Improvements In Ukrainian Air Defence Capabilities Notwithstanding, Shahed-136/Geran-2 Are Unlikely To Go Anywhere

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Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

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This and other attacks involving Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya propeller-driven strike drones against targets near the frontlines/international border should serve as a reminder that these fairly inexpensive strike munitions are unlikely to go away anytime soon. Yes, a new generation of fairly inexpensive air defence systems, including what amount to propeller-driven remotely piloted surface-to-air missile analogues of both fixed-wing and rotary-wing configuration, will, all else being equal, degrade the effectiveness of Russia's propeller-driven strike drone designs.

All else is not, however, equal—ongoing efforts toward expanding production capacity facilitate the expansion of the maximum size of Russian strike drone salvos, which are increasingly bolstered with similarly large salvos of both armed and unarmed decoy drones. This stresses Ukraine's air defence capabilities. Moreover, the new generation of fairly inexpensive Ukrainian air defence systems optimized for use against fairly slow and essentially non-responsive/non-maneuvering aerial targets like the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya, and the rest of Ukraine's air defence systems more generally, are best suited for use in rear areas and in contexts in which successive "lines" of air defences can be used to thin out inbound groups of propeller-driven strike drones. This is not possible in sectors, including the Kharkiv metropolitan area, that are located close to the frontlines/international border. Relatedly, Russia can employ Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drones against battlefield targets located within several dozen kilometers from the frontline/international border. This is not a hypothetical—there is a steadily growing library of documented attacks involving Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drones against stationary battlefield targets.