China Set To Parade A Diverse Array of Air And Ballistic Missile Defence Systems At Forthcoming Parade
🇨🇳
Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.
While the new Chinese strike munitions that are set to feature in the forthcoming military parade in Beijing are likely to receive a lot of attention, it is important to recognize that China is itself the target of an increasing number and increasingly diverse array of strike munitions. As a result, China's strike capabilities are best understood alongside China's air and missile defences, which are what will allow China to absorb enemy air and missile strikes long enough for its own strike capabilities to shift the tide of war in China's favour. China is using the 3 September parade to formally unveil two new air defence and ballistic missile defence systems and present several previously unveiled systems to a much broader international audience.
Any discussion of China's air defence and ballistic missile defence (BMD) capabilities must start with the People's Liberation Army's division of roles and responsibilities in this area. Two of the PLA's four service branches operate ground-based surface-to-air missile systems (SAM). The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) operates the bulk of China's non-human-portable SAM systems, including all of its ground-based long-range SAM systems as part of the country's national air defence network. It is important to note that the PLAAF's national air defence network is not solely composed of SAM systems and ground-based radars, more generally. It is also composed of the PLAAF's fighter aircraft and AEW&C aircraft—the PLAAF's SAM batteries and accompanying ground-based radars do not operate in isolation.
While the PLAAF is tasked with defending Chinese airspace, the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) operates large numbers of short-range and smaller numbers of medium-range air defence systems with the primary objective of defending the maneuver units of the PLAGF's corps-sized group armies and the rear areas in which PLAGF group armies establish command posts, supply dumps, etc. When PLAGF group armies and their constituent combined arms brigades—and the subordinate battalions thereof—are on the move, it is PLAGF SAM systems, not PLAAF SAM systems, that will move closer to the forward edge of the battle area. This distinction is particularly important because there is little overlap in the SAM systems operated by the PLAAF and the PLAGF. Among other things, the PLAGF does not operate a long-range SAM system in the vein of the PLAAF's HQ-9 (or the broadly comparable Soviet-Russian S-300, Russian S-400, or American Patriot). While the PLAGF's air defence units are, for the most part, not suitably equipped to defend a very large volume of airspace, the bulk of the PLA's short-range air defences are found in the PLAGF, not the PLAAF.
Until 2023, the PLA Navy (PLAN) also operated ground-based SAM systems and ground-based acquisition radars to provide air defence coverage in several sectors in which the PLAN—not the PLAAF (let alone the PLAGF)—was assigned the responsibility. As with the PLAAF's ground-based fighter and interceptor aircraft that were also tasked with said role in several sectors, the PLAN's SAM systems were transferred to the PLAAF in 2023, and national air defence over Chinese territory is now solely the preserve of the PLAAF. The PLAN does, however, have an important role to play in using its ship-based air defence systems to intercept aircraft and ballistic missiles that are heading toward Chinese airspace/territory. Whereas there is little overlap in the SAM systems operated by the PLAAF and PLAGF, some of the PLAN's SAMs overlap with those of the PLAAF, while others overlap with those of the PLAGF; a small subset of PLAN SAM systems are exclusively naval systems deployed on PLAN warships. Given the above, some—but not all—advances in the PLAAF's air defence and ballistic missile defences are more likely to find a naval application and appear on PLAN warships than others.
The above discussion of the PLA's division of labour in the areas of air and ballistic missile defence is important given that the pictured air defence and ballistic missile defence systems seen in the attached image appear to be primarily, if not exclusively, PLAAF systems.
HQ-11
The HQ-11 is the PLAAF's new-generation short-range combined SAM and anti-aircraft artillery system. The wheeled launcher vehicle seen in the attached image carries eight SAMs as well as an engagement radar. This vehicle is ordinarily accompanied by another vehicle carrying a turreted 11-barrel 30×165 mm rotary cannon, which is to say a land-based version of the PLAN's shipborne Type 1130 naval close-in weapon system (CIWS). While the HQ-11 amounts to a fairly impressive short-range SAM system, it is likely to be far too complex and expensive for production in very large numbers—in the high hundreds of units, which is what the PLAAF will likely requrie in wartime to defend the tens of thousands of potential targets and large—given a population of over 1 billion—number of major urban areas across Chinese territory.
HQ-20
The HQ-20 is a new—previously unpublicized/unseen—SAM design. While next to nothing is publicly known about the HQ-20 at this time, it is likely to amount to a medium-range SAM design. The guidance system and the supporting radars associated with the HQ-20 SAM are not public knowledge at this time.
While the longest-range SAM systems tend to receive outsized attention, the practical engagement ranges of SAM systems can be very different than the notional maximum ranges—under very specific parameters—that are mentioned in industry documents and thereafter regularly invoked by observers worldwide. Among other things, all medium- and long-range SAM systems rely on acquisition and engagement radars that operate in frequency bands/wavelengths that result in significant line-of-sight (LOS) restrictions to coverage. While China's large and still expanding fleet of airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft can help overcome the LOS restrictions encountered by ground-based radars and the SAMs that these support, AEW&C aircraft primarily ameliorate the limitations of acquisition radars, not the higher frequency engagement radars upon which many—not all—SAMs rely in flight during an engagement.
Given the above, the unveiling of what appears to be a new Chinese medium-range SAM system in the form of the HQ-20 is not necessarily a less important development than, for example, the hypothetical unveiling of a SAM system with a decidedly nominal maximum range of, say, 500 km. Medium-range SAMs tend to offer a better balance of cost, complexity, and capability than longer-range SAMs, and are likely to play a key role in enabling the PLAAF to defend Chinese airspace against large-scale saturation attacks. As with so many areas of military capability, a synergistic combined arms approach will likely be the most effective, and the HQ-20 appears set to fill an important gap in the PLAAF's ground-based air defence capabilities in a world in which China lacks the resources to defend the entirety of Chinese airspace with the likes of the long-range HQ-9 system (or the Russian-built S-400, etc.).
HQ-22A
While the PLAAF deployed a growing number of Chinese-built HQ-9 long-range SAM systems over the 2010s alongside a large but finite and not expanding number of Russian-built S-300 long-range SAM systems and a very small number of S-400 long-range SAM systems that were deployed by the late 2010s, China lacked—and continues to lack—the resources required to defend the entirety of Chinese airspace with such high-end and expensive SAM systems. The PLAAF had large numbers of extremely outdated HQ-2 SAM systems to replace over the 2010s, and Chinese industry developed the HQ-22 as a lower-tier and more affordable long-range SAM system for the PLAAF to deploy in large numbers. The PLAAF began to deploy the HQ-22 in fast-expanding numbers in the late 2010s. The HQ-22 currently plays a pivotal role in defending Chinese airspace in areas that are not along China's maritime frontier and which are not the Beijing metropolitan area. The HQ-22 is notably deployed in Tibet, a location that may be far from the Chinese coastline but is quite proximate for Indian strike munitions and combat aircraft in a mountainous environment that is very challenging for any SAM system.
Having been developed as a lower-tier long-range SAM system to complement the HQ-9, the HQ-22 employs semi-active radar homing (SARH) guidance. While SARH guidance is far from obsolete—and notwithstanding the fact that long-range active radar homing (ARH) SAMs are only "fully" ARH in the terminal phase and are most effectively employed alongside an engagement radar—SARH guidance SAMs face a major limitation in terms of multi-target engagement capability. The scope for China's adversaries to undertake large-scale saturation attacks with various strike munitions is fast increasing, and it is possible that the HQ-22 SAM system is evolving in response to such threats.
HQ-9C
While China's HQ-9 long-range SAM system requires little in the way of introduction, the ongoing evolution of the HQ-9 SAM family—a necessary evolution given fast-evolving air and ballistic missile threats—has not received much attention. This is despite one such evolution—the HQ-9C—having been quietly part of the public display at the 2022 iteration of the Zhuhai Airshow.
Whereas the HQ-9B is reported to be the extended-range version of the original design, the HQ-9C features new SAMs of a smaller diameter than the HQ-9A/HQ-9B. Each specially configured wheeled launcher can carry eight HQ-9C SAMs, whereas the standard wheeled launchers hitherto associated with the HQ-9 SAM system family are limited to four (larger) SAMs each. Little is publicly known about the HQ-9C, including its intended role and optimization. The HQ-9C may be intended to serve as a medium-range SAM alongside the extended-range HQ-9B. It may, however, amount to a BMD-optimized SAM in the vein of the newer PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE SAMs associated with the American Patriot SAM system (the older "extended range" PAC-2 SAM is optimized against aircraft, not ballistic missiles). One area of uncertainty concerning the HQ-9C and its new, smaller-diameter SAMs concerns whether the PLAAF has or will deploy it as a standalone system without the larger-diameter HQ-9A and HQ-9B SAMs. The alternative is that some number of HQ-9C launchers will be assigned to each HQ-9 battery.
HQ-19
The HQ-19 was unveiled at the 2024 iteration of the Zhuhai Airshow and is reportedly something of an analogue to the American THAAD, which is to say a high altitude endo- and exo-atmospheric BMD system. While the HQ-9 has long been reported to offer some level of BMD capability—against shorter, sub-1000 kilometer range ballistic missiles and less kinemetically complex ballistic missile threats more generally, the HQ-19 appears to be a dedicated BMD system, one that is likely incapable of intercepting atmospheric aircraft. As a result, the HQ-19 can play a key role in China's ballistic missile defence capabilities, but it cannot function as a standalone system given China's threat environment—it must be deployed alongside—and defended by—other systems, such as the HQ-9 and HQ-22.
While standalone BMD systems come with trade-offs—above all, a very high unit cost per SAM—a high altitude exo-atmospheric interception capability is the only practical way for the PLAAF to extend BMD coverage across inner China (i.e., China excluding the vast, often desolate expanses of Tibet and Xinjiang). Given the fast-evolving threat environment that China faces, there is no practical substitute for the likes of the HQ-19 for China, even though it likely places the PLAAF "on the wrong side of the cost curve" much as the BMD mission has done for the United States (if narrowly viewed in terms of the marginal cost of interception as opposed to, say, the opportunity cost of selectively not defending the target of an inbound ballistic missile).
HQ-29
The newly unveiled HQ-29 appears to be one of several very large high altitude Chinese BMD interceptors/anti-satellite (ASAT) systems—there is considerable overlap in this area as it concerns systems that operate beyond the Earth's atmosphere—that may have been mentioned but nevertheless remained poorly documented in the realm of publicly available information over the past 20 or so years.
The HQ-29 is associated with an extremely large interceptor, two of which can be carried by each six-axle launcher vehicle—a veritable transporter erector launcher (TEL)—of the type that would otherwise be associated with a medium-range ballistic missile. As a BMD system, the HQ-29 is likely to offer an expansive exo-atmospheric midcourse BMD capability, which is to say, extend BMD coverage over much of Chinese territory. As things stand, the HQ-29 is likely to be more important in the nuclear realm vis-a-vis countries that are not named the United States of America or Russia. BMD dynamics are, however, likely to change as China's adversaries, including the United States, develop and deploy ballistic missiles to strike very lucrative/consequential targets on Chinese territory.
While the aforementioned air defence and ballistic missile defence systems set to be formally displayed, if not unveiled, on 3 September collectively herald a very major expansion of China's air defence and ballistic missile defence capabilities, it is important to recall that the PLA follows a particular division of roles and responsibilities in these interrelated areas. The PLAGF and PLAN have important roles to play in different conflict scenarios, and no analysis is complete without a holistic conception of how China approaches air defence and ballistic missile defence. More generally, it is important to note that the PLA operates a decidedly heterogeneous inventory of equipment of all types, including air defence missile defence systems, and that the latest Chinese systems are not available in infinite numbers. Even the well-resourced PLA must allocate its finite resources, not least when China's military budget is, like that of the United States, increasingly being spread thin over so many different areas.