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According to Ukraine, North Korea has transferred Hwasong-11C (U.S. designation: KN-30) ballistic missiles to Russia. Transfers of North Korean ballistic missiles to Russia and their subsequent use by Russia against Ukraine are not new dynamics and have likely offered North Korea an invaluable opportunity to test its increasingly diverse array of shorter-range ballistic missiles—at least some of which are likely to be deployed in both conventionally-armed and nuclear-armed configurations—in realistic wartime conditions. As a result, it is curious to see which North Korean ballistic missiles do and do not get sent to Russia for use against Ukraine.
While the Hwasong-11C has a particularly interesting design on account of the reported size and weight of its (conventional) warheads, which demands great accuracy and precision to be employed to optimal effect, it is notable that North Korea has not yet dispatched another design, the 600 mm diameter design widely referred to as the KN-25, even though this appears to be fully intended as a true mass-launched long-range strike munition. KN-25 launchers can carry up to six such missiles, and there is little reason to think that the launch crews are going to load a truck with six missiles only to periodically launch one missile at a time. Given its implied operating concept, the KN-25 should be particularly useful to Russia as it works to overwhelm—or, at the very least, induce the depletion of—Ukraine’s ballistic missile defence capabilities.