Concepts–themed posts engage in inherently somewhat speculative analysis. I contend that any serious analysis must engage with the world both as it is and as it can be. Avoiding mindless empiricism requires cognizance of what is and what is not within the realm of possibility. Concepts-themed posts engage in this type of analysis.

The Iranian-designed Shahed-136, which is known as the Geran-2 in Russian service, is the prime example of a lower-cost—and lower capability—strike munition design that enables militaries to service dramatically expanded target lists in a manner that was previously unimaginable. The Shahed-136/Geran-2, and similar fixed-wing propeller-driven strike drones—less expensive, less complex, slower, and easier to shoot down counterparts to turbojet/turbofan-powered cruise missiles—have considerable potential in military operations worldwide, notwithstanding the underway measure-countermeasure competition that has resulted in the advent of a new generation of low-cost air defence capabilities, including electrically-powered armed multirotor drones turned budget surface-to-air guided munitions that are capable of intercepting quite slow propeller-driven strike drones powered by modest piston engines.

Taking full advantage of the potential offered by propeller-driven strike drone designs in the vein of the Shahed-136/Geran-2 will likely require, at the very least, a more diverse array of warhead options so as to optimize the effects of a fairly small and lighter warhead against a greater diversity of target types/classes. In its standard configuration, a Shahed-136/Geran-2 is equipped with a 50-kilogram class high explosive warhead. Both Russia and Iran also employ the Shahed-136/Geran-2 in a reduced-range configuration that features a 90-kilogram class high explosive warhead.

Russia has employed a series of Iranian- and Russian-built warheads with its Shahed-136/Geran-2 strike drones. Publicly known warhead types include:

• High explosive-fragmentation warheads with a singular shaped charge.

• A high explosive-fragmentation warhead with multiple explosively formed penetrators (EFPs).

• High explosive-fragmentation warheads that feature incendiary material.

• A pure thermobaric warhead.

While Russia informally unveiled Shahed-136/Geran-2 strike drones equipped with an airburst fusing mode around the autumn of 2025, the Shahed-136/Geran-2 has not to date been seen with two very useful warhead types.

Submunition-dispensing warhead

The first is a submunition-dispensing warhead (i.e., cluster munition-dispensing) warhead, which will require a modified airframe that incorporates a submunition release/ejection mechanism. This should be a fairly straightforward undertaking when it comes to a very slow propeller-driven strike drone design that can be subject to major modifications without onerous aerodynamic penalties. Consider how a typical 155 mm submunition dispensing artillery shell weighing around 40 kilograms can dispense 60-80 submunitions over a radius of 100 or more meters. The likes of a Shahed-136/Geran-2—particularly an airframe in the higher payload reduced-range configuration which can be equipped with a 90-kilogram class warhead—can not only dispense a larger number/heavier load of submunitions—a thick casing is not required in the manner of an artillery shell subject to extreme chamber pressures—but also dispense said munitions over a larger surface area. The advent of a submunition-dispensing low-cost propeller-driven strike drone design will have major implications in the interrelated areas of air base attack and air base resilience.

Penetrator Warhead Optimized For Use Against Runways

Another approach concerns the use of a penetrating warhead design that is optimized to create (fairly small/shallow) craters in runways, so as to develop a low-cost means to disrupting flight operations at distant airfields—craters/holes in the ground can be filled in and runways can be repaired, so cratering runways is primarily a means of buying time and disrupting adversary opereations rather than a likely approach to securing military victory. While the Shahed-136/Geran-2 has been used with penetrating warheads that are optimized to maximize damage to structures such as electricity substations and heavy-duty industrial machinery in power stations, these are not the same as a warhead that is intended to create a single crater/hole of maximum possible depth. A useful reference design to have in mind is the late Cold War French BAP-100 bomb, which was explicitly designed to crater runways and complement the larger, heavier, and better-known Durandal. The air-dropped BAP-100, which featured both a parachute and a solid-propellant rocket booster, had a total weight of 32.5 kilograms while equipped with a 18.5 kilogram warhead. Through the use of the rocket booster, the air-dropped BAP-100’s shaped charge warhead could reportedly penetrate up to 30 centimeters of reinforced concrete when equipped with a time-delay fuse.

It bears emphasis that even a propeller-driven and piston engine-powered Shahed-136/Geran-2 and similar undertaking a terminal dive will struggle to reach a top speed equivalent to one-fifth that of the air-dropped and rocket-boosted BAP-100. The BAP-100 is, as such, merely invoked in this post to illustrate the potential for a penetrator warhead for use against runways as well as other structures, such as bridges. A low-cost low-payload turbojet-powered cruise missile design will have a much higher cruise speed and top speed during a terminal dive and will be much more suitable as a means of delivering a penetrator warhead. See, for example:

All things considered, propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones are unlikely to disappear even with the intensifying measure-countermeasure competition that has resulted in the increasingly widespread deployment of low-cost air defence capabilities, including electrically-powered interceptor drones. Propeller-driven strike drones are an incredibly inexpensive means of delivering a given payload per kilogram-kilometer. The availability of additional warhead options will likely only increase the appeal of low-cost propeller-driven strike drone designs, which inherently offer militaries the ability to service dramatically expanded target lists in a manner that was previously unimaginable.

The first “torpedoes” used in the 1800s were not self-propelled but explosive charges mounted on a pole that was rammed toward an enemy ship in the manner of a fire lance, one of the earliest gunpowder weapons, and similar. Over the summer of 2024, a Russian drone operator(s) or technician(s) decided to install a trident-type device on an unarmed multirotor drone in order to thrust the trident into the propeller of a Ukrainian drone and, in so doing, disable it and cause its crashing into the Earth’s surface.

In time, an enterprising Russian drone operator(s) and/or technician decided to go one step further by installing a small explosive charge on the trident and, in so doing, developed what amounts to an aerial anti-drone spar torpedo. Upon impact, the aerial spar torpedo detonates. The blast takes out part of the targeted Ukrainian drone and, in so doing, not only causes its crash into the Earth’s surface but also plausibly allows the Russian remote human pilot/operator to recover the multirotor drone used in the interception, rearm it, and use it in future interception attempts.

Measure-countermeasure competitions take on many forms. The low altitude and slow speed uncrewed aerial war that is transpiring over the battlefields of the Russia-Ukraine War is, like the low altitude and slow speed crewed aerial war that transpired over the battlefields of the First World War, likely to have far-reaching and long-lasting effects. Russia and Ukraine are, in real time, rapidly experimenting with many approaches to low altitude air defence against small, slow, inexpensive, and, as such, plentiful aerial targets that regularly fly at depths of up to 50-100 kilometers from the frontlines. While some approaches are not worth pursuing, others may not be viable in the specific context of the Russia-Ukraine War due to sui generis local circumstances and or the state of extant (low cost commercial of the shelf) technology, but may otherwise be promising for future applications elsewhere. Scenes like those in the above videos may become commonplace elsewhere in the world in the near future, and militaries and internal security organizations worldwide will do well to not only keep tabs on which approaches are and are not working for Russia and Ukraine but also diagnose why an approach is and is not working in the specific and, all things considered, not always extrapolatable context of the Russia-Ukraine War.

Commentary-themed posts tend to deal with recent developments. These will typically be much shorter and less detailed than my analysis-themed posts, for which commentary-themed posts may serve as “building blocks.”

Newly available images and video indicate that Ukraine has begun to use armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic cable communication uplink/downlink variety to attack terrestrial targets along the Black Sea coastline. It bears emphasis that Ukraine’s use of USV-launched strike munitions, including armed “FPV” multirotor drones, is not a new development; only the first publicly available documentation of a USV-launched armed “FPV” multirotor drone of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety is particularly notable at this time.

This Ukrainian USV does not appear to be equipped to ram into a target ship, which requires the installation of both a warhead and one or more fuses on the USV’s hull. The USV itself is a human-in-the-loop design controlled via the commercially available Starlink low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite communications (SATCOM)/satellite internet system. As far as the USV is concerned, there is nothing remarkable about its design other than its payload of four large containers that are used to store one armed “FPV” multirotor drone each.

There is nothing particularly remarkable about the armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic uplink/downlink variety carried on the Ukrainian USV other than the longstanding fact that “FPV” multirotor drones are incredibly volume inefficient uncrewed aircraft-turned-strike munitions. A fixed-wing strike drone design with folding wings, which can also be equipped with a fiber-optic cable uplink/downlink, is much more practical for use in such applications, given that such designs can be more readily encapsulated/containerized. Given the volume inefficient form factor, this Ukrainian USV could only transport and launch four armed “FPV” multirotors at a time.

While there are some practical challenges associated with flying armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic uplink/downlink variety over water, especially in a coastal as opposed to a riverine context, the approach is nevertheless practical and has potential applications elsewhere, including in the Taiwan Strait:

Minimal comment-themed posts are used to introduce data points for use in other posts going forward. Posts of this theme will typically feature minimal analysis and commentary.Relevant to both china nad taiwan

A Turkish company, SolidAero has developed the Talay, an uncrewed ekranoplan—also known as a ground-effect vehicle—drone that can be used to undertake sea-skimming attacks on coastal targets. According to its manufacturer, the Talay can reach a maximum speed of 200 kilometers per hour and deliver a 30-kilogram payload over a distance of 200 kilometers.

While a high explosive warhead of this size cannot sink a large warship, let alone a large merchant ship, it can be used to attack port infrastructure and the diverse array of small ships and barges that are found in ports of all sizes worldwide. A munition with a 30-kilogram warhead can also be productively used to attack targets which store and/or deliver fuels and petrochemicals, which is to say targets for which the secondary effects of damage can be far greater than the primary effects of damage. It goes without saying that other countries may pursue a larger, longer-range, and heavier payload ekranoplan/ground-effect vehicle strike drones that better align with their military requirements and military-geographical context.

Ekranoplans/ground-effect vehicles blur the line between a high-speed surface vessel and a fixed-wing aircraft. The Talay and similar designs offer militaries a distinct approach to attacking coastal targets. While the payload of the Talay is much smaller than what is possible with an uncrewed surface vessel (USV) that is used to target surface ships, an ekranoplan that flies at a very low altitude above the water is more difficult to detect and intercept and also has a much shorter time-to-target than a USV. Although armed single-use USVs that function as the surfaced analogues to torpedoes may play an important role in some navies, the development of the Talay ekranoplan strike drone serves as a reminder that other options are available.

Minimal comment-themed posts are used to introduce data points for use in other posts going forward. Posts of this theme will typically feature minimal analysis and commentary.

In a recent post, I laid out the variance in outcomes that result from the interception of the likes of Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya propeller-driven strike drones through various air defence capabilities. The post was intended to highlight some of the oft-overlooked trade-offs and consequences associated with the use of inexpensive and widely available anti-aircraft artillery, particularly machine guns, as well as interceptor drones that are equipped with a very small and light warhead, if any high explosive material at all.

The above video shows the plummeting debris of a Russian propeller-driven fixed-wing drone, possibly a Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya, in central Kyiv. It is worth noting that no detonation of any onboard warhead can be observed in the video, which, of course, only records the fixed-wing drone after it was already intercepted through unknown means.

Another recently uploaded video, which was reportedly recorded near the frontlines, shows a Ukrainian propeller-driven fixed-wing FP-1 drone crashing into the ground—seemingly nowhere near its intended target—and detonating upon impact. This video constitutes a textbook example of what happens when a munition equipped with a simple, unsophisticated warhead that is fused to detonate upon impact either crashes into the ground or is intercepted without detonating the warhead or, more generally, neutralizing the fusing of the warhead.

Commentary-themed posts tend to deal with recent developments. These will typically be much shorter and less detailed than my analysis-themed posts for which commentary-themed posts may serve as “building blocks.”

One of the biggest analytical challenges one encounters when attempting to accurately and holistically assess the effects and effectiveness of armed “first-person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drones—and other “new” munitions more generally—in the Russia-Ukraine War stems from the unsurprising tendency of both Russia and Ukraine as governments and their subordinate military personnel to make highly selective disclosures that, in practice, results publicly available data that reflects a profoundly consequential sampling bias. Simply stated, only videos of successful attacks tend to be publicly disseminated—and constitute the bulk of the publicly available library of armed “FPV” multirotor drone attacks—while videos of unsuccessful attacks—and mundane everyday operations—are not publicly disseminated. As a result, observers are likely to overestimate the per unit—per multirotor drone—effectiveness of armed “FPV” multirotor drones.

As with all areas of analysis, we can work from first principles or we can work from available empirics. While the best analyses will simultaneously do both, much of what passes for serious analysis in the Russia-Ukraine War is best characterized as mindless empiricism that clings to documented real-world cases, which are, of course, selectively disclosed in a manner that amounts to a profoundly problematic sampling bias. Documented real-world uses, such as the following video, offer an opportunity to counter mindless empiricism on its own (problematic) terms.

The video shows two Russian combatants in a van who detect a Ukrainian armed “FPV” multirotor drone seemingly by sight—passive radio frequency sensors/detectors can detect the presence of an armed “FPV” multirotor drone of the radio frequency communication uplink/downlink variety, but not those of the fiber-optic cable communication uplink/downlink variety. The two occupants of the van quickly dismount. The person recording the footage is equipped with a shotgun. The remote human operator/pilot of the Ukrainian armed “FPV” multirotor drone had to quickly decide whether they would target the van or the dismounted Russian personnel. In this particular instance, the remote Ukrainian pilot chose to prioritize the targeting of (dismounted) manpower over materiel.

The armed “FPV” multirotor drone, which is equipped with an impact/contact fuse and has a limited destructive radius, missed the dismounted driver. As the armed “FPV” multirotor drone, which appears to have been of the fiber optic uplink/downlink variety—which Ukraine is also using in ever-increasing numbers—was remotely piloted/navigated to undertake another attack run, it was fired upon by the two dismounted Russian personnel. While the video records the detonation of the Ukrainian armed “FPV” multirotor drone, it may or may not have been hit by small arms fire—the warhead may have been prematurely detonated by an object encountered in flight, or the warhead may have detonated upon impact with the ground following a loss of control.

To be clear, armed “FPV” multirotor drones constitute a profound threat to militaries worldwide. The above video documents just one incident in which the remotely-piloted armed “FPV” multirotor was “expended” without damaging, let alone destroying, anything of note. There are untold thousands of videos documenting successful attacks. The important takeaway is not that armed “FPV” multirotor drones are ineffectual but that these are not (remotely operated/piloted) killing machines characterized by 100% effectiveness. Various countermeasures exist, and we are ultimately dealing with a fairly small and slow uncrewed aircraft-turned-munition that is equipped with a quite small and light warhead that results in a limited destructive radius. Beyond the technical particulars, the remote human operator—and onboard so-called AI going forward—must prioritize either the targeting of the vehicle or its dismounts in a world in which the dismounts can actively target the armed “FPV” multirotor drone with small arms fire and, going forward, purpose-built countermeasures. I covered this dynamic in a recent post dealing with the use of armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic uplink/downlink variety in a recent post.

The multirotor drones lying in ambush must initiate flight from zero elevation above ground level and at zero airspeed. This takes time, and there is a fast-expanding library of documented ambushes in which the occupants of the “ambushed” vehicle evidently detect an armed “FPV” drone casually lying in wait on/next to the road—the remote human operator/pilot must observe the road through the onboard camera for an ambush to be possible—and quickly evacuate the vehicle in response. The remote human operator/pilot is then forced to decide whether to target the vehicle—sans human occupants—or target one of the dismounted occupants of the vehicle, who tend to disperse/not cluster in groups. As a result, an ambush of sorts takes place, but the effectiveness of the ambush is greatly lessened relative to a situation in which the armed “FPV” multirotor drone is not detected, which would allow for an attack on a vehicle that is still carrying its occupants.

Commentary-themed posts tend to deal with recent developments. These will typically be much shorter and less detailed than my analysis-themed posts for which commentary-themed posts may serve as “building blocks.”

The following two undated videos offer fairly uncommon documentary evidence of the employment of armed “first-person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drones, seemingly of the fiber-optic cable communication uplink/downlink variety, to navigate inside buildings and attack targets therein.

As I’ve explained in several recent posts, armed “FPV” multirotor drones, especially those of the fiber-optic uplink/downlink variety, should not be viewed as just another type of battlefield armament but miniature strike munitions that enable highly surgical micro-level targeting. Prior to the advent of these uncrewed aircraft turned munitions, which are notably composed of quite inexpensive commercial-off-the-shelf components, militaries had to, in effect, destroy a building so as to kill its occupants and/or destroy the objects placed within. Militaries can now use armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic uplink/downlink variety to attack persons and/or objects located inside buildings—these uncrewed aircraft turned munitions can also be used to breach an opening if required. As things stand, the maximum practical range of armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic uplink/downlink variety is around 30-50 kilometers. The maximum practical range may, however, expand, at least in certain operational contexts, as new approaches to employment are developed, tested, and refined. As with so many other areas of military technology, developments in the Russia-Ukraine War are likely to spread far and wide, not least when it comes to uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions that are built from readily accessible commercial-off-the-shelf components.

Several relevant posts:

One of the countermeasures that Russia has pursued in response to Ukraine’s increasingly regular and widespread employment of interceptor drones of both the multirotor and fixed-wing variety—a practice that is understood to have begun around near the end of summer 2024—has been to install a rearward-facing camera on fixed-wing drones of various types, some of which would would not ordinarily feature any onboard electro-optical sensor at all. When installed alongside a suitable onboard computer to process the sensor feed, Russian fixed-wing drones can perform pseudo-random evasive maneuvers as a Ukrainian interceptor drone approaches. This greatly increases the challenges encountered by the Ukrainian air defence operators attempting to intercept Russian drones in a context in which most, if not all, of Ukraine’s interceptor drones of both the multirotor and the fixed-wing variety appear to be remotely piloted human-in-the-loop uncrewed aircraft turned anti-aircraft munitions. It bears emphasis that Ukraine’s interceptor drones of both the multicopter and fixed-wing variety are electrically powered designs. The onboard battery offers very limited range-endurance, not least when the interceptor drone must typically fly much faster than the target Russian fixed-wing drone to be able to intercept it. The initiation of pseudo-random evasive maneuvers can, therefore, allow a Russian fixed-wing drone to evade interception by Ukrainian interceptor drones, at least until it runs into the detection and engagement range of another Ukrainian interceptor drone unit that may be able to pull off a successful interception attempt.

Russia is known to have also equipped some of its uncrewed aircraft with simple passive radio frequency sensors that, upon detecting a strong signal in a frequency range associated with Ukrainian interceptor drones, initiate pseudo-random evasive maneuvers. This approach does not require the use of fairly inexpensive commercial-off-the-shelf electro-optical sensors/cameras and an onboard computer. This passive radio frequency approach can also work at night and in low light conditions—commercial-off-the-shelf infrared-band sensors exist and are widely installed on armed “first-person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drones in the Russia-Ukraine War, but are more expensive.

The new video highlights a different non-exclusive approach that Russia is now experimenting with, if not pursuing for widespread deployment. The commercial-grade electro-optical sensors mounted on the Gerbera decoy drone in the above video are notably installed on the topside of the fuselage so as to detect Ukrainian interceptor drones that are not merely in (“tail-chasing”) pursuit of the Gerbera but on a higher altitude interception course that will end in a dive toward the Gerbera. While there are videos documenting interceptions in which Ukrainian interceptor drones impact the underside of a Russian fixed-wing drone or the rear section (i.e., targeting the propeller, which is the obvious target when unarmed kinetic-impact only interceptor drones are used), it is generally preferable for the interceptor drone to attempt to attack the topside of the fuselage, given that the wings have a larger surface area than the fuselage, let alone the rear aspect. All else being equal, a top attack profile is also more energy efficient.

It goes without saying that the above video does not record the dual sensor-equipped Russian Gerbera decoy drone undertaking pseudo-random evasive maneuvers as the Ukrainian interceptor drone approaches. It is not clear why this appears to have been the case. It is also not clear whether this particular Gerbera specimen also featured one or more electro-optical sensors on the underside of the fuselage, which can, in principle, be used to offer something in the vein of omnidirectional warning on impending interception by a fairly slow Ukrainian interceptor drone of either the multirotor or fixed-wing variety. It is worth noting that the passive radio frequency sensor approach, the effectiveness of which is inherently affected by the usual wartime evolution of radio datalink technology, constitutes another way of offering omnidirectional warning of an impending interception by a Ukrainian interceptor drone. The passive radio frequency sensor approach will, however, only work for as long as Ukrainian interceptor drones are primarily, if not exclusively, human-in-the-loop uncrewed aircraft turned anti-aircraft munitions. It bears emphasis that there are indications that this may change going forward.

As of this writing, documentary evidence exists in the public domain for Russia’s installation of electro-optical seekers to initiate pseudo-random evasive maneuvers on its fixed-wing ISR drones, which are typically used within several dozen kilometers of the frontlines/international border, and its Gerbera decoy drones, which regularly penetrate several hundred kilometers of Ukrainian-controlled airspace. Ukrainian sources report that Russia has been working on installing electro-optical sensors and/or passive radio frequency sensors on its Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drones so that these can also undertake pseudo-random evasive maneuvers when subject to an interception attempt by a Ukrainian interceptor drone of either the multirotor or fixed-wing variety. While public documentary evidence of this is not available at this time, such approaches are likely to result in a situation in which propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones such as the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya remain viable as fairly inexpensive strike munitions amid Ukraine’s increasingly widespread use of increasingly more capable uncrewed aircraft turned anti-aircraft munitions. As with so many aspects of the Russia-Ukraine War, an intense measure-countermeasure competition is underway, and nothing that we have seen to date is likely to have been the last act either in the specific context of that conflict or elsewhere in the world.

Some relevant recent posts:

The above video, which was notably recorded by a Russian drone employed as an anti-aircraft interceptor, shows a Ukrainian vertical take-off-and-landing (VTOL) fixed-wing drone carrying two—seemingly armed—“FPV” multirotor drones under its wings. In effect, these “FPV” uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions are being employed as air-launched munitions. Fixed-wing “mothership” drones, which do not have to be VTOL designs—the Ukrainian design in the above video has four electrically-powered rotors in addition to the primary propeller used for lateral movement that is mounted on the fuselage—regularly operate at distances of 20-60 kilometers behind the frontlines. This is well beyond the practical range of armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the radio frequency communication uplink/variety controlled via a low-lying ground-based radio antenna. A “mothership” fixed-wing drone can, therefore, be used to greatly increase the range of the armed “FPV” multirotor drones.

I place mothership in quotations because the “FPV” multirotor drones carried and launched by the “mothership” fixed-wing drone cannot be recovered but are instead employed as single-use air-to-ground guided munitions in the same manner that an attack helicopter or fighter jet will carry and release single-use guided munitions. While the “FPV” multirotor drones carried under the wings can be unarmed and, in principle, reusable, these are in practice being employed as guided air-to-ground munitions. A true “mothership” should, I think, be capable of recovering—and perhaps relaunching—its embarked systems.

“Mothership” fixed-wing drones, which are reusable designs, are typically optimized for use in ISR missions and are, therefore, typically equipped with an electro-optical sensor of much higher quality than the inexpensive designs that are typically installed on single-use armed “FPV” multirotor drones in the Russia-Ukraine War. Optimization for use in ISR missions also means that these tend to have glide-optimized airframes offering a maximum endurance that is measured in hours. The maximum practical range of any human-in-the-loop uncrewed aircraft/drone is primarily determined by the nature of its communication uplink/downlink, not the interplay of its airframe and propulsion system, and both Russia and Ukraine primarily use fixed-wing drones that are equipped with line-of-sight radio datalinks as opposed to beyond-line-of-sight satellite communications. Given the above, an unarmed fixed-wing ISR drone turned “mothership” equipped with one or more armed “FPV” multirotor drones in the manner of a guided air-to-ground munition can loiter for several hours at a distance of some 40-60 kilometers from the frontlines and attack one or more targets with uncrewed (multirotor) aircraft-turned-munitions that are likely to have a maximum range of at least 5-10 kilometers.

While Ukraine has been at the forefront of many developments in uncrewed aircraft technology in the context of the Russia-Ukraine War, it is important to recognize that the barriers to entry for much of what Ukraine has done are fairly low. Russia is, therefore, well-positioned to emulate Ukrainian approaches in this and other areas, much as Ukraine is well-positioned to emulate Russian approaches in this and other areas. The above image shows a Russian Orlan fixed-wing ISR drone carrying two (seemingly armed) “FPV” multirotor drones while serving as a “mothership.”

The use of fixed-wing drones as “motherships” carrying and launching armed “FPV” multirotor drones amounts to an important development, but is nevertheless taking place at a time when both Russia and Ukraine are intercepting slower fixed-wing drone designs with increasing regularity as a result of the mutual adoption of interceptor drones—slower and less complex propeller-driven analogues to rocket-powered anti-aircraft missiles—of both the multirotor and fixed-wing variety. Even so, this amounts to a practical way to increase the maximum reach of armed “FPV” multirotor drones and, more generally, offers militaries around the world a new and very distinct type of guided air-to-ground munition that is not only very inexpensive but can also be used in very distinct ways and to attack very distinct targets against which many existing air-to-ground munitions are not suitable. This is one area of military technology that is likely to spread far beyond the Russia-Ukraine War.

The video featured in the first of the two above posts features the use of armed “FPV” multirotor drones to breach an opening into the main building of a thermal power plant so that another armed “FPV” multirotor drone of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety could fly inside and target the critically important electricity generation machinery. It is worth noting that said particular video suggests a fairly lengthy time interval between the breaching of a sufficiently large gap and the flight of an armed “FPV” multirotor drone through said gap. The video featured in the second of the two above posts is recorded inside a building, but does not show how the armed “FPV” multirotor drone entered the building. A recently released video, however, shows the use of an armed “FPV” multirotor drone to breach an opening into a structure by dismantling a section of protective netting so that two armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety could enter the structure in rapid succession. This video reportedly records a Ukrainian attack on a structure occupied by Russian forces.

As I explained in a recent post (the second of the posts linked above):

Incidents such as this documented attack are likely to become increasingly commonplace as armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety are built and deployed by both Russia and Ukraine in ever-increasing numbers. Such armed “FPV” drones can be flown inside buildings and even underground. As of this writing, I am unaware of any publicly known documented case in which such armed “FPV” drones have been flown inside buildings to target personnel. It is important to keep in mind that this may reflect the sensitivity of such attacks and military censorship rather than the absence of such attacks in the Russia-Ukraine War. It is worth noting that most of the publicly available footage of armed “FPV” drone strikes from the Russia-Ukraine War has been very selectively disclosed as part of public relations, propaganda, and information warfare efforts. (emphasis added)

The footage seen in the above video is notably a mobile phone recording of a monitor displaying what appears to be security camera footage. The footage recorded by the cameras installed on the three Ukrainian armed “FPV” multirotor drones used in this attack has not been publicly released as of this writing and may never be. Even so, this video attests to what is and is not in the realm of possibility given extant technology. In an ideal world, serious military analysis is not undertaken by mindless empiricists who work not from first principles but cling to documented real-world use cases. As things stand, however, observers primarily encounter publicly available analysis on the effects of technological change undertaken by mindless empiricists. Such videos help chip away at the prevailing intellectual status quo as it concerns the implications of the evolution and diffusion of armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety.

Another area for which there are relatively few documented cases concerns the employment of armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety in heavily vegetated areas. The following video, especially the footage from 00:15-00:25, demonstrates what is in the realm of possibility. The following video, which documents the work of a Russian multirotor drone unit, also offers an excellent example of the maneuverability and endurance of such “FPV” multirotor drones.

As I discussed in a separate recent Not Safe For Work (NSFW) post that features combat footage, militaries have long sought refuge in foliage. Two of Ukraine’s largest cities, Kharkiv and Sumy, both of which are located close to the Russia-Ukraine (international) border, are partially surrounded by moderately sized but high-density tracts of woodland that served a key role in the defence of these cities in early 2022. Much the same can be said of Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv. With the advent of armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety, high-density foliage no longer affords the protection it once did. In fact, high-density foliage is now a liability for military officers tasked with planning the defence of a large urban area, given that it affords the enemy something of a highway through which such armed “FPV” multirotor drones can transit while remaining concealed from high frequency radars that could otherwise detect such drones.

Update: A new video offers an interesting view of the scale at which armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety are being used by both Russia and Ukraine in forested areas. The glistening string-type objects in the following video are fiber-optic cable that remains—unused and unusable—caught in the branches.

Russia was the first to deploy armed “FPV” of multirotor drones fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety in appreciable quantities in the Russia-Ukraine War and was, as such, the first to begin employing such “FPV” multirotor drones as ambush weapons. At first, Russian remote human operators/pilots would set up ambushes with a single armed “FPV” multirotor drone of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety. In time, such “FPV” multirotor drones became available in increasing numbers, and Russian forces began to undertake multi-drone ambushes. In principle, a single remote human operator/pilot can fly one or more armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety to a given area so as to set up a multi-drone ambush in which the “FPV” drones are activated and flown in sequence by a single remote human operator/pilot. This can economize on manpower, given that each “FPV” drone will otherwise require its own remote human operator/pilot.

Multi-drone ambushes are particularly important when it comes to targeting armoured vehicles. Both Russia and Ukraine are up-armouring their vehicles in response to changing battlefield conditions. While armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety are not susceptible to electronic warfare in the manner of armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the radio frequency communication uplink/downlink variety, multiple uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions are increasingly required to score even one direct hit against an armoured vehicle that is fitted with additional armored to defeat armed “FPV” multirotor drones of any communication uplink/downlink variety. As a result, multi-drone ambushes have a lot of appeal.

As with essentially every technological and non-technological measure that one can conceive of in the context of warfare, there will always be one or more countermeasures. As the threat of ambushes involving armed “FPV” drones that are not susceptible to jamming equipment—which are now installed on a growing percentage of military vehicles—has increased, the occupants of vehicles monitor roads and remain ready to fire at any detected drone with small arms as it lies on the ground and immediately evacuate the vehicle if the multirotor drone takes off from the ground. While the approach is promising in principle and has resulted in many successful documented ambushes, it bears emphasis that there are downsides and limitations. The multirotor drones lying in ambush must initiate flight from zero elevation above ground level and at zero airspeed. This takes time, and there is a fast-expanding library of documented ambushes in which the occupants of the “ambushed” vehicle evidently detect an armed “FPV” drone casually lying in wait on/next to the road—the remote human operator/pilot must observe the road through the onboard camera for an ambush to be possible—and quickly evacuate the vehicle in response. The remote human operator/pilot is then forced to decide whether to target the vehicle—sans human occupants—or target one of the dismounted occupants of the vehicle, who tend to disperse/not cluster in groups. As a result, an ambush of sorts takes place, but the effectiveness of the ambush is greatly lessened relative to a situation in which the armed “FPV” multirotor drone is not detected, which would allow for an attack on a vehicle that is still carrying its occupants.

Another approach undertaken by the Ukrainian military in response to the threat posed by armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety is to employ other armed “FPV” multirotor drones to patrol roads and attack any multirotor drones on the ground in ambush mode. The above video shows a Ukrainian armed “FPV” multirotor drone, which was notably flying at a very low altitude, patrolling a road and running into no less than three closely-positioned Russian armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety lying in ambush. It is important to note that the proximity of said multirotor drones to one another is likely to reflect upon the laziness and sloppiness of the involved Russian remote human operator(s)/pilot(s). There is no reason why two of the three multirotor drones could not have been landed elsewhere so as to avoid being detected and to avoid the loss of multiple uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions once detected.

The above video begins with the distinctive whirring sound of the electronic motors that power most of these uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions. While the psychological effects of being actively hunted by remotely operated/piloted (large) insect-like flying objects should not be discounted, the above video clearly documents a case in which the warhead does not detonate upon impact, a dynamic that is hardly uncommon in the Russia-Ukraine War and for the most part reflects the low cost and rudimentary design of most of the armed “FPV” multirotor drones used in the Russia-Ukraine War. The remote human operator/pilot of the armed “FPV” multirotor drone was evidently attempting to attack this specific part of the apparent battlefield structure and seemingly tried to reestablish control over and maneuver the armed “FPV” multirotor drone following impact so that the impact fusing of the warhead would be initiated. While the warhead did eventually detonate, the structure, which notably features a log roof, remained intact, and the person recording the video—who recklessly did not seek cover behind some sandbags or similar—likely left the incident largely unscathed.

While armed “FPV” multirotor drones can be far more lethal uncrewed aircraft-turned munitions, this will, all else being equal, require the use of larger and heavier warheads that will, in turn, require larger, heavier, and more expensive multirotor drone designs. The limited destructive effects of armed “FPV” multirotor drones—which also extend to use against armoured vehicles, given the fairly small/light warhead used with most armed “FPV” multirotor drones in the Russia-Ukraine War—is one of the primary trade-offs associated with these fairly crude and therefore inexpensive and, as such, plentiful, uncrewed aircraft-turned munitions.

A new video, reportedly from Russia’s 18th Combined Arms Army, which is currently part of the “Dnepr” grouping of Russian forces, documents another incident in which an armed “FPV” multirotor drone of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety is flown inside a building to attack a Ukrainian armoured vehicle that was parked inside.

Beyond its inherent novelty as a rare documented use case, the video is notable in that it clearly shows the remote human operator/pilot trying to navigate through a small opening in the protective netting placed by Ukrainian soldiers to thwart precisely such an attack—a datapoint that may reflect on how prevalent such indoor attacks may be despite the small but growing library of publicly available footage. Armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic variety can be very adeptly maneuvered—at a very slow speed—to overcome such obstacles. Note the presence of an additional set of protective netting that partially covered the targeted armoured vehicle.

Incidents such as this documented attack are likely to become increasingly commonplace as armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety are built and deployed by both Russia and Ukraine in ever-increasing numbers. Such armed “FPV” drones can be flown inside buildings and even underground. As of this writing, I am unaware of any publicly known documented case in which such armed “FPV” drones have been flown inside buildings to target personnel. It is important to keep in mind that this may reflect the sensitivity of such attacks and military censorship rather than the absence of such attacks in the Russia-Ukraine War. It is worth noting that most of the publicly available footage of armed “FPV” drone strikes from the Russia-Ukraine War has been very selectively disclosed as part of public relations, propaganda, and information warfare efforts.

⚠️***This NSFW post features combat footage. Reading/viewing discretion is advised.***

Note: I have edited the original video to cut the most graphic scenes. This video is being uploaded for informational purposes only. Posts featuring NSFW content including combat footage will never be monetized/paid, subscriber-only posts.

Armed “first person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drones of the fiber-optic—as opposed to the radio frequency (RF)—communication uplink/downlink variety are controlled in flight by a remote human operator/pilot via fiber-optic cable carried in an onboard spool that is laid onto the ground. If the fiber-optic cable is deliberately cut or severed while maneuvering between objects—armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety can be flown at a very low altitude, between trees, and inside buildings—the remote human operator/pilot will experience a loss of control. The armed “FPV” multirotor drone will then typically crash and, depending on the nature of any onboard warhead and its fusing, will typically detonate on impact—caveats are in order given that (A) some armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety feature may onboard automatic target identifcation and engagement capability and (B) may be equipped a backup radio-frequency communication uplink/downlink, which will only function if there is a direct line-of-sight with a ground-based antenna and/or an aerial radio relay/repeater.

While the fiber-optic cable can be cut using scissors or a knife, thereby disabling the armed “FPV” drone—which may still detonate upon impact with the ground/the first object it flies into, depending on the nature of any warhead and how it is fused—this is a perilous approach given the evolving ways in which armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety are being employed to take full advantage of the unique chracteristics of this type of armed “FPV” multirotor drone and amid the increasing availability thereof. The following video, which does not feature gore, documents a successful case of cutting the fiber-optic cable. Note the detonation in the distance following the remote human operator/pilot’s loss of control.

While there are documented successful cases of cutting the fiber-optic cable, this is an increasingly perilous approach. Armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety are being built and deployed in ever-increasing numbers. These are most effectively employed in groups—at least in pairs—given that the warheads that these are equipped with are individually inadequate to disable many armoured combat vehicles, which are being extensively up-armoured by both Russia and Ukraine during the war, and to take full advantage of the unique characteristics of this type of armed “FPV” multirotor drone. Unlike armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the radio frequency communication uplink/downlink variety, those of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety can be used in high densities, given the irrelevance of crowding narrow radio frequency bands. This particular type of armed “FPV” multirotor drone is particularly well-suited to breaching a target—blasting a hole in a door, roof, wall, or window, so that another armed “FPV” multirotor drone of the fiber-optic variety can fly inside the target. As a result, armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic variety are increasingly employed in groups of two or more. This can make cutting the fiber-optic cable a very perilous undertaking, as can be seen in the following combat footage recorded by a Russian armed “FPV” multirotor drone.

The above video, which was reportedly recorded in the Donetsk sector by a Russian armed “FPV” multirotor drone of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety—note the very low altitude flight characteristic of such uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions—documents a Ukrainian soldier breaking cover to cut the fiber-optic cable of another Russian armed “FPV” multirotor drone. The Ukrainian soldier appears to have been unaware of the presence of a second Russian armed “FPV” multirotor drone of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety, the operator of which recofused of this target of opportunity and almost certainly killed the Ukrainian soldier who cut the fiber-optic cable of the other Russian armed “FPV” drone. This video offers an instructive example of how some of the most “obvious” countermeasures to a new military technology are best avoided unless no other option is available—one of the primary roles of military officers, technicians, and engineers is to devise means of doing something so as to avoid such perils.

⚠️***This NSFW post features combat footage. While the attached video does not feature gore, reading/viewing discretion is advised.***

Note: This video is being uploaded for informational purposes only. Posts featuring NSFW content including combat footage will never be monetized/paid, subscriber-only posts.

Militaries have long sought refuge in foliage. Not only does foliage offer cover and concealment, which diminishes the effectiveness of an enemy’s direct fire capabilities, but it can also reduce exposure to indirect fires. Even when observed by the enemy, it is always preferable to be in/near dense foliage over being in an open area when subject to artillery fire and aerial bombardment. In the Russia-Ukraine War, narrow tracts of dense foliage in and around agricultural areas—lines of trees and shrubs known as windbreaks—have been key to enabling both Russian and Ukrainian forces to survive the daily onslaught brought about by the massed employment of artillery and armed “first person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drones. Without the many windbreaks, which not only offer cover and concealment but also diminish the effectiveness of indirect fire capabilities, losses among units along the frontlines would likely be untenable. The advent of armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety, however, greatly diminishes the protection offered by foliage.

Armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety—as opposed to those of the radio frequency communication uplink/downlink variety—are non-line-of-sight uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions. These can be flown—by the remote human operator/pilot via the fiber-optic cable that is laid from the onboard spool—just above the ground, in between obstacles, and even inside buildings—including in underground structures. As a result, armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety can be flown toward windbreaks and other areas characterized by fairly dense foliage and carefully flown between the many obstacles to navigation in a manner that armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the radio frequency communication uplink/downlink variety cannot (some caveats are in order for cases in which an aerial radio relay/repeater is situated directly above such an armed “FPV” multirotor drone in fairly low-density tracts of foliage). The following video, which documents the Russian military’s use of armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety to target dismounted Ukrainian military in a small tract of fairly dense foliage, offers an instructive example of this dynamic.

The above video highlights the ability of the remote human operator/pilot of an armed “FPV” multirotor drone of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety to carefully navigate—at a very slow speed—between the many obstacles to navigation encountered in a wooded area. While the targets of the “FPV” multirotor drone in the above video were enemy infantry, the armed “FPV” multirotor drone may just as well have been used to target vehicles parked in fairly dense foliage—there are many videos of such attacks from the Russia-Ukraine War—or structures, including bunkers, located in an area characterized by dense foliage. These are types of targets that would ordinarily be fairly safe from enemy indirect fire using (unguided) artillery and (unguided) bombs. In the world of armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety, foliage offers fast-diminishing protection.

⚠️***This NSFW post features combat footage. Reading/viewing discretion is advised.***

Note: I have edited the video to remove the most graphic scenes. At least one person appears to have died in this incident. The edited video is being uploaded for informational purposes only. Posts featuring NSFW content including combat footage will never be monetized/paid, subscriber-only posts.

A new video from the Russia-Ukraine War captures the terminal dive of a Russian Molniya-2, which is an electrically-powered fixed-wing “first person video” (FPV) drone that relies on a radio frequency communication uplink/downlink—most “FPV drones” are electrically-powered multirotor designs (i.e., quadcopter designs). This video, which was notably disseminated on social media in a cropped format, is notable in that the attack sequence was recorded by a Ukrainian armed “FPV” multirotor drone of conventional design that was being used as a surface-to-air/anti-aircraft interceptor.

The interception attempt undertaken by the remote human operator/pilot of the Ukrainian armed “FPV” multirotor drone failed, and the targeted vehicle, a small civilian automobile, was destroyed, resulting in at least one likely fatality. The video highlights the challenge of intercepting a powered fixed-wing uncrewed aircraft that is undertaking a terminal dive—trading altitude for airspeed—with a conventional electrically-powered mulitoror drone. While faster electrically-powered multirotor drone designs exist and are being used in the Russia-Ukraine War as surface-to-air/anti-aircraft interceptors with increasing regularity, such designs are highly optimized toward that particular role, fly more like fixed-wing aircraft designs and are, as such, restricted in terms of maneuverability, and are not well-suited for use as a general-purpose uncrewed aircraft-turned-munition in the manner of the armed “FPV” multirotor drone that recorded the terminal dive of the Russian Molniya-2.

It is important to note that even if the Ukrainian armed “FPV” multirotor drone had successfully intercepted—crashed into with or without the detonation of any onboard warhead—the Russian Molniya-2, the Ukrainian drone would have likely been lost in the process and could not, as such, have been used to provide overwatch to that vehicle against a subsequent attack or any other vehicle. “FPV” multirotor drones are remotely operated/piloted and amount to a very labour-intensive approach—and therefore a technologically non-complex and very inexpensive approach—to uncrewed aircraft technology. It is simply impractical to assign multiple armed “FPV” multirotor drones—each with its own remote human operator/pilot—to provide overwatch across the frontlines.

The practical and effective employment of armed “FPV” multirotor drones in an overwatch role over friendly forces, including moving friendly vehicles, will, among other things, likely require the incorporation of a standoff multi-engagement capability so that a single remote human operator/pilot controlling a single armed “FPV” multirotor drone has multiple engagement attempts and can, in principle, neutralize multiple threats. Both Russia and Ukraine are experimenting with arming “FPV” multirotor drones with firearms—often a formulation of a shotgun—for such roles, and are more generally experimenting with a variety of other kinetic approaches to neutralizing small flying targets, including various formulations of what is best characterized as a net launcher. It remains to be seen how practical such approaches will be in real-world combat conditions. Until then, the use of armed “FPV” multirotor drones of conventional design to intercept fixed-wing uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions undertaking a terminal dive—as opposed to a fixed-wing uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions at cruise speed and in level flight—will be a low-probability event.

This video is only notable in that it amounts to one of a very small number of documented cases in which armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber optic uplink/downlink variety are used over water. There are practical challenges to using this particular type of armed “FPV” multirotor drones over water bodies, but the challenges are greatly reduced when operating over a fairly small body of water—the video indicates that the targeted raft was only several tens of meters offshore—and water bodies that are not characterized by a considerable flow or a lot of surface movement more generally. I covered the practical challenges of employing armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber optic uplink/downlink variety to attack targets separated by water in a recent post:

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

This Russian human-in-the-loop multirotor drone is equipped with a satellite communication (SATCOM) system to facilitate beyond-line-of-sight use and overcome lateral line-of-sight restrictions imposed by terrain and human structures. The SATCOM system in question is not a low-latency, high-bandwidth proliferated low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellation like Starlink. This Russian drone is instead controlled via a Russian communications satellite—reportedly the French-built Yamal-601 owned and operated by Gazprom Space Systems—in geostationary orbit (GEO). The white dome houses an RS-30M satellite antenna (images 3-4).

While GEO SATCOM can be productively employed in any number of roles, its comparatively low latency makes it less practical as a communication uplink/downlink for rather fast and nimble remotely operated ("FPV") multirotor drones in combat roles. The unavailability/restricted access of LEO SATCOM in the form of Starlink to the Russian military has resulted in a fundamental asymmetry in the (practical) technological possibilities afforded to Russian and Ukrainian designers. As Starlink becomes available in an increasing number of countries and as other LEO SATCOM providers become widely accessible, we are likely to see a levelling of the playing field in conflicts worldwide.