Canada Proceeds To Procure The M142 HIMARS. Questions Remain About Efficacy.
🇨🇦 🇺🇸 | Commentary
Reports indicate that Canada has proceeded to order M142 HIMARS wheeled launchers and associated munitions from the United States. Canadian interest in the M142 HIMARS, which has become something of a household name as a result of its widespread use in the Russia-Ukraine War, is not a new development, with a public notification to the United States Congress having been released in October 2025.
Much can be said about the wisdom, prudence, and efficacy of this procurement decision, not least on account of enduring tensions with the United States under Trump 2.0, which has made otherwise quite mundane procurement decisions politically toxic and the subject of considerable public curiosity. This post will focus not on the Canada-United States angle but on the question of efficacy with respect to the Canada-NATO angle. Simply stated, why is Canada procuring the M142 HIMARS—or indeed anything like it from any vendor country, including one not named the United States of America? Is this an efficacious procurement decision for Canada itself?
Canada declared its interest in procuring such a ground-based guided artillery rocket/ballistic missile-centric long-range fires capability in Our North, Strong and Free (2024), which resulted in the Long Range Precision Strike (Land) procurement program. According to the former, the objective is to “acquire long-range missile capabilities for the Canadian Army. These missiles will be deployed to enable our forces to shoot at greater ranges than our adversaries in combat.” According to the latter, the objective is to “deliver a long-range precision strike capability that can provide responsive, 24/7, all-weather, precision-guided indirect fire support to defend the continent, enable a combat-capable Canadian brigade within a NATO or FVEY-led Division to deter adversaries, or to neutralize and destroy adversary high pay-off targets.”
All things considered, Ottawa’s intent appears to be to enhance Canada’s contribution to NATO vis-a-vis Russia with respect to a land-based Canadian presence in Europe and with respect to launching such missiles against Russian targets either on NATO or on Russian territory. Given this, Canada is, in effect, buying a political-diplomatic weapon when it comes to M142 HIMARS launchers and associated munitions: the primary objective is to put a pacifier into the mouths of Canada’s NATO allies, including the United States. The fact that the Russian Federation will encounter a greater threat from NATO if and when Canada’s M142 HIMARS launchers are deployed in Europe is, in effect, rather incidental. Unlike many of the other procurement projects pursued by the Canadian Armed Forces, the M142 HIMARS and associated missiles contribute next to nothing to Canada’s security within North America (more on this later).
The October 2025 notification to the United States Congress indicates that Canada had requested to buy up to:
26x M142 wheeled launchers (i.e., M142 HIMARS) alongside various types of ancillary equipment.
132x M31A1 rocket pods (each loaded with 6x 227 mm diameter M31 series guided rockets, which is to say 792 M31 series guided rockets). M31A1 rockets are equipped with unitary high explosive-fragmentation warheads. These have a maximum range of approximately 90 kilometers.
132x M30A2 GMLRS pods (each loaded with 6x 227 mm diameter M30 series guided rockets, which is to say 792x M30 series guided rockets). M30A2 rockets are equipped with the so-called alternative warhead, which is to say a high explosive-fragmentation warhead surrounded by some 160,000 pre-formed tungsten fragments and an airburst fuse. These have a maximum range of approximately 90 kilometers.
32x M403 GMLRS-ER (i.e., extended-range) pods and 32x M404 GMLRS-ER pods (i.e., 384x GMRLS-ER guided rockets in total). The M403 is equipped with a high explosive-fragmentation warhead, whereas the M404 is equipped with the so-called alternative warhead, which comes with pre-formed tungsten fragments and an airburst fuse. These have a maximum range of approximately 150 kilometers.
64x M57 ATACMS 610 mm diameter short-range ballistic missiles. These have a maximum range of approximately 300 kilometers and are much larger and heavier than the aforementioned 227 mm diameter munitions. Each M142 launcher can be loaded with a single pod. Whereas each pod can be loaded with six 227 mm diameter guided artillery rockets, each pod can be loaded with just one 610 mm diameter ATACMS ballistic missile.
It bears emphasis that it is hardly unusual for governments not to purchase the full quantity of items specified in these public documents, which are intended to notify the United States Congress of the intentions of the American executive branch (other countries do not have a comparable procedure, so we typically do not know what deal other countries offer Canada).
The M142 HIMARS and associated 227 mm diameter GMLRS family guided artillery rockets and 610 mm ATACMS family ballistic missiles are potent and proven shorter-range strike systems. Leaving aside tensions in Canada-United States relations, which may well not endure beyond Trump 2.0 and January 2029, and the question of whether a different system, such as the South Korean K239 Chunmoo, is a better option for Canada, my primary objection to Canada’s procurement of any such system from any vendor country concerns how the allocation of Canada’s finite resources toward such a system and capability set is, in effect, increasingly redundant. I say this not least on account of how it is solely a Canadian contribution to NATO within Europe, as opposed to NATO within North America, where Canada’s “homeland” resides—a place that Canada’s European allies simply assume to be secure, even as they make negligible contributions, if any, toward the defence of NATO territory within North America.
At the time when Russia initiated its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, European NATO countries possessed shorter-range strike capabilities in the vein of the M142’s GMLRS guided rockets and ATACMS ballistic missiles in limited and inadequate numbers. Since February 2022, however, European NATO members have made heavy investments toward such capabilities. Existing M270 MLRS operators—the M270 is the older tracked counterpart to the better-known M142 HIMARS wheeled launcher—have doubled down on capabilities that they had been gradually shedding over the course of the post-Cold War era. Some European NATO members, particularly the Baltic states, have, like Canada, acquired such capabilities for the first time. Poland, which borders the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and functionally borders Russia proper, given the geographic realities of the Baltic states and Belarus, has undertaken a veritable procurement spree in this area. As a result, what was once a glaring capability shortfall for European NATO members is, in effect, no more.
According to the formal public notification to the United States Congress, Canada requested authorization to purchase up to 26x M142 HIMARS wheeled launchers alongside associated 227 mm diameter guided artillery rockets and 610 mm diameter short-range ballistic missiles. Each of the RCAF’s CC-177 military transport aircraft can carry up to two M142 HIMARS wheeled launchers at a time—the pods containing the 227 mm and 610 mm must also be transported from Canada to Europe alongside ancillary equipment required to operate the M142 HIMARS launchers. The RCAF operates a total of 5x CC-177 military transport aircraft, not all of which are flightworthy on a given day. The RCAF’s fleet of 17x CC-130J military transport aircraft can carry one M142 HIMARS wheeled launcher at a time and is also more limited in terms of range, not least when carrying even a stripped-down M142 launcher.
Simply stated, even deploying 8x M142 HIMARS launchers from Canada to Europe, specifically, to Poland and/or the Baltic states, will amount to a very significant logistical undertaking in times of crisis or war, which is to say at a time when non-American and American airlift capacity alike will likely be strained. The RCAF itself will have to transfer other types of equipment, as well as personnel and supplies, to Europe. While personnel and certain types of supplies can be loaded onto airliner-type aircraft chartered by the Canadian government, the M142 HIMARS launchers must be transported either via dedicated military transport aircraft or by sea. Maritime shipping from Montreal to a port in western Europe will take the better part of two weeks, even if a ship is immediately available for a Canadian M142 HIMARS unit that is immediately ready to deploy from a Canadian port. It will likely take a Canadian M142 HIMARS unit that reaches Europe several more days to arrive at potential launch sites from which targets in Kaliningrad and/or Russia proper can be targeted with existing munitions.
There is a real possibility that European NATO member states will run out of munitions for their M142 and M270 launchers by the time that non-forward-deployed Canadian M142 HIMARS launchers arrive in Europe, absent considerable early warning as to the potential onset of a war and considerable initiative in rapidly deploying Canadian Forces to Europe prior to the onset of a war. There is, therefore, a real possibility that European NATO member states will ask Ottawa to prioritize the transfer of Canadian-owned 227 mm diameter guided artillery rockets and 610 mm diameter short-range ballistic missiles. Ottawa may understandably balk at such requests, but it would be imprudent in times of crisis or war not to expedite the shipment of Canadian-owned munitions for Canada’s M142 HIMARS launchers over the launchers themselves, even if it means that Canada’s NATO allies, not Canada itself, will end up launching the munitions that Canadian taxpayers pay for.
Toward the beginning of this post, I characterized Canada’s procurement of M142 HIMARS launchers and associated munitions as buying a political-diplomatic weapon: the primary purpose is to put a pacifier into the mouths of Canada’s NATO allies, including the United States. As stated earlier, the fact that the Russian Federation will encounter a greater threat from NATO if and when Canada’s M142 HIMARS launchers are deployed in Europe is, in effect, rather incidental. Naturally, a permanent forward presence of Canadian M142 HIMARS launchers and associated crews in Europe will change things, but Canada is unlikely to forward-deploy its entire arsenal of M142 HIMARS launchers and/or the associated munitions in Europe, and the marginal utility and value of a Canadian M142 HIMARS launcher is inherently lower now that European NATO countries are deploying such systems in growing numbers. All things considered, the M142 HIMARS is a great example of precisely the type of system and capability set that European NATO countries themselves need to be procuring alongside the relevant munitions, and themselves forward-deploying closer to Poland and/or the Baltic states so as to bring Russian targets within range in the opening hours of a war, not the opening days or weeks of a war. M142 HIMARS launchers are simply useless to NATO if they are not within 300 kilometers of potential Russian targets (500 kilometers, if and when NATO member states procure and deploy the new longer-range American PrSM ballistic missile).
As stated earlier, unlike many of the other procurement projects pursued by the Canadian Armed Forces, the M142 HIMARS and associated missiles contribute next to nothing to Canada’s security within North America. In principle, Canada’s M142 HIMARS launchers can be used to target American forces, and perhaps American territory, in the unlikely but nevertheless non-zero probability event of an American invasion. I would, however, caution Canadians that the current state of relations with the United States under Trump 2.0 may not endure past January 2029, and that no amount of M142 HIMARS launchers and associated munitions—or, say, South Korean-built K239 Chunmoo launchers and associated munitions, will either solve the political-diplomatic challenge problem that is Trump 2.0, or afford Canada security—arms procurement is about sourcing means through which to reach the desired ends, above all enhancing Canada’s security.
Even if Canada were to employ the requested 610 mm diameter ATACMS ballistic missiles against the United States, a 300-kilometer range ballistic missile is rather inadequate for Canada’s purposes in a hypothetical American invasion scenario, and Canada’s M142 launchers will likely be subject to the full breadth of American counterforce capabilities in any such potentiality. There is a case for Ottawa to buy out some proverbial insurance policies for such an eventuality, but the M142 HIMARS launchers and associated munitions are a far cry from a suitable insurance policy for Canada’s purposes.
