Norway’s Minister of Defence recently warned that Russia is bolstering its military capabilities in the Kola Peninsula, which functionally borders the Barents Sea, Norway, and Finland, and is also close to Sweden. While there is a very significant concentration of Russian military capabilities in and around the Kola Peninsula that is likely to be bolstered in the years to come once the Russia-Ukraine War come to some sort of conclusion, permanent or otherwise, observers will benefit from trying to view the situation as if they were sitting in a Russian military headquarters in Murmansk.
Russian commanders in Murmansk have, like their Soviet predecessors, always recognized that they constitute an isolated outpost of Russian, previously Soviet, military power in sparsely populated terrain. Contemporary Russian commanders now need to not only confront the realities that the Russian military is, relative to NATO, nowhere near as strong as the Soviet military, that Finland and Sweden are now NATO member states, and, most importantly, that the United States and NATO more generally are well-positioned to deploy hundreds, if not thousands, of strike munitions to severely degrade the Russian military presence in Murmansk province, which includes the Kola Peninsula, and cut off reinforcements from elsewhere in Russia.
As things stand, the Russian military could, for example, deploy ten S-400 long-range surface-to-air missile batteries—an extremely unrealistic number—to locations around Murmansk province and still remain vulnerable to NATO air and missile strikes. The increasingly widespread deployment of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, and other long-range strike munitions more generally, by NATO countries will only further stress Russia’s air defence capabilities, which are heavily optimized toward intercepting crewed fixed-wing combat aircraft. In a similar vein, Russian military positions around Murmansk are highly exposed to multi-axis attacks by low-flying propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones. It bears emphasis that there are presently just four S-400 and S-300 batteries with peacetime garrisons in Murmansk province. Given the very high cost of such systems, Russia is unlikely to deploy anything close to ten S-400 batteries in Murmansk province for the foreseeable future.
While the Russian Navy has a very major presence around Murmansk province, the Russian surface fleet is very poorly positioned to contribute to air defence operations, not least in a context in which it has negligible ballistic missile defence capabilities to offer. The very existence of a major Russian naval presence is primarily what makes Murmansk province such a lucrative and likely high priority target for NATO, and Russia would in an important sense be better off without its critically important Northern Fleet were geographical realities not to demand the existence of extensive naval facilities in this isolated and sparsely populated outpost of not just Russian military power but of the Russian state itself.
As it concerns ground combat capabilities, there are two Russian Army combat brigades and one Russian Naval Infantry combat brigade garrisoned in and around Murmansk province. Once combat support and logistical support units are accounted for, Russia can put together a division-sized ground combat formation in this area. While this composite force outnumbers and outguns the Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish ground combat units that are garrisoned in areas near Russia’s Murmansk province in peacetime, Russia will, in wartime, be poorly positioned to dispatch significant reinforcements by land or air to Murmansk province. The composite division-sized Russian ground combat force in the area is not, as such, in any position to undertake a significant and sustainable offensive into NATO territory. Russia’s terrestrial supply routes north of Lake Ladoga, which traverse sparsely populated and often desolate terrain, are increasingly vulnerable to NATO interdiction efforts, and these supply lines are likely to become increasingly high-priority targets for NATO should Russian forces in Murmansk province undertake an offensive into NATO territory. It also bears emphasis that while a Russian ground offensive in the high north may initially encounter some success, Norway, Sweden, and Finland remain well-positioned to dispatch reinforcements, and Norway, in particular, is likely to quickly receive reinforcements from the United States and the United Kingdom. It is difficult to imagine how a composite division-sized Russian ground combat formation will be able to not just capture but also occupy significant territory in the contemporary military environment, one in which both Finland and Sweden are now NATO member states.
While Russian military capabilities should certainly not be dismissed out of hand, notwithstanding the poor performance of the Russian military throughout the Russia-Ukraine War, it is important to avoid exaggerating Russian military capabilities by underplaying Russia’s many limitations and vulnerabilities, which is essentially what made for much of the public debate in the 2014-2022 timeframe. All things considered, the Kola Peninsula and Russia’s Murmansk province more generally do not constitute a secure bastion that can serve as a springboard for a major Russian offensive into NATO territory in the Arctic Circle. The Russian military is highly exposed in this sector, which amounts to a vulnerable outpost of not just Russian military power but of the Russian state itself. Military and technological trends heavily favour NATO in this sector, and the Russian position is likely to become increasingly untenable unless the Russian military retrenches in this sector by adopting a defensive military posture.