Another Documented Case Of A Fiber-Optic Multirotor Drone Being Used Inside A Building
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One of the most consequential possibilities afforded by the advent of armed “first person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drones of the fiber-optic—as opposed to the radio frequency—communication uplink/downlink variety is the ability to operate these uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions indoors/inside buildings. Documented cases of the employment of armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety indoors/inside buildings in the Russia-Ukraine War, however, remain fairly rare. In a recent post, I covered an unprecedented and intriguing recent Russian attack in which such multirotor drones were used to breach an opening in the main building at a Ukrainian power plant so that another multirotor drone could fly inside to target the electric generator.
Russian Armed Multirotor Drones Used To Target Electricity Generation Equipment Inside Power Plant Building In Pioneering Attack
Viewing so-called “First Person Video” (“FPV”) drone footage from the Russia-Ukraine War is often a quite sordid affair. There are, however, several “genres” of “FPV” drone footage that are not only more palatable to non-sadistic audiences by virtue of not (directly) depicting the injuring or killing of any human beings but by offering a window into the…
A new video, reportedly from Russia’s 18th Combined Arms Army, which is currently part of the “Dnepr” grouping of Russian forces, documents another incident in which an armed “FPV” multirotor drone of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety is flown inside a building to attack a Ukrainian armoured vehicle that was parked inside.
Beyond its inherent novelty as a rare documented use case, the video is notable in that it clearly shows the remote human operator/pilot trying to navigate through a small opening in the protective netting placed by Ukrainian soldiers to thwart precisely such an attack—a datapoint that may reflect on how prevalent such indoor attacks may be despite the small but growing library of publicly available footage. Armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic variety can be very adeptly maneuvered—at a very slow speed—to overcome such obstacles. Note the presence of an additional set of protective netting that partially covered the targeted armoured vehicle.
Incidents such as this documented attack are likely to become increasingly commonplace as armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety are built and deployed by both Russia and Ukraine in ever-increasing numbers. Such armed “FPV” drones can be flown inside buildings and even underground. As of this writing, I am unaware of any publicly known documented case in which such armed “FPV” drones have been flown inside buildings to target personnel. It is important to keep in mind that this may reflect the sensitivity of such attacks and military censorship rather than the absence of such attacks in the Russia-Ukraine War. It is worth noting that most of the publicly available footage of armed “FPV” drone strikes from the Russia-Ukraine War has been very selectively disclosed as part of public relations, propaganda, and information warfare efforts.