America's Depleted Patriot BMD Interceptor Stocks: Implications In The Western Pacific

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The now widely circulating CSIS estimates of remaining American Patriot ballistic missile defence (BMD) interceptor stocks refer to the PAC-3 CRI and PAC-3 MSE interceptors, which is to say that the estimate excludes PAC-2 interceptor stocks, with PAC-2 interceptors not being optimized for BMD in the manner of the aforementioned (very different) PAC-3 CRI and PAC-3 MSE interceptors.

In any event, if one were to assume 827 remaining PAC-3 CRI and PAC-3 MSE interceptors in American stocks, an average of 12 such interceptors per launcher (there is variability on the interceptors:launcher front), and eight launchers per battery/fire unit, then the United States can be estimated to possess sufficient PAC-3 CRI/PAC-3 MSE stocks for 68.9 fully-loaded launchers (launchers can also be loaded with older PAC-2 intercepors as part of a ~modular “mix and match” approach), which is to say 8.6 Patriot batteries/fire units (exclusively equipped with ready-to-launch PAC-3 CRI and PAC-3 MSE interceptors).

If one assumes a full set of available reloads—a 1:1 ratio of ready-to-launch interceptors and nearby reloads assigned to a given battery/fire unit—for each forward-deployed American Patriot battery, then the situation looks far worse for the United States and American allies in the Pacific. With only four fully equipped batteries/fire units, the United States would seemingly struggle to defend even American forces based in Japan during a war with China, let alone deploy Patriot launchers anywhere else in the Pacific, and this itself would require depriving Patriot batteries elsewhere in the world of PAC-3 CRI and PAC-3 MSE interceptors. Yes, the older PAC-2 interceptors are hardly irrelevant, but these are not as optimized against ballistic threats, not least the latest Chinese ballistic missiles.

The situation with the longer-range and higher-end THAAD BMD system is similar. To keep things brief, a “standard” THAAD battery requires 48 ready-to-fire MIM-401 Talon interceptors, and that is without considering any reloads assigned to the battery/fire unit. The CSIS estimate would suggest that the United States currently possesses enough MIM-401 interceptors for 5.79 fully-equipped THAAD batteries—the United States operates 8 THAAD batteries. Place a single THAAD battery in Guam and another in Japan, assign 96 MIM-401 interceptors to these two batteries (a full set of ready-to-fire interceptors and a full set of reloads), and there will be just 86 MIM-401 interceptors left for the six other American THAAD batteries and ~48 associated launchers, which have an upload capacity of 288 MIM-401 interceptors.