China's Gradually Expanding Replenishment Ship Fleet Features Minimal Air Defences; Constitutes Liability For Fleet Operations
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Note: This post is less an example of policy advocacy for the Chinese military to pursue one set of options or another than an example of an analytical approach that is best understood as inference through absence. This post identifies a shortcoming in Chinese military capabilities and discusses how China may go about addressing it. This analytical approach allows observers to gauge the significance of the identified capability shortcoming and how enduring it is likely to be.
While the Chinese Peopleâs Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has undergone a dramatic modernization and expansion drive over the past fifteen or so years, the massive investments in new warships have not to date been matched by comparable investments toward various types of naval auxiliaries, including replenishment ships. As of this writing, the PLANâs capacity to replenish and refuel its surface ships at sea is primarily concentrated in a fleet of just twelve replenishment ships. This total is composed of:
Two Type 903-class replenishment ships (commissioned 2004-2005).
Seven Type 903A-class replenishment ships (commissioned 2013-2019).
Two much larger Type 901-class fast replenishment ships (commissioned 2017-2018).
One Soviet/Ukrainian-built Type 908-class replenishment ship (commissioned in 1996).
As of this writing, reports indicate that at least four new Type 903A-class replenishment ships, or a new variant of this longstanding design, are under construction, with two of these new replenishment ship hulls being at a very advanced stage of construction.
While the PLANâs replenishment ship fleet is fast expanding, the ratio of replenishment ships to large surface warshipsâdestroyers and frigatesâremains quite low, and the PLANâs replenishment ship needs are only increasing, with three aircraft carriers and four large landing helicopter docks (LHDs) in service, as well as one large LHD/aircraft carrier at an advanced stage of construction. Surface groups centered on each of the three aircraft carriers and four LHDs will require the support of one replenishment ship, and the PLAN will also need additional replenishment ships to support expeditionary operations, training events, and, not least, to support surface groups that are centered on destroyers and frigates, not aircraft carriers and LHDs. The most important replenishment ships in the PLANâs current fleet are the two Type 901-class fast replenishment ships, which are powered by gas turbines in order so as to be fast enough to support Chinaâs aircraft carriers and accompanying escorts. The Type 903A-class replenishment ships and the four additional Type 903A-class hulls/derivatives thereof currently under construction cannot truly substitute for the two Type 901-class fast replenishment ships in supporting the operations of a PLAN surface fleet that is increasingly focused on forming surface groups centered on an aircraft carrier or LHD.
Given the above, the PLANâs combat capabilities are heavily reliant on the existence and availability of a surprisingly small number of replenishment ships. It bears emphasis that while the capabilities offered by replenishment ships are often thought in terms of extending the maximum range of accompanying surface ships, replenishment ships are best thought of as expanding the range-endurance of accompanying surface ships. The presence of a replenishment will, in other words, determine how long a PLAN carrier group, amphibious group, and surface group can, for example, operate in the western Philippine Sea without having to return to port to refuel and resupply. While a Chinese blockade of Taiwan is likely to be spearheaded by the paramilitary China Coast Guardâs expanding âhigh seas fleetâ prior to the start of high-intensity combat operations, China Coast Guard vessels operating around Taiwan are likely to be not only backstopped by PLAN vessels but also screened by PLAN surface groups operating in the western Philippine Sea. This may well include every operational aircraft carrier in the Chinese fleet and multiple surface groups composed of destroyers and frigates.
Despite the importance of the PLANâs replenishment ship fleet, these vessels, including the critically important and unsubstitutable two Type 901-class fast replenishment ships, feature very modest sensors and air defences. Each Type 901-class fast replenishment ship is equipped with four radar-directed H/PJ-13 rotary 30 mm cannons and a very modest Type 364 C-band search radar. Each Type 903A-class replenishment ship features either four twin-barrel 37 mm cannons or four single-barrel 30 mm autocannons. The PLANâs replenishment ships are, therefore, almost entirely reliant on the air defence capabilities of PLAN warships in their immediate vicinity and are functionally defenceless on their own in an operating environment that is characterized by the rapid quantitative and qualitative expansion of adversary maritime strike capabilities.
The PLANâs combat capabilities will be significantly degraded if even several of its replenishment ships are either sunk or so heavily damaged as to be forced to limp back to port. While it is not customary for navies to arm their replenishment ships or equip said ships with particularly notable search radars, there is considerable scope to do so given the generous space, weight, and cooling available on large and low-density replenishment ship hull, superstructure, and deck. It is worth noting that during the Cold War, the United Kingdom originally planned to equip its Fort Victoria-class replenishment ships with Sea Wolf short-range surface-to-air missiles so that its replenishment ships could independently intercept anti-ship cruise missiles without relying on what were originally conceived as low-cost frigates optimized for anti-submarine warfare in the North Atlantic. The Netherlands recently commissioned the Den Helder, a replenishment ship that notably features a Thales NS100 S-band search radar, which supports the use of a 76 mm gun and a 21-cell RIM-116 RAM short-range surface-to-air missile launcher. While the United States Navyâs older Henry J. Kaiser-class replenishment ships and newer John Lewis-class replenishment ships tend to be minimally armed in peacetime, these are fitted-for-but-not-with radar-directed rotary cannons and RIM-116 RAM short-range surface-to-air missile launchers. Notwithstanding the perennial and universal issues of cost and the imperative of prudently allocating scarce resources, there is considerable scope for the PLAN to bolster the air defences of its replenishment ships so that these critically important naval auxiliaries are more survivable in light of the escalating threat posed by adversary maritime strike capabilities.
For the Type 901-class fast replenishment ships, there is scope to replace, or perhaps complement, the four H/PJ-13 rotary cannons with two or more HQ-10 launchers, which are the Chinese analogue to the American RIM-116 RAM. The PLAN currently operates eight-cell and twenty-four-cell HQ-10 launchers, while Chinese industry has previously offered launchers of an intermediate capacity that may be more suitable than either of the existing HQ-10 launchers. The installation of Type 1130 rotary cannons, which are now standard on the PLANâs aircraft carriers, LHDs, and destroyers and are far more capable than the quite modest H/PJ-13 design, in lieu of the four existing H/PJ-13 rotary cannons, is also an option, but the Type 1130 requires considerable deck penetration and is more difficult to install on any given ship. Given the critically important role that the Type 901-class fast replenishment ships play in supporting the operation of Chinese carrier groups, there is a case to be made to installing either a single-faced budget S-band search radar along the lines of the new design of unknown designation that is installed on the China Coast Guardâs new waterjet-powered armed patrol ships, or the two-faced H/LJQ-368 X-band search radars that are increasingly standard on new PLAN warships of different types. The single most consequential change that the PLAN can make is to install datalinks on the Type 901-class fast replenishment ships that allow for the two-way exchange of sensor data and the use of sensor data from nearby warships to direct the armaments installed on the replenishment ships.
As for the Type 903A-class replenishment ships, there is also scope to install one or more HQ-10 launchers. It is worth noting that the PLAN commissioned twenty-two Type 056-class corvettes in the 2013-2016 timeframe, only to retire these vessels and transfer them to the China Coast Guard in the 2021-2022 timeframe. The Type 056-class corvettes operated by the China Coast Guard were stripped of, among other things, their four YJ-83 subsonic anti-ship cruise missile launchers, two triple 324 mm torpedo tubes, and their single eight-cell HQ-10 short-range surface-to-air missile launchers. This is to say that the PLAN should still possess 22 minimally used eight-cell HQ-10 launchers that can be installed on the Type 903A-class replenishment ships. As for a search radar, there is also scope to install one of the radars mentioned in the context of the Type 901-class, but the more consequential investment will go toward the installation of datalinks that allow for the two-way exchange of sensor data and the use of sensor data from nearby warships to direct the armaments installed on the replenishment ships.
While this text primarily focuses on the threat posed by adversary anti-ship cruise missiles, it bears emphasis that the threats posed to PLAN surface ships are also rapidly evolving in other areas. As things stand, essentially every PLAN vessel will require defences against adversary armed uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) that operate as surface-running torpedo analogues. Replenishment ships are large and quite slow vessels that cannot rapidly undertake evasive maneuvers in the manner of most warships and cannot, in any event, evade a USV that is capable of sustaining a 30-40 knot maximum speed. Given the size of replenishment ships, at least four heavy machine guns or, preferably, autocannons are required to put in place an absolute minimum of an organic counter-USV capability. In an ideal world, each heavy machine gun and/or autocannon will be stabilized, remotely controlled, and feature at least a medium-end accompanying electro-optical sight and preferably a thermal sight.
To counter the fast-evolving threat posed by armed multirotor drones and armed fixed-wing strike drones, which encompass the likes of both the fairly small Russian Lancet loitering strike drone and the much larger Iranian Shahed-136 strike drone, and other types of unarmed and armed uncrewed aircraft more generally, replenishment ships and other naval vessels will require, among other things, a hard kill defence capability that is best provided by remotely controlled autocannons, preferably of the dual feed variety, that can make use of programmable airburst ammunition. While the likes of the H/PJ-13 and Type 1130 rotary cannons can be effectively used against larger uncrewed aircraft designs, these are optimized for putting a large spread of tungsten carbide or depleted uranium armoured piercing discarded sabot (APDS) projectiles downrange to collide with large anti-ship cruise missiles and are not very well suited to intercepting much smaller and nimbler uncrewed aircraft. In any event, the likes of the H/PJ-13 and Type 1130 rotary cannons rapidly deplete the supply of loaded, ready-to-fire ammunition and can be readily overwhelmed if and when, for example, ten or more inexpensive uncrewed aircraft simultaneously approach a ship.
While suitable armament is required to effectively defend against attacks by USVs and uncrewed aircraft, the PLANâs replenishment ships will also require suitable sensors to detect such threats in the first place. This can be done through various means, including passive electronic sensors, automated electro-optical sights, and high-frequencyâgenerally X-band or higherâsearch radars. While some of the PLANâs latest warships are better equipped to counter such threats, this cannot be said of most of the PLANâs surface warships, let alone its auxiliaries, including its replenishment ships. The challenge faced by the PLAN is shared with other navies worldwide: countering the threat posed by USVs and uncrewed aircraft to surface ships increasingly requires a new and quite different set of armaments and sensors that must be installed in addition to more established types of armament and sensors that can be used to defend against anti-ship cruise missiles.
It is worth mentioning that the PLANâs surface ships, including its replenishment ships, also face an expanding threat from anti-ship ballistic missiles and large-caliber guided artillery rocketsâa form of ballistic missile by another nameâwith anti-ship targeting modes. The task of intercepting anti-ship ballistic missiles is, however, best left to nearby warships, and the most practical way forward for navies worldwide is to have high-end warships focus their sensors and armamentâincluded the finite number of loaded missiles per warshipâon higher end threats while other vessels in the formation can more or less independently draw upon the likes of the RIM-116 RAM and HQ-10 to defend against leakers. A replenishment ship can never practically substitute for a dedicated warship and vice versa, but there is a world of difference between replenishment ships and other naval auxiliaries, that are wholly defenceless, and one in which replenishment ships become more like large amphibious ships as LHDs, which are also critically important and highly lucrative targets that cannot be left defenceless against leakers that evade and/or overwhelm the defences of nearby warships.
While the PLAN benefits from immense resource allocations, its resources are nevertheless finite and must be allocated across a very wide range of areas. Every Yuan available to the PLAN cannot be allocated toward procurement, and it bears emphasis that the PLAN faces an immense modernization mountain over the coming decade or so, as a rapidly growing number of increasingly outdated warships need to undergo midlife modernization. As a result, the PLAN is unlikely to make very major investments toward enhancing the survivability of its replenishment ships, even though this quite modestly sized and gradually expanding fleet of naval auxiliaries plays critically important logistical support roles in times of peace, crisis, and war. Although the PLAN may be unwilling and/or unable to allocate considerable procurement Yuan toward upgrading the sensors and armaments of its replenishment ships, the upcoming midlife upgrades to the PLANâs destroyers and frigates may result in the removal and replacement of various sensors and armaments that the PLAN may decide to refit onto its replenishment ships. Some options worth considering are the Type 382 S-band search radars, Type 364 C-band search radars, and the older Type 730 rotary cannons installed on the PLANâs many Type 054A-class frigates. The use of âsecond-handâ systems removed from PLAN warships is not always ideal, particularly as it concerns older non-phased array radars that lack low probability of intercept modes, but will nevertheless amount to a major upgrade for the PLANâs replenishment ships, provided that space, weight, cooling, and, of course, modernization Yuan, are available.
This post is an example of an analytical approach that is best understood as inference through absence. While China may decide not to address this shortcoming in its military capabilities, the failure to do so will have major implications for the survivability of the PLANâs replenishment ships and, as such, for the durability of Chinese military capabilities in times of war in an operating environment that is characterized by the rapid quantitative and qualitative expansion of adversary maritime strike capabilities.