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China and Thailand have undertaken yet another iteration of the now well-established “Falcon Strike” series of air force exercises. While generally notable by virtue of constituting some of the few opportunities People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) personnel have to engage with their foreign counterparts, the 2026 iteration of “Falcon Strike” is particularly notable given how it comes after the 2025 clashes between Cambodia and Thailand. Both of these Southeast Asian countries are important to China and amount to “near-neighbours” of Beijing. China not only has major economic interests at stake, but has also been cultivating military and security relations with Cambodia and Thailand. This resulted in an awkward situation during the 2025 clashes when Cambodia would have to employ Chinese-supplied weapons against Thailand and, more generally, turn to China for additional, more advanced armaments, perhaps against some of Thailand’s Chinese-built armament (which constitutes a smaller share of the Thai arsenal than is the case for Cambodia). China has so far managed to navigate this awkward dynamic, and the latest iteration of “Falcon Strike” indicates that the unusually important, for the PLAAF, engagement of the Chinese and Thai air forces will continue. It bears emphasis that Beijing also has a major interest in influencing the behaviour of these “near-neighbour” and other countries, which are likely to remain strict neutrals, over the course of a prospective major, and likely protracted, war with the United States.