American Standoff With Venezuela Highlights Enduring Basing Access In Caribbean, Raises Analogy Of China's Reefs-Turned-Islands
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While the American military in general and the American navy in particular are no strangers to operating in the southern stretches of the Caribbean Sea, it nevertheless bears mention that the United States’ ongoing military standoff with Venezuela is facilitated by the existence of basing infrastructure in the Caribbean. This includes ports and airports, some of which were in the distant past quite heavily used by the American military, situated on the American island territory of Puerto Rico. The United States military is also making use of facilities in the nearby United States Virgin Islands, which were acquired from Denmark in 1917, and can also make use of the American military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
While American warships can operate off the coast of Venezuela for weeks, if not months, on end with the support of replenishment ships, most types of fixed-wing military aircraft require a runway to land and refuel located within 500-1000 kilometers of the intended operating area. San Juan, Puerto Rico, which is situated some 1660 kilometers from Miami and around 900 kilometers from Caracas, fits the bill. The existence of nearby ports also eases the strain on the finite number of replenishment ships available to any military and is of increasingly critical importance in terms of allowing warships to rearm, given the enduring challenges associated with reloading vertical launch system (VLS) cells at sea. All things considered, the existence of such basing infrastructure allows the American military to maintain a quite robust military presence off the coast of Venezuela without drawing too heavily on American military capabilities, including American aircraft carriers.
There is a productive analogy to be made with China’s three largest reefs-turned-islands in the South China Sea, which can similarly serve as forward bases for Chinese military aircraft and refuel Chinese warships. Subi Reef is situated some 950 kilometers from Sanya, Hainan, while Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef are situated some 1050 and 1130 kilometers from Hainan, respectively. These Chinese reefs-turned-islands are situated some 860, 1050, and 790 kilometers from Manila, respectively. Where this analogy breaks down is that the Philippines is not Venezuela. While both the Philippines and Venezuela lack long-range terrestrial strike and maritime strike capabilities to hold at risk and, if required, target such fairly proximate ports and airports/airbases that their respective adversaries can employ in times of crisis and war, the Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States and the United States can readily hold at risk whatever military capabilities China deploys to reefs-turned-islands. Even so, the scope for Chinese military coercion short of war in the South China Sea has never been greater, and China’s largest reefs-turned-islands can play an important enabling logistical role should Beijing pursue such an approach akin to that being undertaken by the United States against Venezuela.