On Speculative Reports About The Potential Deployment Of Shahed-136/Geran-2 Strike Drones in Cuba
🇨🇺 🇺🇸 | Minimal Comment | originally posted on X
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Note: The following text was originally posted on my 𝕏/Twitter account. The original post may be expanded upon and edited for grammar and style in this here post. Link: x.com/shahpas/status/2017977860774896037
While deploying Shahed-136/Geran-2 propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones and similar lower-end strike munitions in Cuba will inherently pose a major—but not uncounterable—threat to the United States, the only issue is, to put it politely, who would dare to (A) make such a move and (B) pull the proverbial trigger during a crisis—as part of a preemptive attack—or during a war—as part of a retaliatory attack. There are no public indications that Venezuela dared to make such a move over the course of the months-long coercive military buildup in the lead-up to American military action on 3 January 2026. Even if Venezuela did attempt to constitute some form of long-range strike capability, there is no indication that it pulled the proverbial trigger. Cuba will likely be no different should it come to deploy the Shahed-136/Geran-2 or other conceptually similar low-end strike munitions.
Although the American military can defend against a hypothetical Cuban attack involving the likes of Shahed-136/Geran-2 strike drones, there exists such an incredibly large number of potential targets, especially along the American Gulf Coast, that a country like Cuba may well inflict a non-trivial amount of damage to the United States. Yes, it will likely be tantamount to suicide for Cuban decision-makers, but the capacity to punish even in the event of likely defeat is part of the analytical equation. One can see a real-world case study of this dynamic at play in the ongoing crisis involving Iran and the United States, where Iran can do a lot of damage to the United States and the Gulf Arab countries, even in a situation in which Iranian military defeat is the most likely outcome in the event of open war.
While Cuba will likely be unable to repeat what could be a high spectacle opening salvo against the United States, having even a few oil rigs, refineries, etc., along the American Gulf Coast ablaze will likely be a political disaster for any American president, even if Cuba is unable to repeat such strikes as American forces go on full alert and fully mobilize to counter the threat. In the case of Cuba, as with the cases of Iran and Venezuela, among others, one does not have to be stronger than the other side. One only needs to be strong enough to make the other side think twice before initiating military action. Perhaps Donald Trump will eventually pull the proverbial trigger against Iran, but it does not seem to be happening absent a multi-week military buildup that is only required in the first place because Iran—unlike Venezuela and Cuba—has, among other things, credible albeit decidedly imperfect strike capabilities that allow it to both deter and coerce the United States.