Taiwan Unveils Ground-Launched Radar-Guided AGM-114 Hellfire Missile For Use In Anti-Shipping Role

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Note: The following text was originally posted on my X/Twitter account.

A recent video draws attention to a seemingly new approach that Taiwan is pursuing with the aim of bolstering its coastal defences to defeat a People's Liberation Army (PLA) amphibious landing attempt on the island of Taiwan. While Taiwan has long deployed ground-launched anti-ship missiles of various types and will soon deploy a significantly expanded force of such missiles, these are large and heavy long-range anti-ship cruise missile designs that are optimized for use against larger surface ships, not small landing craft, small boats, and amphibious armoured vehicles approaching a landing zone. To counter such threats, which will be most salient in the event that Taiwan's aforementioned coastal defences fail to neutralize a PLA invasion fleet long before it reaches 10 or so kilometers from the Taiwanese coastline (excluding the Kinmen Islands, Matsu Islands, and Penghu Islands), Taiwan now appears to be pursuing a very different approach: employing inherently multi-purpose "anti-tank missiles" as a form of (very) short-range anti-ship missile against nearby targets. While many have pointed to this and other developments as indicators of how seriously and robustly Taiwan is preparing to defeat a PLA amphibious landing, there is less here than meets the eye.

A recent video shows a small white-coloured commercial truck—a vehicle that with very limited cross-country mobility—that is equipped with a single launcher for an American AGM-114 Hellfire family “anti-tank” missile. This "concealed" launcher vehicle is equipped with an elevated sensor mast that features a large electro-optical sensor ball that likely includes a laser designator alongside what is likely to be a short-range coastal search radar. When launched from ground level—the supersonic AGM-114 is primarily employed as an air-to-ground munition by helicopters and uncrewed fixed-wing aircraft—is limited to a maximum range of around eight kilometers.

The use of "anti-tank" missiles as multipurpose (very) short-range surface-to-surface missiles is not a new dynamic, and "anti-tank" missiles have long been used against small vessels. This notably includes Sweden's longstanding use of a version of the American AGM-114 Hellfire—the Robot 17—as a coastal defence munition (the Robot 17 has been transferred to Ukraine for use against both terrestrial and maritime targets in the Russia-Ukraine War). The Robot 17 is based on the semi-active laser homing (SALH) guidance version of the AGM-114—SALH munitions require the use of a laser designator to illuminate or “paint” the intended target until the time of impact, a dynamic which prevents a multi-target engagement capability. SALH anti-tank missiles, which are primarily employed as air-to-ground missiles, are well-suited for use as surface-to-surface missiles in a coastal defence role. The same cannot be said of wire-guided—using copper wire—semi-active command line of sight (SACLOS) anti-tank missile designs, which were previously the universal standard for both ground-launched and air-launched anti-tank missiles until the turn of the century. It bears emphasis that newer anti-tank missile designs—such as those that are fire-and-forget munitions equipped with imaging infrared seekers and those that are human-in-the-loop designs controlled via a fiber optic cable—are far more suitable for use in a coastal defence role, as are anti-tank missiles using SACLOS laser beam-riding guidance—which should not be confused with SALH—more generally.

The American-built AGM-114 Hellfire family missile seen in the video is not a variant equipped with SALH guidance—most AGM-114 Hellfire family missiles built and used to date use SALH guidance— but the AGM-114L Longbow, which is equipped with an active radar homing millimeter-wave radar seeker. Originally developed for use alongside the AH-64D version of the Apache attack helicopter—which is equipped with a Ka-band AN/APG-78 Longbow fire control radar on top of the main rotor—as a fire-and-forget anti-tank missile as a means of stopping large-scale Soviet mechanized assaults, the AGM-114L has over the past decade found a new purpose as a fire-and-forget air-to-air munition for use against propeller-driven strike drones such as the Iranian Shahed-136 and similar.

Taiwan uses the radar-guided AGM-114L and SALH versions of the AGM-114 family more generally with its American-built AH-64E and AH-1W attack helicopters. Given that it is being launched from essentially zero elevation above ground level and at zero airspeed, the truck-launched AGM-114L will have a reduced maximum range when compared to an AGM-114L launched from an attack helicopter (several sections of the Taiwanese coastline do, however, feature hills/high elevation terrain that will result in an extended maximum range). Notwithstanding the use of a fairly modest elevating mast, the small radar antenna and the large sensor ball that are installed on the "concealed" commercial truck-based launcher are both line-of-sight systems and similarly have a reduced maximum range. As a result, the practical maximum range of this ground-launched AGM-114L against the smallest targets—small boats, amphibious armoured vehicles, and similar—is likely to be closer to 5 kilometers or so than the nominal maximum range of 8 kilometers when launched from an aircraft in flight.

Given the likely reduction in maximum range resulting from launch at ~zero elevation above ground level and at zero airspeed, Taiwan is likely better off employing a different missile(s) as a (very) short-range coastal defence munition. It bears emphasis that the AGM-114L is expensive and only available in limited quantities. The AGM-114 family missiles are also larger and heavier than they need to be for this (very) short-range coastal defence role. Weighing just under 50 kilograms and equipped with an 8-9 kilogram warhead—primarily of the tandem shaped charge variety, the supersonic AGM-114 family are highly optimized toward penetrating the armour of the most heavily armoured tanks from any aspect. Note that the supersonic maximum speed is not an inexpensive design characteristic without tradeoffs and is best rationalized in terms of a reduced time-to-target for an air-launched missile launched from a vulnerable and necessarily exposed attack helicopter.

Human-portable anti-tank missiles, which are subsonic designs, tend to have warheads that weigh no more than half as much as the AGM-114 family but are nevertheless capable of penetrating the armour of most heavily armoured vehicles. In many respects, the AGM-114 family is poorly optimized for the purposes of—is excessive for the purposes of—defeating a PLA amphibious invasion. China’s amphibious armoured vehicles have very modest armour and do not require such a large and heavy anti-tank missile design. China’s most heavily armoured vehicles—its tanks—are not amphibious. Employing an AGM-114 family missile against a small assault boat is not only overkill, but there are likely to be a lot more assault boats than vehicles in the water—many more targets than there are likely to AGM-114L missiles available for launch. At the same time, Chinese landing craft tend to be so large that an AGM-114 family missile, especially one equipped with a 9 tandem shaped charge warhead that has a very concentrated kinetic effect perpendicular to the warhead, is inadequate to cripple or sink the landing craft. Furthermore, the AGM-114 has such a limited maximum range, especially when launched from ~zero elevation above ground level and at zero airspeed, that it strains credulity that a Taiwanese "concealed" truck launcher such as the one seen in the video can casually linger within five or so kilometers of a PLA landing zone. While the commercial truck-based launcher is “concealed” in the sense that it will blend in with nearby civilian trucks, Taiwanese planners need to consider the possibility that the PLA will target every moving or parked vehicle within a 5-10 kilometer radius—if not a larger radius—of a PLA landing zone before/as PLA forces are approaching said landing zone.

It is also important to note that the launcher seen in the video is seemingly limited to launching one AGM-114L missile at a time. Each AH-64D attack helicopter can carry up to eight AGM-114L missiles per sortie. As a result, a two-helicopter AH-64D formation can, in principle, neutralize a company-sized mechanized formation, while a six-helicopter AH-64D formation can, in principle, neutralize a battalion-sized mechanized formation. While AH-64D attack helicopters can do much the same using SALH versions of the AGM-114 missile family, the more expensive AGM-114L—which is equipped with an active millimeter-wave radar seeker—is a fire-and-forget munition of which multiple specimens can be rapidly launched, thereby allowing the attack helicopter pilot to rapidly descend in altitude to avoid becoming the target of the short-range air defence systems that accompanied Soviet mechanized units.

The issue with the “concealed” launch vehicle seen in the video is that “concealment” is only practical and credible if there are not many such vehicles located near PLA amphibious landing zones. If, however, Taiwan is going to park a dozen or so such vehicles near a PLA amphibious landing zone in order to launch a suitably large number of AGM-114L missiles in short order—which it must given the (very) short-range of the likes of the AGM-114L—there will likely be such an unusually high concentration of such trucks around 5 kilometers or so of a PLA amphibious landing zone that the PLA planners will have to be reckless and/or stupid not to identify and counter this threat. Note that this dynamic will remain relevant even if the truck launchers are not coloured white, even if these are covered with camouflage netting and so forth. The AGM-114 missile family simply has inadequate range, not least when launched from the ground, for this purpose—a longer-range missile can be launched from a greater radius from a PLA landing zone and, as such, will be more difficult for the PLA to identify and target before suitable targets come within range of the Taiwanese coastal defence munition(s).

Much more can be said about the employment of "anti-tank" missiles as (very) short-range coastal defence munitions and Taiwan's options for coastal defence and defeating a PLA amphibious invasion attempt once it reaches Taiwan's coastline more generally. Suffice it to say, there is less in the way of credible military capabilities on display in this video than meets the eye.