Scratchpad-themed posts briefly introduce ideas and notes that may be followed by a memo or longer analysis at a future date. Posts filed under the scratchpad section/newsletter are only accessible to subscribers, whether free or paid. For the purposes of navigating this site, scratchpad-themed posts are organized under the region-themed topic-themed subsections under "Memos." You will not receive email notifications for newly posted scratchpad-themed posts.

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) recently deployed aircraft to Egypt for the second iteration of the bilateral “Wings of Civilization” air force exercise. PLAAF aircraft first left China via the Karakoram airway and landed at one of several Pakistani airports, namely in Islamabad and Karachi (a notable fact in itself). The aircraft then took off to fly over the Arabian Sea toward Oman, and transited Omani airspace to enter Saudi airspace in the country’s southeast, from which Saudi airspace was used to reach the Red Sea and ultimately Egypt. The PLAAF’s “pit stops” in Pakistan are notable in that PLAAF aircraft did not make use of a single Pakistani facility, such as a single Pakistan Air Force airbase. This draws attention to the absence of a standing PLAAF presence in Pakistan, which can not only be used to support bilateral engagements with third parties such as “Wings of Civilization” or support PLA activities in Djibouti, but also to, for example, deploy crewed and/or uncrewed Chinese intelligence, surveillance, and reconaissance (ISR) aircraft over the Arabian Sea and along India’s coastline.

China and Pakistan may have exceptionally close military relations, but the PLA has a minimal presence in Pakistan, and the PLAAF does not operate beyond China’s borders in the manner of not only the U.S. Air Force but also leading European air forces, which regularly deploy, among other things, ISR aircraft in locations far from their home territory. Unless the PLA begins to transit the airspace above Myanmar to reach the Indian Ocean, the Karakoram airway and Pakistani airspace will remain key to expanding China’s “overseas” military footprint.

Scratchpad-themed posts briefly introduce ideas and notes that may be followed by a memo or longer analysis at a future date. Posts filed under the scratchpad section/newsletter are only accessible to subscribers, whether free or paid. For the purposes of navigating this site, scratchpad-themed posts are organized under the region-themed topic-themed subsections under "Memos." You will not receive email notifications for newly posted scratchpad-themed posts.

China has announced that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) will host a bilateral air force training event with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from late August through mid-September 2026. The “Falcon Shield 2026” exercise, the fourth of this series, will be held in Hotan, Xinjiang province. The exercise is notable in several respects, above all for acquainting the PLAAF with one of the world’s best-equipped air forces, although the UAE is unlikely to be able to use its American-supplied hardware in an exercise with China. This year’s iteration is also notable for another reason: the PLAAF has just wrapped up the 2026 iteration of the “Falcon Strike” exercise with Thailand, which is hosted by Thailand, and is about to start the 2026 iteration of the “Eagles of Civilization” exercise with Egypt, which is hosted by Egypt. This amounts to an incredible spike in interaction with foreign air forces for a PLAAF—and, more generally, a PLA—that remains strikingly insular. While such bilateral engagements may bolster the export competitiveness of Chinese armaments and raise the PLAAF’s international profile and that of Chinese armaments, these undertakings are most significant in facilitating the PLAAF’s ongoing evolution by offering it exposure to air forces beyond that of Pakistan, which long served as the PLAAF’s only meaningful conduit to foreign air force practices.

Scratchpad-themed posts briefly introduce ideas and notes that may be followed by a memo or longer analysis at a future date. Posts filed under the scratchpad section/newsletter are only accessible to subscribers, whether free or paid. For the purposes of navigating this site, scratchpad-themed posts are organized under the region-themed topic-themed subsections under "Memos." You will not receive email notifications for newly posted scratchpad-themed posts.

According to Ukraine, North Korea has transferred Hwasong-11C (U.S. designation: KN-30) ballistic missiles to Russia. Transfers of North Korean ballistic missiles to Russia and their subsequent use by Russia against Ukraine are not new dynamics and have likely offered North Korea an invaluable opportunity to test its increasingly diverse array of shorter-range ballistic missiles—at least some of which are likely to be deployed in both conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed configurations—in realistic wartime conditions. As a result, it is curious to see which North Korean ballistic missiles do and do not get sent to Russia for use against Ukraine.

While the Hwasong-11C has a particularly interesting design on account of the reported size and weight of its (conventional) warheads, which demands great accuracy and precision to be employed to optimal effect, it is notable that North Korea has not yet dispatched another design, the 600 mm diameter design widely referred to as the KN-25, even though this appears to be fully intended as a true mass-launched long-range strike munition. KN-25 launchers can carry up to six such missiles, and there is little reason to think that the launch crews are going to load a truck with six missiles only to periodically launch one missile at a time. Given its implied operating concept, the KN-25 should be particularly useful to Russia as it works to overwhelm—or, at the very least, induce the depletion of—Ukraine’s ballistic missile defence capabilities.

Scratchpad-themed posts briefly introduce ideas and notes that may be followed by a memo or longer analysis at a future date. Posts filed under the scratchpad section/newsletter are only accessible to subscribers, whether free or paid. For the purposes of navigating this site, scratchpad-themed posts are organized under the region-themed topic-themed subsections under "Memos." You will not receive email notifications for newly posted scratchpad-themed posts.

A recent CSIS analysis highlights the economic vulnerabilities that Pacific Island countries face as a result of their reliance on imported oil. The ongoing war in the Middle East has resulted in a supply shock that largely prices out buyers with less deep pockets. Going forward, the Pacific Island countries face a related but very different challenge: the potential for Chinese strikes against their (few and very small) oil storage facilities, port handling infratsructure, and even their (few and very small centralized) elecricity generation facilities in the event of a China-United States war in the Pacific in which these coutries, including but not limited to the dependencies of countries including the Untied States, United Kingdom, and others, are not strict neutrals in a conflict. See the following for a discussion of how China may go about undertaking such strikes.

Memos will briefly refer to a news development, media report, new or historic image/video, map, and the like. You will not receive email notifications for newly posted memos, which can be found via specific tags corresponding to specific sections/newsletters, where you will find longer posts.

In principle, the challenges faced by Russian air defences should ease as (A) Ukraine goes down its target list after severely damaging, if not destroying, its targets without damaging or destroying whatever Russian air defence capabilities are deployed in the area and (B) as Ukraine’s targeting practices reveal what it is prioritizing at a given time and what it may target next, which should offer Moscow ample time to reposition air defences. “Everyone” knows that Russian oil refineries have consistently been a high-priority target for Ukraine. There is, as such, no reason for any Russian oil refinery to not have, at the very least, several machine gun positions offering a modicum of protection. And yet, there have been over the past two years or so a constant stream of videos in which the footage and associated audio do not indicate even an attempt at employing small arms to defend an oil refinery.

Similarly, “everyone” has learned of the recent phenomenon in which Ukraine targets e-commerce distribution centers, including but not limited to those associated with Wildberries. One would think that, after several strikes, someone in Moscow would wise up that the other, remaining, as-yet-untargeted Wildberries distribution facilities may be the next targets and, in response, assign, at a very least, several machine gun positions to offer a modicum of protection. And yet, there have, over the past month or so, been a constant stream of videos in which the footage and associated audio indicate that this is not the case.

All things considered, Russian air defences are working and very significantly thinning out the large waves of Ukrainian strike munitions entering Russian airspace, but Russia experiences a fundamental geography problem: a vast surface area and not enough medium-end and high-end air defences to defend everything all at once. Russia’s forward air defences work well, but terminal air defences are often lacking, typically on account of not existing at all. This results in a bizarre spectacle, because it is unreasonable to assume that a surface-to-air missile can be assigned to defend every potential target, but it is reasonable to assume that several machine guns can be assigned to more or less every potential target with or without assigned crews—factories and industrial facilities such as refineries are staffed by able-bodied persons who can be readily recruited to serve as part-time air defence personnel (once alerted to inbound Ukrainian strike munitions, which is already the case and why the employees of these facilities evacuate and record the Ukrainian strike munitions crashing and detonating upon impact in their places of employment).

Memos will briefly refer to a news development, media report, new or historic image/video, map, and the like. You will not receive email notifications for newly posted memos, which can be found via specific tags corresponding to specific sections/newsletters, where you will find longer posts.

Taiwan’s large fleet of attack helicopters, which includes American-built AH-64E Apache, is often pitched as an aerial quick reaction force that can respond to amphibious, heliborne air assaults, and parachute-dropped airborne landings by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In principle, Taiwan can effectively employ its attack helicopters in this manner, although there are a lot of caveats, and attack helicopters are likely to be far less effective in certain conflict scenarios. All things considered, Taiwan’s attack helicopter fleet faces two major interrelated challenges: the threats to low-flying attack helicopters are increasing, and for this and other reasons, attack helicopters require longer-range armament, which Taiwan’s attack helicopters are not equipped with.

While it is premature and overly dramatic to declare “attack helicopters are dead,” the reality is that attack helicopters face mounting threats around stationary frontlines, which is to say in situations in which there is little to no element of surprise. Taiwan’s attack helicopters must fly at low altitudes with the aim of blending into the complex topography of the Earth to remain survivable in the face of ongoing advances in Chinese air combat capabilities. Doing so, however, will generally mean operating at a slower speed, which exposes Taiwan’s attack helicopter to a very different new generation of threats, including multirotor drones that treat slowly moving and hovering helicopters as exceptionally lucrative targets of opportunity. The initial crop of multirotor drones used in the Russia-Ukraine War lacked the kinematic performance required to target attack helicopters other than in chance encounters. More recent electrically-powered interceptor drones, however, can “outrun” an attack helicopter and therefore pose a far more credible threat. Chinese industry is a world leader in most of the components going into such designs, and such capabilities will likely be available to the PLA. When viewed alongside the long-standing threat posed by Chinese shoulder-launched manportable air defence systems (MANPADS), gone are the days in which lightly equipped Chinese infantry landing on the island of Taiwan would be defenceless against attack helicopters such as the AH-64.

In principle, such threats can be blunted by employing longer-range munitions from attack helicopters. This comes with a series of complications, not least cost and payload restrictions, that at some level beg the question of whether attack helicopters are (universally) the most suitable and/or most cost-effective means of delivering the desired effects, but nevertheless constitute a path forward. As things stand, Taiwan’s attack helicopters are, at best, equipped with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles which have a modest range relative to current and prospective threats, especially when launched from a low altitude and at a low speed. While there are other, longer-range missiles on the market, the situation in Taiwan appears unlikely to change anytime soon, and Taiwan’s attack helicopter force currently appears far more capable on paper than it is likely to be in practice over the near term.

Memos will briefly refer to a news development, media report, new or historic image/video, map, and the like. You will not receive email notifications for newly posted memos, which can be found via specific tags corresponding to specific sections/newsletters, where you will find longer posts.

The Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) has long encountered a problem: what to do if and when Chinese strikes against Taiwanese airbases and airports result in a situation in which airborne ROCAF aircraft have nowhere to land. Several auxiliary runways built on specific—and readily identifiable via satellite imagery—locations around the island of Taiwan constitute a partial solution alongside the establishment of rapid runway repair capabilities. These allow ROCAF aircraft to land, rearm, and refuel—with performance and maximum take-off weight restrictions—and, more to the point, help “save” aircraft that would otherwise flame out upon fuel exhaustion and crash. There is, however, another plausible way for Taiwan to go about this: divert aircraft to the Philippines, specifically, to airports and airbases on Luzon.

A distance of some 350 kilometers separates southern Taiwan from northern Luzon, and some 800 kilometres separates southern Taiwan from Manila. The Philippines’ airport and airbase infrastructure is far from ideal, and the entirety of Luzon falls within 1200 kilometers of China and is, as such, well within the reach of Chinese strike capabilities, but there is a case to be made that Taiwanese aircraft will be far more effective when operating from airbases outside the island of Taiwan. Such a development is, of course, diplomatically fraught, and that is a gross understatement. Tense though China-Philippines ties may be, Manila is unlikely to undertake such a dramatic escalation by agreeing to such measures, especially in peacetime. For Taiwan, however, this may be one of the best ways to ensure the future viability of the ROCAF.

As things stand, there are simply too many Taiwanese aircraft at airbases that are too close to China and have too few runways available to them. Most Japanese airports and airbases are too far (even if Tokyo were to agree to such an approach), and those on the Ryukyu Islands Chain are not a viable option. Airports and airbases in the Philippines can constitute a better alternative, but diplomatic realities will likely mean that the ROCAF will remain “trapped” on Taiwan Island, although wartime realities may mean that some ROCAF aircraft end up in the Philippines with or without an arrangement with Manila made in peacetime.

Scratchpad-themed posts briefly introduce ideas and notes that may be followed by a memo or longer analysis at a future date. Posts filed under the scratchpad section/newsletter are only accessible to subscribers, whether free or paid. For the purposes of navigating this site, scratchpad-themed posts are organized under the region-themed topic-themed subsections under "Memos." You will not receive email notifications for newly posted scratchpad-themed posts.

One of the most unusual aspects of the China-Thailand “Falcon Strike” air force exercises concerns the regular participation of Thailand’s Swedish-built Gripen fighter aircraft in exercises between China and a formal treaty ally of the United States. The Royal Thai Air Force’s much-larger fleet of American-built F-16 fighter aircraft does not participate in these exercises, almost certainly as a result of customary American restrictions on such activities. Curiously, the otherwise Swedish Gripen is not free of American technology on account of its turbofan engine, which is a version of the American F404. So far, neither Sweden nor the United States appear to have drawn a firm line in the sand with the aim of bringing the participation of Thai Gripen aircraft in bilateral China-Thailand air force exercises to an end. As a result, the “Falcon Strike” air force exercises continue to offer the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), which is one of the world’s most insular air forces, a valuable opportunity to not only interact with another air force, but train with and against a modern non-Chinese combat aircraft in the form of the Gripen.

Scratchpad-themed posts briefly introduce ideas and notes that may be followed by a memo or longer analysis at a future date. Posts filed under the scratchpad section/newsletter are only accessible to subscribers, whether free or paid. For the purposes of navigating this site, scratchpad-themed posts are organized under the region-themed topic-themed subsections under "Memos." You will not receive email notifications for newly posted scratchpad-themed posts.

China and Thailand have undertaken yet another iteration of the now well-established “Falcon Strike” series of air force exercises. While generally notable by virtue of constituting some of the few opportunities People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) personnel have to engage with their foreign counterparts, the 2026 iteration of “Falcon Strike” is particularly notable given how it comes after the 2025 clashes between Cambodia and Thailand. Both of these Southeast Asian countries are important to China and amount to “near-neighbours” of Beijing. China not only has major economic interests at stake, but has also been cultivating military and security relations with Cambodia and Thailand. This resulted in an awkward situation during the 2025 clashes when Cambodia would have to employ Chinese-supplied weapons against Thailand and, more generally, turn to China for additional, more advanced armaments, perhaps against some of Thailand’s Chinese-built armament (which constitutes a smaller share of the Thai arsenal than is the case for Cambodia). China has so far managed to navigate this awkward dynamic, and the latest iteration of “Falcon Strike” indicates that the unusually important, for the PLAAF, engagement of the Chinese and Thai air forces will continue. It bears emphasis that Beijing also has a major interest in influencing the behaviour of these “near-neighbour” and other countries, which are likely to remain strict neutrals, over the course of a prospective major, and likely protracted, war with the United States.

Scratchpad-themed posts briefly introduce ideas and notes that may be followed by a memo or longer analysis at a future date. Posts filed under the scratchpad section/newsletter are only accessible to subscribers, whether free or paid. For the purposes of navigating this site, scratchpad-themed posts are organized under the region-themed topic-themed subsections under "Memos." You will not receive email notifications for newly posted scratchpad-themed posts.

The Russian bomber force faces many pressures, including the forced concentration of serviceable aircraft at Ukrainka airbase in the Russian Far East and, to a lesser degree, Olenya Airbase in the Kola Peninsula to avoid the worst of the threat posed by Ukrainian strike munitions. This dynamic has resulted in an exceedingly inefficient approach to employing bomber aircraft as launch platforms for cruise missiles. It is contributing to the rapid consumption of the finite service hours left on these almost exclusively Soviet-built airframes, engines, and other components. It has also likely disrupted maintenance, training, and other day-to-day activities.

Time will tell how the Russian Air Force will adapt to these dynamics in a post-war setting. The strike munition threat is unlikely to go away or be greatly dampened, not least with European NATO countries pursuing a dramatic qualitative and quantitative expansion of their strike munition arsenals and bomber-sized hardened aircraft shelters being extremely expensive. Engels-2, Olenya, Dyagilevo, and Shaykovka are unlikely to be remotely safe any time soon, and the Russian bomber force may come to having its peacetime home bases at locations much further east, such as Belaya and Ukrainka, and perhaps at other facilities east of the Ural Mountains, while periodically deploying aircraft to airbases west of the Urals as and when needed. This would be easier to do with bomber aircraft that were not built in the Soviet era and will not address the inherent inefficiencies of this operating concept, but Moscow appears intent on maintaining a bomber force for both conventional strike and nuclear strike missions even if this may not be the best use of Russia’s scarce resources.

American allies worldwide face a major but underappreciated challenge. Air combat dynamics are fast-evolving, with Chinese combat aircraft technology closing the technological gap with the United States and intensifying military-technological competition between China and the United States increasingly leaving others behind in the dust. American allies that look at advances in Chinese combat aircraft technology with apprehension have few options at present. The U.S. Air Force’s F-47 is likely to be exceedingly expensive and unavailable for export. The under-development trinational (Italy, Japan, United Kingdom) GCAP project is unlikely to be able to deliver a militarily significant number of aircraft to an export customer until around 2040. The trinational (France, Germany, Spain) FCAS project is no more, and whatever comes to succeed this effort is similarly unlikely to be available to an export customer until around 2040.

Until around 2040, the only in-production fighter aircraft available to American allies worldwide that will not encounter major obsolescence concerns at the time of its introduction is the F-35 (even then, any country receiving new-build F-35 aircraft by circa 2040 will likely have these aircraft in service into the circa 2070 timeframe, by which time the oldest American F-35 fighters will have been in service for over 50 years and, as such, likely retired). The U.S. Navy’s F/A-XX next-generation fighter, which has itself had a troubled gestation, may come to offer American allies an alternative. While the details are non-public, this will itself present American allies with a major challenge given how the F/A-XX may be less exquisite and expensive than the F-47 but is nevertheless unlikely to be remotely “cheap”: there will be no “medium-weight,” let alone “light-weight,” next-generation low-observable fighter aircraft for the price-conscious buyer. Even so, the F/A-XX may be the closest thing to something that is neither an F-35 nor GCAP (and whatever comes to succeed the FCAS effort). With next-generation fighter aircraft set to be considerably more expensive at the unit cost level, this may result in American allies experiencing another round of reduction in fleet size.

sdfsfs