NB: Please treat this as a working paper that has been rather hurriedly prepared in light of recent and ongoing events. The following text is also available on my website, which offers a better reading experience as well as a text-to-speech option.
A lot of ink has been spilled on the Iran nuclear issue over the past thirty or so years, much of it focusing on Iran’s fissile material stockpiles, pathways to weaponization, and breakout times, as well as the possibility of a hypothetical regional proliferation cascade in response to Iran’s nuclearization. It remains exceptionally rare to come across an analysis of the potential implications of a nuclear-armed Iran for Iran itself. The allure of nuclear weapons has perhaps never been greater among Iranian officials and everyday Iranians alike, but obtaining nuclear weapons will likely only be the start of Iran’s problems, even if a hypothetical nuclear breakout attempt succeeds with or without yet another devastating round of fighting with the United States and Israel.
At some level, one must ask whether the proverbial game is worth the candle. Given the challenges that Iran will likely face in operationalizing a notional Iranian nuclear arsenal against Israel and the United States, with which Iran will likely form its two primary nuclear deterrence relationships, I contend that Iran is, all things considered, best off without nuclear weapons. This argument is, of course, contingent upon there not existing a credible threat of nuclear attack from Israel and/or the United States, which there is not at this time, and upon the non-existence of ongoing and escalating efforts to bring about state collapse in Iran. I would be remiss not to underscore that there are, of course, other plausible ways through which policy change can bring Iran, and the Islamic Republic itself, greater security without nuclear weapons, but such matters are beyond the scope of this analysis.
This analysis will sketch out my thinking on this increasingly topical issue based upon various notes and drafts, the most recent revision of which was undertaken in late October 2024, that have been “collecting dust” over the years. I will not touch on every possible issue, but this rather hastily updated draft—which should be treated as a working paper and not a polished final product—will draw attention to several issues that I find to be very important as a military and technology analyst. Before explaining my views on this matter, I stress that I merely presume, not prescribe, policy continuity in Tehran, whether in terms of domestic, foreign, or military policy, and, more to the point, policies with respect to Israel and the United States. Many analysts succumb to the temptation of thinking in terms of “if I were the all-powerful emperor” or “if I could choose the all-powerful emperor,” or “if I could whisper into the ears of the all-powerful emperor, then I would do/recommend policies x, y, z.” I am not the all-powerful emperor, do not select the all-powerful emperor, and do not get to whisper in the ear of an all-powerful emperor. As an analyst, I strive to deal with the world as it is, not as I wish it would be. The current leadership of the Islamic Republic constitute the powers that be in Tehran, and those who collectively sit upon the proverbial peacock throne in Tehran alone have full control over Iran’s nuclear file, no matter what one may think of the Islamic Republic.
For the purposes of this analysis, Iran and the Islamic Republic are necessarily one and the same. Those who contend that the distinction is of practical consequence should note that the central thesis of this analysis is that nuclearization will likely amount to a bad deal for both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the people of Iran, no matter who sits upon the proverbial peacock throne in Tehran and their choice of headgear. As I have explained in the past, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, both material and human, and related areas, including long-range ballistic missile infrastructure, both material and human, are part of Iran’s “crown jewels” and are, as such, part of the patrimony of the Iranian people. Iran’s current leaders, who have, in effect, recently inherited said crown jewels upon taking power in wartime, and Iran’s future leaders—Iran’s current leaders are also mortal men—will have to make fateful decisions about the country’s crown jewels, including its nuclear infrastructure, both material and human. This analysis does not address the question about what should be done with Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including whether it should be traded away in one or more negotiated agreements, and exclusively focuses on the challenges that Iran will likely face in operationalizing a notional nuclear arsenal.
Iran’s Geography, Deterrence Relationships, and Directional Dyads
Let us suppose that Iran becomes a nuclear-weapon state in the following x months or years. The first issue to be addressed concerns how many nuclear deterrence relationships Iran will become a part of. Excluding the nuclear weapons that the United States and Russia share with some of their treaty allies, there are currently nine nuclear-weapon states, Israel included. Iran’s nuclearization will bring the total to ten. Nuclear-weapon states logically cannot be in a nuclear deterrence relationship—part of a nuclear dyad—with themselves, which means that there will be 45 nuclear dyads and 90 directional nuclear dyads if and when Iran becomes a nuclear-weapon state.
A dyad refers to a pairing of countries x and y, such as the United States and North Korea. A directional dyad refers to how x may view its nuclear deterrence relationship with y (x→y) as more important than y views its nuclear deterrence relationship with x (y→x). North Korea is, for example, just one of the United States’ nuclear-armed adversaries, and a relatively minor one—relative to Russia and, increasingly, China—when it comes to matters of nuclear strategy, nuclear posture, capability development, force size, and so forth. The same cannot be said of North Korea with respect to the United States as its nuclear-armed adversary—the United States—including American military forces in South Korea and Japan—is the primary, if not the only, nuclear-armed adversary of North Korea.
For the present purposes, I will refer to the North Korea→United States nuclear dyad as an example of a strong directional nuclear dyad, one that is notably stronger than the United States→North Korea directional nuclear dyad. The North Korea→China and North Korea→Russia nuclear dyads are, by contrast, examples of weak directional dyads. All else being equal, any nuclear-armed state will also want to be in as few strong directional dyads as possible. All else being equal, any nuclear-armed state will also want to be in as few politically salient nuclear dyads—whether strong or weak in directional terms—as possible. Not all nuclear dyads are politically salient, with the France-UK, France-USA, and UK-USA nuclear dyads constituting some of the best examples of this dynamic.
A nuclear-armed Iran will, at the very least, enter into nuclear deterrence relationships with Israel and the United States. I would characterize these directional dyads involving Iran as mutually strong and exceedingly strong with respect to the Israel→Iran directional dyad. I cannot overemphasize how the intensity of the Israel→Iran directional dyad will likely make the Iran-Israel nuclear deterrence relationship an outlier in the current nuclear landscape. The terminology “nuclear deterrence relationship” captures how we are dealing with a two-sided dynamic, one in which the Iran→Israel directional dyad may be very different than the Israel→Iran directional dyad, as is the case in the North Korea-United States nuclear deterrence relationship. Here, as elsewhere, strategic empathy is required, no matter what one thinks of Iran and Israel, insofar as one cares about having a stable nuclear relationship and avoiding the use of nuclear weapons against a nuclear-armed adversary that can retaliate in kind to devastating effect.
It bears emphasis that while nuclear deterrence relationships tend to be primarily bilateral affairs, the Iran-Israel nuclear deterrence relationship may well take on a more or less trilateral form should the United States extend to Israel a “nuclear umbrella,” which is to say nuclear guarantees if Iran ever employs nuclear weapons against Israel, once Iran becomes a nuclear-weapon state. I will touch upon this profoundly complexifying potential dynamic later on. Beyond a potential trilateral or triadic dynamic, Iran will likely enter into a mutually, albeit not symmetrically, strong nuclear deterrence relationship with the United States. The United States will likely view any Iranian nuclear weapons as a threat to itself solely as a result of the threat that Iran can pose to American military bases and forces in the Middle East, even if Iran were to forgo the development and deployment of intercontinental-range ballistic missiles.
A nuclear-armed Iran will, in turn, likely have to more seriously consider the potential of American nuclear weapons being used against it. The best way to deter such an eventuality, including the possibility of American nuclear blackmail against Iran—as a nuclear-weapon state—during a crisis or war, will be to bring the continental United States within range of Iran’s nuclear weapons by developing and deploying intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. Even attempting to do so will, however, likely only intensify the United States→Iran directional dyad, thereby resulting in a likely unstable nuclear deterrence relationship until Iran’s incipient nuclear arsenal matures and/or until Iran and the United States reach a modus vivendi. It bears emphasis that developing intercontinental range ballistic missiles to target the United States, and deploying such missiles in such numbers as to credibly deter the United States, will inherently bring all other nuclear-weapon states within the range of Iran’s nuclear arsenal.
As the range of Iranian nuclear-capable ballistic missiles approaches 3500-4000 kilometers, Iran will likely enter into nuclear deterrence relationships with France and the United Kingdom. I would characterize these directional dyads as mutually weak—my simplified binary strong/weak framing does not, of course, capture all the potential levels of nuance—at the outset of Iran’s nuclearization, but asymmetrically directional, which is to say relatively stronger in the France→Iran and United Kingdom→Iran directional dyads as Paris and London come within the range of Iran’s nuclear arsenal than the Iran→France and Iran→United Kingdom directional dyads. (Iran will, at the time of nuclearization, also enter into a nuclear deterrence relationship with NATO in general and with the United States and Turkiye, which hosts American nuclear bombs at Incirlik airbase as part of a NATO nuclear sharing arrangement, in particular, but this complex issue is best put aside for another time)
Iran already borders a nuclear-weapons state, Pakistan, and will likely enter into at least a mutually weak nuclear dyad with its neighbour. Islamabad is some 1200 kilometers from Iran, and New Delhi is less than 1700 kilometers from Iran. Iran will likely also enter into a mutually weak and, as with Pakistan, not very politically salient nuclear dyad with India, even if it forgoes the longer-range nuclear delivery systems required to target France and the United Kingdom, let alone the United States.
As I have explained in the past, Iran occupies a rather “central” geographic position in the section of the Afro-Eurasian landmass that lies north of the equator. As a result, although North America may be very far from Iran, many countries are close to being Iran’s “neighbours” if and when Iran transitions from its current crop of ~2000-kilometer nominal maximum range ballistic missiles to ~3500-4000-kilometer nominal maximum range ballistic missiles.
Across the Caspian Sea lies another nuclear-weapon state that is functionally another neighbour of Iran. The southernmost parts of Russian territory near the Caucasus lie within 200 kilometers of northwestern Iran, and Moscow is just ~1900 kilometers from northwestern Iran and ~2450 kilometers from Tehran. While Iran and Russia currently have good working relations, Iran will likely enter into a mutually weak nuclear deterrence relationship with Russia that is characterized, at least initially, by low political salience.
Although Beijing is some 4900 kilometers from Iran, the westernmost parts of Chinese territory lie within 1200 or so kilometers of northeastern Iran. While Iran and China currently have good working relations, Iran will likely enter into a mutually weak nuclear deterrence relationship with China. Arguably, the China-Iran nuclear dyad will be politically non-salient to an even greater degree than the Iran-Pakistan, Iran-India, and Iran-Russia nuclear dyads.
Finally, Iran will likely enter into a particularly politically non-salient and mutually weak nuclear deterrence relationship with North Korea. A distance of 5600 kilometers or more separates Iran and North Korea.
In sum, Iran will likely enter into two intense and strong nuclear dyads with both Israel and the United States at the time of its “birth” as a nuclear-weapon state. Iran will, as such, have both a regional/proximate nuclear-armed adversary and a distant nuclear-armed adversary on the other side of the world. The closest analogy is that Iran will, at the time of its “birth” as a nuclear-weapon state, face the challenges faced by both Pakistan and North Korea at the time of their respective “births” as nuclear-weapon states. One can also draw an analogy to the context that China encountered when it became a nuclear-weapon state in 1964. While Moscow was around 4000 kilometers from the more secure parts of China’s western territory bordering the Soviet Union and some 5800 kilometers from a much more secure location in inner China, such as Xian, other parts of the Soviet Union were well within China’s reach. For context, a distance of around 7500 kilometers separates New York and Moscow, and Moscow is around 2500 kilometers from London and Paris.
Among the four more recent nuclear-weapon states, who are, not incidentally, not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or permanent members of the UN Security Council, Israel does not, in effect, have any nuclear-armed adversaries at this time, although it does have a latent nuclear deterrence relationship with Pakistan since 1998 and wields its nuclear arsenal as the ultimate deterrent against overwhelming conventional attacks by its neighbours (not limited to Iran).
India is part of two nuclear deterrence relationships involving China and Pakistan, respectively. Beijing is ~3200-3800 kilometers from northern India (south of the Himalayas) and ~4300 kilometers from central India, while Chongqing and Chengdu are less than 2000 kilometers from northern India (south of the Himalayas), and even closer to viable launch positions in India’s northeast (i.e., east of the Siliguri Corridor). This is all to say that India has, in effect, two “regional” nuclear adversaries and no “intercontinental” nuclear adversaries.
Pakistan, meanwhile, has, in effect, a single politically salient nuclear deterrence relationship with India, notwithstanding American recent claims and reports that Pakistan is developing intercontinental-range ballistic missiles so as to bring the continental United States within range of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Notably, the geographies and military realities of the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad are such that there remains a non-zero risk of large-scale ground combat, namely an Indian invasion of parts of Pakistan. Such a scenario has driven Pakistan’s development and deployment of so-called “battlefield nuclear weapons,” including an extremely short-range nuclear-armed ballistic missile that is seemingly intended for use against Indian mechanized formations.
North Korea, which notably borders two nuclear-weapon states that have historically been its allies and which remain its partners, however begrudgingly, has a single nuclear deterrence relationship with the United States. While some 5500 kilometers separates North Korea from Anchorage, 7300 kilometers from Honolulu, 7800 kilometers from Seattle, 10,500 kilometers from New York City, and 10,500 kilometers from Washington, DC, American forces in peninsular South Korea are all within 450 kilometers of North Korea, the entirety of “peninsular” Japan lies within 1300 kilometers of North Korea, with the American island territory of Guam being situated around 3300 kilometers from North Korea. While South Korea and Japan—beyond the American military bases that these countries host—are likely among the targets of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, these are not, of course, nuclear-weapon states themselves, and any nuclear retaliation against North Korea will have to come from the United States as part of a so-called American nuclear umbrella.
An Iranian nuclear-weapon state will be “born” into a very different situation than the other nuclear-weapon states. An Iranian ballistic missile with a maximum range of just 1300 kilometers can essentially bring all of Israel within range, and a ballistic missile with a maximum range of 2400 kilometers can essentially bring all of Israel within range when launched from Iran’s northeastern city of Mashhad. Some 7700 kilometers separates Iran’s northwest—which has notably been heavily bombed by Israel in two wars—from Alaska, with the rest of the continental United States being some 8500 kilometers away. The distance from Tabriz in Iran’s northwest to New York City is 9350 kilometers. To Washington, DC: 9680 kilometers. To Chicago or Seattle: some 10,000 kilometers. The distance from Mashhad in Iran’s northeast to Chicago and Seattle is some 10,700 kilometers. To New York City: 10,250 kilometers. To Washington, DC: 10,500 kilometers.
It bears emphasis that this discussion highlights the effects of geography and not the intensity of a nuclear deterrence relationship. For Israel, Iranian nuclear weapons will likely be viewed and treated as—irrespective of veracity—a truly existential threat in a manner not typically seen in other nuclear dyads. It also bears emphasis that bringing the continental United States within range of Iranian nuclear weapons is not only a question of the qualitative development of Iran’s nuclear arsenal but also its quantitative development. Iran will likely require a quite large arsenal of nuclear-armed intercontinental-range ballistic missiles as well as a quite large arsenal of nuclear-armed shorter-range missiles to target Israel, all in a context in which Israel and the United States have, of course, demonstrated their ability to penetrate and quite readily operate combat aircraft across Iran.
The Iran-Israel Nuclear Deterrence Relationship
While Iran will likely have multiple nuclear deterrence relationships and feature in multiple more or less politically salient nuclear dyads, the Iran-Israel nuclear dyad is likely to be Iran’s most important dyad for the foreseeable future (again, I merely presume, not prescribe, policy continuity in Tehran). While distance and technology will together strain Iran’s ability to operationalize a credible nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis the United States, Iran will paradoxically likely encounter far greater struggles when it comes to operationalizing a credible nuclear deterrent against Israel, even though a “mere” 1000 or so kilometers separates the two countries.
To state what should now be obvious to even the most ardent skeptic, we live in a world in which ballistic missile defence technology, specifically American and Israeli ballistic missile defence technology, is sufficiently advanced and reliable to offer robust protection against shorter-range and medium-range ballistic missiles, even if the longest-range ballistic missiles, namely so-called intercontinental ballistic missiles (i.e., ICBMs), remain more difficult to intercept and, as such, remain more viable as means of reliably delivering nuclear warheads. Israel’s existing ballistic missile defences are evidently not impregnable. Israel will, moreover, be unable to simply let inbound Iranian ballistic missiles set to impact “unimportant dirt” reach its territory if an inbound Iranian ballistic missile may be equipped with a nuclear warhead. Even so, Israel’s existing, let alone future, ballistic missile defences, pose a major challenge to a notional Iranian nuclear-weapon state.
As Iran’s experience in the April and October 2024 exchanges with Israel, the June 2025 Iran-Israel War, and the current American and Israeli war against Iran all indicate, the country’s decidedly heterogeneous arsenal of longer-range (i.e., 1000+ kilometer range) ballistic missiles exhibits quite poor accuracy and precision, as well as reliability. This has allowed Israel to selectively intercept inbound Iranian ballistic missiles, and compounds the low observed penetration rate of Iranian ballistic missiles against their intended targets in Israel. The very existence of Iranian nuclear warheads will, however, likely force Israel to intercept each and every inbound Iranian ballistic missile whenever potential Iranian nuclear use is suspected, which may lead to interception attempts being undertaken against each and every inbound Iranian ballistic missile. While this may appear to be a welcome development for an Iranian nuclear-weapon state, this is not only a question of numbers and resources for Iran, but will also likely create profoundly destabilizing problems in the Iran-Israel nuclear deterrence relationship for reasons that I will cover later in this post. Iran’s leaders presumably want nuclear weapons to enhance their security. As things stand, however, the challenges to operationalizing an Iranian nuclear deterrent may well have the effect of increasing Iran’s insecurity.
Can Iran improve its ballistic missile penetration rates against Israel? In principle, the answer is, of course, yes, although there are major uncertainties as to whether and when Iran can pull it off, how much such qualitatively superior ballistic missiles will cost Iran, and, as such, how many higher (expected) penetration rate ballistic missiles Iran will be able to afford. China’s conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, which are, of course, essentially untested in combat, constitute something of a gold standard in this area of military technology, not least on account of the United States long forgoing the development of such ballistic missiles due to, among other things, the constraints imposed by the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF Treaty). In principle, Iran can aspire to develop a ballistic missile with a maximum range of at least 2500 kilometers in the vein of the Chinese DF-26 to deliver a likely quite large and heavy first-generation Iranian nuclear warhead to essentially any part of Israel from a notional launch position in Iran’s extreme northeast and do so with greater accuracy and precision, as well as a higher expected penetration rate, than Iran’s current ballistic missile arsenal.
Should Iran be able to develop and deploy such a ballistic missile design(s) to deliver nuclear warheads, it will, of course, also be able to employ such a ballistic missile design(s) with conventional high-explosive warheads, and Iran would perhaps be able to deter Israel without becoming a nuclear-weapon state. Be that as it may, the fact remains that Iran is unlikely to be able to develop and then deploy in large numbers such ballistic missiles for the foreseeable future, not least on account of the extensive damage to Iran’s ballistic missile industry over the course of the current war. As a result, an incipient Iranian nuclear-weapon state will likely seek to attempt to overwhelm Israel’s ballistic missile defences, if not compensate for poor accuracy and precision, through numbers alone.
Iran can, in principle, attempt to overwhelm Israel’s ballistic missile defences by launching some number of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles alongside some number of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles. This may take the form of, for example, launching conventionally-armed ballistic missiles alongside nuclear-armed ballistic missiles at a ratio of 99:1, or 24:1, or 9:1, or just 4:1. (If this comes across as insane, consider that an alternative approach entails launching one or more large salvos of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.) It bears emphasis that an incipient Iranian nuclear-weapon state will likely have a very small number of nuclear warheads at its disposal for, at the very least, the first 5-10 years following nuclearization (during which time Israel’s ballistic missile defences will likely evolve, but that is a topic for another time). With time and resources, however, Iran may be able to build out a sufficiently large arsenal of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles and, in so doing, outpace and offset the qualitative and quantitative enhancement of Israel’s ballistic missile defence capabilities that will likely emerge following Iran’s hypothetical nuclearization. Iran will, however, face two fundamental interrelated challenges: that of warhead ambiguity and the fact that its counterpart in its most important nuclear deterrence relationship, Israel, cannot, in effect, absorb an Iranian nuclear strike.
The Vexing Challenge of Warhead Ambiguity
Israel will, for all practical intents and purposes, be unable to discern whether a given inbound Iranian ballistic missile is equipped with a conventional high-explosive warhead or a nuclear warhead, not least in a situation in which Iran may employ a given ballistic missile design to deliver both conventional high-explosive and nuclear warheads. (It must also be said that Iranian planners also have no way of knowing exactly which Iranian ballistic missile reentry vehicle, with or without a nuclear warhead, will penetrate Israel’s ballistic missile defences and exhibit high accuracy and precision to impact near the intended target) Strictly speaking, there are ways through which Iran and Israel can manage this part of their nuclear deterrence relationship. Iran may, for example, only operate nuclear-armed ballistic missiles from certain missile bases, which is to say certain parts of Iran, and perhaps do so exclusively. This may somewhat reassure Israel, but it will not fundamentally address the issue of warhead ambiguity.
In a similar vein, Iran may launch different types of ballistic missiles that follow distinct trajectories to reassure Israel, but this will also not fundamentally address the issue of warhead ambiguity, given that Israel will have no way of knowing whether an Iranian ballistic missile is or is not equipped with nuclear warheads in the manner that, for example, the Soviet Union and the United States could have high confidence that intercontinental-range ballistic missiles launched by the other would be equipped with a nuclear warhead(s) during a crisis or conflict. Note that American and Soviet confidence on such matters did not require “trust,” only simple analytical assumptions. There will likely be no assurances that Iran can offer (via intermediaries) that Israel will readily accept, and there will be little to stop Iran from reneging on any such commitments in times of crisis or war.
Moreover, if Iran attempts to overwhelm Israel’s ballistic missile defences through, in effect, numbers alone, which is to say by launching some number of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles alongside some number of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles at whatever ratio, then warhead ambiguity will be both a bug and a feature of Iran’s nuclear posture-turned-de facto nuclear strategy. If Israel can distinguish Iran’s nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in flight from its conventionally-armed ballistic missiles and thereby selectively prioritize interceptions of the nuclear-armed Iranian ballistic missiles, then Iran’s nuclear-armed ballistic missile launches will, like Iran’s conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, have poor prospects for penetrating Israel’s ballistic missile defences. Stated differently, the more that warhead ambiguity is addressed in the Iran-Israel nuclear deterrence relationship, the greater the scope for robust Israeli ballistic missile defences against Iran, and the greater the challenges that Iran will face in credibly threatening to use nuclear weapons against Israel as a deterrent.
All things considered and in the absence of high expected penetration rate Iranian ballistic missiles, the realities of Israeli ballistic missile defence effectiveness incentivize Iran to attempt to overwhelm Israel’s defences by launching some combination of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles alongside some number of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles so as to exploit warhead ambiguity, even as Iran assumes most of the inherent risks in its nuclear deterrence relationship with Israel. As noted earlier, one of the alternatives is for Iran to launch one or more large salvos of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Such an approach is, of course, both less practical on account of, among other things, the amount of fissile material required to fabricate so many nuclear warheads, but also extraordinarily reckless on account that, given the risk of multiple Iranian nuclear warheads detonating in Israel, there will, in effect, be nothing to distinguish between a small-scale and a large-scale Iranian nuclear attack for reasons independent of the exceedingly important question of whether Israel can and will absorb any nuclear attack at all.
It bears emphasis that Iran had negligible ballistic missile defences going into this war—and going into April 2024—and is unlikely to possess the types of ballistic missile defences required to defend against Israeli nuclear-armed ballistic missiles for the foreseeable future. As a result, without high expected penetration rate ballistic missiles of its own and without a practical and low-risk approach to exploiting warhead ambiguity with the aim of overwhelming Israeli ballistic missile defences, Iran will likely neither be able to credibly deliver a nuclear warhead to Israel nor defend against reciprocal Israeli nuclear attacks. This will likely lead to a functionally paralyzed Iranian nuclear-weapon state—or a cartoonishly reckless one—that functionally derives little security vis-a-vis Israel from possessing nuclear weapons. It should go without saying that inducing, wittingly or otherwise, Israel to contemplate, let alone attempt, preemptive counterforce strikes, including nuclear counterforce strikes, against Iran’s nuclear forces during a crisis or conflict will not enhance Iran’s security.
It is worth noting that Israel is not understood to be limited to a land-based nuclear-armed ballistic missile force but also has a contextually very survivable submarine-based nuclear deterrent. Israel may well also enhance its suspected longstanding air-launched nuclear deterrent by adapting some of Israel’s rather exquisite air-launched ballistic missiles—the conventionally-armed versions have already been used against Iran to devastating effect—for use with nuclear warheads. Such air-launched ballistic missiles are limited in terms of payload size and weight, but one possible Israeli adaptation to an Iranian nuclear-weapon state may entail the development and deployment of more “usable” lower-yield nuclear weapons.
Can Israel Absorb a Nuclear Strike?
As a quite small country—in both geographic and demographic terms—with a densely concentrated and highly urbanized population, if one excludes the sparsely populated Negev Desert, and with the historical experience of the Holocaust forever in the background, Israel is particularly unlikely to absorb a nuclear strike. This may come across as “obvious” to some, but it actually makes Israel an outlier among existing nuclear-weapon states. With the partial and qualified exception of North Korea, the other nuclear-weapon states are, in both geographic and demographic terms, large enough to absorb one or more nuclear detonations and endure as functioning nation-states notwithstanding the terrible devastation brought about by even “limited” nuclear use.
Strictly speaking, the same is, of course, also true of Israel. Israel will endure even in the catastrophic event that, for example, the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, or the Haifa metropolitan area, or the Beersheba metropolitan area—let alone some sparsely populated part of the Negev Desert—is subject to one or more nuclear detonations, but the interplay of geographic and demographic realities, coupled with the shadow of the Holocaust, which, if nothing else, looms large in Israeli politics, result in a situation in which Israel will likely either initiate a—from its vantage point—preemptive nuclear strike against in Iran should I think that Iran will soon undertake a nuclear strike against Israel, and/or undertake wholly disproportionate nuclear retaliatory strikes even against a nuclear-armed Iran that may retain the ability to retaliate in kind. Israeli leaders may well convince themselves that damage limitation, a concept that has lost much of its purchase since the Cold War, is the best approach in a situation in which they cannot—or will not—contemplate absorbing even a limited and, all things considered, small-scale, Iranian nuclear strike. Here, as elsewhere, Israeli thinking on this grave matter will likely be shaped by, among other things, the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of Iran’s nuclear arsenal; Iran’s ability to credibly carry out retaliatory strikes, which encompasses the very issue of ballistic missile penetration rates that is likely to lead Iran to exploit warhead ambiguity out of necessity; and, Iran’s ability to defend against Israeli nuclear strikes, which is primarily, but not exclusively, related to Iran’s functionally non-existent ballistic missile defence capabilities.
Warhead ambiguity—Israel being unable to distinguish nuclear-armed Iranian ballistic missiles from conventionally-armed Iranian ballistic missiles—will be a byproduct of Iran’s most practical, at least in the short-term, approach to addressing the challenge posed by Israel’s formidable ballistic missile defences, but it bears emphasis that warhead ambiguity is not merely a problem for Israel. It is also a challenge—a very grave challenge—for Iran itself, and a profoundly vexing one at that, precisely because Israel is unlike the other nuclear-weapon states.
The other nuclear-weapon states can, in effect, absorb one or more nuclear strikes and lose, say, a million people in the process, without feeling so compelled to give as much consideration to promptly initiating preemptive nuclear strikes in such a scenario and/or launching wholly disproportionate nuclear retaliatory strikes against a nuclear-armed state with a residual nuclear capability. Anyone who thinks Israel is likely to, at a time of devastation and grief, show such composure and magnanimity should pause to reflect on the devastation that Israel has wantonly wrought onto Gaza and Gazans after some 1200 of its inhabitants were killed on and around 7 October 2023, some 30% of whom were military and security personnel. One should also pause to reflect on the devastation that Israel has and, as with Gaza, continues to wreak across Lebanon, as well as, not least, the devastation that Israel has and continues to wreak across Iran. Even a fairly small and low-yield Iranian nuclear weapon used outside a densely populated area—excluding desolate parts of the Negev—in Israel is likely to kill at least several thousand people.
Israel and Israeli leaders do, of course, have agency like other nuclear-weapon states and their respective leaders; Israel’s current leaders are unlikely to be wholly irrational to the level of caricature; and, more to the point, the historical experience of the Holocaust does not force the hand of any particular Israeli leader to act one way or another, much as it does not force the hand of the leader of any of group that has experienced such horrors among its recent generations. Israel’s current crop of political and military leaders nevertheless appear to be fundamentally unwilling to accept mutual vulnerability with a nuclear-armed Iran, or indeed accept much in the way of vulnerability to conventional attacks on the part of Israel’s non-nuclear neighbours and adversaries, including Iran itself. One needs to look no further than how Israel has recently initiated two wars aimed at significantly degrading Iran’s conventional military capabilities, not just Iran’s nuclear industrial base, or even just Iran’s ballistic missile industrial base. It bears emphasis that there is a case to be made that Israel cannot be in a stable mutually politically salient nuclear deterrence relationship with any nuclear-weapon state, even in a situation in which a nuclear-armed Iran may enter into stable nuclear deterrence relationships with other nuclear-weapon states, including the United States.
Israel’s Problems Are Also Iran’s Problems In A Nuclear Deterrence Relationship
Whatever the leaders of the Islamic Republic may think of Israel, they will have to make decisions in the nuclear realm that necessarily reflect unilateral Iranian strategic empathy toward Israel insofar as Iran’s leaders care about their self-interests—including self-preservation—and want a hypothetical nuclear-armed Iran to have a durably stable nuclear deterrence relationship with a nuclear-armed Israel over the years and decades to come. This is, in effect, one of the “burdens” associated with Iran becoming a nuclear-weapon state: the Islamic Republic may well employ its hypothetical “nuclear shield” to sustain its longstanding efforts via proxy against Israel, but it will almost certainly have to drop the always fanciful notion of bringing about the absolute destruction of the Israeli state and the zionist enterprise, which, of course, possesses and operates nuclear weapons of its own.
Once Iran becomes a nuclear-weapon state, it will, in effect, have Israel as a co-pilot with some level of input over the controls of the Iranian state. All states in a nuclear deterrence relationship must, out of self-interest, go out of their way to ensure that their unwanted co-pilot does not act in a reckless and unintended manner. Failing to do so will simply mean that both parties assume the risks, including risks concerning crisis stability and escalation control. Unless we are dealing with truly insane leaders with a death wish, at least a modicum of strategic empathy, tact, and compromise comes with the territory of being a nuclear-weapon state.
Failing to exhibit even a modicum of strategic empathy toward Israel—refusing to accept that Israel’s problems are also Iran’s problems in a nuclear deterrence relationship—will likely result in an extremely dangerous era of instability between two nuclear powers, one in which, Israel, is likely to use every tool at its disposal, including its nuclear weapons, in potential counterforce strikes during a crisis or war, and perhaps even a commit itself to preemptive countervalue strikes, should it perceive a credible threat of Iranian nuclear use. With Israel having conventional military strength over Iran, quite robust ballistic missile defences, decades of experience as a nuclear power, and, above all, the United States behind it, Iran will likely be poorly positioned to respond to such catastrophic scenarios, not unless it adopts an exceptionally aggressive and risk-prone nuclear strategy and posture that places great emphasis on early and asymmetric nuclear use that arguably no sane person would want to pursue, not least as a result of the particular realities of the Iran-Israel dyad hitherto discussed in this analysis.
Lay readers unaccustomed to often macabre thinking on nuclear matters may be wondering whether the primary purpose of nuclear weapons is not to simply deter attacks. In principle, attacks, including nuclear attacks, can be automatically deterred by the mere possession of nuclear weapons. In practice, however, any country in Iran’s position will require a credible nuclear deterrent, which is to say the ability to deliver nuclear warheads against the intended target(s) as and when required, all while possessing a nuclear arsenal that is resilient—survivable—in the event of potential adversary first strike attacks that seek to neutralize Iran’s nuclear arsenal (i.e., a counterforce attack), and ideally while retaining the ability to undertake a credible retaliatory second strike (if not a third strike, at least in a context in which smaller and lower-yield nuclear weapons are likely to be used). Perhaps counterintuitively, a durably stable nuclear relationship requires mutual vulnerability as well as mutual confidence in the credibility and survivability of the respective nuclear forces. In an ideal world, a (conventional) war can break out between two nuclear-weapon states without the use of nuclear weapons being seriously considered on the part of either belligerent, for as long as each side restricts itself to war aims and actions that do not pose an existential threat to the other. When such lofty ideals are not realized in the real world, instability and escalation risks arise, and the more powerful and/or more risk-accepting member of a nuclear deterrence relationship may well come to rue their actions and inactions.
While Israel and Israeli leaders are unlikely to absorb a nuclear strike, which will be Iran’s problem if and when Iran becomes a nuclear-weapon state, it bears emphasis that the other nuclear powers manage the inescapable everyday reality of (some level of) mutual vulnerability—that at least some of their major population centers may be no more within thirty or so minutes, with little satisfaction to be found out of the possibility of retaliating in kind. Can the Iran-Israel nuclear dyad not also navigate this inescapable reality in the same manner as the other nuclear dyads? At this point, it is commonplace to encounter invocations of how the Islamic Republic and its leaders are uniquely different, or even uniquely irrational and, as such, functionally immune to deterrence, whether nuclear or otherwise. I have long maintained that such commentary is typically hysterical, and often instrumentally hysterical at that, in addition to being without much merit. Iran’s leaders have exhibited a great many tendencies over the course of the June 2025 Iran-Israel War and the current American and Israeli war against Iran. Insanity, a death wish, and an inability to instrumentally calibrate coercive and deterrent acts and efforts are not among them.
This analysis has placed considerable emphasis on Israel’s likely unwillingness to absorb an Iranian nuclear strike because this is, at the end of the day, a central challenge for a hypothetical nuclear-armed Iran. Israel’s problems will be Iran’s problems once Iran becomes a nuclear-weapon state, insofar as Iran’s leaders want a durably stable nuclear deterrence relationship with Israel—and the United States. If that is not what Iran’s leaders seek or attempt to bring about through carefully calibrated actions and inactions, then Iran will likely have to navigate an intensely unstable nuclear deterrence relationship with Israel—and the United States—all while possessing negligible ballistic missile defences, and without the ability to credibly deliver nuclear warheads of its own to targets in Israel on account of the poor accuracy and penetration rate exhibited by Iranian ballistic missiles to date in the face of Israeli and American ballistic missile defences. Given the state of Iran’s current and near-term future air defences, Iran will, in the absence of strategic empathy toward Israel and significant compromises on the Israel policy file, likely also have to navigate this intensely unstable nuclear deterrence relationship with Israel without a credible retaliatory nuclear strike capability. In this particular respect and in the absence of strategic empathy toward Israel and major policy compromises on the Israel file, the nuclear game will not be worth the candle for Iran, not least on account of offering neither Iran nor the Islamic Republic greater security.
A Somewhat Brief Aside On Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal and Ballistic Missile Technology
Prior drafts of this rather hastily reformulated text, which were not (re)written during an active war, included a fairly detailed discussion of Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal and Iranian ballistic missile technology to offer the background required to better appreciate the practical challenges of warhead ambiguity in a hypothetical near-term Iran-Israel nuclear deterrence relationship. For the present purposes, a condensed summary will have to suffice.
Iran operates a decidedly heterogeneous arsenal of longer-range ballistic missiles, which is to say, ballistic missiles with a maximum range of 1000 kilometers or greater. As things stand, some of Iran’s existing ballistic missiles are more likely candidates for use as nuclear delivery systems than others. The large and heavy Khorramshahr ballistic missile family, which employs storable liquid fuel, is perhaps the most likely candidate nuclear delivery system, although Iran may well turn to a solid-propellant design, whether something related to the Sejjil ballistic missile or one of Iran’s larger-diameter multi-stage solid-propellant satellite launch vehicle (SLV) designs.
The Khorramshahr family has been quite extensively used against Israel over the course of the current war, which suggests that it has been operationally deployed and has been built in sizable numbers. Notably, the Khorramshahr design has the range required to target all of Israel when launched from Iran’s northeast, such as a notional base in the general area of the city of Mashhad. While the Sejjil has been used in combat against Israel during the two wars, its production and deployment status remains uncertain, and it may well constitute a legacy design with no future beyond the specimens that have been manufactured to date.
While the much smaller diameter and lighter payload Kheibar Shekan family of solid-propellant ballistic missiles, which encompasses the Fattah-1 and Fattah-2, can, in principle, be used as nuclear delivery systems against Israel, this will require higher levels of nuclear warhead miniaturization. The widely deployed Kheibar Shekan family ballistic missiles, as such, are unlikely candidates for use with nuclear warheads over the first 5-10 years of Iran becoming a nuclear-weapon state. This is, all things considered, likely a welcome development for a hypothetical nuclear-armed Iran, given how the Kheibar Shekan family serves as a critically important conventional strike munition against not only Israel but also the Gulf Arab states and American military forces therein—I will address why Iran will still need its longer-range conventionally-armed ballistic missiles in the next section.
The long-standing and widely deployed liquid-fuelled Qadr (i.e., Ghadr) design family, which does not employ a storable liquid fuel, may well be used as a nuclear delivery system, but is far less optimal for nuclear purposes than the much larger and heavier Khorramshahr design family. While I had, before the start of this war, viewed the Khorramshahr family as Iran’s most likely initial nuclear delivery system, the surprisingly large-scale use of Khorramshahr family ballistic missiles over the course of this war and the extensive targeting of Iranian ballistic missile production infrastructure may have the effect of forcing a hypothetical nuclear-armed Iran to place greater reliance on older and decidedly inferior Qadr family ballistic missiles as nuclear delivery systems than would perhaps otherwise be the case, at least in an interim basis. This is a particularly likely eventuality if Iran proceeds to exploit warhead ambiguity by launching nuclear-armed Qadr family ballistic missiles alongside some number of conventionally-armed Qadr family ballistic missiles with the aim of overwhelming Israel’s ballistic missile defences. Iran appears unlikely to possess enough Khorramshahr family ballistic missiles to undertake such an approach with these larger, higher-payload, and broadly more sophisticated ballistic missiles.
Let us suppose that a hypothetical nuclear-armed Iran initially employs Khorramshahr and Qadr family ballistic missiles as its nuclear delivery systems, even as it may work on introducing a new solid-propellant—and perhaps even new liquid-fuelled—ballistic missile(s) to deliver nuclear warheads to Israel. Whatever the benefits of introducing one or more new ballistic missile designs with sufficient range to target any part of Israel with a nuclear warhead, it bears emphasis that Iran can only both benefit from—and assume the risks inherent to—warhead ambiguity for as long as Israel struggles to distinguish Iran’s nuclear-armed ballistic missiles from its conventionally-armed ballistic missiles. Warhead ambiguity applies to the Khorramshahr family and Qadr family ballistic missiles because these are unlikely to be exclusively equipped with nuclear warheads.
If Qadr family ballistic missiles, and, more to the point, Khorramshahr family ballistic missiles—or a notional new Iranian ballistic missile design(s)—is exclusively employed with nuclear warheads, then Israel will be better positioned to selectively intercept said Iranian ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads, with the likely effect of dramatically undermining the credibility of Iran’s nuclear deterrent against Israel. The only way out of this conundrum is for Iran to develop a highly reliable ballistic missile that can consistently achieve a high penetration rate against Israeli—and likely American—ballistic missile defences, which are only set to improve in both qualitative and quantitative terms if and when Iran becomes a nuclear-weapon state. Given this dynamic, a nuclear-armed Iran will likely have little choice but to exploit warhead ambiguity in its nuclear deterrence relationship with Israel (but not in its nuclear deterrence relationship with the United States).
Can A Nuclear-Armed Iran Deploy Both Conventionally-armed and Nuclear-armed Ballistic Missiles Against Israel?
For all the discussion of what Iran may gain from becoming a nuclear-weapon state—I have gone at length to explain why the benefits may be exaggerated why the game may not be worth the candle—strikingly little attention has been given to what Iran will likely have to sacrifice in terms of its conventional military capabilities as part of the price of admission for becoming a nuclear-weapon state. Warhead ambiguity is not merely an Israeli problem-turned-Iranian problem by virtue of the uncomfortable realities of any nuclear deterrence relationship. Iran will, going forward, likely have to forgo some parts of its conventional military capabilities vis-a-vis Israel, and perhaps also the Gulf Arab states, because it is difficult to envisage a scenario in which a regional nuclear power can launch hundreds of longer-range conventionally-armed ballistic missiles against its nuclear-armed adversary while maintaining some number of longer-range nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in reserve without the loss of escalation control. Stated differently, while a post-war Iranian nuclear-weapon state may, for a time, be forced to embrace warhead ambiguity with the aim of quickly developing a credible capability to deliver nuclear weapons to Israel despite Israeli ballistic missile defences, it may, going forward, have to forgo longer-range conventionally-armed ballistic missiles that can reach Israel, or at least carefully partition its nuclear-armed longer-range ballistic missiles from its conventionally-armed longer-range ballistic missile arsenal so as to help address the warhead ambiguity issue vis-a-vis Israel, a nuclear-weapon state that is unlikely to absorb a single Iranian nuclear strike.
As explained earlier, there are ways through which Iran and Israel can, in principle, manage this part of their nuclear deterrence relationship. Iran may, for example, only operate nuclear-armed ballistic missiles from certain missile bases, which is to say certain parts of Iran, and perhaps do so exclusively. This may somewhat reassure Israel, especially if “certain parts” of Iran refer to, for example, northeastern Iran, where Iran may forgo deploying longer-range conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, but it will not fundamentally address the issue of warhead ambiguity absent some degree of trust in the Iran-Israel nuclear deterrence relationship. In a similar vein, Iran may launch different types of ballistic missiles that follow distinct trajectories to reassure Israel, but this will also not fundamentally address the issue of warhead ambiguity, given that Israel will have no way of knowing whether an Iranian ballistic missile is or is not equipped with nuclear warheads, at least not in the absence of some degree of trust in the Iran-Israel nuclear deterrence relationship. Israel’s problems will be Iran’s problems if and when Iran becomes a nuclear-weapon state.
As Iran’s attacks, including large-scale conventionally-armed ballistic missile attacks, against Israel make clear, nuclear weapons do not automatically deter and, as such, prevent attacks against nuclear-weapon states. Nuclear weapons also do not automatically deter and, as such, prevent attacks on the part of one nuclear-weapon state against another nuclear-weapon state. If nuclear weapons had such inherent properties, Israel’s ballistic missile defences would not be so depleted as a result of sustained Iranian conventionally-armed ballistic missile launches since April 2024, and the May 2025 India-Pakistan War would not have occurred. Given such realities, a hypothetical Iranian nuclear-weapon state will require conventional military capabilities, and strong conventional military capabilities at that. As things stand, Iran’s conventional military capabilities vis-a-vis Israel are largely indistinguishable from its hypothetical near-term nuclear capabilities vis-a-vis Israel. That is, Iran is heavily reliant on its longer-range ballistic missiles, as well as cruise missiles, to deliver both conventional high-explosive and nuclear warheads against Israel. This reliance is unlikely to end anytime soon.
If Iran had a large and capable air force, it could, in effect, readily place a partition between nuclear capabilities and its conventional capabilities and perhaps reduce its reliance on longer-range conventionally-armed ballistic missiles. But Iran does not have a large and capable air force and is unlikely to possess such an air force anytime soon, not least vis-a-vis the formidable air combat capabilities of Israel and the United States, as well as the Gulf Arab states. It bears emphasis that no matter who sits upon the proverbial peacock throne in Tehran, putting together a large and capable air force will likely cost several tens of billions of dollars (I would conservatively place the price tag for such an air force in the region of at least US$30-US$40 billion). Iran will, as things stand, likely have to primarily source such an air force from China, which may not want to uncharacteristically so strongly place its proverbial thumb on the scale in light of China’s extensive economic and, increasingly, military-industrial ties with the Gulf Arab states. Russia would ordinarily be the Islamic Republic’s preferred supplier of combat aircraft, but Russia’s aerospace industry simply cannot deliver the required number of aircraft in a reasonable timeframe, given the dislocations brought about by the Russia-Ukraine War and the Russian Air Force’s own needs. Moreover, Russia cannot offer Iran combat aircraft that will be competitive vis-a-vis Israel, whereas present-day China can, should Beijing sign off on such exports to Iran, and should Iran be able to pay for such combat aircraft.
All things considered, Iran is unlikely to possess a large and capable—not least vis-a-vis Israel—air force within the next 5-10 years, even if the Islamic Republic’s new political and military leadership prioritizes the development of a conventional air force in a manner that their predecessors rejected for 47 years. In the interim, Iran cannot fully rely on nuclear weapons to deter conventional attacks. Even nuclear-weapon states in the positions of Pakistan and North Korea, who must counter the larger and/or better-equipped conventional military capabilities of their nuclear-armed adversaries, recognize that they also have to compete in the conventional capabilities arena even more vigorously now that they have more or less credible nuclear deterrents. Stated differently, becoming a nuclear-weapon state does not lead to a “game over” dynamic, but a “game on” dynamic, and, of course, a “game” in which the stakes could not be higher, and which places great demands on constitutional fitness in military and military-technological competitions, not least when faced against formidable adversaries such as Israel and the United States.
As things stand, Iran’s longer-range ballistic missiles, namely those of the Qadr, Kheibar Shekan, and Khorramshahr design families, as well as the orphan Sejjil design, are central to Iran’s conventional strike and, as such, conventional deterrence capabilities, irrespective to how much these leave to be desired in terms of reliability, accuracy and precision, and penetration rates against Israeli, American, and Gulf Arab ballistic missile defences. While an Iranian ballistic missile with a maximum range of just 1300 kilometers can essentially bring all of Israel within range when launched from western Iran, while a ballistic missile with a maximum range of 2400 kilometers can essentially bring all of Israel within range when launched from Iran’s northeastern city of Mashhad, it is important to recognize that Iran’s nominally “Israel-oriented” ballistic missiles do not only exist to target Israel. These are also required to attack targets in the ~western half of Saudi Arabia, including targets along the country’s Red Sea coast, and, more generally, to facilitate attacks against targets across the region from launch positions deeper inside Iran so as to avoid the situation in which Iranian ballistic missiles concentrated in underground missile bases located in the western third of the countries are repeatedly entombed, however temporarily, within said underground missile bases as a result of Israeli and/or American aerial attack.
It is worth considering that while Riyadh is some 600 kilometers from Iran, that is, from the closest section of Iranian territory along the northern shores of the Persian Gulf, it is some 1100 kilometers from the rather centrally positioned Iranian city of Yazd. For context, Tel Aviv is some 1100-1300 kilometers from Iranian territory along the Iran-Iraq border and some 1850 kilometers from Yazd. Jeddah is around 1350 kilometers from Iran, which is to say that it is a more distant target than Tel Aviv, but some 1900 kilometers from Yazd. Tabuk, which is home to a major airbase in northwestern Saudi Arabia, is some 1050 kilometers from the Iran-Iraq border, but some 1600 kilometers from the central part of Iran’s Persian Gulf coastline, and some 1750 kilometers from Yazd. Khamis Mushayt, which is home to a major airbase in southwestern Saudi Arabia, is some 1400 kilometers from Iran’s borders, and some 1900 kilometers from Yazd. Unless Iran restricts itself to holding targets at risk—with conventional weapons—that are located in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, as well as locations near Saudi Arabia’s Persian Gulf coastline, against which it can employ shorter-range ballistic missiles that cannot, in any event, be used to target Israel, Iran will likely require conventionally-armed ballistic missiles with a much greater range than the 1300 kilometers range threshold required to essentially bring all of Israel within range—from increasingly vulnerable launch positions in western Iran.
At some level, there is a case to be made that Iran can, in the long run, either have conventionally-armed ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel or nuclear-armed ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel. While it is hardly impossible to deploy both nuclear-armed and conventionally armed ballistic missiles—as some nuclear-weapon states already do—there tends to be a fairly clear-cut range partition that goes a long way toward addressing adversary concerns about warhead ambiguity. That is, China and Russia may, for example, deploy shorter-range conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, but primarily deploy their nuclear warheads with much longer-range so-called intercontinental ballistic missiles. Chinese and Russian intercontinental-range ballistic missiles are, with one publicly known exception, exclusively equipped with nuclear warheads. A Russian Iskander ballistic missile launched toward NATO territory, and a Chinese DF-26 launched toward the American island territory of Guam may, in principle, be equipped with a nuclear warhead and are not, as such, immune to the warhead ambiguity dynamic, but NATO and the United States will still know that the bulk of Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities are found in nuclear warheads installed on intercontinental range ballistic missiles.
While China is reportedly developing intercontinental range conventionally armed strike munitions such as the DF-27, China can only seriously contemplate targeting the continental United States with conventionally-armed ballistic missiles of this range class now that it has initiated an ongoing large-scale nuclear buildup, which includes a very major expansion of its nuclear-armed intercontinental range ballistic missile force. China’s development and deployment of longer-range conventionally-armed strike munitions, such as the DF-27, is unlikely to be pursued as a way to take advantage of warhead ambiguity, and there is nothing in the public domain to suggest that China intends to launch some combination of conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed intercontinental range ballistic missiles against the continental United States. If anything, China’s distinct nuclear-armed intercontinental range ballistic missiles will function, in part, as a shield that facilitates the use of the likes of the conventionally-armed DF-27 against the United States in the first place. The same cannot be said of Iranian ballistic missiles in the geographically proximate Iran-Israel nuclear deterrence relationship, which will likely be affected by Israeli concerns about warhead ambiguity for as long as Iran deploys both conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles of the requisite range class.
In principle, an Iranian nuclear-weapon state may be able to exclusively deploy longer-range conventionally-armed ballistic missiles in some areas, and its nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in other areas, and do so in a manner in which the former and latter do not have identical trajectories when approaching Israel. It is, for example, possible to envisage a scenario in which Iran establishes new underground missile bases in the northeastern part of its territory that will be garrisoned by units that exclusively operate nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles that follow different trajectories toward Israel at that. This will perhaps allow Iran to get away with deploying distinguishable conventionally-armed longer-range ballistic missiles elsewhere in the country. It will, of course, also result in a situation in which Israel will be able to prioritize the interception of inbound Iranian ballistic missiles that are launched from Iran’s northeast, all while leaving Israel uncertain as to whether Iran has not engaged in deception by deploying some number of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles elsewhere in Iran with the aim of including one or more nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in larger salvos of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles. More generally, Israel will confront a situation in which Iran may exclusively launch nuclear-armed ballistic missiles from northeastern Iran while simultaneously launching other, conventionally-armed longer-range ballistic missiles from elsewhere in Iran, all with the aim of overwhelming Israel’s ballistic missile defences so that the nuclear-armed ballistic missiles get through.
Evidently, there are no simple solutions here for as long as an Iranian nuclear-weapon state deploys both nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed ballistic missiles with a nominal maximum range of 1000 or more kilometers—Iranian ballistic missiles with a nominal maximum range of less than 1000 kilometers are not the issue here. At the same time, Iran will require longer-range conventionally-armed ballistic missiles for use against Israel and the Gulf Arab states, irrespective of whether Iran becomes a nuclear-weapon state, for as long as Iran lacks a large and capable air force. Stated differently, a hypothetical nuclear-armed Iran will confront challenges in the nuclear domain that are rooted in the weakness of its conventional military capabilities vis-a-vis Israel and the United States.
The (tempting) notion that a nuclear-weapon state can lean on its nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional military inferiority is hardly novel, but it will likely not bode well for a stable Iran-Israel nuclear deterrence relationship and, as such, does not bode well for a hypothetical nuclear-armed Iran. We have real-world examples in the form of the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad, as well as the North Korea-United States dyad, which also inherently encompasses South Korea and, to a lesser degree, Japan. Needless to say, present-day non-nuclear Iran should not envy either Pakistan or North Korea, and the Iran-Israel nuclear deterrence relationship will likely exhibit extreme levels of instability if Iran heads in such a direction, which can be characterized as an asymmetric escalation nuclear strategy in which Iran will, in effect, rapidly run up the nuclear escalation ladder during a crisis or early in a conflict with the aim of deterring (further) conventional attacks and, more to the point, placing a cap on underway conventional escalation.
All things considered, this is unlikely to be a viable approach vis-a-vis Israel, not least on account of the challenges that Iran will face in terms of penetrating Israel’s current, let alone future, ballistic missile defences, irrespective of whether Iran’s ballistic missiles are equipped with conventional and/or nuclear warheads. It bears emphasis that Pakistan and North Korea either do not face the exact same dynamic that Iran faces vis-a-vis Israel or have managed to develop geographically specific workarounds that are rooted in sharing a border with their counterpart in a nuclear deterrence relationship (in the case of North Korea, this takes the form of of American forces in South Korea and Japan, as well as using South Korea and Japan as punching bags in light of North Korea’s very limited ability to target the continental United States short of what will likely result in an all-out nuclear exchange). The 1000 or so kilometers that separate Iran from Israel is far enough to make it hard for Iran to attack Israel with either nuclear or conventional weapons, but close enough to subject Iran to much of the Israeli air force’s (conventional) combat capabilities.
A Nuclear-Armed Iran’s Problems Will Begin, But Not End, With Israel
It is important to recognize that a hypothetical Iranian nuclear-weapon state’s problems will begin, but not end, with Israel. As explained earlier, a nuclear-armed Iran will likely enter into a nuclear deterrence relationship with the United States, and may well find itself dealing with a triadic Iran-Israel-United States nuclear deterrence relationship, instead of two wholly separate Iran-Israel and Iran-United States nuclear dyads, should the United States extend to Israel a “nuclear umbrella,” which is to say nuclear guarantees, that will activate in the event that Iran ever employs, or threatens to employ, nuclear weapons against Israel. It bears emphasis that this may well, on balance, help stabilize the Iran-Israel nuclear dyad, at least for as long as the United States imposes and strictly enforces constraints on Israel such that Israel does not, once again, treat an American military backstop as a crutch to launch an offensive (non-nuclear) war of choice against Iran, and in so doing take advantage of the United States as either a witting or unwitting enabler of such a war against Iran. Leaving aside such potential triadic nuclear dynamics, the United States will, at the very least, likely view Iranian nuclear weapons as a threat to itself solely as a result of the threat posed to American military bases and forces in the Middle East, even if Iran were to forgo the development and deployment of the intercontinental-range ballistic missiles it will require to bring the continental United States within the reach of its hypothetical nuclear arsenal.
All things considered, including the mutual long-standing animosities encountered in the Iran-United States relationship since 1979, and, not least, the legacies of the ongoing American and Israeli war against Iran, a hypothetical nuclear-armed Iran will have to seriously consider the possibility of American nuclear weapons being used against it. The best way to deter such an eventuality, including the possibility of American nuclear blackmail against a hypothetical Iranian nuclear-weapon state, will be to bring the continental United States within range of Iran’s nuclear weapons by developing and deploying intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. Leaving aside the challenges associated with developing intercontinental-range ballistic missiles with a maximum range of at least 9000-10500 kilometers, even attempting to develop and deploy such nuclear-armed ballistic missiles will likely only have the effect of bringing about a particularly unstable Iran-United States nuclear deterrence relationship—from Iran’s perspective—until Iran’s nuclear arsenal matures and/or until Iran and the United States reach a modus vivendi.
For as long as an Iranian nuclear-weapon state forgoes the development and deployment of intercontinental-range ballistic missiles that will be required to target the continental United States (excluding Alaska), as well as intermediate-range ballistic missiles required to target Western Europe and American military bases therein, Iran’s nuclear requirements vis-a-vis the United States will likely largely overlap with Iran’s nuclear requirements vis-a-vis Israel. A triadic Iran-Israel-United States dynamic will, however, likely force Iran to make even greater exertions toward improving its position in the Iran-United States nuclear deterrence relationship, which is to say developing and deploying intercontinental-range ballistic missiles so as to bring the continental United States within range of Iranian nuclear warheads.
This may well be a dynamic that the Islamic Republic considers to be inevitable and necessary, but it will amount to a massive burden on the Iranian state and dramatically raise the stakes for Iran in the nuclear arena. As things stand, the only nuclear-weapon states in politically salient nuclear deterrent relationships with the United States are Russia, China, and North Korea. Iran risks biting off far more than it can chew in a context in which it can, unlike North Korea, more plausibly carve out a path in which it remains a regional nuclear power without attempting to go head-to-head with the United States’ formidable nuclear arsenal. Iran’s resources are finite and limited, and a necessarily bifurcated nuclear arsenal oriented against both a regional nuclear adversary, Israel, and a nuclear adversary located “on the other side of the world,” the United States, will likely strain Iran’s resources and leave it less well-positioned vis-a-vis Israel, thereby increasing Iran’s insecurity even as nuclear weapons are intended to offer Iran greater security.
Note: I have prepared additional material on Iran-United States nuclear dynamics, but will leave further comment for another time and perhaps a separate post.
Is the Game Worth the Candle—For Iran Itself?
A lot of ink has been spilled on the Iran nuclear issue over the past thirty or so years, much of it focusing on Iran’s fissile material stockpiles, pathways to weaponization, and breakout times, as well as the possibility of a hypothetical regional proliferation cascade in response to Iran’s nuclearization. It remains exceptionally rare to come across an analysis of the potential implications of a nuclear-armed Iran for Iran itself, or the challenges that Iran will likely face in operationalizing a credible nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis not just Israel but also the United States. The allure of nuclear weapons has perhaps never been greater among Iranian officials and everyday Iranians alike, but obtaining nuclear weapons will likely only be the start of Iran’s problems, even if a hypothetical nuclear breakout attempt succeeds with or without yet another devastating round of fighting with the United States and Israel. All things considered, an incipient Iranian nuclear-weapon state will likely face greater challenges in developing, deploying, and sustaining a credible nuclear deterrent against its primary nuclear-armed adversaries than recent entrants to the nuclear-weapon state club. At some level, one must ask whether the proverbial game is worth the candle. Given the challenges that Iran will likely face in operationalizing its notional nuclear arsenal, Iran is, all things considered, best off without nuclear weapons.
One way to interpret this thesis is to think in terms of what Iran still has to gain from remaining at some level of nuclear latency or nuclear threshold state status, something that will likely require a negotiated settlement with the United States and perhaps other countries. Another way to interpret this thesis is to recognize that a nuclear-armed Iran will likely have to, in effect, pursue a brute force approach—beyond a nuclear breakout attempt—by exploiting warhead ambiguity vis-a-vis Israel and assuming all the risks that entails in the inherently unstable Iran-Israel nuclear deterrence relationship. Without any level of trust in the Iran-Israel nuclear deterrence relationship, and with the United States likely to involve itself in said relationship so as to establish a particularly complex and, for Iran, likely quite challenging, triadic Iran-Israel-United States nuclear deterrence relationship, the prospects for a durably stable Iran-Israel nuclear deterrence relatioship are poor, especially over the first fiven to ten years years, if not more, of Iran’s nuclearization, during which Iran’s nuclear arsenal will likely be far from mature.
For all of the attention given to the nature of the Islamic Republic and what it may or may not do vis-a-vis Israel, its other neighbours, and the United States once it possesses nuclear weapons, this analysis highlights an important but often underappreciated dynamic: it key issue is not the case that the Turkiye and the Gulf Arab states, and perhaps a country like Egypt, cannot live with a nuclear-armed Iran, or that the United States cannot have a more or less stable nuclear deterrence relationship with a nuclear-armed Iran. The fundamental challenge that a hypothetical Iranian nuclear-weapon state poses to the world is rooted in how Iran’s primary nuclear-armed adversary, Israel, is unwilling, and plausibly unable, to absorb even a single nuclear strike. This makes Israel an outlier among nuclear-weapon states and a country that is perhaps uniquely incapable of, in effect, being in a strong nuclear dyad with any nuclear-weapon state, let alone a hypothetical Iranian nuclear-weapon weapon that that is some 1000 kilometers of Israel and with which Israel has a long-standing mutually acrimonious relationship, not least on account of the present American and Israeli war against Iran.
Over the course of the Cold War, the survivability of nuclear arsenals—the existence of more or less secure second strike capabilities—was increasingly treated as a given in many influential circles. The Cold War was not, however, characterized by the existence of widely deployed ballistic missile defences, let alone ballistic missile defence systems that are demonstrably effective against the types of non-intercontinental-range ballistic missiles that Iran can and likely will use for the purpose of holding targets in Israel at risk with nuclear warheads. A nuclear-armed Iran will be born into a very different nuclear world than the existing nuclear-weapon states, with the partial and qualified exception of North Korea. The floor for what amounts to a credible nuclear deterrent in a regional nuclear dyad has risen dramatically, and the question of whether Iran can realistically launch one or more nuclear-armed ballistic missiles against Israel with a high probability of penetration takes precedence over the comparatively more mundane question of whether Iran can develop and deploy a survivable nuclear force, at least vis-a-vis Israel. An incipient nuclear-armed Iran will likely have no option but to exploit warhead ambiguity vis-a-vis Israel, with the result of establishing an exceedingly intense Iran-Israel nuclear deterrence relationship. Iran is unlikely to benefit from an increase in security in such a situation—because Israel’s problems are necessarily also Iran’s problems in a nuclear deterrence relationship—for as long as a hypothetical nuclear-armed Iran wants to have a durably stable nuclear deterrence relationship with Israel, and with the United States, over the years and decades to come. As things stand, the game may not be worth the candle—for Iran itself.