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Russia’s Tu-22M bomber force has been largely irrelevant over the course of the Russia-Ukraine War on account of the limited selection of armaments it can employ. Ukrainian officials now claim that production of the Kh-32 liquid-fuelled rocket-powered supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, which has a (decidedly imperfect) secondary land-attack capability, has been suspended on account of poor effectiveness. As a result, Russia’s substantial force of supersonic Tu-22M bombers, which have considerable potential, is largely relegated to, at best, a tertiary role in the war absent the integration of one or more new armaments onto the Soviet-built airframes.
The Tu-22M has a curious design history and came to serve two different roles in the Soviet era under the Soviet Air Force’s Long-Range Aviation and Soviet Naval Aviation, respectively. In addition to unguided bombs, the Tu-22M became associated with the Kh-22, of which the aforementioned Kh-32 is the evolved variant, and the Kh-15, a solid-propellant air-launched short-range ballistic missile that is no longer in service. Specualtion and reports nowithstanding, there are no public indications that the quite large and heavy 9-S-7760 (“Kh-47 Kinzhal”) air-launched ballistic missile has been integrated onto the Tu-22M fleet, which perhaps ended up a positive development for the Russian Aerospace Force on account of the disappointing wartime performance of this air-launched ballistic missile design, which is to date exclusively associated with modified MiG-31K aircraft operated by the Russian Aerospace Forces’ Long-Range Aviation. Russia’s subsonic Tu-95 bomber aircraft and supersonic Tu-160 bomber aircraft are employed to launch subsonic land-attack cruise missiles, namely the Kh-101, which is notably not integrated onto the Tu-22M fleet.
For background on the Kh-22 and Kh-15, see:
As things stand, the Tu-22M serves little appreciable purpose in the context of the Russia-Ukraine War unless Moscow decides to further draw down on its Kh-22/Kh-32 stocks to little appreciable effect. All things considered, the supersonic Tu-22M airframe makes for an excellent launch platform for air-launched ballistic missiles, perhaps a modern take on the Soviet Kh-15 or an even smaller design in the vein of the Israeli Rampage. The Tu-22M may also be effectively employed as a launch platform for guided glide bombs such as the Russian UMPK and UMPB designs, including for the turbojet-powered variants thereof. A supersonic high-altitude launch from a position beyond 200 or so kilometers from the international border/frontlines would offer a significant range extension to powered and unpowered strike munitions alike. As a ballistic missile launch platform, the Tu-22M fleet is inherently very well suited to undertaking simultaneous multi-axis attacks against defended targets, including strikes against highly sectored ballistic missile defence systems such as Patriot—the fire control radars used by Ukraine’s Patriot systems have a field of view of no more than 120°. As things stand, however, Russia’s Tu-22M fleet may not be literally grounded or even significantly attrited by the Russia-Ukraine War, but may as well be, on account of not having suitable munitions integrated so as to bring its considerable weight to bear on a conflict that is fast approaching the start of its fifth year.