Discussions of how China will pursue a war over the fate of Taiwan often focus on Chinaās ability to successfully undertake an amphibious invasion of Taiwan and, relatedly, Chinaās ability to neutralize Taiwanās air force and air defences, among other aspects of Taiwanās military capabilities, so as to facilitate a successful Chinese amphibious invasion. This results in frequent invocations of Peopleās Liberation Army (PLA) landing vesselsāincluding ordinarily civilian ferries, the PLA Rocket Forceās (PLARF) arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles, and the role of Chinaās fast-improving air combat and naval capabilities more generally. I have long taken the view that many writings on the matter offer what can be politely characterized as quite superficial and underdeveloped analyses of how military operations may play out over days, weeks, and perhaps months, and whether the PLAās existing and forthcoming fielded military capabilities are adequate for such ambitious undertakings. I also contend that many analyses are limited by a lack of imagination as to how the PLA may approach military operations against Taiwan.
In several recent posts, I have worked to expand the analytical aperture as to how the PLA may pursue military operations against Taiwan. Much has changed in the realm of military technology over the past twenty or so years. A full-scale amphibious invasion preceded and accompanied by air and missile strikes, standalone air and missile strikes, and a blockade, are not the only ways through which Beijing can pursue its political and military objectives in a cross-strait conflict. In this post, I will broach the issue of whether the PLA can pull off an āunmannedā invasion of Taiwan that is centered on the widespread, but not necessarily exclusive, use of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs), (waterborne) uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs), and uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs).
To understand where this post is coming from, it is productive to provide summaries of several of my recent posts. In a recent post, I broached the potential role that Chinese ground-based tube artillery may play in an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. While the following post focused on providing fire support to PLA personnel undertaking an amphibious landing attempt, ground-based fires can, of course, also be used to both support the use of uncrewed systems and take advantage of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities that uncrewed systems operating near, above, and on the island of Taiwan can provide.
In another recent post, I examined some of the many ways through which the PLA can attack Taiwanās outlying western Island. This post, which is intended to be the first of a series, focuses on how China may conduct operations against Taiwanās Kinmen Islands, which are located around ten kilometers off the coast of Chinaās Fujian province. While the post discussed how China can employ uncrewed aerial vehicles to target the Kinmen Islands, it did not discuss how China can also use uncrewed ground vehicles, including those of the amphibious variety, and uncrewed surface vehicles to target the Kinmen Islands and even undertake what amounts to an āunmannedā amphibious invasion of these and other outlying Taiwanese outposts. While this post primarily focused on the use of uncrewed aerial vehicles of various types, it mentioned how China can use other capabilities, including guided tube artillery, short-range rocket artillery, and long-range anti-tank missiles/surface-to-surface missiles to target the Kinmen Islands. It bears emphasis that these are not mutually exclusive optionsāthe PLA would be wise to synergistically integrate various systems and munitions into its military plans.
Unlike the Kinmen Islands, the island of Taiwan itself is separated from the Chinese mainland by around 130-180 kilometers of water at the narrowest points. Simply stated, the island of Taiwan is far too far from the Chinese mainland for the PLA to be able to launch armed āfirst-person videoā (āFPVā) multirotor drones and similar to target Taiwan. The PLA does, however, have other options. The PLA can use fixed-wing drones to serve as āmothershipsā to transport and bring within range of the island of Taiwan armed āFPVā multirotor drones and similar. These fixed-wing āmothershipā drones can also serve as airborne radio delays/repeaters to facilitate the use of much the same types of armed āFPVā multirotor drones and similar that Russia and Ukraine are now building and employing at an annualized seven-digit rate. The armed āFPVā multirotor drones that are being used in the Russia-Ukraine War are notably built from inexpensive commercial-off-the-shelf components that are primarily sourced from China. It bears emphasis that the PLA can also use vessels, whether crewed or uncrewed, to bring armed āFPVā multirotor drones and other munitions more generally within range of the island of Taiwan.
In another recent post, I broached the underexamined and multifaceted issue of how China may employ the very specific military capabilities that will be unlocked by armed āFPVā multirotor drones in particular against the island of Taiwan. In other writings that appear on this site and elsewhere, I have explained that armed āFPVā multirotor drones and similar are not merely another type of ābattlefield weaponā like an anti-tank missile against enemy vehicles and personnel; these are best understood as miniaturized strike munitions that can be used to undertake highly surgical strikes against an incredibly wide range of targets. In the following post, I highlighted the use of armed āFPVā multirotor drones to target gas/petrol stations in the Russia-Ukraine War and Chinaās ability to do the same on the island of Taiwan. Armed āFPVā multirotor drones and other fairly range-restricted strike munitions more generally can, of course, be used to attack a much broader set of targets than gas/petrol stations.
With the lengthy preamble completed, we can now turn our attention to the question of whether the PLA can undertake an āunmannedā amphibious invasion of Taiwan. It bears emphasis that an āunmannedā amphibious invasion of Taiwan will not necessarily mean that there will not be a āmannedā amphibious invasion of Taiwan. I do, however, think that the PLA increasingly has the option of undertaking a preparatory āunmannedā amphibious invasion of Taiwan before undertaking a full-scale amphibious invasion attempt in which uncrewed systems can also be used alongside PLA combat units in very large numbers. To be clear, I do not view an āunmannedā invasion as a substitute for PLA āboots on the ground.ā Uncrewed systems are, like cavalry units in the past, poorly suited to holding territory, not least in complex urban terrain and against an adaptive enemy. Uncrewed aerial, ground, surface, and underwater vehicles can, however, be used to lure out Taiwanese forces from their places of hiding, attrit Taiwanese forces, attack key logistical nodes and key nodes of Taiwanās critical infrastructure in a highly surgical manner, and, more generally, force Taipei to confront a de facto invasion scenario from essentially day one of a war.
How can the PLA undertake an āunmannedā invasion of Taiwan? I can easily write several tens of thousands of words on this topic, but I will limit myself to broaching this complex and multifaceted issue for the purposes of this post.
Uncrewed Aircraft
The PLA can use fixed-wing uncrewed aircraft, USVs, and perhaps UUVs, to bring armed āFPVā multirotor drones and similar within range of Taiwan. The PLA may even be able to use uncrewed aircraft of both the fixed-wing and multirotor variety to deliver unattended/uncrewed sensors onto the island of Taiwan and perhaps even deliver some UGVs (likely smaller and lighter UGVs given constraints on weight and volume, as well as the question of how the UGV is delivered on the ground). More generally, uncrewed aircraft of the fixed-wing variety can be equipped with a fairly rudimentary and inexpensive form of āartificial intelligenceā to fly over a certain sector and target any vehicle that fits the preprogrammed engagement parameters. This is not a hypothetical undertaking. Russia is known to be using such a fixed-wing loitering strike drone against Ukraine. Unlike Russia, the PLA does not have to be concerned about potential fratricide if such an armed uncrewed aircraft is used as part of a preparatory amphibious invasion. There will, however, likely be an elevated risk to Taiwanese civilians.
I cannot overstate how armed āFPVā multirotor drones, fixed-wing strike drones, and fixed-wing loitering strike drones are best understood as miniaturized strike munitions. These can be used to attack an extremely diverse array of targets beyond military personnel and military equipment, including but not limited to:
Antennas, whether military or civilian, and communication infrastructure more generally.
Small electrical generators.
Local fuel storage and distribution.
Local electricity transmission infrastructure.
Construction equipment that Taiwan is likely to use to build field fortifications and counter-mobility obstacles.
Trucks and other logistics vehicles, whether civilian or military, that can be used to resupply Taiwanese military units in forward areas near the island countryās western coastline.
Light industrial units, garages, and similar structures that can be used to, among other things, repair military vehicles, build certain types of military equipment, conceal military equipment such as large armoured vehicles, and stockpile ammunition and other military supplies.
Should the PLA be able to operate armed āFPVā multirotor drones of the fiber-optic cable communication uplink/downlink varietyāas opposed to those of the radio frequency communication uplink/downlink varietyāover Taiwan, it will be able to undertake far more sophisticated and consequential attacks. Armed āFPVā multirotors drones of the fiber-optic uplink/downlink variety can uniquely operate inside buildings and even fly underground and in tunnels. If an opening exists or if one is breached, it is no exaggeration to say that the PLA will, for example, be able to look inside garages, warehouses, and similar structures to determine if large caches of munitions and difficult-to-conceal military vehicles such as tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery are located inside. While armed āFPVā multirotor drones of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety can be armed, these are limited to carrying fairly small and light warheads that have limited destructive effects and a limited destructive radius. The PLA may, therefore, employ some of its armed āFPVā multirotor drones as ISR assets that are used to locate targets that can be attacked by guided bombs, cruise missiles, fixed-wing strike drones, large-caliber guided artillery rockets, and ballistic missiles.
One of the biggest challenges that Taiwan faces is that the island countryās western coastal plain is quite narrow and, as such, offers limited depth when the attacker is situated to the west. Much of Taiwanās western coastal plain has a width of just 25-35 kilometers. For context, should the PLA be able to launch armed āFPVā multirotor drones of the fiber-optic uplink/downlink variety from locations on the island of Taiwan itself, it will be able to attack targets located even on the foothills that precede the islandās central mountain range. Armed āFPVā multirotor drones of the fiber-optic variety with spools of 30-40 kilometers are now commonplace in the Russia-Ukraine War. Spools that enable a maximum range of 50 kilometers or more are being experimented with, and both Russia and Ukraine are working on approaches through which to increase the maximum practical range of armed āFPVā multirotor drones of the fiber-optic uplink/downlink variety beyond that. It goes without saying that the PLA will face greater challenges in getting armed āFPVā multirotor drones of the fiber-optic uplink/downlink variety to the island of Taiwan, but it is far from an impossibility. It is also worth noting that PLA special forces and air assault units, more generally, may also be deployed onto the island with such multirotor drones and other fairly short-range munitions.
Uncrewed Surface Vessels And Uncrewed Ground Vehicles
As with uncrewed aircraft, the PLA can employ USVs as both a means of delivering other systems/munitions closer to Taiwan and as a munition in itself. The issue that China faces as it concerns USVs is that it has limited incentives and, arguably, limited need to use USVs to target ships transiting to and from Taiwanese ports and merchant ships and naval ships in Taiwanese ports. USVs can, however, be used as launch platforms for munitions that can attack targets on the island of Taiwan and also deliver UGVs onto the Taiwanese coastline.
Given that (pure) USVs cannot operate on land, these are best employed as forward launch platforms for various munitions, including but not limited to:
Guided and unguided artillery rockets.
Armed āFPVā multirotor drones. In certain environments, the PLA may be able to use USVs to launch armed āFPVā multirotor drones of the fiber-optic uplink/downlink variety, which can operate over water, albeit with certain restrictions.
Fixed-wing drones/uncrewed aircraft, including loitering strike drones.
Guided surface-to-surface missiles, such as longer-range so-called anti-tank guided missiles. One candidate operational PLA system is the AFT-10/HJ-10, which is controlled in flight via fiber-optic cable.
While this post focuses on an āunmannedā invasion of Taiwanās western coastline, it bears emphasis that the strike munitions carried by USVs can also be used to attack other parts of Taiwan, such as Taitung or Hualien on the islandās eastern coastline. USVs can be used to launch any of the above strike munitions against key military and infrastructure targets on Taiwanās eastern coast that are, in many respects, shielded by Taiwanās central mountains.
USVs can also be used to deliver UGVs, whether designs of the human in the loop or the fully automated variety, onto the island of Taiwan. These UGVs may be unarmed and used as ISR assets to monitor areas in which the PLA plans to undertake an amphibious landing and/or an air assault. UGVs may be as small and rudimentary as something in the vein of a remotely controlled toy car that is equipped with a camera and perhaps some explosives. A UGV may, however, be a wheeled or tracked design that weighs many tens if not hundreds of kilograms. Such a design will, of course, be more difficult to deliver to the Taiwanese coastline. Chinese industry has notably developed a large tracked amphibious UGV, which likely weighs several tonnes, that can be launched near the Taiwanese coastline and move up the beach and perhaps further inland. Such designs are, however, not only more expensive but are also more susceptible to detection and attack by Taiwanese forces. The smallest and least expensive UGVs will inherently be most limited in terms of payload-range and combat potential more generally, but may end up being the most numerous, effective, and consequential.
While small UGVs can, in principle, be delivered onto the island of Taiwan by PLA uncrewed aircraft, USVs are likely to be the primary means of delivering UGVs to the shore. While I primarily have wheeled and tracked UGVs of different sizes in mind, there are other options available to the PLA. This includes, among other things, quadruped robotsāso-called robotic dogsāthat are available from Chinese commercial vendors and appear to have found favour with the PLA in recent years. One of the key limitations of the simplest and least expensive tracked and wheeled UGVs is that such designs are unsuited to navigating human terrain in built-up areas. Other designs, including quadruped robots, are better suited for such roles. All things considered, the challenges of remote operation and, for now, the cost and complexity of wholesale automation, are likely to drive the employment of most UGVs as persistent uncrewed sensors that can facilitate targeting through other means, including armed āFPVā multirotor drones and similar.
Uncrewed Underwater Vehicles
UUVs can, in principle, also be used to bring strike munitions, including armed uncrewed aircraft of both the multirotor and fixed-wing varieties, within range of Taiwan, but USVs and uncrewed aircraft amount to a more straightforward way of doing so. All things considered, the PLA may be able to forgo using UUVs for such purposes in and around the Taiwan Strait. The PLA can, however, use UUVs to attack targets located along Taiwanās eastern coastline, including the Taitung and Hualien areas. UUVs can, of course, also be used for other purposes, including ISR and mining, that are beyond the scope of this post.
A full-scale amphibious invasion preceded and accompanied by air and missile strikes, standalone air and missile strikes, and a blockade, are not the only ways through which Beijing can pursue its political and military objectives in a cross-strait conflict. The PLA is increasingly well-positioned to undertake a preparatory āunmannedā amphibious invasion of Taiwan and, more generally, use various types of uncrewed systems alongside PLA forces in an amphibious landing attempt. While uncrewed systems are poorly suited to holding territory, uncrewed aerial, ground, surface, and underwater vehicles can be used to lure out Taiwanese forces from their places of hiding, attrit Taiwanese forces, attack key logistical nodes and key nodes of Taiwanās critical infrastructure in a highly surgical manner, and, more generally, force Taipei to confront a de facto invasion scenario from essentially day one of a war. It bears emphasis that none of the approaches mentioned in this post are beyond the realm of possibilities. Most of what I have described already transpired in some shape or form in the Russia-Ukraine War. For many years, detractors of the PLAās amphibious capabilities often (justifiably) talked about a āmillion-man swimā across the Taiwan Strait. China is now in a position to undertake something more in the vein of a āmillion-drone assaultā in advanceāand perhaps independent ofāan amphibious landing attempt on the island of Taiwan involving large numbers of PLA personnel.