The Ukrainian military news website Militarnyi recently disclosed unit costs for various Russian strike munitions derived from leaked Russian procurement documents. This includes documents indicating that Russia ordered 32 new Izdeliye-506 nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles for delivery in the 2024-2026 timeframe. According to Russian state media, the subsonic nuclear-armed Izdeliye-506, which is also known as the Kh-BD, has a maximum range of over 6000 kilometers, although this remains to be confirmed and should be understood as a nominal maximum range figure.
While Russia’s so-called “strategic” nuclear weapons are primarily delivered by high-probability-of-penetration intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the country continues to deploy large numbers of nuclear-armed cruise missiles of both the subsonic and supersonic varieties to attack terrestrial and maritime targets. When it is deployed, the Izdeliye-506/Kh-BD will provide the Russian Air Force’s nuclear-armed bombers with a longer-range cruise missile than the existing subsonic Kh-102, which is the nuclear-armed version of the more widely deployed conventionally-armed Kh-101 air-launched land-attack cruise missile. Although a greater nominal maximum range can be used to attack more distant targets, Russia may use the Kh-BD’s extended range for two other purposes.
First, a longer-range nuclear-armed land-attack cruise missile will allow Russian bomber aircraft to attack targets in North America from a greater standoff range from North America. This is an important consideration given the vulnerabilities of Russia’s non-low-observable bomber aircraft and the impracticality of employing Russian fighter aircraft to escort Russian bomber aircraft in the Arctic Circle while the bombers undertake nuclear strike missions. If Russia deployed low-observable bomber aircraft designs in the vein of the American B-2 and B-21, a longer-range nuclear-armed subsonic land-attack cruise missile in the vein of the Kh-BD would likely have been a less appealing investment.
Second, a longer-range nuclear-armed land-attack cruise missile can be used to fly more circuitous routes than is possible with the (comparatively) shorter-range Kh-102. This will, in principle, increase the probable penetration rate of nuclear-armed Kh-BD cruise missiles, provided that Russia has accurate intelligence on the dispositions of adversary air defences. While this approach can be used to attack targets in North America, it can also be used to attack targets in Europe so as to bypass NATO’s forward-most air defences. Specifically, a longer-range cruise missile in the form of the Kh-BD that is launched from northern Russia will be able to undertake an extended and circuitous flight over the Atlantic Ocean so as to approach and attack targets in Europe from a less expected direction.
Whatever the actual maximum range of the Kh-BD, no discussion of Russian cruise missiles is complete without mention of how Russia’s conventionally-armed subsonic land-attack cruise missiles are understood to have had a low penetration rate against Ukraine, which is to say that Ukraine’s air defences are understood to have sustained a high interception rate against Russian land-attack cruise missiles. It remains to be seen whether and how the Kh-BD will fare much better against adversary air defences than the air-launched Kh-101, which is the conventionally-armed version of the nuclear-armed Kh-102, has in the Russia-Ukraine War.