"FPV" Drone Strikes Against Petrol/Gas Stations In Russia And Ukraine Highlights Increasing Scope For The Surgical Targeting of Fixed Infrastructure Sites

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Note: This post expands on the theme of one of my previous posts. This is an issue area that I take great interest in, and the videos featured in this post are likely to be a harbinger of what is to come in terms of short-range strike capabilities worldwide. Expect additional posts dealing with this theme.

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Viewing so-called “First Person Video” (“FPV”) drone footage from the Russia-Ukraine War is often a quite sordid affair. There are, however, several “genres” of “FPV” drone footage that are not only more palatable to non-sadistic audiences by virtue of not (directly) depicting the injuring or killing of any human beings but by offering a window into the new options—and new threats—enabled by technological change. One such “genre” is the employment of armed “FPV” drones, typically of the multirotor as opposed to the fixed-wing variety, against fixed—stationary—structures of various types. This dynamic is best characterized as the highly surgical micro-level targeting of fixed—stationary—sites, including critical infrastructure. While severely limited in terms of both range and destructive effects, technological change in the form of low-cost and plentiful armed “FPV” multirotor drones weighing just several kilograms allows militaries to attack an incredibly and unprecedentedly large and diverse (potential) target bank that was previously not possible due to the qualitative and/or quantitative limitations of strike capabilities broadly conceived.1

This post focuses on several videos posted on Telegram in June and July 2025 that show armed “FPV” multirotors being used to target gas/petrol stations and related local small-scale energy storage and distribution infrastructure. While there is precedent for the targeting of such facilities in the Russia-Ukraine War, the use of armed “FPV” multirotor drones for such purposes remains quite novel, and the use of armed “FPV” multirotor drones of the fiber optic (FO)—as opposed to those of the radio frequency (RF) variety—in such roles is not only particularly novel but lends itself to a high level of potential accuracy, destructive effects, and, as such, effectiveness.

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In late July, two videos were posted on the Telegram account of user “@supernova_plus”. These videos showed an armed “First Person Video” (“FPV”) multirotor drone—seemingly Ukrainian—attacking a petrol/gas station near Pyatnitskoe in Russia’s Belgorod province. These videos were geolocated by the X/Twitter user “@99Dominik_" to the following coordinates: 50.410922, 37.839131. The petrol/gas station in question is located just over 18 kilometers from the international border. While this distance falls within the maximum range of many armed “FPV” multirotor drones used in the Russia-Ukraine War, the targeted petrol/gas station may nevertheless have been near the maximum range of the specific—seemingly Ukrainian—armed “FPV” multirotor drone in question.

It is important to note that it is atypical for munitions not employed by small combat echelons, such as an infantry squad or platoon, to be located at and launched from the forward-most positions along the frontlines (i.e., the Forward Edge of the Battle Area, or FEBA). A munition that may have a nominal maximum range of 30 kilometers—powered munitions, including electrically-powered multirotor drones, are best understood as having a maximum range-endurnace, with endurance decreasing range and vice versa—may well be launched from a position located from 10 kilometers from the FEBA given that the FEBAs tend to be, and certainly are in the Russia-Ukraine War, an extremely dangerous place to linger. It is, therefore, possible that the remote operator of the armed “FPV” multirotor drone in question may have been searching for a nearby target of opportunity as the low battery warning repeatedly flashed into view.

While this is speculative, it nevertheless bears emphasis that the maximum practical range—range-endurnace—of armed “FPV” multirotor drones assumes a one-way flight in which the uncrewed aircraft is employed as a single-use munition. With no possibility of returning to an area in which the remote human operator or friendly forces can recover the armed “FPV” multirotor drones, the remote human operators of armed “FPV” multirotor drones are strongly incentivized to attack something—anything—before the battery is depleted and the uncrewed aircraft haphazardly falls to the ground, a dynamic that may or may not result in a detonation given systematic problems with the fusing of the typically ersatz warheads attached to armed “FPV” multirotor drones in the Russia-Ukraine War.

The first video shows an armed “FPV” multirotor in the moments before it attacks a petrol/gas pump at a petrol/gas station in Russia’s Belgorod province. The video is recorded by a person inside the service building, and the presence of a person in bright green clothing is likely indicative of an employee. All of this is to say that this petrol/gas station was almost certainly in operation at the time it was attacked. No vehicle, whether civilian or military, can be seen at the specific pump that was attacked, a dynamic that is confirmed in the second video.

It is important to note that “FPV” multirotor drones are equipped with small high explosive-fragmentation warheads that typically weigh no more than two to three kilograms. The destructive radius of such warheads against matter other than soft tissue and similar materials is quite limited. A direct hit is, therefore, typically required to significantly damage, let alone destroy, many structures, but certain types of targets are more readily subjected to damage and can be more susceptible to combustion. Petrol/gas pumps constitute a textbook example of a non-inert target type that is likely to be subject to secondary damage following a direct impact from an explosive or even a nearby detonation. Even so, fires can be contained, and rendering a petrol/gas station offline will generally require the employment of multiple armed “FPV” multirotors, with each of these uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions being limited to targeting a single discrete aim point, which is to say a single petrol/gas pump.

It is important to note that there are other appealing discrete aim points at petrol/gas stations. This includes objects such as propane cylinders and propane tanks as well as the main—either underground (shallow depth, non-hardened, and necessarily partially exposed) tank(s) storing petroleum products, including diesel fuel. Targeting diesel fuel pumps and storage tanks is particularly important because most military vehicles run on diesel. The primary exceptions are petrol/gasoline-combusting vehicles ordinarily driven by civilians that are adapted—painted—for military use. It is also important to note that the specific petrol/gas pump targeted in the above two videos is not under the environmental shelter that covers the other pumps. That is, this particular pump does not have a height restriction and, as such, is likely to have been a diesel dispensing pump that can be used by larger commercial vehicles and trucks.

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The second video is a compilation posted by the Telegram account “@zogrussia1,” which is associated with one of Russia’s expanding roster of armed “FPV” multirotor units. As with their Ukrainian counterparts, these Russian units have a social media presence and advertise—gloat about—their attacks. While primarily motivated by a desire to raise funds through donations, it is important to note that this dynamic is enabled by the fact that armed “FPV” multirotor drones are sensor-equipped human-in-the-loop uncrewed aircraft turned munitions that transmit the flight sequence, including the critical final moments of flight prior to impact with the intended target, to the remote human operator who can, in turn, share such footage on social media.

While undated, this video compilation, which I have trimmed for the purposes of this post, is likely to feature recently recorded footage. Among other things, this video compilation shows the targeting of:

• A petrol/gas station pump through the use of what is likely to be an FO armed “FPV” multirotor drone. Note the very low altitude flight toward the fuel/gas pump, which would typically result in the loss of the line-of-sight RF communications up/down link for armed “FPV” multirotor drones that are exclusively RF designs.

• Two fairly large cylindrical propane tanks at one outdoor site through what are likely to be FO armed “FPV” multirotor drones. Note the slow and deliberate low altitude maneuverability enabled by the use of FO guidance on armed “FPV” multirotor drones. Note also the high definition video feed, which is a hallmark of armed “FPV” multirotor drones using FO guidance.

• A dramatic explosion resulting from the successful targeting of a fuel tank located on the premises of a petrol/gas station near a residential area. This particular attack sequence was notably recorded by another FO armed “FPV” multirotor drone, which was itself later employed to target one of the petrol/gas pumps.

Multiple characteristics of this video compilation are suggestive of a deliberate and rather systematic approach to targeting such local energy storage and distribution facilities. This video also highlights the high maneuverability of “FPV” multirotor drones in general and FO “FPV” multirotor drones in particular, an attribute that facilitates the targeting of highly discrete small aim points, including specific important objects located at a target facility. While the targets in this video compilation were petrol/gas pumps and fuel storage tanks, such uncrewed aircraft turned munitions can, of course, be used against essentially any mobile and stationary object.

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While there are other means of targeting such local energy storage and distribution facilities, which in Russia’s case primarily means guided glide bombs and/or propeller-driven strike drones, such munitions are typically equipped with much larger warheads. Local energy storage and distribution facilities are often located near or within population centers. Employing a FAB-500 series unguided bomb—500 refers to the nominal weight of 500 kilograms—equipped with the UMPK guidance and wing assembly or a Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya single-use propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drone, which are generally equipped with either a 50-kilogram or a 90-kilogram class warhead, is not only excessive for use against the likes of a petrol/gas station or a propane tank but can also result in extensive civilian casualties.

While some militaries have in their arsenals very small and light munitions—with a very limited destructive radius—that are both highly accurate and highly precise, these tend to be expensive and are highly specialized—non-versatile—munitions. As noted earlier, armed “FPV” multirotor drones are severely limited in terms of both range and destructive effects. When it comes to the very surgical micro-targeting of fixed-stationary sites, such as local energy storage and distribution infrastructure, the limitations in terms of maximum range are not ideal, but the limited destructive effects of armed “FPV” multirotor drones make these munitions very well suited to attacking local energy storage and distribution facilities, among other potential targets. The fact that armed “FPV” multirotor drones, including those of the FO variety, are inexpensive and plentiful, highlights the increasing scope for the surgical targeting of fixed infrastructure sites located close to the frontlines of a conflict.