Minimal comment-themed posts are used to introduce data points for use in other posts going forward. Posts of this theme will typically feature minimal analysis and commentary.
In several recent posts, I have covered recent developments in the posture of the China Coast Guard (CCG), a paramilitary organization that is part of the paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP) and answers to China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) in the same manner as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In recent years, the CCG has established what is best characterized as a fast-expanding armed “high seas fleet” that appears to be intended to not only intimidate and overpower rival claimants in the disputed waters of the South China Sea but also to spearhead a PLAN-backstopped quarantine/blockade type operation in the event of a major crisis over the political fate of Taiwan. The CCG’s fast-expanding “high seas fleet” is also likely to increasingly serve as an adjunct to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in disputed sectors of the East China Sea and regularly operate in the western parts of the Philippine Sea. As a result, the CCG’s “high seas fleet” is likely to become a growing thorn for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) in times of peace as well as in crises over the political fate of Taiwan.
One of the important questions concerning the future of the CCG is the extent to which its expanding fleet of larger, longer endurance patrol ships, including the vessels that constitute the CCG’s “high seas fleet,” is going to regularly deploy in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. While this is, for the most part, a function of where CCG vessels are homeported, it will also be shaped by the extent to which the CCG is willing and able to rely on smaller and more numerous patrol vessels in its regular standoffs with the Philippines. Relatedly, the scope of the challenge posed by the PLAN to Japan in peacetime will be affected by the extent to which Chinese decision-makers continue to deploy PLAN vessels to serve as a backstop to CCG and Chinese Maritime Militia vessels in the South China Sea.
Another important dynamic that affects Japan is that the CCG is gradually expanding its “overseas” presence in distant waters. The CCG recently completed its tenth North Pacific patrol, and its expanding fleet is increasingly well-positioned to regularly operate in the North Pacific. This may entail the transit of CCG vessels through the Sea of Japan and the passage of both the Tsushima Strait and the La Perouse/Soya Strait. It may also entail the transit of CCG vessels off Japan’s eastern coastline.
Another dynamic to keep in mind is that the CCG is gradually expanding its aviation capabilities. With additional helicopters available, an increasing portion of the CCG’s expanding fleet of flight deck and hangar-equipped vessels will be able to go to sea with an embarked CCG helicopter. The CCG is also deploying vertical take-off and landing (unarmed) fixed-wing uncrewed aircraft to both complement and substitute for CCG helicopters. A CCG vessel in the Sea of Japan or off Japan’s eastern coastline is not, as such, simply a vessel to be monitored but also an aircraft to be monitored. It is worth noting that the CCG has also acquired land-based fixed-wing (unarmed) uncrewed aircraft that can undertake long-distance and long-endurance patrols. CCG uncrewed aircraft patrolling for hours around Japan’s Ryukyu Islands, and CCG uncrewed aircraft patrolling near Tokyo Bay, may become regular undertakings in the not-too-distant future.