Making Sense Of The Latest Ukrainian Air Force Disclosure Regarding Russian Strike Munition Launches, Interceptions
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Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.
According to the Ukrainian Air Force's latest daily disclosures, Russia launched a total of 614 strike munitions across Ukraine between 6:40 PM local time on 20 August and 9 AM local time on 21 August. This total number includes: - Single-use propeller-driven strike drones in the form of the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya. These are typically equipped with either 50-kilogram or 90-kilogram class warheads. - Single-use propeller-driven Gerbera and Parodiya decoy drones, which appear to be primarily unarmed or, at most, carry a very small/light—almost token— 1 to 2 kilogram warhead.
Single-use propeller-driven strike drones in the form of the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya. These are typically equipped with either 50-kilogram or 90-kilogram class warheads.
Single-use propeller-driven Gerbera and Parodiya decoy drones, which appear to be primarily unarmed or, at most, carry a very small/light—almost token— 1 to 2 kilogram warhead.
It is important to recognize that the Ukrainian Air Force's daily figures and official Ukrainian disclosures more generally do not disaggregate Russian employment of decoy drones from strike drones. The most recent daily report simply claims that a total of 574 strike drones and various decoy drones—also called "simulator drones"—were launched. The failure to distinguish between there two extremely different genera of strike munition—consider the vast different in warhead weight— presents a major analytical problem for serious observers and analysts, but is nothing new—Ukraine has not changed how it presents this data since the late summer of 2024 when Russia began to launch primarily unarmed Gerbera and Parodiya decoy drones in increasingly large numbers.
Based on recent Ukrainian media reports and often cryptic official disclosures to Ukrainian journalists in the form of what appear to be semi-scripted interviews with Ukrainian officials, some 40-50% of the Russian "drones" launched on a given day are likely to be primarily unarmed decoy drones, not armed strike drones in the vein of the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya. This also tracks with Ukrainian claims about the sale of production/rate of production for the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya strike drones on the one hand, and the Gerbera and Parodiya decoy drones, on the other.
While this extremely important analytical consideration appears to be lost on the many journalists, commentators, and government officials who regularly discuss the Russia-Ukraine War and cite figures from the Ukrainian Air Force's daily disclosures, it is important to recognize that it is not a new dynamic.
Another issue with the Ukrainian Air Force's daily disclosures is that it does not appear to disaggregate the use of the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya—and other Russian strike drones more generally—against targets that are located fairly close to—generally no more than 50 or so kilometers from—the frontline from the use of the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya to undertake "deep" strikes across Ukraine. Note that the Ukrainian Air Force's daily figures do not include Russia's use of what are often human-in-the-loop loitering strike drones, such as the Lancet-3 (Izdeliye-51) and the comparatively very crude Molniya and Privet-82 to attack targets located several tens of kilometers from the frontlines. While Russia's employment of the Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya against proximate targets was previously rare, it is now an increasingly regular occurrence, a dynamic that is likely driven by several supply-side and demand-side factors that are best addressed in a separate thread. In any event, the Ukrainian Air Force's daily disclosures amount to increasingly problematic data for use in serious analysis.
According to the Ukrainian Air Force, Russia also launched the following:
4 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles. Each MiG-31K assigned to the Russian Air Force's Long-Range Aviation (i.e., bomber force) can only carry one such missile at a time, so a minimum of four MiG-31K aircraft took part in this "operation." These are essentially token numbers in a context in which Ukraine operates multiple American-built PATRIOT and French/Italian SAMP/T air defence systems that can intercept ballistic missiles.
2 ground-launched ballistic missiles, which the Ukrainian Air Force claims were either Russian-built Iskander-M or North Korean-built KN-23. While Ukraine regularly offers evidence of Russia's use of North Korean ballistic missiles, the Ukrainian Air Force's daily disclosures do not make a distinction between the two. These are essentially token numbers in a context in which Ukraine operates multiple American-built PATRIOT and French/Italian SAMP/T air defence systems that can intercept ballistic missiles.
19 Kh-101 air-launched land-attack cruise missiles. These are exclusively launched by the Russian Air Force's Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers, which are part of Long-Range Aviation. Long-Range Aviation's Tu-22M bombers are exclusively used to launch Kh-22/Kh-32 missiles, which are primarily anti-ship missiles with a secondary land-attack mode for which these are poorly suited—the low accuracy and very large high explosive warhead of the Kh-22/Kh-32 has often resulted in extensive civilian casualties.
14 3M14 Kalibr ship/submarine-launched land-attack cruise missiles. These were reportedly launched by what remains of Russia's Black Sea Fleet.
While observers have seen very large-scale ballistic missile attacks undertaken by Iran against Israel, Russia has never been able to launch a comparably large number of Iskander ballistic missiles despite the availability of 100+ Iskander launchers in the Russian Army's arsenal. While production of the Iskander ballistic missile is reported to have been substantially expanded during the war, this ballistic missile remains unavailable in the numbers that are required to help change Russia's fortunes in this protracted conflict. Although transfers of the North Korean KN-23 have helped Russia ameliorate this longstanding dynamic, Russia is in a situation where it needs to launch several hundred ballistic missiles per month. North Korea is likely unable—and unwilling—to supply ballistic missiles in such numbers. Although Iran was previously better positioned—but likely not entirely willing—to supply ballistic missiles in such numbers, it is very unlikely to do so in the aftermath of the June 2025 Iran-Israel War.
It is important to note that the Russian Army regularly launches Iskander missiles to attack targets of opportunity—undertake so-called dynamic targeting—located no more than 50-100 kilometers from the frontlines/international border. It is forced to do so due to the apparent unavailability of more appropriate munitions, such as the guided version of a 300 mm diameter heavy artillery rocket—a missile by another name—associated with the Russian Army's Tornado-S launcher. As a result, the Ukrainian Air Force's daily disclosures are also somewhat problematic when it comes to Russian ballistic missile launch activity. Note that the Ukrainian Air Force's daily disclosures do not include Russia's employment of shorter-range surface-to-surface missiles such as the guided 300 mm diameter heavy artillery rocket.
The reported employment of a total of 33 land-attack cruise missiles is notable given how Russia remains forced to sporadically launch its cruise missiles in order to allow a sufficiently large number of stockpiled missiles to be available for launch. As with the Iskander ballistic missile, production of the Kh-101 and, to a reportedly lesser degree, the 3M14 Kalibr cruise missiles is understood to have been substantially expanded during the war. Even so, an insufficient number of such missiles are available on a given day, and Russia is, therefore, forced to stockpile cruise missiles for use in sporadic large-scale launch activity. Ukraine's air defences appear to have been able to intercept a large percentage of the cruise missiles launched on a given day, a dynamic that forces Russia to launch larger numbers of cruise missiles so that just one or two can impact the intended target.
Russia likely has more serviceable Iskander launchers available than it has stockpiled ballistic missiles available for launch on a given day. While the same can likely be said about the ratio of serviceable Tu-95 and Tu-160 bomber aircraft, which can carry multiple Kh-101 cruise missiles per sortie, to stockpiled Kh-101 cruise missiles that are ready for launch on a given day, the Russian Air Force's long-range aviation experienced a significant blow to its force structure following Ukraine's 1 June 2025 Operation Spiderweb. As for the 3M14 Kalibr, the loss of multiple cruise missile launch platforms—both surface ships and submarines—of the Black Sea Fleet has significantly decreased the maximum salvo size of 3M14 Kalibr cruise missiles that can be launched on a given day irrespective of the limited availability of this seemly non-prioritized cruise missile design (which can notably also be launched from land-based wheeled launch vehicles).
All things considered, the Ukrainian Air Force's daily figures on Russian strike munition launches are extremely valuable for analysts and observers but have been and remain decidedly incomplete and are increasingly misleading as technology and operational concepts have evolved over the course of the Russia-Ukraine War. Much the same can be said of the daily claims of the number of Russian strike munitions that the Ukrainian military claims to have intercepted or neutralized through some other means, but that is also a topic for a separate thread.