The following text was originally posted on the website of the Canadian International Council (CIC), which hosted me for a briefing on the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP). The following text was originally posted on the CIC website on 20 July, 2026.
German vendor TKMS has been selected as the preferred supplier for up to 12 new diesel-electric submarines under the Canadian Patrol Submarine Program (CPSP), which is intended to replace the Royal Canadian Navy’s (RCN) existing four-strong fleet of Victoria-class diesel-electric submarines. Much has been written on the selection of the TKMS offering—the Type 212CD—over the South Korean offering from Hanwha—namely the KSS-III Batch-II, the industrial and economic implications, as well as the diplomatic implications vis-a-vis Europe and NATO, on the one hand, and South Korea and the Asia-Pacific, on the other. While there is much to commend about how the procurement process out has played out thus far, and notwithstanding how there is, all things considered, limited scope to criticize the specific selection of the German design over the competing Korean design—absent access to non-public information—there is ample scope to be concerned as to why Canada is even undertaking such a massive generational investment toward submarines in the first place.
Specifically, what are the discrete threats, both extant and prospective, motivating this major investment toward undersea warfare capabilities? Is the procurement of up to twelve new submarines the best allocation of Canada’s finite resources toward national defence over the coming decades? There may be defence industrial and economic benefits, there may be diplomatic benefits, and the RCN will doubtless benefit in several respects, but Canadians deserve disciplined public policy and judicious stewardship of the public purse when it comes to allocating tens of billions of dollars and burdening future generations of taxpayers with a total life cycle cost that may exceed $100 billion. In a hypothetical world of unlimited resources and no resulting allocative trade-offs, Canada can procure not just twelve submarines, but any number of other things as well. As things stand, however, there is a very real risk that CPSP ends up being a bad investment for current and future generations of Canadians. The preferred supplier, TKMS, has not yet received a signed contract, and Ottawa is understood to have committed to an initial purchase of just four Type 212CD-class submarines. There is, as such, still time for Canada to reassess the current and prospective threat environment, undertake the critically missing public debate as to why submarines in general and twelve submarines in particular are what is needed, and potentially recalibrate at a time when the international order is in a state of flux, which should motivate the federal government to squeeze the greatest possible returns from every dollar it spends.
This text, which is divided into two parts, will offer a condensed threat-centric analysis to help bring Canadians up to speed as to what the contemporary and prospective undersea threat environment around North America looks like. This is a logically prior undertaking that has, it would seem, been desperately missing in public discussions and political debate over the CPSP. At the end of the day, Canada is procuring military equipment in the form of submarines to acquire military capabilities, namely undersea warfare capabilities. One can only hope that a threat-centric military analysis has been front and center in such a massive military procurement program.
Placing The Contemporary and Prospective Russian Undersea Threat In Its Proper Context
As with the Soviet Union before it, Russia possesses a formidable undersea warfare capability set. As of this writing, nuclear-powered submarines in particular constitute one of the few remaining crown jewels of post-Soviet Russian military industry, and some of Russia’s latest designs, most notably the Project 885M-class (NATO: Severodvinsk II, also known as the Yasen-M class), are well-regarded by foreign observers. Russia notably operates a very large submarine fleet, one that, on paper, poses a major potential direct threat to Canada—in and around North America—as well as an indirect threat by way of threatening Canada’s allies in Europe and North America. According to the 2026 edition of the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) Military Balance, Russia operates a total of 53 combat-oriented submarines of all types, 34 of which are nuclear-powered. On paper, the Russian submarine force may be menacing, but Canadians stand to benefit from placing the contemporary and future Russian undersea threat in its proper context.
The Russian submarine fleet may be large on paper, but is, among other things, decidedly heterogeneous and, no less importantly, divided between multiple far-flung and functionally independent fleets. According to the 2026 edition of the Military Balance, Russia operates:
7 Project 949A-class (NATO: Oscar II) nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), 3 of which are in long-term refit
1 Project 885-class SSN (NATO: Severodvinsk I)
4 Project 885M-class SSNs (NATO: Severodvinsk II)
2 Project 954A-class SSNs (NATO: Sierra II)
2 Project 671RTMK-class SSNs (NATO: Victor III)
3 Project 971-class SSNs (NATO: Akula I), with additional hulls undergoing protracted refits
2 Project 971U/M-class SSNs (NATO: Akula II)
In addition to the aforementioned 21 SSNs, which are the focus of this analysis and the primary submarines of concern to the RCN in the waters around North America, Russia also operates 13 nuclear-armed nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), as well as a total of 19 diesel-electric submarines.
The Russian submarine force is divided between multiple—four—far-flung and functionally independent fleets. Only the Russian Northern Fleet, which is concentrated in and around the Kola Peninsula, and the Russian Pacific Fleet, which divides its submarines between Vladivostok (diesel-electric submarines) and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy (nuclear-powered submarines), operate SSNs. The Northern Fleet, which primarily operates in the North Atlantic and the marginal seas of the Arctic Ocean adjacent to Russia, operates 13 SSNs alongside 7 SSBNs and 3 diesel-electric submarines. The Pacific Fleet, meanwhile, operates 7 SSNs alongside 5 SSBNs and 10 diesel-electric submarines. In principle, SSNs from both of these fleets can operate around the Canadian Arctic, although the larger SSN force within the Northern Fleet is better positioned to do so.
Given these dispositions and numbers, Canadian public debate on CPSP stands to benefit from disaggregating the Russian submarine force. In the Atlantic, Russia can only make use of up to 13 SSNs. In the Pacific, Russia can only make use of up to 7 SSNs. Russian SSBNs and diesel-electric submarines are unlikely to operate near North America. These are, however, indirectly relevant in several other respects. Russian diesel-electric submarines play an important defensive role in certain sectors, which, in principle, frees up Russian SSNs for operations elsewhere. Russian SSBNs, however, are not known to operate in the roaming manner of American SSBNs for reasons that are beyond the scope of this analysis. Suffice to say, some number of Russian SSNs are likely to be restricted to operating in the vicinity of the Kola and Kamchatka Peninsulas to protect Russian SSBNs from American SSNs. Furthermore, a significant part of the Russian SSN fleet is of late Soviet construction—which is to say very old and in need of replacement. Russia is not, moreover, immune to the universal reality in which three to four submarines are required in a fleet just to have one submarine at sea/available for deployment on very short notice.
Given the above, the Northern Fleet may possess a total of 13 SSNs, but, in practice, can only deploy 3-4 at any given time/on short notice, and will likely struggle to put even 8 SSNs to sea with ample preparation time. The Pacific Fleet, meanwhile, only possesses a total of 7 SSNs and can, as such, only be realistically expected to deploy no more than 2-3 SSNs at any given time. As indicated earlier, some number of Russian SSNs will likely be restricted to defensively oriented patrols in support of the Russian SSBN. It is worth pointing out that Russia places increasing emphasis on its nuclear-powered and diesel-electric attack submarines as land-attack cruise missile launchers. Russian SSNs allocated toward undertaking conventional strike missions will have circumscribed flexibility in terms of deployment (i.e., launch areas). As with the envisaged future twelve-strong Canadian submarine fleet, Russian SSNs cannot be everywhere all at once and simultaneously undertake all potential missions, including in the vicinity of Canada.
Whatever presumption Canadians make of the qualitative attributes of the Russian SSN fleet, the latest Project 885M SSNs (NATO: Severodvinsk II), also known as the Yasen-M class, presently constitute just 19% of the 21-hull-strong Russian SSN fleet. Analytical sobriety is needed to place the Russian undersea threat in its proper context. There is an extant contemporary direct Russian undersea threat to Canada in the waters near North America, but it is decidedly bounded in both qualitative and quantitative terms. The dislocations and uncertainties brought about the Russia-Ukraine War notwithstanding, the Russian SSN fleet is, of course, likely to only evolve and improve over time, at least in absolute qualitative terms, but it is important to recognize that we are unlikely to see a significant expansion of the Russian SSN fleet resulting from the large-scale construction of the very complex and expensive Project 885M-class SSN design (NATO: Severodvisnk II), or even its planned successor, the in-development Project 545-class (also known as the Laika-class).
SSNs and SSBNs may constitute some of the few remaining crown jewels of post-Soviet Russian military industry, but Russia’s resources and industrial capabilities are limited. Production capacity that can be allocated toward new SSNs is finite—most Russian shipyards can build some form of surface warship, but cannot build submarines, certainly not very large and complex nuclear-powered submarines, the production of which is now consolidated at a single shipyard, Sevmash. It also bears emphasis that Russia faces major headwinds in keeping up with the rapidly expanding technological frontier amid the ever-intensifying military-technological competition between China and the United States, not least on account of the dislocations and uncertainties brought about by the Russia-Ukraine War. Simply put, Russia may or may not be able to maintain a fleet of 21 or so competitive SSNs over the course of the 2030s and into the 2040s, let alone significantly expand its SSN fleet.
Beyond the circa 2040 timeframe, which is to say over the decades in which Canada’s future Type 212CD-class submarines will be operational, much is uncertain beyond the fact that most of Russia’s existing SSNs will require replacement and the fact that Russia can no longer simply live off the fruits of late Cold War Soviet research and development activities. Leaving aside the profound political uncertainties as to the nature and trajectory of the Russian Federation once Vladimir Putin dies, Canadians need to be mindful that the present-day Russian undersea threat is not only bounded in both qualitative and quantitative terms, but is also not on a trajectory of qualitative and/or quantitative growth heading into the 2030-2040 timeframe.
Placing The Contemporary and Prospective Chinese Undersea Threat In Its Proper Context
The Russian SSN fleet is, by virtue of being the successor to the Soviet SSN fleet, the familiar—“traditional”—threat to the RCN and Canadians more generally. Russia is not, however, the pacing military and military-technological threat—in both qualitative and quantitative terms—for NATO member states, above all the United States. The pacing threat is increasingly China, which has, as of 2026, surpassed Russia in an ever-expanding list of areas of military technology, dramatically closed the gap with the United States in many areas of military technology, and is increasingly expanding the technological frontier itself. Canadian public debate concerning military procurement—not limited to CPSP—is, however, rather mute when it comes to the military threat that China poses at present, and, more to the point, the military threat China may come to pose to Canada over the coming decades.
Much the same can, using broad strokes, be said about official public documents released by the federal government, as well as public on-record speeches by Canada’s senior civilian and military leaders. As of this writing, the still quite small and, in terms of extant operational hulls, qualitatively limited Chinese SSN fleet does not pose much of a threat to Canada, but Canada will not be receiving its first new diesel-electric submarines until the mid-2030s. According to the 2026 edition of the Military Balance, China currently operates some 9 Type 093-class SSNs, which exist in several distinct variants, alongside 6 Type 094-class SSBNs, as well as 46 diesel-electric submarines (extant Chinese diesel-electric submarines pose no appreciable threat to Canada in the waters around North America).
On paper, the present-day Chinese undersea threat to Canada—in the waters near North America—is very limited in purely quantitative terms relative to the threat posed by Russia. As things stand, however, public reporting indicates that China is on a trajectory to experience a profoundly consequential qualitative and quantitative expansion of its undersea warfare capabilities, a dynamic which may well lead to progressively more advanced Chinese SSNs becoming the more challenging—and perhaps the primary—threat to Canada and the RCN over the coming decades.
While China’s present-day nuclear-powered submarine fleet—which includes decidedly heterogeneous and progressively more refined Type 093-class SSNs—remains largely hidden behind a veil of secrecy, Canadians need to be aware that there are very major shifts underway in China’s undersea warfare capabilities. Although the details are beyond the scope of this analysis, it is important to convey that China has, in recent years, significantly expanded the shipyard—near Huludao along the Bohai Sea—primarily associated—to date—with constructing SSNs and SSBNs. As of this writing, there reportedly exist two new Chinese nuclear-powered submarine designs—seemingly SSNs—in the water, one of which appears to be the long-expected Type 095-class SSN. Notably, one of these apparent new Chinese SSN designs has been built at another shipyard, that is, a second, near Shanghai, which has not previously built nuclear-powered submarines.
There also exists a third, very different, primarily diesel-electric submarine design—the reported Zhou-class—with a reported (small) auxiliary nuclear propulsion system. While this third design should not be understood as a “true” SSN but a wholly new formulation of submarine, one that is, all things considered, unlikely to operate near North America, this peculiar area of Chinese effort in submarine technology may well have the effect of helping freeing up China’s potentially much-expanded future fleet of “true” SSNs to operate much further from the Chinese coastline over the coming years. This third nuclear-powered design is notably built at yet another, that is, third, shipyard near Wuhan, which should underscore just how well positioned China, a titan in both naval and merchant shipbuilding, is to undertake a profoundly consequential nuclear-powered submarine construction spree.
Last but not least, China is also known to be working on a successor SSBN design, the long-anticipated Type 096-class. While a Chinese SSBN is unlikely to operate anywhere near Canada, this forthcoming Chinese SSBN design, or perhaps a derivative thereof, may come to constitute the basis of a conventionally armed land-attack-oriented Chinese nuclear-powered submarine in the vein of the four modified Ohio-class SSBNs operated by the U.S. Navy. Should China develop and deploy a conceptually similar SSBN derivative as a means of attacking distant targets with conventionally armed ballistic and/or cruise missiles, American territory in North America—likely not Canada itself per se—is likely to be a very high priority target.
Although public domain information, which should inherently be treated with caution, has long suggested that Russia retains a qualitative lead over China in key performance parameters in submarine technology, including both reactor design and acoustic signature management, one can only expect China to eventually match, if not surpass, Russia in this area of military technology if it has not already done so, much as China has in so many other areas of military technology. There are, to be clear, major analytical uncertainties on the qualitative front, at least when operating with publicly available open-source information, but Canadians need to be mindful that the Chinese undersea threat will likely only expand even if China undertakes an SSN construction spree without significantly closing the qualitative gap relative to the latest in Russian SSN technology, let alone American SSN technology.
Given the above, there exists a very real possibility that, over the course of the 2030s and beyond, which is to say by the time Canada operationally deploys its new Type 212CD-class submarines, Canada and the RCN will likely have much greater cause for concern when it comes to Chinese nuclear-powered submarines than Russian nuclear-powered submarines, not least on account of the present and prospective quantitative limitations of the Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet vis-a-vis Canada. There are two major uncertainties at play for Canada vis-a-vis Chinese undersea capabilities going forward.
First, how many SSNs is China projected to deploy by, say, 2030, 2040, and 2050? Canada’s intelligence apparatus has presumably furnished Canadian decision-makers, including the persons involved with making the final selection in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), with assessments on such matters during the CPSP process, but Canadians, seemingly including many members of parliament, are left in the dark by virtue of how little the federal government discloses in terms of medium- and long-term threat projections.
Second, does Canada’s intelligence apparatus assess China as being likely to place any discernible emphasis on deploying nuclear-powered submarines near Canada, including but not limited to the Canadian Arctic? If the answer is no, then the RCN can presumably optimize its undersea warfare capabilities against the qualitatively and quantitatively limited Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet. There are, however, major uncertainties at play. There exists a very real possibility that China will soon initiate a nuclear-powered attack submarine construction spree in the vein of the still ongoing construction spree for surface warships it has undertaken since circa 2010. A much larger nuclear-powered submarine fleet will allow Beijing, which can presently draw upon fewer than 10 operational SSNs, to begin to seriously consider a more or less sustained, if not permanent, forward presence of one or more nuclear-powered attack submarines off the western coast of North America, and quite possibly such a presence off the eastern coast of North America. The former potentiality should be of concern to Canada for multiple reasons, including the proximity of Vancouver and important maritime infrastructure near the approaches to lucrative targets in the form of American facilities around Seattle. The latter potentiality is likely to be of particular concern to Canada, given how a transit of the Northwest Passage to reach the northwestern Atlantic Ocean from Chinese ports constitutes a much shorter and more practical route than reaching the Atlantic via the Indian Ocean. More generally, China faces strong incentives to sustain a forward presence of one or more SSNs near Alaska and the Aleutians.
All things considered, Canada faces a prospective threat environment over the course of the 2030s and beyond in which the Chinese Navy may not merely be a threat the RCN must take into account when forward-deploying Canadian warships in the western Pacific but a threat, whether direct or indirect, in Canada’s own backyard. If nothing else, the looming Chinese undersea threat emerging on the horizon inherently begs the question of whether the selected Type 212CD design, or indeed the unselected KSS-III Batch II design, will be fit for purpose against the pacing threat of Chinese SSNs by circa 2040 and beyond.
The analysis presented thus far has focused on extant and prospective Russian and Chinese undersea warfare capabilities. If viewed in isolation, the analysis can be interpreted as quite emphatically, albeit implicitly, supportive of the notion that Canada needs to significantly enhance its undersea warfare capabilities, albeit more out of concern about the threat China may pose in the future than the threat Russia poses at present or, in all likelihood, in the future. Such a reading will, however, be premature and erroneous without a realistic appraisal of what undersea warfare, broadly defined, will even look like in the waters around Canada, including but not limited to the Canadian Arctic. One of the most problematic shortcomings of public debate around CPSP concerns the paucity of concrete statements as to how submarines, specifically diesel-electric submarines, are to be precisely used in furtherance of Canada’s security.
To illustrate this all-important dynamic, it is productive to consider how the new commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, Vice-Admiral Dan Charlebois, recently characterized submarines as the “ultimate deterrent” while Secretary of State for Defence Procurement Stephen Fuhr recently said that “submarines are a massive deterrent.” These statements from senior officials who have presumably been intimately briefed on the CPSP front draw attention to the problematic manner in which the submarine procurement effort has been justified in public thus far. Both Charlebois and Fuhr made logically incomplete statements. Submarines are an “ultimate deterrent” and “massive deterrent” against what adversary action(s), specifically? How exactly do submarines even “deter”? Will the mere existence of Canadian submarines and their potential presence in a one or more specific tracts of water around Canada’s immense coastline along three oceans intrinsically deter Canada’s adversaries from deploying their surface ships and submarines in international waters off the North America’s western and eastern coastlines, or, no less importantly, in the Canadian Artctic, which Canada uniquely considers to be its internal waters in a manner that is—as a matter of fact—inconsistent with prevailing international interpretation(s) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)?
There are, to be clear, official documents that offer some insight into Ottawa’s thinking on the matter. Our North, Strong and Free, the defence policy document from 2024, articulated the case for procuring submarines as follows: “We will explore options for renewing and expanding our submarine fleet to enable the Royal Canadian Navy to project a persistent deterrent on all three coasts, with under-ice capable, conventionally powered submarines. Submarines allow Canada to covertly detect and deter maritime threats, control our maritime approaches, and project power and striking capability further from our shores, at a time when Russian submarines are probing widely across the Atlantic, Arctic and Pacific Oceans and China is rapidly expanding its underwater fleet.” (emphasis added) This second, similarly condensed, part of this analysis will briefly draw attention to several important dynamics that have received inadequate attention in public discussion and political debate concerning CPSP. Simply stated, the causal chain through which procuring up to twelve submarines—whether the German Type 212CD or the South Korean KSS-III Batch-II—through the CPSP will enhance Canada’s security is not so direct, not least in a context in which the interplay of climate change and China’s ongoing naval modernization may result in a very different threat environment than what Canada and the RCN have grown accustomed to since the Cold War.
Toward A Realistic Appraisal of Undersea Warfare In The Waters Around Canada
Given concerns about how climate change will open up the Canadian Arctic to sustained maritime activity, including both merchant shipping and naval vessels, it is important to consider what the threat(s) to Canada may be and what submarines can help with. Should the waters of the Northwest Passage be sufficiently ice-free for merchant shipping beyond specialized ice-rated vessels, naval and coast guard vessels, including vessels with ice-rated hulls well below the standards of fully-fledged icebreakers, can be used by the RCN as well as the Canadian Coast Guard to keep tabs on foreign merchant ships and naval vessels, including the armed surface ships of adversaries. While such patrol vessels may be limited in terms of combat capabilities, there are a great many ways to damage, if not destroy and sink, adversary merchant ships (which are, by definition, unarmed), an adversary’s fully-fledged warships, and other adversary surface ships, such as icebreakers and paramilitary coast guard vessels (which are typically equipped with limited armament, if any at all), through means that do not require the presence of a Canadian submarine near the Canadian Arctic.
While a 533 mm diameter heavyweight torpedo launched from a submarine can utterly devastate, if not outright sink, all but the largest and most resilient of ships, submarines, especially the diesel-electric submarines Canada is procuring under CPSP, are quite slow—in terms of sustained submerged speed— and not very responsive, not least in the confined waters of the Canadian Arctic—submarines will have to navigate around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago in much the same manner as surface ships. Although the Type 212CD-class design can be used to launch anti-ship cruise missiles—via its torpedo tubes—against distant ships from forward launch positions in the Canadian Arctic, it is far more practical to turn to ground-based fixed-wing aircraft—equipped with stand-off powered anti-ship munitions—to hold adversary ships at risk on very short notice across the entirety of the Canadian Arctic and adjacent waters. It also bears emphasis that Canadian diesel-electric submarines will struggle to keep up with adversary warships powered by gas turbines, which can sustain a maximum speed of around 30 knots in open waters. As such, the RCN will have to ultimately rely on Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) fixed-wing aircraft—as well as American combat aircraft—as a backstop when it comes to holding adversary ships at risk around North America, even if Ottawa persists in orchestrating the delivery of twelve Type 212CD-class submarines to the RCN.
The fundamental problem with CPSP and aligning the selected means with the desired ends concerns how submarines are highly specialized and extremely inflexible military tools, certainly when compared to surface warships and, in more limited terms, when compared to fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft, which are very limited in terms of endurance vis-a-vis both surface warships and submarines. As articulated in Our North, Strong and Free, submarines make for excellent covert underwater sensing platforms, which is to say semi-mobile submerged sonar pickets. While there are various non-exclusive approaches through which Canada can detect and track foreign surface ships of all types operating in the Canadian Arctic, Canadian submarines constitute one of the best ways through which Canada can, in principle, both detect and track (submerged) adversary submarines operating around the Canadian Arctic. The employment of submarines as submerged sonar pickets, however, also draws attention to one of the greatest limitations of submarines in times of peacetime, crisis, and war.
Suppose that a Canadian Type 212CD submarine is on patrol in Lancaster Sound, a 60-100 kilometer-wide body of water that separates Baffin Island and Devon Island. Suppose that the Canadian submarine manages to detect an adversary submarine—an SSN—without itself being detected. How exactly is the Canadian submarine supposed to deter the adversary submarine from persisting in operating in the Canadian Arctic, which Canada uniquely considers to be its internal waters, notwithstanding how this is inconsistent with prevailing international interpretation(s) of UNCLOS? Short of an all-out war, the Canadian submarine is unlikely to “shoot first” after detecting the adversary submarine, even if the latter is operating in what Canada considers to be its internal waters, so the Canadian submarine can, at most, notify Ottawa of the presence of the adversary submarine and perhaps give pursuit.
Simply stated, Canadian submarines cannot force the likes of China and Russia—or even the United States—to seek Ottawa’s permission to operate in the Canadian Arctic, including but not limited to the Northwest Passage, not unless Canada is willing and able to credibly threaten the use of force if other countries do not accede to its demands concerning the declared internal waters status of the Canadian Arctic. As explained earlier, submarines are highly specialized and extremely inflexible military tools. Yes, a submarine will, all else being equal, be better positioned to detect a submerged adversary in the waters in a given tract of the Canadian Arctic than a surface warship or maritime patrol aircraft, but there is little that a submarine can be used for in such a context short of an all-out war in which a submarine can be employed as both a semi-submerged sonar picket and a submerged torpedo launcher against adversary submarines.
Insofar as CPSP is primarily motivated by the current and prospective threat posed by adversary submarines around North America, which is not an unreasonable assumption given how there are multiple more practical approaches toward dealing with adversary surface ships, Canadians needs to recognize that the RCN will be primarily, if not exclusively, dealing with adversary nuclear-powered submarines—that is, primarily, if not exclusively, SSNs. While lithium-ion batteries and so-called air-independent propulsion systems, such as the fuel cells that come with the Type 212CD-class design, amount to a major advance over the lead-acid batteries that have been standard on diesel-electric submarines for decades, adversary nuclear-powered submarines will have an intrinsic advantage in terms of both speed and endurance on account of the inescapable realities of energy density and specific energy. This is not, to be clear, an indictment of the selected German Type 212CD, as it also affects the South Korean KSS-III Batch-II and all other non-nuclear-powered submarine designs under consideration for CPSP.
Suppose once again that a Canadian Type 212CD submarine is on patrol in Lancaster Sound, which separates Baffin Island and Devon Island. Suppose the Canadian submarine manages to detect an adversary submarine—an SSN—without itself being detected. Short of an all-out war, Canada is unlikely to shoot first, so the Canadian submarine can, at most, notify Ottawa of the presence of the adversary submarine and perhaps give pursuit. Even if we suppose that the adversary SSN is operating at a very slow speed to minimize its acoustic signature—and, elsewhere, to safely navigate submerged in confined and/or shallow waters, it will be able to operate at a speed that will far exceed what the Canadian Type 212CD submarine can sustain—after having abandoned its position and tasking as a sonar picket in Lancaster Sound even though there may well exist a second, if not a third, adversary submarine approaching the area. It bears emphasis that adversary submarines have little incentive to linger in an area like Lancaster Sound, given how the Northwest Passage is fundamentally something of a highway to reach either the Atlantic or the Pacific. It is also important to consider that Canadian submarines operating off the West Coast, as well as the East Coast, will face an even greater challenge against adversary SSNs in open waters, where adversary SSNs can readily operate near their maximum speeds, which is to say at speeds far beyond what a hypothetical Canadian Type 212CD-class submarine—or a Canadian KSS-III Batch-II submarine—will be able to sustain.
Given the above and the implausibility of the mere existence of Canadian diesel-electric submarines “deterring” adversary submarines from operating near North America and in the Canadian Arctic, not least on account of the intrinsic speed and endurance advantages held by adversary SSNs, Canada needs to think hard about what is to be done if and when adversary SSNs—particularly Chinese SSNs—employ the Canadian Arctic as a highway to reach the Atlantic from the Pacific in times of peace and crisis, which is to say short of an all-out war—which somehow involves Canada as a belligerent at the outset—in which a Canadian submarine can readily use force upon detecting an adversary submarine in what Ottawa considers to be Canadian internal waters.
Impressive though the Type 212CD-class design is—as is the case with the Korean KSS-III Batch-II—it has limited utility in truly deterring adversary submarine—especially adversary SSN activity—activity in the Canadian Arctic beyond serving as a semi-mobile underwater sonar picket, at least not without a Canadian diesel-electric submarine fleet that is much larger than 12 hulls, which will only allow 3-4 submarines to be at sea on a sustained basis or on very short notice. All things considered, Canada will, short of initiating hostilities by attacking adversary submarines “on sight,” require very major investments toward anti-submarine warfare capabilities across the board, including surface ships and aircraft, as well as extensive coordination with the United States, including but not limited to the waters between the Bering Strait in the west and the Davis Strait in the east. The submarines that Canada intends to procure under CPSP will add a not insignificant capability to the RCN, albeit with a massive price tag, but even a cursory attempt toward a realistic appraisal of undersea warfare in the waters around Canada should raise questions about how the selected means align with the desired ends in light of how submarines are highly specialized and extremely inflexible military tools short of an all-out war.
Conclusion
As with any large-scale government program, the CPSP will (re)distribute large sums to a great many pockets, not least on account of how the Carney government made a concerted and ultimately successful effort to seek industrial offsets and workshare from the two shortlisted vendors. The interplay of the realities of political economy with Canada’s peculiar electoral system may well mean that the CPSP train may be politically more or less unstoppable once the dollars begin to flow. Even so, Canada runs the risk of making an unnecessarily expensive—excessive—resource allocation toward undersea warfare capabilities in the form of submarines. Canadians are fortunate that Ottawa has committed to ordering just an initial four submarines as part of the contracted negotiations initiated with the preferred supplier, TKMS. Canadians are not, therefore, on the hook just yet, certainly not with respect to the potential eight additional hulls. While public discussion and political debate appear to have gotten lost in focus on industrial benefits and diplomatic and alliance considerations, as well as the technical particulars of the competing designs, there is still time for a rigorous and sober public debate as to what Canada intends to do with a substantially enlarged submarine fleet and, as such, still time for a potential course correction.