Concepts–themed posts engage in inherently somewhat speculative analysis. I contend that any serious analysis must engage with the world both as it is and as it can be. Avoiding mindless empiricism requires cognizance of what is and what is not within the realm of possibility. Concepts-themed posts engage in this type of analysis.
Maps depicting the maximum range of Chinese maritime strike capabilities, including the country’s anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and similar, tend to depict range rings that extend from China’s borders or coastline out to a distance of x kilometers for Chinese anti-ship munition y and so forth. Such maps tend to be unrealistic for, if nothing else, two reasons:
China is unlikely to launch longer-range terrestrial strike or maritime strike munitions from positions along the country’s borders or coastline.
Attacking a moving target in the form of a ship places immense demands on maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, even in a context in which high-speed short time-to-target maritime strike munitions such as the DF-26 ballistic missile mitigate the inescapable reality of target location error.
While China has developed a dense multi-phenomenology sensor array, including multiple space-based sensor architectures that not only offer redundant coverage but also, with respect to non-geostationary ISR satellites, inherently “global” coverage, China’s ever-improving maritime strike capabilities are primarily oriented toward the Western Pacific. Even so, China is surprisingly well-positioned to target ships—including American warships transiting toward the Western Pacific during a crisis or war—as they traverse two distant but very important maritime chokepoints, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz.
The Strait of Hormuz, which constitutes a bona fide maritime chokepoint that is the entry and exit to and from the Persian Gulf, is around 2100 kilometers from China and around 2300 kilometers from the western city of Kashgar in Xinjiang. For context, the American island territory of Guam is some 3100 kilometres from China, and Tokyo is some 1750 kilometers from Shanghai. The Suez Canal is some 3900 kilometres from China, and some 4050 kilometers from Kasghar in Xinjiang. Stated differently, both the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz—two of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints—are, in principle, within the nominal maximum range of the Chinese DF-26, which the latest annual American China Military Power Report (CMPR) characterizes as being 3000-4000 kilometers.
A curious fact about what is publicly known about the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force’s (PLARF) order of battle is that there exists a DF-26 launch brigade garrisoned near Korla, also in Xinjiang. The Korla DF-26 garrison, which is likely deployed in Xinjiang to bring Moscow with range—the DF-26 is a nuclear-capable ballistic missile, is “just” ~3200 kilometers from the Persian Gulf, which is to say a shorter distance than DF-26 ballistic missiles targeting Guam from launch positions elsewhere in China are likely to cover. The Korla garrison, which is, of course, equipped with wheeled self-propelled DF-26 launchers that can relocate as required, is, however, situated some 4900 kilometres from the Suez Canal.
Anyone familiar with Iranian maritime strike capabilities and the Iranian-supplied maritime strike capabilities employed by Ansarallah in Yemen will recognize the important role that permissive maritime geography can play in enhancing maritime strike capabilities, including lowering the requirements for effective maritime ISR against moving targets in the form of ships. Maritime chokepoints not only make it easier to discern the presence of ships to target, but also make it easier to directly track the movement of a ship or, at the very least, plot its projected future position. This is how Ansarallah has been able to target ships not only in and around the Bab al-Mandeb—a maritime strait—but also in the open/less confined waters of the Gulf of Aden.
Ongoing Transfers of Iranian Ballistic Missiles Enhance Ansarallah’s Long-Range Strike Capabilities
Merchant ships and warships transiting the extremely narrow Suez Canal and even the much wider Strait of Hormuz have, in effect, nowhere to hide should China seek to selectively extend the reach of its maritime strike capabilities in a westward direction.
This is particularly the case with respect to the Suez Canal, as the 2021 obstruction of the canal by the large container ship Ever Given so memorably put on public display.
With respect to targeting ships, including American warships, that may transit the Suez Canal during a crisis or conflict in the Western Pacific, it bears emphasis that China does not need its exquisite and increasingly space-centric multi-phenomenology maritime ISR sensor array. Ground observers—and unattended cameras—with internet access will likely do just fine over a 20 or so minute flight time for the likes of a DF-26 launched from a position to the west of Kasghar.
The intent of this post is not to suggest that China will target ships transiting the Suez Canal and/or the Persian Gulf, but to highlight the importance of grounded but nevertheless creative analysis that deals with the world as it can be and not just as it currently is. China may well enter a crisis or war without having either the desire or the ability to target ships transiting these distant maritime chokepoints, but the highly stylized analysis found in this post suggests that China is likely to face quite low barriers to entry should it proceed in this direction. This post more generally serves as a reminder to observers and military analysts focused on the Western Pacific that the territory of the People’s Republic of China extends some 4500 kilometers west of the country’s coastline—the Earth’s equatorial circumference is “only” ~40,075 kilometers.