Commentary-themed posts tend to deal with recent developments. These will typically be much shorter and less detailed than my analysis-themed posts.

Ukraine and Russia are targeting gas/petrol stations located on the opposite side of the frontlines/international border with increasing regularity. These attacks notably involve the use of armed “first-person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drones. As I’ve explained in many recent posts, armed “FPV” multirotor drones and similar are best characterized as miniaturized strike munitions that can be used to undertake highly surgical strikes against an incredibly diverse array of targets that were previously beyond the practical reach of militaries for want of a sufficiently large arsenal of suitable high-accuracy munitions. Gas/petrol stations are among the targets that militaries can now readily attack with quite accurate but inexpensive munitions that are built from commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components.

Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Force recently claimed responsibility for an attack that targeted two tanker trucks at a gas/petrol station in Russian-occupied territory. The resulting inferno appears to have rendered the entire gas/petrol station unusable. It goes without saying that the destructive effects of quite inexpensive uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions that are restricted to carrying a fairly small and light explosive payload are ordinarily quite limited. By attacking loaded tanker trucks, the Ukrainian military personnel involved in this attack selected targets that would result in far greater secondary destructive effects than the primary destructive effects resulting from the detonation of the fairly small and light warhead.

Another recent attack that took place in Russia’s Belgorod province draws attention to a different dynamic: the potential for civilian casualties. Most of the videos that I have come across of attacks targeting gas/petrol stations in the Russia-Ukraine War document attacks on fuel pumps and storage tanks at a time when no civilians are around. The same cannot be said of the following video of what appears to be a Ukrainian attack that targeted what amounts to a functionally ~inert roof of a Russian gas/petrol station for unknown reasons.

Minimal comment-themed posts are used to introduce data points for use in other posts going forward. Posts of this theme will typically feature minimal analysis and commentary.

As I’ve explained in many recent posts, uncrewed “first-person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drones and similar are best characterized as miniaturized strike munitions that can be used to undertake highly surgical strikes against an incredibly diverse array of targets that were previously beyond the practical reach of militaries for want of a sufficiently large arsenal of suitable high-accuracy munitions. Armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic cable communication uplink/downlink variety can even be flown inside buildings and tunnels to attack what would otherwise be hard, if not impossible, to reach concealed targets with an inexpensive and, as such, plentiful uncrewed aircraft-turned-strike munition.

One of the most fascinating and, I think, most consequential applications of armed “FPV” multirotor drones is likely to be the very surgical micro-level targeting of various antennas, including those installed on the likes of cell phone towers and other quite tall mast-type structures. Such structures, which are mostly hollow and are designed to withstand sustained powerful wind gusts, can be quite resilient to damage absent a very high level of accuracy and precision. With armed “FPV” multirotor drones and similar, the individual antennas mounted on such structures can be readily attacked if situated within 30-50 kilometers of the frontlines. The following videos document several such attacks undertaken by the Russian military against antenna masts in Ukraine.

Commentary-themed posts tend to deal with recent developments. These will typically be much shorter and less detailed than my analysis-themed posts, for which commentary-themed posts may serve as “building blocks.”

I have covered multiple attacks against gas/petrol stations in the Russia-Ukraine War. What is particularly notable about these attacks concerns the use of armed “first-person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drones as miniaturized strike munitions in highly surgical micro-level attacks against specific nodes of local energy storage and distribution, among other target types. The following video and images document an apparent Ukrainian attack on a gas/petrol station in Severodonetsk, which is located in Russian-occupied Luhansk province. According to local reports, the video records the third recent attack on a gas/petrol station in Russia-occupied Luhansk province, a dynamic that may indicate that this incident is part of a concerted campaign and possibly a Ukrainian emulation of what had until recently appeared to have been a Russian practice.

The images and videos record major damage to this particular gas/petrol station, which was located some 26 kilometers from the frontlines. The only sensible targets—discrete aimpoints—at a gas/petrol station for a quite small and light uncrewed aircraft-turned-munition that is equipped with a small and light warhead with limited destructive effects and a limited destructive radius are: individual fuel pumps, above ground fuel storage, underground fuel storage tanks, and the likes of propane cylinders that are often sold at gas/petrol stations. This Ukrainian attack, however, involved an attack on a different target that is only occasionally found at a gas/petrol station: a tanker truck which, if successfully attacked, will likely result in extensive secondary damage to an entire gas station, a target that will ordinarily have to be attacked by multiple armed “FPV” multirotor drones or, alternatively, a much larger and heavier munition, in order to be subject to such extensive damage.

It is unclear whether this attack—which was reportedly the third such attack against a gas/petrol station in Russian-occupied Luhansk province in recent days—was a preplanned attack or a target of opportunity. Unlike their Russian counterparts, the Ukrainian drone crew involved in this attack selected a very lucrative target that is not always found at a gas/petrol station. Supposing that this was a preplanned attack intended to specifically attack a more “destructive” target that would result in greater secondary damage, this incident highlights the importance of measures to protect critical nodes of local energy storage and distribution against inexpensive and, as such, plentiful armed “FPV” multirotor drones and similar that can be readily employed as miniaturized strike munitions.

I have covered the targeting of gas/petrol stations with armed “FPV” multirotor drones in several recent posts:

Commentary-themed posts tend to deal with recent developments. These will typically be much shorter and less detailed than my analysis-themed posts for which commentary-themed posts may serve as “building blocks.”

A new undated video shows an armoured Ukrainian train locomotive. Armour of this type is optimized against armed “first-person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drones, which are typically equipped with a modest shaped charge warhead that is initiated by an impact/contact fuse.

Russia and Ukraine have been regularly targeting one another’s trains. The advent of armed “FPV) multirotor drones has greatly reduced the barriers of entry to undertaking such attacks and, more importantly, allows for the targeting of specific cars/wagons/cargoes as well as train locomotives. I covered a Ukrainian attack involving the use of multiple armed “FPV” multirotor drones against a Russian train in a recent post:

Armed “FPV” multirotors drones are fairly small and light uncrewed aircraft turned munitions that are restricted to a small and light explosive payload. The resulting destructive effects and destructive radius are, as such, quite limited. Given this, armed “FPV” multirotor drones are best used to attack targets for which the secondary destructive effects are far consequential than the primary destructive effects brought about by the detonation of the warhead. That is, armed “FPV” multirotor drones are best used to attack the operator’s cab in a train locomotive, propulsion machinery in a locomotive, and specific types of cars/wagons/cargoes, such as those used to transport fuel or chemicals. An adeptly undertaken attack involving multiple armed “FPV” multirotor drones can bring a train to a halt and possibly result in its derailing. Subsequent attacks using armed “FPV” multirotor drones can later be used to target specific cars/wagons/cargoes so as to prevent recovery and, more importantly, permanently take a given car/wagon, and perhaps a stretch of track, offline. Beyond that, larger and heavier munitions are required to destroy a train locomotive in the manner seen in the following video.

As with so many other areas of military technology, developments in the Russia-Ukraine War are likely to spread far and wide, not least when it comes to uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions that are built from readily accessible commercial-off-the-shelf components. Armoured train locomotives and the use of other countermeasures, more generally, may become an unremarkable practice worldwide going forward.

The Ukrainian Air Force also recently released a video documenting the launch of AIM-9 infrared-seeker-equipped short-range air-to-air missiles from its F-16 fighters to intercept either propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones or cruise missiles. It bears emphasis that the Ukrainian Air Force released the longer video from which the following was trimmed alongside a press release claiming that its F-16 fleet had intercepted most of the cruise missiles that Russia had launched overnight.

While the use of the M61 rotary cannon in the first video likely made for a memorable experience for observers on the ground, it is in many respects a high-risk and, more importantly, an uneconomical undertaking. Given the closing velocity, the pilot of any fighter aircraft attempting to shoot down the likes of a Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drone runs the risk of rapidly flying into the cloud of debris generated by a successful interception. The fundamental problem with gun-type armament is limited range. Air-to-air missiles such as the AIM-9 are, when viewed in isolation, incomparably more expensive, but can be launched from a safe distance—semi-active laser homing air-to-ground turned air-to-air missiles like the American AGR-20 FALCO are far less capable than the likes of the AIM-9 but also around 90% less expensive.

Another problem associated with using gun-type armament in air-to-air interceptions is that contemporary fighter aircraft carry very limited ammunition for their extremely high rate of fire gun-type armament. The F-16, for example, is limited to carrying around 500 rounds of 20×102 mm ammunition for its six-barrel M61 rotary cannon, which has a maximum rate of fire of around 6,000 rounds per minute. Simply stated, contemporary fighter aircraft can undertake very few interception attempts with gun-type armament before running out of ammunition. While wing or fuselage-mounted gun pods are an option for some contemporary fighter aircraft, the onboard ammunition supply is still limited, and no amount of ammunition can mitigate the risks posed by the interplay of closing velocities with the very short range of gun-type armament.

While air-to-air missiles such as the AIM-9 do not have the aforementioned limitations of gun-type armament, these are far more expensive and, no less importantly, each F-16 can only carry up to six AIM-9 air-to-air missiles per sortie. Other contemporary fighter aircraft have similar maximum loadout figures. At the same time, air-to-air missiles such as the AIM-9 are one-shot, one-kill type munitions against the likes of the fairly large fixed-wing propeller-driven strike drones like the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya, as well as cruise missiles more generally. Any sound analysis must assign the appropriate weight to this attribute, one that essentially means that each F-16 equipped with six AIM-9 air-to-air missiles has a realistic prospect of successfully intercepting six (non-evasive) aerial targets.

In this and so many other aspects of the Russia-Ukraine War, observers run the risk of comparing the unit costs of munitions without undertaking a holistic accounting. The likes of 20×102 mm ammunition—whether fired from a M61 rotary cannon mounted on an F-16 or a M61 rotary cannon mounted on a truck—will always be less expensive than any guided, anti-aircraft munition equipped with a solid-propellant rocket motor. It is, however, ill-advised to forgo the use of air-to-air missiles, whether a quite sophisticated design like the AIM-9 or a comparatively rudimentary AGR-20 FALCO, in aerial interceptions on the basis of unit cost comparisons. Interceptions involving the use of gun-type ammunition take more time, and all fighter aircraft cost thousands of dollars to operate per flight hour. Fighter aircraft also cost tens of millions of dollars to acquire, and the acquisition cost is, in practice, amortized per flight hour. A very brief fifty-round burst from an autocannon can cost something in the region of US$500-$1000, if not more. While this is a very low cost per intercept (attempt) when compared to around US$500,000 for the likes of the AIM-9 and around US$50,000 for the likes of the AGR-20, the aircraft being flown, its post-flight servicing and repairs, and its fuel are not free. A holistic accounting of cost effectiveness in air defence cannot be reduced to the unit cost of ammunition x vs ammunition y. All things considered, militaries are buying capability and, in an important sense, paying to save time. While decision-makers and observers are susceptible to stickshock, money spent is sometimes money saved.

Some related posts:

• What goes up must come down. Intercepting a Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drone results in debris plummeting uncontrollably toward the planet’s surface with what amounts to a random point of impact.

• Different anti-aircraft capabilities and anti-aircraft munitions result in damage that varies in terms of both kind and degree. Lower-cost anti-aircraft capabilities and anti-aircraft munitions are likely to result in damaged, not destroyed, aircraft that will crash in a more or less intact state—possibly with an intact warhead—into the planet’s surface. When low-cost anti-aircraft capabilities and anti-aircraft munitions are used in or near residential areas, the successfully intercepted strike drone will still pose a serious threat, with the added complications that no one knows the ultimate point of impact, and no one, including the military that launched the strike drone, can do anything about it.

• Cost and availability are not the only factors at play when determining air defence requirements and other military requirements more generally. All else being equal, lower cost generally translates into lower capability for good reason. In the area of air defence capabilities, lower cost can also translate into assuming more risk in sustaining—absorbing—damage, including damage at points of impact that were not the intended target of the successfully intercepted strike munition.

It should come as no surprise that what goes up must come down, not least on a planet in which gravity accelerates objects to the ground at a rate of 9.8 m/s². This dynamic, of course, includes the likes of Russia’s propeller-driven fixed-wing Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drones, which are not only being launched against Ukraine in ever-increasing numbers but are also being intercepted by Ukraine through an increasingly diverse and heterogeneous set of air defence capability set. While the question of how many strike drones Russia launches and how many strike drones Ukraine intercepts dominates headlines and many analytical writings, the question of how Ukraine intercepts Russian strike drones receives very little attention, even though this is where most of the consequential analytical implications lie. In this post, I will focus on what happens when a Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya—and other strike munitions, Russian or otherwise, more generally—are shot down. None of the attached videos feature graphic context—this post does not directly examine the effects at the ultimate point of impact with the planet’s surface.

The above video is reported to have been recently recorded in the Ukrainian city of Dnipro. The video records a Russian Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drone that has (A) been damaged by some Ukrainian air defence capability—the Russian strike drone is clearly on fire and may have had a lot of fuel remaining, given how relatively proximate Dnipro is to the frontlines/international border—and is (B) plumetting uncontrollably to the ground with the end result of impacting at what is essentially a random part of the planet’s surface, one that happens to be in the Dnipro metropolitan area in this instance.

There are many such videos of strike drone interceptions from the Russia-Ukraine War, a conflict that is, of course, taking place at a time and in a context characterized by the widespread availability of camera-equipped mobile phones and internet access. The following video was posted on social media in July 2025 and shows much the same dynamic.

These two videos serve as a reminder that successful interceptions of strike munitions will result in debris plummeting uncontrollably to the planet’s surface in what is, for all practical intents and purposes, a random and unpredictable way. While only an act of god can change the ultimate points on the ground that the debris from what was a functioning strike drone will impact, different types of air defence capabilities will generate different types of debris.

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Different Anti-Aircraft Capabilities, Different Effects On The Targeted Object

When assault rifles and machine guns of the light and medium variety are used to shoot down strike drones and other flying objects, the projectiles that are fired—bullets—create fairly small holes in the target object. While small arms can be used to intercept the likes of Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drones, the bullets have limited incendiary effects and do not contain any explosive material—the effects on the strike drone being targeted are almost entirely kinetic in nature. As a result, unless a lucky bullet initiates the detonation of the warhead installed in the strike drone, a successful interception involving the use of assault rifles and machine guns of the light and medium variety will, at best, result in a damaged strike drone that will at some point no longer fly as intended along the preprogrammed flight path and will, like all flying objects, crash into the planet’s surface. The impact point is, in effect, random and unpredictable, and the strike drone’s warhead may or may not still detonate upon impact with the planet’s surface.

When heavy machine guns and, more to the point, autocannons are used to shoot down strike drones and other flying objects, the projectiles that are fired will either only have kinetic effects or, more commonly in an air defence context, will contain incendiary material and/or explosives—explosives are generally found in autocannon ammunition (i.e., 20 mm and larger). The use of heavy machine guns and autocannons in particular will subject the likes of Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drones to significant structural damage. With incendiary material being commonly used with both heavy machine gun and autocannon ammunition, the targeted object may catch fire, not least when the fuel tank(s) are hit. Even so, unless a lucky hit initiates the detonation of the warhead installed in the strike drone, a successful interception involving the use of heavy machine guns and autocannons will typically result in a damaged strike drone that will, at some point, no longer fly as intended along the preprogrammed flight path and will, like all flying objects, crash into the planet’s surface. The impact point is, in effect, random and unpredictable, and the strike drone’s warhead may or may not still detonate upon impact with the planet’s surface.

A note on the combustibility of fuel and range-payload: This post deals with the interception of powered strike munitions that, by definition, either carry fuel onboard or are electrically powered. While electrically-powered strike drones exist, these are severely limited in terms of range-payload given the poor energy density and specific energy of even the latest lithium-ion batteries relative to petroleum-based fuels. Russia’s Lancet (Izdeliye-51) loitering strike drone, for example, is being used to attack targets located a hundred or so kilometers away, but is equipped with a very small/light warhead that is unsuitable for the roles in which the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drone design is employed. The Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya is, in its baseline configuration, reportedly capable of carrying a 50-kilogram warhead over a distance of 2000 kilometers. As I’ve explained in many posts dealing with this Iranian-origin strike drone design in Russian service, this range-payload is poorly optimized for Russia’s purposes in the specific military-geographic context of the Russia-Ukraine War, and an unknown percentage of the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drones launched against Ukraine are equipped with a heavier 90-kilogram warhead in a reduced range configuration.

Given the above, this post primarily covers the interception of strike drone designs that are not equipped with electric propulsion. The Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya is powered by a piston engine that combusts gasoline. Some uncrewed aircraft—but seemingly no (single-use) strike drones used in the Russia-Ukraine War—are equipped with aero diesel engines and, as such, combust a “heavy fuel” in the form of diesel. Some uncrewed aircraft—but seemingly no (single-use) strike drones used in the Russia-Ukraine WAr—are equipped with turboprop engines that combust a kerosene-based jet fuel. Gasoline is flammable, whereas diesel fuel and kerosene-based jet fuels are combustible. Strike drone designs equipped with piston engines, such as the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya, therefore, have an inherent vulnerability that can be taken advantage of. This is not a dynamic unique to intercepting strike drones—the damage that a munition can inflict on a tank, aircraft, and warship tends to be greatly amplified by the presence of onboard fuel and munitions that result in the secondary effects of the warhead/destructive payload of a munition.

When it comes to autocannon ammunition, it bears emphasis that we are dealing with a highly heterogeneous grouping of armaments that can employ a diverse array of ammunition. Some types of autocannon ammunition, namely those that feature either proximity fuses or programmable airburst fuses, can result in significantly more damage through fragmentation effects—a greater number of smaller and lighter high-velocity kinetic impacts on the targeted strike drone. The largest caliber autocannons, however, typically employ ammunition that features a significant amount of explosive material. While such autocannons have a lower rate of fire, hits, whether direct or the result of a non-impact fuse, can severely damage, if not functionally destroy, a strike drone such as the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya. Even so, the use of autocannons of any type is likely to result in large chunks of debris, including a possible intact warhead, crashing into the planet’s surface at what amounts to a random location.

When surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles are used to shoot down strike drones and other flying objects, the missiles will generally carry a substantial amount of high explosives that is measured in kilograms. For shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, we are dealing with a warhead that typically weighs around one kilogram. All else being equal, as (most) surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles become larger and offer greater range, the installed warheads tend to become larger and heavier. For shorter-range surface-to-air missiles and most air-to-air missiles, a warhead of around 10 kilograms is commonplace. Anti-aircraft missiles of the so-called hit-to-kill variety—which have kinetic effects—may contain no high explosives at all, but some designs feature a small warhead as a so-called lethality enhancer. Many medium-range surface-to-air missiles feature a warhead that weighs something in the region of 50 kilograms while long-range surface-to-air missiles may have warheads that may weigh something in the region of 100 kilograms. Simply stated, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles have very different effects on the likes of a Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drone than small arms and light/medium machine guns or even heavy machine guns and autocannons.

Whereas the use of small arms as well as heavy machine guns and autocannons will generally result in a strike drone eventually crashing uncontrollably in a more or less intact state into the planet’s surface in what amounts to a random location, surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles will generally result in severe damage to, if not the outright destruction of, the likes of a Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drone. In part, this is because strike drones are of fairly fragile construction and can be severely damaged—functionally destroyed—when subject to a nearby detonation of a significant amount of high explosives, subject to a large number of high-velocity fragments from the nearby detonation of an anti-aircraft missile’s warhead, or when subject to a direct hit by a quite heavy high-speed anti-aircraft missile. The above video is understood to have been recently recorded in southern Israel and captures the interception of a propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drone of Iranian origin launched by Ansarallah in Yemen against Israel. This video is particularly notable in that it not only documents the successful interception of a propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drone with a missile but also captures two explosions, the second of which results in what appears to have been quite small pieces of debris crashing into the planet’s surface.

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The Problem With Interceptor Drones

In an ideal world, Ukraine and other countries would use as many anti-aircraft missiles—with associated launchers, sensors, and support equipment—as needed to secure their airspace. Resources are, however, limited, and anti-aircraft missiles—just the single-use anti-aircraft missiles without the reusable supporting equipment—are very expensive, not least when compared to a target like the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drone design. Ukraine, therefore, extensively relies on small arms, machine guns, and autocannons, which are quite inexpensive and plentiful—in terms of both the reusable firearm and its ammunition—for rear area air defence against propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones in particular.

It is worth noting that this is an inexpensive but extremely manpower intensive approach to air defence, and one that is not suitable for use against all target types. To enhance the effectiveness of this approach to air defence against the likes of the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drones employed by Russia, Ukraine has equipped its machine gun- and/or autocannon-equipped machine gun teams with the likes of infrared and thermal sights, mobile short-range high-frequency acquisition radars, and both early warning and a form of tracking through a nationwide acoustic sensor network, among other measures. While all of these efforts have sustained a remarkably effective nationwide air defence capability set—remarkable largely as a result of what it is/is not, with the caveat that Russia’s employment of its strike drones and other strike munitions more generally has been remarkably unimaginative and, as such, unsurprisingly ineffectual—the ammunition used with Ukraine’s small arms, machine guns, and autocannons has the same limitations as before and, most of the time, results in damaged strike drones that will crash into the planet’s surface with an intact warhead.

The following recently publicized video compilation documenting the activity of a Russian rear-area air defence team—which can be seen operating in much the same manner as its Ukrainian counterparts—constitutes a case in point. Note that the warheads installed in the Ukrainian AN-196 propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones only detonated after the severely damaged low-flying strike drones crashed into the planet’s surface, at what amounted to a random point of impact. If this video had been recorded in a built-up area such as a large city, the Ukrainian strike drones may have detonated upon impact with or near residential buildings.

Ukraine is far too large a country for rudimentary anti-aircraft artillery to be in all places at all times and, more generally, has a long list of limitations, including limited destructive effects on successfully intercepted strike drones like the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya. Ukraine has, therefore, developed what amount to lower-cost, slower, and, in essentially every respect, lower-capability anti-aircraft munitions that can be likened to propeller-/rotor-driven anti-aircraft missile surrogates. I have covered some of these developments in several recent posts:

Ukraine is now using interceptor drones of both the multirotor and the fixed-wing variety in ever-increasing numbers to intercept Russia’s propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones. While these vary in design and function, the heterogeneous details are not very consequential for the present purposes. In order to optimize on high speed and low cost—all without using a solid propellant rocket motor—Ukraine’s interceptor drones have a very limited payload, which is to say that armed interceptor drones are unlikely to be equipped with a warhead that weighs much more than a kilogram or so—at most, just several kilograms. This is particularly the case with Ukraine’s multirotor interceptor drones. It bears emphasis that most, if not all, of Ukraine’s interceptor drones of both the fixed-wing and multirotor variety are electrically powered. Many factors are likely to have led to this design choice, above all the interrelated imperatives of developing an interceptor drone design that not only flies faster than the target object but has a very significant advantage in terms of acceleration so as to close the distance to the target strike drone before it leaves the limited maximum range-endurance of the electrically-powered interceptor drone that is reliant on batteries. Given these dynamics, some of Ukraine’s interceptor drones, particularly those of the multirotor variety, are unarmed, kinetic effect only, uncrewed aircraft turned anti-aircraft munitions. The videos showing interception attempts against Russia’s (seemingly primarily) unarmed Gerbera decoy drones are a case in point.

One of the implications of Ukraine’s turn toward interceptor drones of both the fixed-wing and multirotor variety is that successful interceptions are likely to result in a damaged Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya that will eventually crash into the planet’s surface at what amounts to a random location—as seen in the first two videos in this post. Should the warhead remain intact, it may detonate upon impact with the ground. The successful Russian interceptions of Ukrainian AN-196 propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones in one of the above videos should illustrate how such dynamics can play out. Simply stated, these inexpensive approaches to air defence are best deployed in areas that the likes of the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya are expected to overfly while transiting toward their intended targets. Unless interceptor drones are equipped with a sizable high explosive warhead, successful interceptions are likely to result in a more or less intact airframe—possibly including an intact warhead—plummeting uncontrollably into the planet’s surface with what amounts to a random point of impact. While this is likely to be perfectly acceptable when the random point of impact is in an agricultural area or other sparsely populated area, this is unlikely to be the case when the random point of impact is in a residential area.

As with all areas of military technology, Ukraine and any other countries interested in interceptor drones of the fixed-wing and/or multirotor variety to counter the likes of the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drone encounter tradeoffs. Different anti-aircraft capabilities and anti-aircraft munitions result in damage that varies in terms of both kind and degree. Countries that turn toward lower-cost anti-aircraft capabilities must assume the risk that strike drones and similar targets are likely to crash in a more or less intact state, possibly with an intact warhead. Given all of this, cost and availability should not be the only factors at play when determining air defence requirements and other military requirements more generally.

The new footage was released as part of a compilation of interceptions. The relevant interception can be seen from the start of the video through 00:12. The first twelve or so seconds of the video record a (successful) single interception attempt on a Russian family fixed-wing loitering strike drone (an Izdeliye-51) from the vantage point of two Ukrainian drones: a Ukrainian armed fixed-wing interceptor drone and a “Ukrainian first-person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drone, which may have been unarmed.

Unlike most samples from this particular genre of anti-aircraft drone combat footage from the Russia-Ukraine War, including the other interception sequences that appear in this video compilation, the Ukrainian fixed-wing interceptor drone (A) does not crash into the intended target, but (B) is equipped with a warhead that detonates anyway. In itself, this strongly suggests that the Ukrainian fixed-wing interceptor drone was not equipped with a warhead that had an impact fuse, which is the most common type of fuse employed on armed multirotor drones and armed fixed-wing loitering strike drones in the Russia-Ukraine War. While proximity fuses are an option and make a lot of sense in this particular anti-aircraft application, proximity fuses are somewhat expensive and appear to be uncommonly used on various types of uncrewed aircraft in the Russia-Ukraine War.

Something must have initiated the unambiguous detonation of the warhead just as the (faster) Ukrainian fixed-wing interceptor drone was about to overtake the Russian loitering strike. This video is likely to document a Ukrainian command-detonated fixed-wing interceptor drone that, as the name indicates, did not require a direct hit on the target uncrewed aircraft so as to detonate the blast-fragmentation warhead. While uncertainties remain, it is possible that the footage of the interception recorded by the remotely piloted Ukrainian multirotor drone, which features the line of dots in the center of the screen—the forward pair of rotors are also visible, exists because the multirotor drone was used to monitor the engagement for review. The presence of visible band footage from the nose-mounted electro-optical sensor installed on the Ukrainian fixed-wing interceptor drone suggests that this was also a remotely piloted uncrewed aircraft design. The interception sequence was likely enabled by a suitable high-frequency ground-based acquisition radar, such as one of the RADA designs transferred to Ukraine, that is optimized for detecting quite small, slow, and low-altitude targets over fairly short distances. Given this, we are likely dealing with a situation in which a Ukrainian combatant—perhaps the remote human operator—manually detonated the fixed-wing drone interceptor in an interception attempt that was likely enabled by a ground-based acquisition radar and a multirotor drone that acted as an aerial spotter—and perhaps a backup interceptor.

It is worth noting that there are images circulating online that are suggestive of the installation of what may amount to radar reflectors on multirotor interceptor drones, a practice that is likely intended to allow the operators of a suitable high-frequency ground-based acquisition to track both the target uncrewed aircraft and the multirotor interceptor drone launched in its pursuit. Such tracking will enable the remote command detonation of the warhead via radio. While the forward-looking electro-optical sensor/camera mounted on the Ukrainian fixed-wing interceptor drone offers its remote human operator/pilot feedback, the operators of a suitable high-frequency acquisition radar, such as one of the RADA designs, are better positioned to track the flight of both aircraft and detonate the warhead without the use of a fairly expensive proximity fuse. In time, the detonation of the warhead may be automated using radar tracking data along the lines of a command-guided surface-to-air missile. Ultimately, militaries will likely want fully automated short-range low-altitude air defence systems that employ fixed-wing and/or multirotor interceptors that are fully automated—independently fly toward the target(s) based on radar tracking data—as opposed to manpower-intensive remotely piloted uncrewed aircraft turned anti-aircraft munitions.

The targeted natural gas compressor station is well within the range of Russia’s armed “FPV” multirotor drones and its armed “FPV” fixed-wing drones. Notably, all of the dozen or so documented attacks featured in the video compilation appear to have been undertaken using armed drones equipped with a radio frequency communication uplink/downlink, which is attested by the loss of the line-of-sight radio frequency communication uplinks/downlinks as the armed drones descended in altitude. While the video compilation indicates that at least two armed drones were used simultaneously, the remote human operators/pilots would have had no way to control the armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the radio frequency uplink/downlink variety as the descending drones went beyond the line-of-sight of the ground-based uplink/downlink antenna(s). Most of the documented attacks are, as such, likely to have been quite inaccurate and resulted in very limited damage, given the very modest destructive radius of munitions that are equipped with a warhead weighing just several kilograms. It is unclear why the Russian military did not employ armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety, given how these can be used to undertake the highly surgical micro-level targeting of discrete objects. That said, the Russian military could have used a guided glide bomb or a Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drone if it really wanted to render wholly unusable—destroy, not damage—this natural gas compressor station.

While the Russian military’s “Rubicon Center,” which primarily operates armed "FPV” multirotor drones but appears to be branching out into several new areas, has rapidly risen in prominence, it is difficult to say whether the (documented) repeated targeting of such a politically sensitive and rather “strategic” target reflects a directive from Moscow or the local initiative of drone operators/pilots operating in the Sumy sector. Much the same can be said about other publicly known documented cases in which Russian armed “FPV” multirotor drones have been used to undertake the highly surgical micro-level targeting of energy infrastructure elsewhere in Ukraine. There have been several very prominent documented attacks of this type in the Kherson metropolitan area, which I covered in a recent post.

A (seemingly Russian) armed multirotor drone is reported to have recently crashed somewhere in/near the southern Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia. While the frontlines have hardly shifted in the sector along what used to be the Kakhovka Reservoir, the frontlines are now some 25 km from the outskirts of the Ukrainian-controlled city, and the practical range-endurance of armed multirotor drones keeps increasing. This notably includes the use of fixed-wing uncrewed aircraft/drones, which can serve as both "motherships" and aerial repeaters/radio relays for armed multirotor drones of the radio frequency communication uplink/downlink variety (those of the fiber optic variety are not well suited for use with fixed-wing uncrewed aircraft).

While the Kherson metropolitan area has been subject to sustained Russian attacks involving the use of armed multirotor drones, other large Ukrainian cities located near the frontlines, namely Kharkhiv, Sumy, and, to a much lesser degree, Zaporizhia, have not yet been subjected to regular and large-scale attacks involving the use of armed multirotor drones in the manner of smaller towns located close to/along the frontlines. If and when a large city comes within the practical range-endurance of armed multirotor drones, we are likely to witness a fundamentally new approach to urban warfare that will likely make the use of armed multirotor drones in battlefields characterized by open terrain look banal. Recent developments in the Kherson metropolitan area may offer a preview of what is to come in the Russia-Ukraine War and beyond.

On 4 September 2025, a seemingly Russian armed “FPV” multirotor drone of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety was spotted in daylight over Zaoprizhzhia prior to detonating upon impact with an apartment building, which may or may not have been the intended target. The circumstances behind this incident remain uncertain, and the use of armed “FPV” multirotor drones in large urban areas remains rare outside of the Kherson metropolitan area, which is best understood in somewhat different terms than any such operations in Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Sumy, or any other large Ukrainian population center.

It is important to note that Zaporizhzhia is within the range of armed “FPV” multirotor drones, among other Russian strike munitions. While Ukraine may be intercepting most, if not all, of any Russian multirotor drones, as well as armed “FPV” drones of the fixed-wing variety, being directed toward Zaporizhzhia, we are likely dealing with a situation in which such strikes have not—perhaps not yet—been prioritized by the Russian military. This may change in the coming months if Russia initiates another campaign targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The expanding reach of armed “FPV” multirotor drones and armed “FPV” fixed-wing drones, including those controlled via an aerial relay/radio repeater, allows Russia to methodically target local electricity generation and transmission infrastructure—as well as local energy storage and distribution infrastructure—in a manner that has never before been seen. Should it decide to do so, Russia will have additional tools—not limited to armed “FPV” drones—at its disposal, including systems that were not available six months ago, let alone twelve months ago.

While I contend that the videos featured in my prior posts reflect the conceptually innovative use of such “micro strike munitions” on the part of a small number of Russian multirotor drone units, there are many questionable—difficult-to-explain—incidents in the Russia-Ukraine War. The following video, which records the aftermath of what is said to be a Russian Molniya propeller-driven fixed-wing “FPV” drone strike on a Ukrainian gas/petrol station located some 28 kilometers from the frontlines in Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk province, offers a case in point.

While the specific circumstances behind this incident are not public knowledge, this particular incident verges on absurdity, given that the roof of a gas/petrol station is not used to store any fuel, unlike, for example, the wings of many large fixed-wing aircraft designs. While a fairly large and heavy munition with a large destructive radius can render a gas/petrol station wholly unusable, munitions that are equipped with a warhead weighing just several kilograms lack such destructive effects, and must, therefore, be accurately and precisely used to attack discrete aimpoints. When it comes to targeting gas/petrol stations, the only aimpoints worth expending a munition on are the fuel pumps, which must be attacked one at a time, above-ground fuel tanks, and any equipment used to facilitate the underground storage of fuel. Unless large external fuel tanks are present, this requires considerable accuracy, which, in effect, rules out the practical use of a fixed-wing human-guided munition against such discrete aimpoints. Armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety are, however, very well suited to attacking local fuel storage and distribution facilities that are located some 20-30 kilometers from the frontline, and we are likely to have additional documented cases of use going forward.

On 10 September 2025, the Russian military issued a press release that claimed an unusually large number of strike drone interceptions. Between midnight and 5 AM Moscow time that day, the Russian military claimed to have intercepted a total of 122 Ukrainian propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones. While the veracity and completeness of this figure cannot be independently verified, observers can nevertheless consider the geographical distribution of the claimed interceptions. One of the major analytical limitations of the Ukrainian Air Force’s daily press releases is that it does not break down the where, (precisely) when, and how of claimed interceptions of Russian strike munitions in a given timeframe. The Russian military’s regular press releases similarly do not offer any indication of (precisely) when and how, but do indicate where interceptions are said to have taken place.

While headlines tend to focus on the total number of strike munitions employed in a given timeframe, any serious analysis of the effectiveness of air defences requires information on where strike munitions are intercepted. This is particularly the case in the context of a large country such as Russia, where many of the targets of Ukrainian strike munitions are located many hundreds of kilometers—up to ~2000 kilometers—from the frontline/international border, and when it comes to propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones, which tend to have a cruise speed of around 150 kilometers per hour. Simply stated, Ukraine’s propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones spend hours—sometimes ten or more hours—transiting through Russian airspace—flying over multiple Russian provinces/administrative divisions—to reach their intended targets.

The Russian military’s regular press releases offer insight into how Ukrainian strike drone attacks unfold. On 10 September 2025, Ukraine appears to have primarily used strike drones to attack more proximate targets. On 12 September 2025, however, not only did the Russian military claim to intercept an unusually large number of Ukrainian propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones—which may or may not be reflective of an actual spike in Ukrainian launch strike drone launch activity—but the location of the claimed interceptions indicates a focus on more distant targets. Saint Petersburg and nearby areas may have been the primary focus of Ukrainian strike drone launches on 12 September 2025, given the concentration of claimed Russian interceptions in Russia’s Bryansk, Smolensk, Tver, Novgorod, and Leningrad provinces. No fewer than 172 of the claimed interceptions—77.82%—of claimed interceptions took place in those provinces, which suggests a focus on targets in the direction of Saint Petersburg, and it is notable that 28 of the claimed interceptions—some 12.66% of the total—took place in Leningrad province, which is adjacent to the federal city of Saint Petersburg. That is, there appear to have been many leakers, and Russia’s forward-most line(s) of low-altitude air defences appear to remain quite porous.

The Russian military’s regular press releases amount to a decidedly imperfect data source that is, in most respects, of much less analytical value than the Ukrainian Air Force’s daily press releases. The Russian military’s regular press releases only offer a numerator for the number of Ukrainian propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones that Russia claims to have intercepted without offering a denominator for the number of said munitions that Ukraine launched. The Russian military does a far worse job at presenting this data—an analytically important point in itself given the consequential role of public relations, propaganda, and information warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War—and observers must piece together fragmetentary claims for various timeframes—it is not unusual for the Russian military to issue multiple press releases in a single day without explicating whether the figures are cumulative. Even so, the Russian military’s often disregarded regular press releases on air defence actvity offer non-zero insights into this increasingly important aspect of the Russia-Ukraine War and the immense challenges that Russia continues to face in countering Ukraine’s increasingly widespread employment of propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones.

Russia—even western Russia, which is to say the parts of the country west of the Ural Mountains, which currently delineates the maximum practical range of publicly known Ukrainian strike munitions—encompasses an extremely large surface area. Any military will struggle to secure such an expanse of airspace, especially when the primary threats are fairly low-cost and, as such, very affordable and plentiful, propeller-driven single-use strike drones that primarily fly at a low altitude. The challenges faced by the Russian military in the area of air defence are compounded by the non-availability of radar-equipped airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft and the division of responsibilities and resources for air defence in the Russian military. While this post only examines two single-day snapshots of claimed Russian air defence activity, even such decidedly imperfect and fragmentary data indicates that Ukraine is alternating between target lists so as to stretch Russian air defences thin. The Russian military cannot rapidly redeploy its ground-based air defences from Crimea and Krasnodar to Saint Petersburg and Moscow. This is an area of warfare in which the attacker inherently holds the initiative and the defender must be strong everywhere, which is simply not practical in a world of finite resources that must be allocated, not least when attempting to defend the territorial expanse of western Russia.

It is worth noting the contrast between how Russia and Ukraine appear to be employing their respective propeller-driven strike drone arsenals: Russia repeatedly targets the same areas, above all the Kyiv metropolitan area, despite the predictability of such attacks and, more consequentially, the sustained high concentration of Ukrainian air defences in those sectors. Simply stated, the Russian military does not alternate between target lists in the manner that Ukraine appears to be when it comes to attacking targets deep inside Russia. In this and so many areas of warfare, equipment and technology matter, but can only be as effective and effectual as the minds behind employment practices allow.

Whereas airbases, oil refineries, and the likes of armaments factories tend to be sprawling targets, specific nodes of electricity transmission equipment amount to fairly compact targets. Attacking such fairly compact targets requires strike munitions that are precise and accurate. As the following images and video show, the four propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones that the Rapid Support Forces is reported to have employed to attack the al-Markhiyat substation in Omdurman displayed decent but imperfect accuracy and precision—note the large hole in the concrete wall that separates the transformers, which is unlikely to have been the intended target.

The destructive effects and effectiveness of a given munition are a function of the destructive radius of the munition against a given target type. Leaving aside nuclear weapons, the destructive radius of a munition is generally related to the amount of high explosives of a given type that is present in the warhead. As a result, strike munitions with a larger and heavier warhead will, all else being equal, have a larger destructive radius than strike munitions with a smaller and lighter warhead. Given this, strike munitions with smaller and lighter warheads must compensate for the lesser destructive radius with greater accuracy and precision.

Propeller-driven strike drones are typically designed and built to a low price point. As a result, these can be procured, fielded, and employed in very large numbers, which, in turn, allows militaries, paramilitaries, and non-state armed groups to attack what were, until recently, unimaginably expansive and deep target banks. There tends to be a tradeoff that even accurate and precise impacts against many types of targets will typically damage, not wholly destroy, the intended target. All else being equal, if you want to damage a power plant beyond economic repair or beyond practical repair, let alone to wholly destroy it—raze the structure(s)—you will need a larger and heavier warhead and, in turn, a larger, heavier, and more expensive strike munition that is more difficult to access and likely to be available in much smaller numbers. While it is possible to use multiple strike munitions to compensate for the limited payload of a single given strike munition, this typically places greater demands on weaponeering and accuracy. As of 2025, lower-cost long-range strike munitions such as propeller-driven strike drones tend to be far better suited toward harassment strikes than wholesale destruction and, therefore, appear to be better suited in, for example, protracting the Sudanese Civil War than bringing it to a quick conclusion.

While long-range attacks tend to receive a lot of attention, it is important to recognize that improving the accuracy and precision of a strike munition becomes an increasingly challenging proposition once intensifying measure-countermeasure dynamics take effect. It also tends to result in more complex and more expensive strike munitions that will, all else being equal, be available in more limited numbers. The Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces are well behind the “state of the art” of strike munition designs and countermeasures thereto seen in the Russia-Ukraine War. It is also important to recognize that the Russia-Ukraine War is, in itself, something of a technological backwater as far as the worldwide/system-level technological frontier is concerned (the Russia-Ukraine War does, however, offer many examples of conceptual innovation and, above all, regular and large-scale demonstrations of real-world effects and effectiveness). While the net effects of the diffusion of propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drone technology to Sudan on the course of the country’s civil war remain to be seen, it is safe to say that this area of military technology is likely to shape interstate and intrastate conflicts alike going forward.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

Reports of Russian propeller-driven strike drones heading toward Poland serve as a reminder of how porous Ukraine's air defences remain. The inexpensive approaches to rear area short-range low-altitude air defecce that Ukraine has pursued allow it to secure specific sectors at a fairly low cost, not secure the entirety of its vast airspace. If Ukraine's (fully alerted, mobilized, and heavily reinforced as a result of foreign largesse) air defences were not so porous, the attached (Ukrainian) unofficial maps would not feature so many Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya flight paths in western Ukraine.

Much of the (impressive) performance of Ukrainian air defences against Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya propeller-driven strike drones and similar kinematically non-complex aerial threats can be explained by Russia's unimaginative and inept approach to targeting and its heavy reliance on the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya as an ersatz cruise missile surrogate.

Background:

These reported—as yet unconfirmed by official sources—incidents are happening in the lead up to the joint Belarus-Russia Zapad-2025 ("west 2025") military exercise in Belarus. Zapad-2025 may provide the backdrop for the formal unveiling of Russia's new Oreshnik ballistic missile, which is squarely aimed at NATO even though it has, to date, been employed once against Ukraine. Ukrainian officials have in the distant past voiced concern that Russia may seek to reopen the northern front via the Ukraine-Belarus border. While Russian forces engaged in combat operations against Ukraine withdrew from Belarus in 2022, Russia continued to use Belarusian airspace for air and missile strikes against Ukraine. Ukrainian reports suggest that this practice ended a long time ago.

Update:

The Polish military is currently characterizing this incident as a spillover from Russian propeller-driven strike drone launches against Ukraine, which are now an everyday occurrence (there is, however, considerable variance in the numbers launched per day). The fear among the residents of eastern Poland and the economic disruption brought about the the closure of multiple major Polish airports notwithstanding, this incident is likely to be looked back on as a useful opportunity to test the state of Polish—and NATO more generally—air defence capabilities against a still fairly new and both qualitatively and quantitatively distinct type of aerial threat that is unlikely to go away.

Much of the (impressive) performance of Ukrainian air defences against Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya propeller-driven strike drones and similar kinematically non-complex aerial threats can be explained by Russia's unimaginative and inept approach to targeting and its heavy reliance on the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya as an ersatz cruise missile surrogate. Poland and NATO are likely to encounter a qualitatively and quantitatively enhanced propeller-driven strike drone threat from Russia—and perhaps Belarus—going forward.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

While the regular stream of videos showing Ukrainian Air Force fighter aircraft—Soviet-built Su-27 and MiG-29 fighter aircraft, Su-24 strike aircraft, and Su-25 attack aircraft, as well as American-origin F-16 fighter aircraft and French-built Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft—undertaking air-to-ground sorties when equipped with foreign-supplied guided bombs, land-attack cruise missiles, and other guided air-to-ground munitions highlights the non-trivial growth of Ukrainian military capabilities, it is important for observers to develop an accurate understanding of scale and regularity of such air-to-ground sorties. Fortunately, the Ukrainian Air Force—which operates the country's fixed-wing crewed combat aircraft—has been making monthly disclosures of the number of sorties it has generated.

This allows observers to not only assess the Ukrainian Air Force's monthly sorties and sorties by type but also discern the average daily number of sorties and sorties by type.

If we accept the data in the Ukrainian Air Force's monthly disclosures at face value, most of the sorties that the Ukrainian Air Force has undertaken since April 2025 were—unsurprisingly—air-to-air combat sorties. This presumably includes standing combat air patrols in sectors located close to the frontlines—which is to say sorties for which the intended targets are primarily Russian fixed-wing and rotary-wing crewed combat aircraft—quick reaction alert sorties across Ukrainian airspace, and rear area air-to-air sorties that are undertaken with the primary objective of intercepting inbound Russian cruise missiles and/or propeller-driven strike drones (i.e., the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya). The other/unaccounted for category is a residual that may or may not encompass training and testing/research and development sorties. Note that the Ukrainian Air Force faces strong incentives to allocate—convert—as many training sorties into combat sorties as possible. This is, however, less practical when sorties are flown by less experienced aircrew. It is also important to note that the Ukrainian Air Force is known to use its turbojet-powered L-39 trainer aircraft to intercept Russian propeller-driven strike drones in rear areas/sectors situated far from the frontlines.

While the aggregate monthly figures may appear impressive in absolute terms, given that there is no baseline for comparison, the imputed daily average figures are decidedly unimpressive, irrespective of the relatively small size of the Ukrainian Air Force's combat aircraft fleet and the low serviceability rates that it is likely to encounter following over three and a half years of sustained combat operations. The Ukrainian Air Force's monthly disclosures indicate that it has generated an average of just 20-30 sorties per day from April 2025 through August 2025. The "fire strike and aviation support of troops" sorties—air-to-ground sorties—that receive so much attention appear to be limited to a daily average of 4-6 sorties from April 2025 through August 2025. It bears emphasis that some portion of the presumably air-to-air "fighter aviation cover" sorties may entail the carriage and release of some number of air-to-ground munitions.

All things considered, these figures—which are directly sourced from the Ukrainian Air Force's monthly disclosures—indicate an air force that is predominantly tasked with generating air-to-air sorties. Observers viewing the regular stream of images and videos of Ukrainian Air Force crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft equipped with guided air-to-ground munitions and videos of the detonation of said munitions should, therefore, be mindful of how few sorties—especially air-to-ground sorties— the Ukrainian Air Force appears to be generating on a given day. As with so many aspects of the Russia-Ukraine War, there seems to be less here than meets the eye.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

Unofficial maps such as these, which draw upon open source monitoring of air defence activity and official warnings from the Ukrainian Air Force, should lead observers to ask how porous Ukraine's air defences must continue to be despite the immense allocations toward bolstering the country's air defences. This notably includes the increasingly widespread employment of rather inexpensive uncrewed aircraft turned (remotely-) human-piloted surface-to-air munitions of both the multirotor and fixed-wing variety. Unlike most surface-to-air missile systems, these are optimized against slow, non-maneuvering/poorly maneuvering, and generally unresponsive targets such as Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones—which are typically equipped with either 50-kg or 90-kg class warheads—and Gerbera propeller-driven fixed-wing decoy drones. It is important to note that decoy drones—which appear to be primarily unarmed but which can be equipped with a 1-3 kg warhead at the cost of a reduction in maximum range-endurance—appear to regularly constitute some 40-50% of all the "strike drones" that the Ukrainian Air Force's daily official disclosures claim Russia to have launched on a given day.

The apparent ongoing existence of very porous Ukrainian air defences against the likes of the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya—and the apparent inability of Ukraine's air defences to intercept most, let alone all, the inbound Russian strike and decoy drones along the frontlines/international border draws attention to the potential effectiveness of Russia's recent shift toward employing Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drones against proximate battlefield targets located up to some 50 or so kilometers from the frontlines.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

This apparent Ukrainian Neptune cruise missile launcher was severely damaged/likely destroyed by what is reported to have been a Russian Iskander ballistic missile. According to Russian commentary and a geolocation by X/Twitter user @99Dominik_, the Neptune launcher appears to have been targeted in Zaporizhzhia province at a location that is some 26 kilometers from the frontline. If the targeted launch vehicle was used to launch the baseline anti-ship version of the Ukrainian R-360 Neptune cruise missile, the intended naval target(s) likely to have been located in the Sea of Azov. Alternatively, the targeted launch Neptune vehicle may have been used to launch the terrestrial targets with the land-attack version/derivative of the Neptune.

While the video amounts to another documented successful case of Russian "dynamic targeting," it is important to consider several points:

• The video recorded by a Russian ISR drone clearly shows that the launch vehicle successfully launched one Neptune missile prior to the arrival and detonation of the reported Iskander ballistic missile. In other words, the Russian "dynamic targeting" attempt was simply not fast/responsive enough, even though the geolocation indicates that the targeted launch vehicle was located some ~26 kilometers from the frontlines.

• Supposing that the video shows the employment of an Iskander ballistic missile against the targeted Neptune launcher, this latest incident suggests that other, more suitable munitions—such as the 300 mm guided artillery rockets/missiles associated with the Tornado-S—remain unavailable in the required numbers. It is otherwise very difficult to justify the expenditure of an Iskander ballistic missile against such a proximate target, notwithstanding the high-value nature of a Neptune launch vehicle.

• The reported Iskander ballistic missile did not directly impact the target but detonated upon impact several tens of meters away, a dynamic that evidently caught the remote human operator of the Russian ISR drone monitoring the incident off guard.

• The video indicates that the reported Iskander ballistic was equipped with a unitary high explosive warhead that was fitted with an impact/contact fuse. Uncertainties notwithstanding, it is possible, even likely, that the reported Iskander ballistic missile used in this "dynamic targeting" event was likely loaded onto a launch vehicle that was ready to launch on very short notice. A munition equipped with a unitary warhead+airburst fuse mode or, alternatively, a submunition dispensing warhead would have been more suitable for this engagement. While Russia continues to have a large number of munitions at its disposal, there tends to be an enduring mismatch between warhead and/or fusing mode and the role to which a Russian munition is applied.

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Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

While Ukraine's successful employment of two seemingly sea-launched—from Ukrainian USVs in the Black Sea—fixed-wing human-in-the-loop loitering strike drones against a Russia Project 21631/Buyan-M corvette in the Sea of Azov will receive a lot of attention as an early documented case of the employment of such uncrewed aircraft-turned munitions in the anti-ship role, the incident also draws attention to the absurdity that was and remains the so-called "Kalibrization" of the Russian Navy over the course of the 2010s. Since February 2022, the Russian warships and submarines that are capable of launching 3M54 Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles leave port, launch a handful of Kalibr cruise missiles, and then immediately return to port to rearm. Given the military-geographical context of the Russia-Ukraine War, Russia would be better off installing a vertical launch system on the ground in Crimea or elsewhere—the Kalibr has sufficient range to target any part of Ukraine and can be programmed to fly over the Black Sea if that approach is advantageous. As the threat posed by Ukrainian USVs in the Black Sea increased, some Russian warships "retreated" to the Sea of Azov, where sporadic Kalibr cruise missile launch activity continues (sporadic as a result of the limited supply of such cruise missiles). See: https://x.com/shahpas/status/1929195837264892117

The inefficiencies of Russia's employment of ship- and submarine-launched Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles parallel the inefficiencies of Russia's employment of air-launched Kh-101 land-attack cruise missiles with its fleet of bomber aircraft, which I covered in a recent post: https://x.com/shahpas/status/1961164592186278103

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

While armed multirotor drones can be effectively and productively employed as a form of inexpensive surface-to-air munition/interceptor against fixed-wing drones—at least the slower designs and those that fly at a lower altitude—as well as other multirotor drones, these are inexpensive systems because they are remotely operated/piloted, human-in-the-loop uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions. The combination of very limited range-endurance, the fact that the target is often moving at a speed of 50-100 km/h, and the fact that the armed multirotor drone employed as a surface-to-air interceptor is not a whole lot faster means that every pairing of armed multirotor drone-turned-interceptor and a remote human operator/pilot can only cover—protect—a very limited surface area. As a result, this amounts to an inexpensive but very manpower-intensive approach to air defence.

The videos of such interceptions released over the past year or so suggest that it is not unusual for two armed multirotor drones-turned interceptors—each with its own remote human operator/pilot—to pursue a potential target, a dynamic that can be seen from 00:35 in the attached video. Automating the systems and the targeting process will free up manpower, but will likely result in a non-trivial increase in the unit cost of such uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions, with much of the greater expense going toward reusable sensors and command and control equipment that will remain on the ground. More generally, it is important to keep in mind that many discussions of the cost of a given military system tend to assign inadequate weight to the economic allocation of finite manpower and time. A faster surface-to-air munition will likely be considerably more expensive, but nevertheless offers a shorter time-to-target that can itself translate into the ability to intercept a much greater number of (moving) targets in a given timeframe. Given the above, there is a case to be made that the inexpensive but nevertheless rather primitive approach to air defence seen in this video and others like it should be primarily viewed as an effective wartime expedient rather than an approach that should necessarily be widely emulated (at least by countries that have the resources to do a lot better).

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

The establishment of a Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya launch position at Donetsk airport is likely intended to support the expanded use of these propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones against battlefield targets located some ~50 or so kilometers from the frontlines. Russia is heavily concentrating its capabilities to break through Ukraine's defensive lines in Donetsk and has recently been regularly employing Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drones for this purpose. While there is precedent for the use of the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya against targets that are fairly close to the frontlines, the observed dynamic in Donetsk and in other sectors—including Sumy—is likely driven by several factors. https://x.com/shahpas/status/1928276028130029672

These factors likely include: - The much greater availability of such strike drones as a result of sustained efforts to expand production capacity. There is now a production line at Alabuga, Tatarstan, for the Shahed-136/Geran-2 and a separate production line in Izhevsk, Udmurtia, for the related Garpiya. - The availability of the Shahed-136/Geran-2 in a reduced range configuration that is equipped with a heavier 90-kilogram—as opposed to a 50-kilogram—class warhead. The destructive potential of such a Shahed-136/Geran-2 can be compared in broad strokes to a medium-caliber artillery rocket such as the 227 mm GMLRS used with the American HIMARS and M270 MLRS launchers (the analogy focuses on warhead weight and does not necessarily extend to warhead design and fusing). - The availability of the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya in a version that is equipped with an airburst warhead. - The availability of the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya in a version that is equipped with an inexpensive and rudimentary camera + radio datalink that enables its employment as a loitering strike drone in a manner that is broadly analogous to the much smaller, lighter, and shorter-range Russian Lancet strike drone. Note that the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drone can only be operated as a human-in-the-loop strike munition while it is within line-of-sight of a ground-based antenna (or aerial repeater/radio relay) in the absence of a beyond-line-of-sight satellite communications datalink. Following successful Russian offensives, Donetsk airport is now beyond the practical range of Ukrainian artillery. A Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya launched from Donetsk airport can reach the frontlines in around 20 minutes and can cover an additional 50 or so kilometers in another 20 minutes. As a result, the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya can be effectively employed against both stationary/fixed and semi-mobile targets in a battlefield support role. This amounts to a very different concept of operations than what the Shahed-136's Iranian designers originally had in mind, and should be understood as Russia's adaptation of the Iranian strike drone design to meet Russian needs in the specific military-geographical context of the Russia-Ukraine War. The increasing use of the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya to attack targets close to the frontlines has analytical implications for those who track Russia's use of strike munitions of all types. I covered this issue at length in a recent thread: https://x.com/shahpas/status/1958562969127637027

Simply stated, Ukraine's regular disclosures on Russian strike munition launches are decidedly incomplete and increasingly misleading as technology and operational concepts have evolved over the course of the Russia-Ukraine War. The increasingly regular employment of Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drones against battlefield targets is just the latest manifestation of this dynamic.

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

While there is an ever-expanding library of footage documenting the employment of armed multirotor drones in various roles and contexts—including the use of multirotor drones of the fiber optic (FO) communication uplink/downlink variety to navigate *inside* buildings (see link) to attack high value targets—documented usage of multirotor FO drones to attack underground targets remains rare. See: