Extensions: The Many Ways Through Which The PLA Can Attack Taiwan's Outlying Western Islands-Part I
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Note: This post broaches an oft-overlooked important topic that I will return to in future posts. Part I focuses on Taiwan’s Kinmen Island(s).
This post is an extension of material that has appeared in another newsletter/section and other parts of my website more generally. While my newsletters/sections are primarily categorized by region—you can either subscribe to specific newsletters/sections or subscribe to the entire website/all of my writings—many posts can be readily placed in multiple newsletters/sections—but only appear in one newsletter/section given how the Substack platform is configured—and may be highly relevant to readers who are primarily interested in other parts of the world. I hope that my Extensions themed posts help rationalize my comparativist analytical approach, one that results in my website covering a very wide range of military-related topics and much of the world.
Discussions of China’s amphibious assault capabilities tend to focus on the ability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to undertake a large-scale amphibious assault on the island of Taiwan. This does not, however, reflect what is likely to be the full scope of PLA military activity in a Taiwan conflict scenario. The PLA is likely to undertake multifaceted operations against Taiwan’s outlying western islands—the Kinmen Islands and Matsu Islands, which are just off the coast of Fujian, and the Penghu Islands, which are some 50-70 kilometers west of the island of Taiwan.1 The PLA’s ability to neutralize Taiwanese military forces on the island country’s outlying western islands—and possibly occupy said islands—receives remarkably little analytical attention even as this is one of the fastest-changing aspects of the cross-strait military balance.
While the PLA can, of course, undertake amphibious assaults against Taiwan’s outlying western islands, whether in advance of or at the same time as amphibious landing attempts against the island of Taiwan itself, the PLA has never had so many options for attacking Taiwanese forces and critical infrastructure on Taiwan’s outlying western islands as it has now. I envisage such operations not to be merely symbolic or punitive in nature but attempts to both secure the proverbial flanks of a Chinese amphibious landing on Taiwan itself and, more generally, attempts to bolster the PLA’s logistical position, which is to say prepare these islands for occupation by PLA forces.
Military technology has advanced considerably over the past several decades. China now approaches the technological frontier and, in a growing number of technology areas, increasingly drives the expansion of the technological frontier. As a result, the question of the PLA’s options when it comes to attacking Taiwan’s outlying western islands is not only a matter of the PLA’s existing fielded military capabilities but also what Chinese military industry is well-positioned to enable in fairly short order. To appreciate the PLA’s options, it is important to recognize the following:
Kinmen Island is located some ten or so kilometers from the Chinese mainland—this part of China’s coastline has been subject to widespread “land-reclamation” efforts as well as bridge construction, which has resulted in the “mainland” extending further into the Taiwan Strait.2
Taiwan’s Matsu Islands are located some 30-70 kilometers from the Chinese mainland—some of the small Chinese islands along the Fujian coastline are closer. This part of China’s coastline is also subject to widespread “land-reclamation” efforts which result in the “mainland” extending further into the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan’s Penghu Islands are located some 135-160 kilometers from the Chinese mainland. While the Penghu Islands are not close to the Chinese mainland relative to the island of Taiwan—the Taiwan Strait is some 130-180 kilometers wide at its narrowest points—the Penghu Islands amount to relatively isolated outposts that Taiwan cannot readily reinforce in the manner of the various sectors along its western coastline (i.e., on the island of Taiwan itself). As a result, some approaches that the PLA may pursue to target the Penghu Islands are likely to be more effective than when used against the island of Taiwan, at least in the opening stages of a conflict, despite not being so close to the Chinese mainland as Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands and Matsu Islands.
As indicated earlier, this extensions-themed post focuses on Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands. Future posts will focus on Taiwan’s Matsu Islands and Penghu Islands, respectively.
Kinmen Islands
Kinmen Island, and the smaller nearby Taiwanese islands that constitute the Kinmen Islands (plural), more generally, are located extremely close to the Chinese mainland and can be targeted by essentially the full range of PLA capabilities, including even mortars. While this is not a new dynamic—the PLA has always been able to subject Kinmen Island to sustained artillery bombardment, the PLA has never been better equipped to methodically target Taiwanese military forces and defensive positions—as well as Taiwan’s offensive military capabilities that are directed against the Chinese mainland—using a wide range of systems. The PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) can now employ guided tube artillery, among other systems, to systematically target hundreds of discrete aimpoints across Kinmen Island in short order. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) can also employ guided bombs, including guided glide bombs, to target aimpoints for which the likes of a 155 mm guided shell are inadequate.
I covered some of the key developments in the PLAGF’s artillery capabilities in a recent post:
While none of the above is new, the PLA’s options to target Kinmen Island have never been greater. Kinmen Island and the much smaller nearby Taiwanese islands are well within range of Chinese armed “first-person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drones and similar. Being built from commercial-off-the-shelf components, these amount to extremely inexpensive guided micro-strike munitions. While limited in terms of payload and, as such, destructive effects, armed “FPV” multirotor drones and similar can be used to methodically target individual vehicles, fighting positions such as machine gun nests and small bunkers, artillery pieces, radio antennas, electrical generators, fuel storage tanks, and so forth.
While there are some complications when it comes to usage over water in general and seawater in a coastal environment in particular, the PLA will likely be able to make use of suitably equipped armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic cable communication uplink/downlink variety—as opposed to those of the radio communication uplink/downlink variety—to target the Kinmen Islands. This will facilitate, among other things, the use of such “FPV” multirotor drones to attack targets located inside buildings, breach the entrances to Taiwanese bunkers, and so forth. I covered the use of armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber-optic uplink/downlink variety in several recent posts:
It is important to note that the PLA can also make use of armed "FPV” fixed-wing drones, which have their own set of advantages and disadvantages, to target the Kinmen Islands. Relatedly, the PLA can also use some of its so-called anti-tank guided missiles—which are better characterized as fairly light and very short-range surface-to-surface missiles—to target the Kinmen Islands. While such missiles of relevant range are primarily associated with the PLAGF’s attack helicopters and armed transport helicopters, the PLAGF ground-launched AFT-10—also known as the HJ-10—and similar missiles equipped with a fiber-optic cable communication uplink/downlink—can be used to attack high-value and time-sensitive targets on the Kinmen Islands.
While most of the above PLA systems can be launched from the Chinese mainland and the Chinese islands off the Fujian coastline, it is important to recognize that there is little preventing the PLA from placing some of these capables on ships, boats, helicotpers, and uncrewed aircraft with the aim of increasing maximum range, increasing standoff range, and more generally reducing the exposure of PLA launch platforms and launch personnel. The PLA can also make use of high-elevation terrain along the Fujian coastline to extend the maximum practical range of some of the aforementioned systems. Several of my recent posts address such matters:
https://www.spasconsulting.com/p/extensions-china-can-use-fixed-wing?r=4cjv7q&utm_campaign
When viewed as a collective, China can use the aforementioned systems and others to subject Kinmen Island and the smaller nearby Taiwanese islands to something far more effective than the longstanding threat posed by massed PLAGF tube artillery and bombardment by the PLAAF more generally. Simply stated, the PLA is increasingly well-positioned to systematically dismantle Taiwanese defences in the Kinmen Islands and destroy Taiwanese military units garrisoned there. Unlike a given sector on the island of Taiwan itself, the Taiwanese military is very poorly positioned to reinforce the Kinmen Islands in wartime, even as the forces that it, in effect, forward-deploys there in peacetime are increasingly exposed. Taiwan’s prospects for engineering a way out of this situation are very poor. Yes, there are countermeasures to each of the aforementioned Chinese military systems and capabilities. The problem that Taiwan faces vis-a-vis China in general and in the Kinmen Islands in particular is that China is exceedingly well-positioned to neutralize whatever systems and forces that Taiwan decides to deploy to the Kinmen Islands so as to bolster its position in light of the mounting threat posed by the PLA.
Suppose, for example, that Taiwan deploys a comprehensive suite of air defence systems that are optimized to intercept small, slow, and low-flying aerial targets such as armed “FPV” drones of both the multirotor and fixed-wing variety, as well as the likes of the AFT-10/HJ-10 surface-to-surface missile. Surely Taiwan will then be able to neutralize such threats? I am not optimistic about Taiwan’s prospects for the following reason: the PLA is exceedingly well-positioned to, in effect, out-class whatever Taiwan tries to do. Supposing that Taiwan deploys very effective air defence systems of the aforementioned type on the Kinmen Islands, the PLA can simply up the ante and use the likes of the PLAGF’s PHL-191 guided artillery rocket/missiles or guided glide bombs launched from PLAAF aircraft to neutralize said Taiwanese air defence systems and, in so doing, create an opening for the PLA’s armed “FPV” drones of both the multirotor and the fixed-wing variety.
While it is easy to postulate Taiwanese counter-countermeasures and counter-counter-countermeasures and so forth, Taiwan’s prospects in the Kinmen Islands—which are located some ten kilometers from the Chinese mainland—are exceedingly poor. Taiwan’s resources are not unlimited, and the capabilities that Taiwan currently has and will be able to acquire and deploy before a conflict will also be required elsewhere. Taiwan cannot, as such, simply deploy more and more air defence systems and other military capabilities on the Kinmen Islands, not least when there is quite literally very limited real estate (i.e., surface area) to work with. As the density of Taiwanese military forces deployed to the Kinmen Islands increases, the PLA will face an ever easier task of identifying targets for attack.
Given the above, the Kinmen Islands are, in effect, a bottomless money pit that simply drains scarce military resources that Taiwan can better employ elsewhere. Not only has the military balance in the Taiwan Strait been fundamentally transformed by China’s efforts toward the PLA’s ongoing modernization, but technological change—including many of the fast-evolving systems and capabilities that are being used in the Russia-Ukraine War—are enabling China to militarily dominate Taiwan’s outlying western islands in unprecedented ways. I am cognizant of arguments that such technological change is bringing about a state of “defence dominance,” a dynamic which, if taken at face value, would appear to favour Taiwan. Whether an unfolding “defence dominance” is an accurate description of reality—I think such arguments are hopelessly oversimplistic and do not, therefore, translate well across time and space—is a subject for another (lengthy) post and another time. As things stand, Taiwan’s military position in the Kinmen Islands is increasingly untenable because the interplay of the PLA’s ongoing modernization and technological change has dramatically expanded China’s options when it comes to attacking such a proximate target.
All things considered, the PLA is increasingly well-positioned to systematically dismantle Taiwanese defences in the Kinmen Islands and destroy Taiwanese military units garrisoned there. Whether such an operation will be followed by a PLA amphibious landing on the Kinmen Islands—which are located some ten kilometers from the Chinese mainland—is uncertain, but the PLA does encounter major incentives to occupy the Kinmen Islands to both secure the proverbial flanks of a Chinese amphibious landing on Taiwan itself and, more generally, attempts to bolster the PLA’s logistical position. While a Chinese amphibious assault on the Kinmen Islands was always a likely scenario in a major conflict in the Taiwan Strait, an actual amphibious assault is likely to be preceded by a fairly brief but extremely high-intensity strike operation, and PLA amphibious forces may end up going to the Kinmen Islands primarily to collect prisoners of war and evacuate the civilian population, who are part of the human terrain and should not be forgotten.
At some point, Taiwan’s decision-makers will have to revisit their assumptions and relax their understandable instinctual desire to try to defend everything and everywhere at once, including the very isolated Kinmen Islands. If Taiwan’s latest civil defence handbook and the statements of Taiwanese decision-makers more generally are anything to go by, however, Taipei has not yet come to terms with this particular aspect of the fast-evolving cross-strait military balance.
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This extensions-themed post highlights the benefits that result from the rather eclectic analytical approach that drives my interest in a wide range of military technologies and military dynamics across much of the world.
Taiwan’s more southern Pratas Island, which is some 330 kilometers southeast of Hong Kong, Taiping Island, which is part of the Spratlys chain in the South China Sea, as well as Orchid Island and Green Island, which lie to the east of the island of Taiwan, are beyond the scope of this post, which focuses on Taiwan’s outlying western islands.
Much of this “land-reclamation” activity in Fujian is likely to be driven by economic and developmental motives, not military motives. Coastal real estate draws a premium in this area, including for industrial and commercial purposes. Flat, readily-buildable land is in short supply in this economically dynamic and fast-growing region, which is largely mountainous.