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In principle, the challenges faced by Russian air defences should ease as (A) Ukraine goes down its target list after severely damaging, if not destroying, its targets without damaging or destroying whatever Russian air defence capabilities are deployed in the area and (B) as Ukraine’s targeting practices reveal what it is prioritizing at a given time and what it may target next, which should offer Moscow ample time to reposition air defences. “Everyone” knows that Russian oil refineries have consistently been a high-priority target for Ukraine. There is, as such, no reason for any Russian oil refinery to not have, at the very least, several machine gun positions offering a modicum of protection. And yet, there have been over the past two years or so a constant stream of videos in which the footage and associated audio do not indicate even an attempt at employing small arms to defend an oil refinery.
Similarly, “everyone” has learned of the recent phenomenon in which Ukraine targets e-commerce distribution centers, including but not limited to those associated with Wildberries. One would think that, after several strikes, someone in Moscow would wise up that the other, remaining, as-yet-untargeted Wildberries distribution facilities may be the next targets and, in response, assign, at a very least, several machine gun positions to offer a modicum of protection. And yet, there have, over the past month or so, been a constant stream of videos in which the footage and associated audio indicate that this is not the case.
All things considered, Russian air defences are working and very significantly thinning out the large waves of Ukrainian strike munitions entering Russian airspace, but Russia experiences a fundamental geography problem: a vast surface area and not enough medium-end and high-end air defences to defend everything all at once. Russia’s forward air defences work well, but terminal air defences are often lacking, typically on account of not existing at all. This results in a bizarre spectacle, because it is unreasonable to assume that a surface-to-air missile can be assigned to defend every potential target, but it is reasonable to assume that several machine guns can be assigned to more or less every potential target with or without assigned crews—factories and industrial facilities such as refineries are staffed by able-bodied persons who can be readily recruited to serve as part-time air defence personnel (once alerted to inbound Ukrainian strike munitions, which is already the case and why the employees of these facilities evacuate and record the Ukrainian strike munitions crashing and detonating upon impact in their places of employment).