism, in which an onboard computer, not a remote human operator, selects one of multiple possible targets for attack with automated target lock engaged.

An automated target lock capability has many benefits in a loitering strike drone design, which is an expendable single-use munition that detonates upon impact, but requires additional onboard computation and, all things equal, a higher-definition sensor. This adds to the complexity and, more importantly, the cost of a loitering strike drone design. Iran has displayed the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 in a configuration equipped with what is likely to be a low-cost nose-mounted gimbal-mounted visible band electro-optical sensor. In itself, an electro-optical sensor is not useful in low-light conditions or at nighttime and is usually accompanied by an infrared band sensor to facilitate operation in low-light conditions and variable atmospheric conditions. While a version of the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 may exist with a higher-end gimball-mounted sensor ball that incorporates both a visible band electro-optical sensor and an infrared band sensor, the version seen to date is likely to only employ a low-cost visible band electro-optical sensor. Beyond the implications that this has on the effectiveness of the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 in combat at night or in low visibility atmospheric conditions, it also means that this encapsulated Iranian loitering strike drone design is unlikely to be equipped with much more than an enhanced autopilot that allows the remote human operator to function as a remote sensor operator responsible for identifying and selecting a target while the enhanced autopilot is responsible for flying the uncrewed aircraft.

Loitering strike drones are inherently capable of diving toward a target in a manner that, to invoke the terminology used in the context of the related area of anti-tank missile technology, amounts to a top-attack capability. That is, loitering strike drones can impact an armoured vehicle such as a tank on the roof, the area in which vehicular armour is typically far less resilient than the armour found on the frontal sector or the sides of a vehicle. The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is reportedly equipped with a 5 kg warhead, which is typical for many anti-tank missile designs.

If the objective is to use the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 to target armoured vehicles, then this Iranian loitering strike munition design may be equipped with a shaped charge warhead with enhanced fragmentation for multifunctionality. All else being equal, the weight and diameter of a shaped charge warhead are important proxies for the expected level of armour penetration. A generic 5 kg class shaped charge warhead that fits inside the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 fuselage is suitable for use against most armoured vehicles and all unarmoured vehicles, but will likely be of limited effectiveness when used against heavily armoured vehicles such as the Israeli Merkeva IV tank and the Israeli Namer armoured personnel carrier, which is based on the Merkeva IV chassis. More generally, a loitering strike drone will not always impact the roof of a target vehicle, especially if the target is moving. The warhead may, for example, detonate upon impact with the frontal arc of the turret of a target tank, which is very heavily armoured, or impact the side of a turret, which may be protected by explosive reactive armour. In such cases, a 5 kg class-shaped charge warhead that fits inside the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 fuselage may be inadequate to have a high probability of penetration. That will require a larger warhead or a tandem shaped charge warhead. The point here is that although a Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 can destroy an unarmoured vehicle and can inflict significant damage on most armoured vehicles, it will likely be unable to destroy the most heavily armoured vehicles, including some of those deployed by Israel. It bears emphasis that although Iran does not share a border with Israel, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 was likely developed with use by Hizballah against Israel in mind.

Although measures can be undertaken to enhance fragmentation and thereby modify a shaped charge warhead into something amounting to a multipurpose warhead, it is important to recognize that the destructive effects of all shaped charge warheads are highly concentrated in one direction by design. That is, the detonation of high explosives, however small the amount, will inherently result in a lethal radius that is subject to blast effects and the fragmentation of the casing containing the explosives as well as nearby material, including the airframe of a loitering strike drone. Shaped charge warheads are optimized to have a high-velocity kinetic effect on a very small surface area that is perpendicular to the airframe containing the warhead. Any other destructive effect is, all things considered, essentially incidental. Any 5 kg class high explosive warhead has a limited destructive radius and a 5 kg class shaped charge warhead has inferior destructive effects unless the warhead detonates upon impact with an armoured vehicle or similar, in which case the designer’s primary concern is the extent of damage made to the interior of the armoured vehicle rather than persons and objects around the vehicle’s exterior.

Assuming that the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2’s standard payload is a 5 kg shaped charge warhead, this warhead has likely been designed for enhanced fragmentation to increase lethality against soft targets, including personnel. As a result, the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 simply offers Iran a different way to deliver the equivalent of a 5 kg anti-tank missile warhead around the battlefield. The destructive effect of the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is, as such, nothing like, for example, a Tomahawk cruise missile or similar, a typical aerial bomb released from a crewed combat aircraft, or a much larger and much heavier (non-loitering) single-use propeller-driven strike drone like the Shahed-136. This is not surprising given that the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 airframe likely has a total weight of less than 30 kg, while the Tomahawk cruise missile is equipped with a 450 kg class warhead, combat aircraft typically employ 200-500 kg class aerial bombs, and the Shahed-136 is typically equipped with a 50 kg class warhead.

It is important to note that some of Iran’s anti-tank missiles, which are in practice short-range and inherently multi-purpose non-ballistic surface-to-surface missiles, exist in versions equipped with thermobaric warheads for use against targets other than armoured vehicles. Thermobaric warheads can be highly effective against personnel, including personnel concealed within structures. The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 may be available with various warhead options, including a thermobaric warhead, in which case it will provide a capability to undertake non-line-of-sight attacks on structures occupied by enemy personnel (i.e., deliver a warhead through a window on the other side of the fourth floor of a building). As with all munitions, fusing is as important as the design and weight of the warhead itself. The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 may be equipped with an airburst fusing option for more effective employment against soft targets such as personnel concentrations, but this cannot be confirmed with available information.

The Ra’ad-3 Loitering Strike Drone

The second loitering strike drone design that Iran formally unveiled in early 2025 is the Ra’ad-3, which appears to be very closely related to, if not the same as, the non-encapsulated cruciform wing design that was informally unveiled in February 2024. According to Iran, the electrically-powered Ra’ad-3, which has fixed wings and is configured for rocket-assisted take-off from a launch rail, is equipped with a rather large 12 kg warhead. In contrast, the encapsulated Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is equipped with a 5 kg warhead. While Iran has not disclosed the takeoff weight of the Ra’ad-3, it is likely to be several times greater than that of the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2. The Ra’ad-3 has a claimed maximum range of 100 km and a maximum endurance of 40 minutes. In contrast, the encapsulated Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 has a claimed maximum range of just 20 km and a maximum endurance of 17 minutes.

Like the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, the Ra’ad-3 is equipped with a gimballed nose-mounted sensor ball. The sensor ball seen to date may be the same design as that which has been seen to date on the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2. It is not clear if the Ra’ad-3 is equipped with an infrared band nose-mounted sensor. It would be unusual for such a relatively high-end loitering strike drone with a reported maximum range of 100 km to be incapable of effectively operating at night or in low visibility conditions. It is, of course, possible that the baseline version of the Ra’ad-3 is equipped with a lower-cost electro-optical sensor for use in daytime, while another, more expensive version is equipped with an infrared band sensor for use at night and in low visibility atmospheric conditions.

One of the most distinctive features of the Ra’ad-3 specimen featured at the formal unveiling event is what appears to be a large antenna that extends above the fuselage just behind the nose. It bears emphasis that this feature does not appear on what is understood to be a Ra’ad-3 specimen on display at an IRGC Ground Force exhibition—which can be seen in the preceding image—following the design’s formal unveiling. The presumed Ra’ad-3 specimen that was informally unveiled in February 2024 is also different from the two other Ra’ad-3 specimens seen to date. This small but not insignificant variance in the design cannot be explained at this time. That said, the only known recent image of a Ra’ad-3 in flight, that of a specimen that detonated upon impact in an exercise, incorporates the large antenna on top of the fuselage that was seen installed on the specimen on display at the Ra’ad-3’s formal unveiling.

While Iran has disclosed that the Ra’ad-3 is equipped with a 12 kg warhead, it has not disclosed the type of warhead carried by this loitering strike drone. A 12 kg shaped charge warhead, perhaps a tandem shaped charge warhead, is a possibility, but it is not optimal for use against many potential targets. As with all munitions, the destructive effects are strongly shaped by the selection of both a warhead and a fusing option that is optimized for damaging or destroying a particular target. It is not known if the Ra’ad-3 is available with various warhead options, including a thermobaric warhead, or, for example, an airburst fusing option. Given the larger size of its warhead, the Ra’ad-3 is a candidate for use of a (light) penetrating warhead designed to apply blast and fragmentation effects after a hardened structure, such as a bunker or the doors of a munitions storage bunker, has been penetrated.

While Iran may develop an encapsulated derivative of the Ra’ad-3, the version seen to date is a very cumbersome loitering strike drone design that is best deployed from a self-propelled wheeled launcher that will, in turn, have to be supported by one or more other vehicles carrying reloads. With a claimed maximum range of 100 km, which should in practice be viewed as range-endurance, the Ra’ad-3 considerably expands the reach of Iranian ground combat commanders. There is, nevertheless, a very large 80 km gap between the claimed maximum range of the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and Ra’ad-3 that begs the question as to the nature of the presumably as yet unseen Ra’ad-1. Although it is possible that the Ra’ad-1 is more of a technology demonstrator not intended for deployment, it may also amount to a more practical intermediate design, which is to say a design that is neither encapsulated nor oversized in pursuit of longer range-endurance. The Ra’ad-3 will complement the curiously short-range Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 well if such an intermediate design exists, but will otherwise amount to more of a standalone system used to attack targets between 20 and 100 km from the frontline.

Although the seemingly successful development of the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and Ra’ad-3 amount to significant achievements for Iran’s military industry, it bears emphasis that the specifications that Iran disclosed to date suggest that these are designed to a lower price point than the loitering strike drone designs of other countries. The specifications for the Ra’ad-3, for example, compare quite poorly with those of the Israeli HERO-400, a class-leading optionally encapsulated electrically-powered 50 kg design with a claimed maximum range of over 150 km and 120 minutes of endurance while equipped with an 8 kg warhead. While both the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and Ra’ad-3 appear to have been developed to a much lower price point than other loitering strike drone designs and notwithstanding the fact that the Israeli company UVision is a world leader in this area of uncrewed aircraft technology, the specifications of the two members of the Ra’ad family of loitering strike drones that have been unveiled to date leave much to be desired. It remains to be seen if there exists a Ra’ad-1 that can serve as an intermediate design with a maximum range of 40-50 kilometers, and perhaps even a prospective Ra’ad-4 with specifications more in line with the designs offered by the fast-expanding roster of vendors offering cruciform wing loitering strike drones.

A Submerged Launch Capable Encapsulated Strike Munition of Unknown Designation

Whereas Iran appears to have formally unveiled the Rezvan at one event only to formally unveil it once more several weeks later under the designation Ra’ad-2, in early 2025, Iran informally unveiled what is likely to be a separate submerged launch capable encapsulated strike munition of unknown designation. That is, Iran has developed a distinct encapsulated strike drone that can be launched from a submerged crewed submarine or an uncrewed underwater vehicle. A land-based version of this design, in what is likely to be a different encapsulated form, may also exist, but this is speculative. It bears emphasis that this submerged launch-capable encapsulated strike drone design may or may not be capable of loitering with or without a human in the loop.

This encapsulated, submerged-launch capable strike drone of unknown designation has a very different design than the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and is unlikely to form part of the Ra’ad family of loitering strike drones. Although the wing folding configuration is similar to that used on the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, the rest of the airframe has major differences. Unlike the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, the fuselage of this design is not of uniform diameter. The launch capsule also appears to be of rather robust construction when compared with the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, and this is, of course, required to facilitate a submerged launch. This submerged launch-capable loitering strike drone is also notably equipped with what is likely to be a CRPA GNSS antenna array on top of the fuselage just behind the nose section. GNSS antenna arrays of this type are typically installed on single-use strike drones that autonomously navigate to attack predesignated targets without a human in the loop.

Whereas the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 is a human-in-the-loop loitering strike drone with a maximum range of just 20 kilometers, it is possible that this submerged-launch capable strike drone of unknown designation may not operate in human-in-the-loop mode or, alternatively, it may be capable of operating autonomously without a human-in-the-loop. The very limited imagery and video that is currently available of this design are insufficient to confirm the existence of a nose-mounted electro-optical and/or an imaging infrared sensor.

While it is possible that a nose-mounted sensor is installed but maintained in a stowed position to prevent damage during the multi-phase launch process, it is also possible that this design lacks a nose-mounted sensor. This design of unknown designation may therefore constitute not a submerged-launch capable (human-in-the-loop) loitering strike drone but a submerged-launch capable autonomous strike drone with a guidance system that is reliant on INS and GNSS, one that is restricted to attacks on preprogrammed stationary targets. It is, of course, also possible that this submerged launch-capable design exists in two or more variants, one of which may be wholly reliant on INS and GNSS. This would not be surprising given that this drone appears to have been developed for launch from, but possibly not yet tested with, crewed submarines and uncrewed underwater vehicles.

As explained earlier in this briefing, absent sufficient onboard automation to facilitate automated target detection, a loitering strike drone requires a human in the loop to identify potential targets and select one for attack. A remote human operator typically undertakes this vital role through a radio frequency data link through which a sensor mounted on the uncrewed aircraft offers feedback from the perspective of the uncrewed aircraft. Radio frequency datalinks are line-of-sight systems and operate at frequencies that do not penetrate water. It is not practical for a crewed submarine or an uncrewed underwater vehicle to surface or even elevate a communications mast at periscope depth for a prolonged time to support the operation of what is likely to be a propeller-driven strike drone with a maximum speed of just 100-200 km/h. A crewed submarine and uncrewed underwater vehicle can, of course, also release a communications buoy to the surface, but this will only add to the cost and complexity of employing such a loitering strike drone.

Much is uncertain about this submerged launch-capable encapsulated strike drone design of unknown designation. There is currently no indication that this system has been tested at sea, let alone deployed on a crewed submarine or an uncrewed underwater vehicle, and the design may not even amount to a loitering strike drone—it may simply be yet another (non-loitering) Iranian strike drone. This design is nevertheless important for the purposes of this briefing because an encapsulated ground-launched version may emerge and join Iran’s steadily expanding roster of loitering strike drones. A ground-launched version can, after all, readily incorporate an electro-optical sensor and radio frequency datalink in the same manner as the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and the Ra’ad-3.

The Saeghe Family of Low-Cost Loitering Strike Drones

The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, Ra’ad-3, and the submerged launch loitering strike drone of unknown designation are all quite large and, all things considered, fairly complex designs. That is, these are likely to be low-cost strike munitions by the standards of purpose-built military equipment produced by the world’s best-resourced militaries, but not low-cost in the manner of, for example, the armed FPV uncrewed multirotor drones made of inexpensive commercial off-the-shelf components that are widely employed in the Russia-Ukraine War. For Iran, which has limited resources and cannot afford to deploy systems like the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and Ra’ad-3 in very large numbers across its military without forgoing other procurement efforts, and for its non-state allies, which encounter challenges in terms of storage, transport, and, not least the availability of trained manpower to operate let alone sustain complex military equipment, a smaller, lower-cost, and less sophisticated loitering strike drone is likely to have much appeal.

In early 2025, Iran unveiled a small cruciform wing loitering strike drone design with the designation Saeghe-1. The electrically-powered Saeghe-1 has a claimed maximum range of 20 km and a maximum endurance of 30 minutes while carrying a 1 kg warhead. The 1 kg warhead of unknown design is quite small and unsuitable for use against most armoured vehicles. It is, however, adequate for use against personnel, unarmoured vehicles, and various soft targets as well as for use as a fire support system.

According to an IRGC Ground Force officer interviewed in an Iranian media report, the Saeghe-1 is but one member of the Saeghe family. While the Saeghe-1 is equipped with a 1 kg warhead, there is reportedly a version equipped with a 3 kg warhead and another with a 7 kg warhead. The range and endurance of the heavier payload members of the Saeghe family are not known at this time. While multiple Saeghe family specimens were placed on display at a February 2025 IRGC Ground Force exhibition, Iran has not formally unveiled the Saeghe-2 and Saeghe-3, and it is possible that the airframes seen on display are all Saeghe-1 specimens. According to the IRGC Ground Force officer in the press report, all three members of the Saeghe family utilize a single control system. This should allow operators to be cross-trained on all members of the Saeghe family and make the Saeghe family a more versatile design analogous to a multi-purpose anti-tank missile family in the manner of the American BGM-71 TOW and the Russian Kornet in Iranian service.

The most striking attribute of the Saeghe-1 design is its nose-mounted sensor. Loitering strike drones are typically equipped with a nose-mounted sensor ball that can pan and tilt, with the sensor able to undertake optical zoom through its lens. The Saeghe-1, in contrast, is equipped with a small nose-mounted electro-optical sensor in a fixed aperture that cannot pan or tilt and likely has negligible optical zoom. This is likely to be a low-cost commercial off-the-shelf electro-optical sensor, which is to say much the same type of low-cost—and low-definition—electro-optical sensor that is used on most armed FPV multirotors in the Russia-Ukraine War, as well as some fixed-wing FPV loitering strike drones such as the Russian Molniya-1 and Molniya-2. Very low-cost electro-optical sensors can be purchased on AliExpress at a starting unit cost of less than US$10 (higher quality components are available at a somewhat higher price point, and Chinese vendors typically offer bulk discounts).

The cruciform wing Saeghe-1 appears to be Iran’s take on a factory-built and more sophisticated counterpart to the very crude Russian Molniya-1 and Molniya-2. While armed multirotors, including those of the FPV variety, have proven to be very effective in the Russia-Ukraine War, these have a major limitation in terms of cruise speed and therefore have a long time to target. As a result, armed multirotors are very effective when used to actively search for targets to attack and when used to support a preplanned assault or defensive action, but are less useful in offering a more responsive fire support capability against time-sensitive targets identified by other means. Fixed-wing designs like the very crude electrically-powered Russian Molniya-1 and Molniya-2 constitute a practical and low-cost approach to delivering a larger payload than a typical single-use armed uncrewed multirotor drone and doing so at a greater range and a higher cruise speed than is possible with a low-cost armed and laden, as opposed to unarmed and unladen, uncrewed multirotor drone. The Saeghe-1 offers Iran a comparable capability, albeit with a far more sophisticated cruciform wing airframe than the Molniya-1 and Molniya-2 that complements the comparatively much higher-end Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and Ra’ad-3. That is, what the Saeghe-1 lacks in quality is likely to be made up for by a very large scale of production and employment.

It is important to note that the Russian Molniya-1 and Molniya-2 are both fixed-wing FPV loitering strike drones that require remote human operators to directly fly the aircraft—the remote human pilot has full control authority (throttle, pitch, roll, and yaw) over the uncrewed aircraft as if it were a radio-controlled hobby aircraft (i.e. an “RC plane”) with an onboard sensor providing feedback to the remote human pilot. This approach to remotely operating an uncrewed aircraft is very labour-intensive, requires personnel trained to serve as remote pilots, is intrinsically susceptible to adversary electronic warfare and signals intelligence capabilities, and imposes a wide range of limitations on the performance of uncrewed aircraft. On the other hand, these minimally automated single-use uncrewed aircraft can be built at a very low unit cost. While Iranian disclosures give no indication that the Saeghe-1 is an FPV loitering strike drone, the low-cost—and low definition—commercial off-the-shelf electro-optical sensor installed in a fixed position on the nose is highly indicative of a low-cost FPV design or at least a minimally automated non-FPV design. If this is the case, then the Saeghe family of loitering strike drones will be most effectively employed when supported by one or more reusable ISR drones equipped with superior electro-optical and/or infrared band sensors to identify priority targets for the Saeghe-1 to attack. This is a very different approach than that which is typically undertaken with loitering strike drones like the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2 and the Ra’ad-3, which are designed to independently search for targets to attack and are functionally better characterized as armed single-use ISR drones that detonate upon impact with the target instead of dropping one or more munitions on the target or calling in fire support from another source.

Conclusion

The Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, Ra’ad-3, the submerged launch-capable encapsulated strike drone of unknown designation, and the Saeghe-1 collectively mark a new direction in Iranian uncrewed aircraft technology. The new Iranian loitering strike drones examined in this SPAS Consulting briefing have many shortcomings, but have the potential to engender a major expansion of the combat capabilities of Iran and its non-state allies across the Middle East. Longer-strike capabilities exemplified by the Iranian Shahed-136 remain important but are impractical and inefficient when employed to attack more proximate targets at a distance of several dozen to a hundred or so kilometers from the frontlines or international border. It bears emphasis that longer- and shorter-range strike systems do not exist in isolation. Shorter-range strike systems can be used to create opportunities to more effectively employ longer-range strike systems, such as when, for example, a Ra’ad-2 is used to neutralize a gap-filler radar located close to the frontlines or international border, or when a Ra’ad-3 is used to target a mobile short-range air defence system along the planned route of longer-range strike drones. In so doing, Iran and its non-state allies can more effectively employ longer-range strike capabilities, including the Shahed-136.

While the limitations of the recently unveiled uncrewed designs covered in this SPAS Consulting betray Iran’s resource limitations and the enduring limitations of Iran’s fast-improving military industry, it bears emphasis that these designs appear to have been purposefully developed with a low price point in mind. All things equal, lower cost tends to equal lower capability as well as greater exposure to lower-cost countermeasures, but quantity can nevertheless have a quality all of its own in a world in which even the most lavishly resourced militaries cannot afford to service their very long target lists with high-end strike munitions alone. Iran has demonstrated the viability of lower-cost strike munitions through its development and deployment of an increasingly diverse and ever-expanding arsenal of long-range single-use propeller-driven strike drones, as well as low-cost cruise missiles and turbojet-powered single-use strike drones. The Russia-Ukraine War has demonstrated the value and effectiveness of such designs—which Iran independently pursued for well over a decade before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022—to a global audience while also demonstrating the value and effectiveness of armed uncrewed multirotor drones of various types (an area of technology development that Iran in contrast appears to have largely ignored prior to the Russia-Ukraine War). With the Rezvan/Ra’ad-2, Ra’ad-3, the submerged launch-capable encapsulated strike drone of unknown designation, and the Saeghe-1, Iran appears to be turning its attention to an area of uncrewed aircraft technology it has not previously given much priority. It remains to be seen if Iran has developed loitering strike drone designs that are not only cost-effective but also effective on a battlefield subject to an ever-intensifying measure-countermeasure competition now that observers worldwide are alerted to the threat that loitering strike drones can pose.