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The Wall Street Journal recently carried an op-ed-style piece that placed great emphasis on American ballistic missile defence (BMD) interceptor stocks to ask whether “America [is] still capable of enforcing the world order?” A widely circulating recent CSIS analysis estimated the American arsenal of BMD-optimized PAC-3 CRI and PAC-3 MSE interceptors at under 850 (these stocks are complemented by a likely larger number of non-BMD-optimized PAC-2 interceptors). A serious analyst with time on their hands would do well to estimate current American and allied BMD interceptor stocks, on the one hand (with allies separated by region), and adversary ballistic missile stocks on the other (with adversaries also separated by region). Stated differently, how many ~sub-1000 kilometer range ballistic missiles do China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia collectively possess, and how do those figures, separated by region, compare with American and, in a separate adjacent column, allied stocks of BMD interceptors? There is a lot of uncertainty in this area, and some American allies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, among others, have non-depleted stocks of interceptors for Patriot and other systems, but the situation is unlikely to look very good for at least several years, which is to say until yet another major planned expansion of Patriot interceptor production takes hold.
A serious analyst with even more time on their hands would complement the above analysis with estimates of current Chinese, Iranian, North Korean, and Russian ballistic missile production as well as projected future production by these countries, such as over a three-to-five year timeframe. If there is a “race”-type dynamic in this area, a holistic forward-looking analysis will be required, one that is very difficult to undertake without baseless speculation when limited to publicly available data. Uncertainties notwithstanding, it bears emphasis that America’s adversaries—which are not a monolith and are very unlikely to simultaneously be at war and/or share their ballistic missiles with one another in the manner in which American allies sometimes share, even to a limited degree, BMD interceptors with one another—will require a substantially larger arsenal of ballistic missiles than there exist American and allied BMD interceptors. A 1:1 ratio will not do, as it will, all else being equal, result in no net penetrations (assuming a 100% reliability and accuracy rate for both adversary ballistic missiles and allied BMD interceptors—neither assumption is realistic). Ballistic missiles are not merely procured to help deplete opposing BMD capabilities, but to damage, if not destroy, targets. This requires very large stocks of ballistic missiles so as to establish scope for a substantial number of net penetrations. While defenders bear the burden of having to be strong everywhere, American allies are unlikely to have cause for fatalism unless and until America’s adversaries go out of their way to share their ballistic missile arsenals for maximal effect, a dynamic that is exceptionally unlikely.