Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.
One of the surprise revelations at the rehearsals for the forthcoming 3 September military parade in Beijing has been the unveiling of four new—in three cases previously unseen—Chinese anti-ship munitions: the YJ-15, YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20. Whereas the YJ-15 is a supersonic cruise missile, the YJ-17 and YJ-20 are extensions of ballistic missile technology. The YJ-19 amounts to something in between, but primarily functions in a manner comparable to a high-altitude cruise missile design. Collectively, these four new anti-ship munitions herald a very significant enhancement of China’s maritime strike capabilities.
The YJ- prefix refers to YingJi or “Eagle Strike” and is the longstanding designation for Chinese surface- and air-launched anti-ship cruise missile designs operated by both the PLA Navy (PLAN) and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). These four new anti-ship missiles highlight a clear-cut emphasis on longer-range high-speed—short-time-to-target—anti-ship munitions at a time when some navies—but notably not the PLAN—are primarily, if not exclusively, allocating their finite resources toward long-range subsonic anti-ship cruise missiles with passive guidance systems and greatly reduced radar and infrared signatures.
YJ-15 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
The YJ-15 is a ramjet-powered supersonic anti-ship cruise missile that appears to be a further development of the Chinese ramjet-powered supersonic YJ-12 and may be its eventual successor. Ramjet-powered missiles have air-breathing ramjet engines that combust jet fuel that is carried inside the airframe but draw upon atmospheric oxygen as the oxidizer. Most anti-ship missiles, including the YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-19, use solid-propellant rocket motors that contain both fuel and oxidizer. While there are tradeoffs and, as such, good reasons as to why militaries and designers worldwide continue to regularly select solid-propellant rocket motors over air-breathing ramjet engines, ramjet propulsion allows a missile of a given mass and set of dimensions to have a greater range-payload than would otherwise be the case if it were powered by a solid-propellant rocket with an onboard supply of oxidizer.
The new ramjet-powered YJ-15—the year in which this and the other newly unveiled missiles may have entered service is not public knowledge—may or may not be compatible with the larger of the PLAN’s two operational and in-production vertical launch systems (VLS), which are multipurpose “universal” launchers that allow warships to carry and launch multiple types of munitions in a given VLS cell. The implications of the YJ-15 for China’s maritime strike capabilities will largely hinge on this currently unanswerable question.
While introduced in the early 2010s, the YJ-12 has not been widely deployed by the PLAN. Due to its exceptional size and weight, the YJ-12 is not compatible with either of the PLAN’s two operational and in-production multipurpose VLS designs. As a result, the PLAN is currently reliant on the YJ-18 for use with its multipurpose VLS-equipped Type 052D-class and Type 055-class destroyers and the older and far less sophisticated YJ-83 for use with its multipurpose VLS-equipped Type 054A-class and Type 054B-class frigates. Whereas the YJ-83 is a very modest subsonic anti-ship cruise missile design, the YJ-18 is a primarily subsonic anti-ship cruise missile design that features a solid-propellant rocket-powered supersonic sprint vehicle to accelerate the warhead and guidance system to a supersonic speed in the final minute or so of flight.
With the PLAN making the choice to exclusively employ multipurpose VLS to launch all missiles larger than the fairly small HHQ-10 short-range surface-to-air missile on its new-build large warships over the past decade or so, only a handful of PLAN surface ships have been equipped with the YJ-12—in all cases following a mid-life upgrade and never on a new-build design. As a result, the YJ-12 is primarily employed by the PLAAF’s H-6K and H-6J bombers—the latter were previously operated by the PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) prior to the transfer of most of the PLANAF’s land-based fixed-wing combat aircraft to the PLAAF in 2023—and by the PLAN’s land-based coastal defence units, which deploy the YJ-12 on wheeled launcher vehicles as their sole publicly-known supersonic anti-ship munition.
Given the YJ- prefix in its designation, the high-speed YJ-15 requires either a radio-frequency seeker—an active radar seeker and/or a passive radar seeker—or an infrared-band seeker to accurately impact its target. While unconfirmed, the YJ-15 is likely to primarily rely on an active radar seeker.
It remains to be seen whether the YJ-15 is compatible with the PLAN’s GJB 5860-2006 “universal VLS” (UVLS). If so, the YJ-15 may supplant the YJ-18 as the PLAN’s primary anti-ship cruise missile on its UVLS-equipped warships and more generally supplant the YJ-12 on other PLAN warships and perhaps the PLAN’s land-based coastal defence units. While the new YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20 anti-ship munitions, which will be formally unveiled at the forthcoming 3 September military parade in Beijing, are likely to offer a much greater maximum range than the YJ-15, it is important to recognize that not all engagements will take place at maximum range and that those particular new anti-ship missiles likely have very significant minimum engagement range restrictions. In other words, long-range anti-ship missiles that rely on large solid-propellant rocket boosters in the manner of a ballistic missile are unlikely to wholly supplant anti-ship cruise missiles in the PLAN’s arsenal anytime soon.
While the YJ-15 designation is indicative of a maritime strike munition, the YJ-15 may nevertheless have a land-attack mode, as is reportedly the case with the YJ-12. It nevertheless bears emphasis that neither of these ramjet-powered supersonic anti-ship cruise missile designs—which are quite exquisite and expensive—are particularly well-suited to the land-attack role, not least in a context in which the PLA can draw upon many other strike munitions to attack terrestrial targets.
YJ-17 Anti-Ship Boost-Glide Vehicle
The YJ-17 is an anti-ship ballistic missile that is not equipped with a maneuvering high-speed reentry vehicle in the manner of the Chinese DF-21D and DF-26, but a seemingly unpowered boost-glide vehicle (BGV—also known as a hypersonic glide vehicle, or HGV). The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) deploys large numbers of the DF-17, which couples a single-stage solid-propellant rocket booster with an unpowered BGV, to attack terrestrial targets. The PLAAF also operates an air-launched ballistic missile design with its H-6N bombers that is equipped with a BGV. As a result, the YJ-17 may, when deployed, be the PLA’s third operation BGV at a time when other leading militaries do not presently deploy any BGVs.
While the DF-17 is far too large to be launched from existing PLAN surface warships, the YJ-17 is likely to be compatible with the PLAN’s larger GJB 5860-2006 “universal VLS” (UVLS), which is installed on Type 052D-class and Type 055-class destroyers. It is possible, even likely, that the YJ-17 and conceptually similar munitions—including the YJ-19 and YJ-20—will be the primary armament of some PLAN submarines in the future.
Given the YJ- prefix in its designation, the high-speed YJ-17 requires either a radio-frequency seeker—an active radar seeker and/or a passive radar seeker—or an infrared-band seeker to accurately impact its target. While unconfirmed, the YJ-17 is likely to employ an active radar seeker.
While the YJ-17 designation is indicative of a maritime strike munition, the YJ-17 may nevertheless have a land-attack mode and is more generally well-suited for use as a long-range short-time-to-target land-attack munition against high-value targets of opportunity. The YJ-17 is, however, likely to be limited in terms of payload weight and volume in order to be compatible with the UVLS, and is, therefore, unlikely to be suitable for use against some target classes.
YJ-19 Ramjet/Scramjet-Powered High Altitude Vehicle
Whereas the YJ-17 appears to feature an unpowered BGV, the YJ-19 appears to have an air-breathing propulsion system, which is either a ramjet engine or possibly a scramjet engine. As explained earlier in the context of the ramjet-powered YJ-15 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, ramjet-powered missiles have air-breathing engines that combust jet fuel that is carried inside the airframe while drawing upon atmospheric oxygen as the oxidizer. The primary distinction between a ramjet and a scramjet engine concerns whether combustion takes place with a subsonic or supersonic airflow: scramjet = supersonic combustion ramjet.
Present uncertainties concerning the exact nature of its apparent propulsion system notwithstanding, the revelation of the YJ-19 amounts to a surprising development in a context in which the rest of the PLA, including the PLARF, is not publicly known to operate a ramjet-powered—or perhaps scramjet-powered—missile of this type. While the seemingly powered YJ-19 is closer in function to a cruise missile than a ballistic missile, it is a surface-launched munition that relies upon a very large solid-propellant rocket booster—which is jettisoned when expended—to place the cruise missile-type ramjet/scramjet-powered vehicle into a high altitude “launch position” and accelerate it from zero airspeed at the time of launch on the Earth’s surface. All known ramjet and scramjet-powered designs are reliant on rocket boosters, given that neither of these related propulsion systems functions when launched by a subsonic platform—the experimental American X-51 Waverider, for example, relied on a solid-propellant rocket booster from the MGM-140 ATACMS short-range ballistic missile, even though it was released from altitude by a (subsonic) B-52 bomber.
Being launched from the Earth’s surface and given that it does not appear to be an experimental design, the YJ-19 features a comparatively very large solid-propellant rocket booster. In this very specific respect, the YJ-19 is somewhat similar to a ballistic missile during its initial phase of flight, but the seemingly powered atmospheric vehicle, which will primarily fly at a very high altitude with the Earth’s atmosphere/will not exit and reenter the Earth’s atmosphere in the manner of most (longer-range) ballistic missiles, and primarily functions in a manner comparable to a high altitude cruise missile. Of the four new anti-ship missiles that are set to be formally unveiled at the forthcoming military parade in Beijing, the operational status of the YJ-19 is likely to be subject to the greatest uncertainty, given that it is likely to be the most complex and sophisticated design of the four.
Given the YJ- prefix in its designation, the high-speed YJ-19 requires either a radio-frequency seeker—an active radar seeker and/or a passive radar seeker—or an infrared-band seeker to accurately impact its target. While unconfirmed, the YJ-19 is likely to employ an active radar seeker.
While the YJ-19 designation is indicative of a maritime strike munition, the YJ-19 may nevertheless have a land-attack mode and is more generally well-suited for use as a long-range short-time-to-target land-attack munition against high-value targets of opportunity. The YJ-19 is, however, likely to be limited in terms of payload weight and volume in order to be compatible with the PLAN’s UVLS, and is, therefore, unlikely to be suitable for use against some target classes. As what is likely to be the most complex and most expensive among the YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20 and the design with the smallest warhead of the three, the YJ-20 may well be reserved for use against the most challenging, most heavily defended, and highest-value maritime targets such as American aircraft carriers.
YJ-20 Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
Whereas there was no public indication of the existence of the YJ-15, YJ-17, and YJ-19 prior to the rehearsals held in Beijing in preparation for the 3 September military parade, the YJ-20 may have been informally unveiled in an official video released in 2022. The informally unveiled ship-launched ballistic missile of publicly unknown designation was informally referred to as the YJ-21 by many PLA watchers, but the informal YJ-21 designation now appears to be incorrect.
Whereas the YJ-17 combines a solid-propellant rocket booster with a BGV, and the YJ-19 combines a solid-propellant rocket booster with a ramjet or scramjet-powered air-breathing high altitude cruise missile-type vehicle, the YJ-20 amounts to a fairly conventional—by established Chinese standards—ballistic missile design that can be launched from a UVLS cell installed on a Chinese surface warship, and perhaps Chinese submarines going forward.
Given the YJ- prefix in its designation, the high-speed YJ-20 requires either a radio-frequency seeker—an active radar seeker and/or a passive radar seeker—or an infrared-band seeker to accurately impact its target. While unconfirmed, the YJ-20 is likely to employ an active radar seeker.
While the YJ-20 designation is indicative of a maritime strike munition, the YJ-20 may nevertheless have a land-attack mode and is more generally well-suited for use as a long-range short-time-to-target land-attack munition against high-value targets of opportunity. The YJ-20 is, however, likely to be limited in terms of payload weight and volume in order to be compatible with the PLAN’s UVLS, and is, therefore, unlikely to be suitable for use against some target classes. All else being equal, the PLARF’s arsenal of ballistic missiles and similar is far better suited for use against terrestrial targets, but something in the vein of the YJ-20 may eventually come to be a long-range, high probability of penetration—in the absence of ballistic missile defence coverage extending over the intended target—and short-time-to-target stand-off land-attack munition for the PLAN’s surface ships and PLAN submarines.
It goes without saying that the unveiling of these four previously unknown designations—YJ-15, YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20—naturally raises questions as to the possible nature of a notional YJ-16 and YJ-18. While the PLA may currently also deploy YJ-16 and YJ-18 anti-ship missiles, it bears emphasis that the PLA would not be the first military to skip numbers in a sequence or assign numbers to designs that are abandoned and which are more generally not deployed.
While these four newly unveiled Chinese anti-ship missiles herald a very significant enhancement of China’s maritime strike capabilities, it is important to recognize that the present analytical uncertainties are not limited to the technical particulars of the YJ-16, YJ-19, YJ-20 and, to a much lesser degree, the ramjet-powered YJ-15 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile. However central a role that technology increasingly plays in fielded military capabilities, it is important to have a holistic view of capability sets. Several considerations are worth highlighting.
How Consequential Are the YJ-16, YJ-19, and YJ-20 For China’s Maritime Strike Capabilities Given The Present Composition Of The PLAN Surface Fleet?
These four new anti-ship missiles are likely to be restricted to launch from the GJB 5860-2006 “universal vertical launch system” (UVLS). At this time, the UVLS is only installed on China’s Type 052D-class—31 of which are presently commissioned—and Type 055-class destroyers—eight of which are presently commissioned. This inherently limits the scale at which these new anti-ship missiles can be deployed—no other commissioned PLAN warship is equipped with the UVLS. The PLAN’s workhorses—its 40 commissioned Type 054A-class frigates—and its apparent next-generation frigate design—the 2-strong Type 054B-class—are equipped with a very different and much smaller VLS design, the H/AKJ-16, with which the YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20—and perhaps the ramjet-powered YJ-15 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile—are likely to be compatible. The rest of the PLAN’s surface warships—its decidedly heterogeneous legacy fleet of 17 destroyers and 9 frigates—are not equipped with the UVLS—and in some cases do not even feature the H/AKJ-16 VLS—and the PLAN’s 50-strong Type 056A-class corvette fleet cannot accommodate either VLS at all. Stated differently, of the aforementioned 157 presently commissioned Chinese warships, only 39 warships—24.8% of the total—can launch the YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20.
The Chinese UVLS design is in many respects larger than it needs to be for most roles and is not, therefore, a very efficient design, even as it likely allows for the employment of very large long-range anti-ship missiles like the YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20. While these statements may appear to be in tension, it is important to recognize that only a small subset of the UVLS cells on a given Chinese warship are likely to be loaded with anti-ship missions of any type at a given time.
As a result of its larger-than-necessary dimensions for most roles, Chinese warships equipped with the UVLS—which are likely to be the only warships capable of launching the YJ-17, YJ-19, YJ-20—feature fewer launch cells than would be the case if the same hulls were equipped with something closer to the smaller American Mark 41 VLS design. This dynamic is compounded by the possibility that the PLAN may not presently deploy a smaller, long-rumoured shorter-range surface-to-air missile design that can be quad-packed, with four such missiles being loaded into each UVLS cell in the same manner that four American RIM-162 ESSM surface-to-air missiles can be quad-packed in each Mark 41 VLS cell.
Each of the PLAN’s 31 currently operational Type 052D-class destroyers has 64 UVLS cells, while each of the PLAN’s 8 currently operational Type 055-class destroyers has 112 UVLS cells. Prior to the unveiling of the four new Chinese anti-ship missiles, the UVLS were known to be loaded with HHQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missiles, YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missiles (which are primarily subsonic but feature a rocket-powered supersonic sprint vehicle), and the CY-5 anti-submarine rocket (which is used to deploy a 324 mm diameter lightweight torpedo). Most of the 64 UVLS cells on the Type 052D-class and the 112 UVLS cells on the Type 055-class are likely to be loaded with HHQ-9 surface-to-air missiles—and any other surface-to-air missile(s) more generally—at a given time, given the potent threat posed by American combat aircraft and air-launched munitions. Simply put, each Type 052D-class destroyer is unlikely to carry much more than 12 anti-ship munitions at a given time, while each Type 055-class destroyer—which mainly exist to serve as the primary air and ballistic missile defence combatant in a PLAN surface group or carrier group—is unlikely to carry more than 20x-30x anti-ship munitions at a time. While the Type 055-class destroyers are fairly well-suited to launching large numbers of YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20 anti-ship missiles, only 8 Type 055-class ships are presently commissioned—a new batch reportedly amounting to 6 additional hulls is, however, at varying stages of construction.
Will The YJ-15, YJ-17, YJ-19, And YJ-20 Only Be Launched From PLAN Vessels?
As of this writing, it is not clear whether China’s newly unveiled YJ-15, YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20 anti-ship munitions are exclusively intended for launch at sea. The YJ-15 ramjet-powered anti-ship cruise missile, in particular, may be too large to fit inside the UVLS and may, as such, be limited to the subset of PLAN surface warships that do not exclusively employ VLS to launch missiles that are larger than the fairly small HHQ-10 short-range surface-to-air missile. It is possible that one or more of these four new anti-ship missiles are intended for use—perhaps intended for exclusive use—by the PLAN’s land-based coastal defence units. As it stands, these PLAN units are equipped with subsonic YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missiles and supersonic YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missiles, which are loaded onto wheeled launcher vehicles that can be repositioned along China’s expansive maritime frontier.
The YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20 are likely to offer a considerably greater maximum range than either the YJ-62 or the YJ-12 and can, as such, greatly extend the reach of the PLAN’s land-based coastal defence units and allow these to more readily support fleet operations in the Western Pacific. Doing so will, of course, put the PLAN’s land-based coastal defence units in a position to take on part of the long-range, short-time-to-target anti-ship targeting role that is currently essentially monopolized by the PLARF. While the PLARF will likely continue to operate the PLA’s longest-range ground-launched maritime strike munitions, such a shift—a devolution—of long-range maritime strike capabilities to the PLAN’s land-based coastal defence units will parallel the partial devolution of the shorter-range ground-launched terrestrial strike mission from the PLARF to the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF), which has in recent years deployed fairly long-range large-caliber guided artillery rockets—missiles by another name—and short-range ballistic missiles that are primarily intended for use against Taiwan and, secondarily, against India and around the Himalayas. Even if the PLAN’s land-based coastal defence units do not deploy these new anti-ship missiles, the very presence of such long-range maritime strike munitions in the PLAN fleet will further erode what was until recently a Second Artillery Corps-turned-PLARF monopoly on the PLA’s long-range strike capabilities, a dynamic that is also being driven by the simultaneous expansion of the PLAAF’s long-range strike capabilities in general and the PLAAF’s deployment of air-launched ballistic missiles in particular.
It bears emphasis that the PLAN may deploy one or more of the YJ-15, YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20 both on land and at sea, and observers should consider the possibility that one or more of these designs will be primarily, if not exclusively, operated by the PLAN's submarine force. It is also important to consider the possibility that one or more of these four new anti-ship munitions—or variants if not derivations thereof—may be employed—likely in a non-exclusive manner—by the PLAAF bomber fleet. Since the transfer of most of the PLANAF’s land-based fixed-wing combat aircraft, including its older H-6G/H-6L and newer H-6J bombers, to the PLAAF in 2023, the PLAAF has become primarily responsible for airborne maritime strike missions in the PLA. It remains to be seen whether the PLANAF’s carrier air wings will be assigned a clear-cut maritime strike mission set once the Fujian, China’s first catapult-assisted take-off barrier arrested recovery (CATOBAR) aircraft carrier, is commissioned and embarks a CATOBAR-capable airwing of J-15T and J-35 fighter aircraft capable of taking off with a much heavier payload than is the case with China’s two operational short take-off, barrier-arrested recovery (STOBAR) aircraft carriers Liaoning and Shandong.
Another area of uncertainty concerns whether the PLARF is at all associated with the YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20, given the inherent potential of employing these strike munitions—or at least versions thereof—against terrestrial targets and the overlap these can have with the PLARF’s primary mission set. Although the YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20 have much smaller and lighter warheads than the PLARF’s publicly known arsenal and are likely to have designs that are restrictively optimized for compatibility with the PLAN’s UVLS, these munitions or derivations thereof may be deployed on land—perhaps in the service of the PLARF—for purposes beyond that of the PLAN’s land-based coastal defence units.
The following text was posted on 21 August 2025:
The forthcoming formal unveiling of four new high-speed supersonic Chinese anti-ship missiles—the YJ-15, YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20—heralds a very significant enhancement of China’s maritime strike capabilities some fifteen years after China's first anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D, began to make headlines as a potential "(aircraft) carrier-killer." Observers should be mindful of the immense resource allocation required to develop, test, and deploy at scale such a diverse array of high-end anti-ship missiles, all of which are likely to be ship-launched—and perhaps submarine-launched—anti-ship munitions that may or may not have ground-launched and/or air-launched versions/derivatives.
The YJ-15 is a ramjet-powered supersonic anti-ship cruise missile.
The YJ-17 couples a large solid rocket booster with a "hypersonic" boost-glide vehicle.
The YJ-19 couples a large solid rocket booster with a ramjet—or scramjet—powered high-altitude cruise missile.
The YJ-20 is a comparatively conventional anti-ship ballistic missile along the lines of the ground-launched Chinese DF-21D and DF-26.
No other country is publicly known to have undertaken such an ambitious and concerted effort toward developing such a diverse array of qualitatively distinct high-speed anti-ship missiles. The closest analogy can be found in the Soviet Navy, which deployed a progressively more impressive array of air-, ship-, and submarine-launched anti-ship missiles throughout the Cold War. The four new Chinese anti-ship missile designs, however, reflect major advances over late Cold War technology, China's approach to maritime strike is far more sophistcated—including in terms of how it goes about undertaking the relevant intelligence, surveillance, and reconaissance roles required to facilitate long-range strikes against maritime targets—and, mostly importantly, the Soviet approach relied heavily on the use of nuclear-armed anti-ship missiles whereas all of China's anti-ship missiles are understood to be equipped with high explosive warheads.
Given these and other related developments in Chinese military capabilities, China's adversaries are forced to make large-scale investments in improving their naval ballistic and cruise missile defences to counter the challenge posed by this impressive array of qualitatively very distinct anti-ship missiles, among the many other anti-ship capabilities resident in the collective arsenal of the PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), and PLA Air Force (PLAAF).
It is important to note that several Chinese missile designs exist in both surface/ground-launched and air-launched versions. Beyond the possible use of one or more of these four new anti-ship missiles by the PLAN's land-based coastal defence units, which have experienced a long-term decline in relevance, and perhaps even the PLARF, air-launched versions/derivatives of the YJ-15, YJ-17, YJ-19, and YJ-20 may be deployed using PLAAF aircraft. PLA Navy Air Force (PLANAF) carrier-based combat aircraft may use the ramjet-powered YJ-15 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile once China's first catapult-assisted take-off barrier arrested recovery (CATOBAR) aircraft carrier, the Fujian, enters service in the near term. Background on Chinese air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles and air-launched ballistic missiles, including background on the Cold War Soviet antecedents to Chinese designs and aspects of China's approach to more generally, can be found at the following links: