Russian commanders in Murmansk have, like their Soviet predecessors, always recognized that they constitute an isolated outpost of Russian, previously Soviet, military power in sparsely populated terrain. Contemporary Russian commanders now need to not only confront the realities that the Russian military is, relative to NATO, nowhere near as strong as the Soviet military, that Finland and Sweden are now NATO member states, and, most importantly, that the United States and NATO more generally are well-positioned to deploy hundreds, if not thousands, of strike munitions to severely degrade the Russian military presence in Murmansk province, which includes the Kola Peninsula, and cut off reinforcements from elsewhere in Russia.

As things stand, the Russian military could, for example, deploy ten S-400 long-range surface-to-air missile batteries—an extremely unrealistic number—to locations around Murmansk province and still remain vulnerable to NATO air and missile strikes. The increasingly widespread deployment of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, and other long-range strike munitions more generally, by NATO countries will only further stress Russia’s air defence capabilities, which are heavily optimized toward intercepting crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft. In a similar vein, Russian military positions around Murmansk are highly exposed to multi-axis attacks by low-flying propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones. It bears emphasis that there are presently just four S-400 and S-300 batteries with peacetime garrisons in Murmansk province. Given the very high cost of such systems, Russia is unlikely to deploy anything close to ten S-400 batteries in Murmansk province for the foreseeable future.

While the Russian Navy has a very major presence around Murmansk province, the Russian surface fleet is very poorly positioned to contribute to air defence operations, not least in a context in which it has negligible ballistic missile defence capabilities to offer. The very existence of a major Russian naval presence is primarily what makes Murmansk province such a lucrative and likely high priority target for NATO, and Russia would in an important sense be better off without its critically important Northern Fleet were geographical realities not to demand the existence of extensive naval facilities in this isolated and sparsely populated outpost of not just Russian military power but of the Russian state itself.

As it concerns ground combat capabilities, there are two Russian Army combat brigades and one Russian Naval Infantry combat brigade garrisoned in and around Murmansk province. Once combat support and logistical support units are accounted for, Russia can put together a division-sized ground combat formation in this area. While this composite force outnumbers and outguns the Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish ground combat units that are garrisoned in areas near Russia’s Murmansk province in peacetime, Russia will, in wartime, be poorly positioned to dispatch significant reinforcements by land or air to Murmansk province. The composite division-sized Russian ground combat force in the area is not, as such, in any position to undertake a significant and sustainable offensive into NATO territory. Russia’s terrestrial supply routes north of Lake Ladoga, which traverse sparsely populated and often desolate terrain, are increasingly vulnerable to NATO interdiction efforts, and these supply lines are likely to become increasingly high-priority targets for NATO should Russian forces in Murmansk province undertake an offensive into NATO territory. It also bears emphasis that while a Russian ground offensive in the high north may initially encounter some success, Norway, Sweden, and Finland remain well-positioned to dispatch reinforcements, and Norway, in particular, is likely to quickly receive reinforcements from the United States and the United Kingdom. It is difficult to imagine how a composite division-sized Russian ground combat formation will be able to not just capture but also occupy significant territory in the contemporary military environment, one in which both Finland and Sweden are now NATO member states.

While Russian military capabilities should certainly not be dismissed out of hand, notwithstanding the poor performance of the Russian military throughout the Russia-Ukraine War, it is important to avoid exaggerating Russian military capabilities by underplaying Russia’s many limitations and vulnerabilities, which is essentially what made for much of the public debate in the 2014-2022 timeframe. All things considered, the Kola Peninsula and Russia’s Murmansk province more generally do not constitute a secure bastion that can serve as a springboard for a major Russian offensive into NATO territory in the Arctic Circle. The Russian military is highly exposed in this sector, which amounts to a vulnerable outpost of not just Russian military power but of the Russian state itself. Military and technological trends heavily favour NATO in this sector, and the Russian position is likely to become increasingly untenable unless the Russian military retrenches in this sector by adopting a defensive military posture.

This post is an extension of material that has appeared in another newsletter/section and other parts of my website more generally. While my newsletters/sections are primarily categorized by region—you can either subscribe to specific newsletters/sections or subscribe to the entire website/all of my writings—many posts can be readily placed in multiple newsletters/sections—but only appear in one newsletter/section given how the Substack platform is configured—and may be highly relevant to readers who are primarily interested in other parts of the world. Posts dealing with ongoing conflicts or advances in military technology, for example, may highlight developments and dynamics that may be be of consequence to other countries. Similarly, posts that deal with the military capabilities of one country may be relevant to readers who are primarily interested in the military capabilities of other countries. My Extensions themed posts will be used to highlight content that I think subscribers of other newsletters/sections may find interesting. I hope that my Extensions themed posts help rationalize my peculiar comparativist analytical approach, one that results in my website covering a very wide range of military-related topics and much of the world.

In several recent posts, I have highlighted the diminishing protection that foliage offers militaries following the advent of armed “first-person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drones of the fiber-optic cable communication uplink/downlink variety—as opposed to those of the radio frequency communication uplink/downlink variety. This is of particular relevance to several NATO countries, particularly Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania, given their proximity to Russia proper and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. These countries have long been able to treat fairly dense tracts of woodland, as well as peatland, marshes, and lakes, as obstacles to the mobility of Russian maneuver formations. While the longstanding threat posed by Russian fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, as well as Russian tube and rocket artillery, has always extended over such difficult-to-navigate terrain, the advent of armed “first-person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drones, particularly those of the fiber-optic cable communication uplink/downlink variety, now presents a very distinct challenge to NATO militaries.

While readers who have subscribed to my Europe & NATO section/newsletter are likely to be very familiar with the everyday large-scale employment of armed “FPV” multirotor drones and similar to attack armoured vehicles, dismounted combatants, and various types of military equipment in the Russia-Ukraine War, it is important to recognize that Russia can employ armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic variety can be used to attack an extremely diverse array of targets that are separated from Russia-controlled terrain by fairly dense tracts of woodland, peatland, marshes, lakes, and similar.

I have addressed the diminishing protection that foliage offers militaries in several recent posts:

The following post features ⚠️ combat footage ⚠️ from the Russia-Ukraine War. While the attached video found in this post does not feature gore, reading/viewing discretion is advised. I only upload combat footage for informational purposes. Posts featuring not safe for work (NSFW) content, including combat footage, will never be monetized/paid, subscriber-only posts.

I have addressed Russia’s use of armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety to attack targets separated by water obstacles in several recent posts:

The following post features what remains a rare video of an armed “FPV” multirotor drone of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety being used to attack a waterborne target, which is to say a documented attack in which said multirotor drone is itself flown over water.