Minimal comment-themed posts are used to introduce data points for use in other posts going forward. Posts of this theme will typically feature minimal analysis and commentary.

The Laotian and Russian militaries have undertaken a bilateral training event held in Laos. This bilateral training event comes amid the ongoing Cambodia-Thailand border conflict, which has left Cambodia in the uncomfortable position of being beholden to China for economic and even (peacetime) military support—in a manner not dissimilar to Laos—without being able to count on Beijing for firm security guarantees, given the value that Beijing places on China-Thailand relations. Given this, Cambodia and Laos are likely to diversify their security providers going forward, including, for example, a country such as Russia that may be open to selling a long-range air defence system such as the S-400, long-range strike munitions such as Iskander ballistic missiles and the likes of Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones, among other types of military equipment, so that these small Southeast Asian countries can bolster their military capabilities against a far larger, better-resourced, and better-equipped country like Thailand.

While Cambodia and Laos have very limited resources to spend on military equipment, and notwithstanding the fact that Russia’s military industry is poorly positioned to fulfill export orders for the foreseeable future for as long as the Russia-Ukraine War continues, Russia is increasingly well-positioned to offer countries like Cambodia and Laos with far less expensive and, as such, more plentiful, munitions such as armed “first-person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drones of the types that are being built and employed on a seven-digit annualized basis in the Russia-Ukraine War. Stated differently, Russia is very well-positioned, particularly if there is a lasting ceasefire in the Russia-Ukraine War, to sell countries such as Cambodia and Laos, say, ten thousand armed “FPV” multirotor drones. Assuming a higher than normal profit margin for Russian armed “FPV” multirotor drone manufacturers when supplying an export customer, as well as a training package and spare parts, countries like Cambodia and Laos may have to pay something in the region of US$10 million to US$15 million for around ten thousand armed “FPV” multirotor drones.

While the fact that Ukraine is increasingly well-positioned to share its expertise and its armed “FPV” multirotor drones with Western countries and other potential export customers worldwide has been widely discussed, Russia is, of course, similarly well-positioned to share its expertise and its armed “FPV” multirotor drones with other countries. Both Russia and Ukraine are likely to have a fairly short window to monetize their experience, expertise, and technology before this market segment becomes very crowded with largely undifferentiated and, in effect, highly commoditized armed “FPV” multirotor drones. Given the poor state of government finances resulting from an economically ruinous war, Russia is likely to be highly motivated to export its armed “FPV” multirotor drones to paying customers. The provisioning of armed “FPV” multirotor drones is also likely to constitute a tool that Moscow is likely to use in order to reestablish relations and, more generally, bolster relations, following the isolation that it has faced as a result of the Russia-Ukraine War. Countries such as Laos and perhaps Cambodia may become some of the first export customers for Russia’s armed “FPV” multirotor drones.

This extensions-themed post is an extension of material that has appeared in another newsletter/section and other parts of my website more generally. While my newsletters/sections are primarily categorized by region, these can only appear in one newsletter/section, given how the Substack platform is configured, even as these may be highly relevant to readers who are primarily interested in other parts of the world.

In several recent posts that primarily appear in my China newsletter/section, I have discussed some of the externalities of the intensifying military-technological competition between China and the United States, a dynamic that is likely to leave many countries behind in the dust. With the partial exception of well-resourced Singapore, Southeast Asian countries have little to no immunity to the effects of this dynamic. As I explained in the context of the six new anti-ship munitions that were unveiled at the 3 September military parade in Beijing, most Southeast Asian countries are unable to keep up and deploy credible naval forces for the foreseeable future:

As things stand, Southeast Asian countries other than Singapore regularly cut corners in naval procurement in order to develop fleets that are more impressive on paper than in practice—and larger than fleets would otherwise exist if these countries procured more capable and more expensive warships with the same very limited budget. While Southeast Asian fleets were, of course, increasingly overshadowed by the PLAN over the course of the 2010s, their relative standing vis-a-vis China in 2025 and going forward is worse than it has ever been. Given the current and emerging threat environment, Southeast Asian countries are likely to be better off investing their limited resources in submarines, land-based anti-ship munitions, and maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities more generally, as well as terrestrial air defences. Contestations in the disputed waters of the South China Sea may require fairly large vessels, but do not require expensive vessels equipped with medium-end sensors and armament, not least when going head-to-head with the Chinese Coast Guard and Chinese maritime militia, which are backstopped by the PLAN and the rest of the PLA more generally.

The externalities of intensifying military-technological competition can also be seen in other capability areas and other regions, above all in the critically important area of air combat capabilities. We are fast approaching a context in which Chinese combat aircraft will be able to essentially run amok, attacking targets in Southeast Asian countries—should these not remain neutral in time of war—with near impunity unless the United States deploys some of its immense but nevertheless finite military capabilities to defend the territory of Southeast Asian countries.

As I explained in two other recent posts, even Japan, a country that has access to considerable resources and a world-class technological base, is experiencing the negative effects of intensifying military-technological competition between China and the United States. A world in which even countries such as Japan are likely to struggle to counter the likes of China’s new anti-ship munitions and next-generation combat aircraft is a world in which Southeast Asian countries will be forced to fundamentally adjust how they allocate their finite, if in most cases steadily increasing, resources toward military capabilities in an increasingly precarious and increasingly high-stakes security environment. Whether Southeast Asian countries can make the necessary course corrections remains to be seen at a time when China’s options for undertaking long-range strikes against terrestrial targets are also fast expanding:

Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

Saab is pitching its Gripen fighter aircraft and Erieye AEW&C aircraft (with the Erieye radar installed on used/out of production Saab 2000 airframes) for the Philippine Air Force's multi-role combat aircraft requirement. While commentary tends to engage in head-to-head comparisons of Chinese and American military and military-technological capabilities, one of the most consequential dynamics at play in the region over the past ten or so years is that China is racing far ahead of its neighbours, even if it remains second place to the United States in many important capability and technology areas. The China-Philippine military balance offers an excellent example of this dynamic. Suppose that the Philippines places an order for 30 or so new fighter aircraft and, say, 3-4 AEW&C aircraft with deliveries of said equipment set to conclude by the early 2030s. On paper and in purely monadic terms, the Philippines will significantly enhance its military capabilities vis-a-vis China, but the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is in a very good position to allocate a few more munitions, a few more aircraft sorties, and so forth to neutralize the Philippine Air Force's new fighter and AEW&C aircraft in the air and on the ground. Manila has very limited resources to allocate—over a multi-year timeframe—to address a very long list of pressing military shortcomings. The Philippines is not in the market for the likes of the American F-35 fighter aircraft and cannot afford the full suite of capabilities—including extensive air defence systems and ballistic missile defence systems—that are required to withstand a concerted Chinese attempt at rapidly neutralizing the Philippines—and critical infrastructure in the Philippines that will be vital to the American war effort against China—in time of war. To be clear, none of this is to say that countries like the Philippines should simply play dead or that there are no advantages to having new fighter aircraft and AEW&C aircraft in scenarios short of an all-out war. It is nevertheless important to set realistic expectations as net gains in fielded military capabilities vis-a-vis a fast modernizing Chinese military.