Russian "FPV" Multirotor Drone Strikes Against Kherson Thermal Power Plant Highlight Scope For The Surgical Targeting of Fixed Infrastructure Sites
🇷🇺 🇺🇦
Viewing so-called “First Person Video” (“FPV”) drone footage from the Russia-Ukraine War is often a quite sordid affair. There are, however, several “genres” of “FPV” drone footage that are not only more palatable to non-sadistic audiences by virtue of not (directly) injuring or killing any human beings but by offering a window into the new options—and new threats—enabled by technological change. One such “genre” is the employment of armed “FPV” drones, typically of the multirotor as opposed to the fixed-wing variety, against fixed—stationary—structures of various types. This dynamic is best characterized as the highly surgical micro-level targeting of fixed—stationary—sites, including critical infrastructure. While severely limited in terms of both range and destructive effects, technological change in the form of low-cost and plentiful armed “FPV” multirotor drones weighing just several kilograms allows militaries to attack an incredibly and unprecedentedly large and diverse (potential) target bank that was previously not possible due to the qualitative and/or quantitative limitations of strike capabilities broadly conceived.1
This post focuses on two new videos that were uploaded by a Telegram channel claiming to be the official media presence of the “PHOBOS” drone group associated with the Russian Army’s 18th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, which is currently deployed along the Dniepr River near Kherson. While most videos featuring armed “FPV” multirotor drones have become unremarkable notwithstanding the profoundly intimate views of death and destruction, the two new videos feature the employment of such drones to target electricity transmission equipment in the immediate vicinity of a thermal power plant outside of Kherson in southern Ukraine. Limited though all armed “FPV” multirotor drones are in terms of payload, these videos highlight the potential for employing such plentiful and inexpensive short-range munitions to attack a wide range of stationary targets beyond the immediate battlefield.
Some context is required to fully appreciate the insight offered by these two videos. Cities in Ukraine and other parts of the former Soviet Union, which are generally characterized by harsh winters, often rely on district heating to keep apartment buildings habitable in the winter. Distinct heating is notably very similar in concept to distinct cooling, which is found in places with arid climates such as the Gulf Arab states. While all contemporary countries have exposed critical infrastructure, including electricity generation and transmission infrastructure, some countries also have centralized heating and/or cooling systems that amount to an additional layer of vulnerability independent of the economic and energy efficiencies associated with centralized, as opposed to decentralized, heating and/or cooling. The target of the armed “FPV” multirotors is a relatively small gas-burning thermal power plant in the Kherson metropolitan area that also provides distinct heating in the winter. Electricity generation in the Kherson area has been severely affeted by the war not only due to a period of Russian occupation and ongoig proximity to the frontline—Russian forces occupy the opposite (left/east) bank of the Dniepr—as well as Russia’s country-wide targeting of Ukraine’s electricity generation and transmission infratsruture, but the June 2023 destruction of the nearby Kakhovka Dam, which encompassed a hydroelectric powerplant that supplied electricity to the Kherson area.
The first undated video uploaded on Telegram shows a Russian FPV drone setting an electrical substation on fire in Kherson at the following location: 46.674263, 32.649119. This geolocation comes from the X/Twitter user @99Dominik_.
The above video begins with the relatively high definition sensor feed of a(nother) Russian drone rather than the single-use armed “FPV” multirotor drone that undertakes the attack. The video captured by the armed “FPV” multirotor drone itself offers a good view of Ukrainian efforts toward hardening these key nodes of electricity transmission infrastructure.
It is important to note the loss of the radio frequency (RF) communication link as the armed “FPV” multirotor drone was diving toward its intended target. All relevant terrestrial RF communications links are line-of-sight (LOS) systems. As armed RF “FPV” multirotor drones descend in altitude, these tend to experience the loss of LOS to the ground station antenna and/or the airborne repeater, which is to say another drone that serves as an airborne radio relay. Disruptions to the RF LOS communications link are, of course, affected by both natural and anthropogenic terrain, which is to say human structures. Given this, armed “FPV” multirotor drones that are remotely operated through an RF LOS communications link tend to be poorly optimized for use in the most densely built-up parts of many urban areas.
The second undated video uploaded on Telegram shows another transformer being set on fire at the following location: 46.674558, 32.648808. This geolocation also comes from the X/Twitter user @99Dominik_.
The above video features much higher definition footage from the vantage of the armed single-use “FPV” multirotor drone. This footage offers an even better view of Ukrainian efforts toward hardening these key nodes of electricity transmission infrastructure.
Given the absence of the characteristic degradation and ultimate loss of the LOS communications link when an RF “FPV” multirotor drone descends in altitude as it approaches its intended target, the above video may be indicative of the employment of an armed single-use “FPV” multirotor drone equipped with a fiber optic (FO) communication link, which is to say a multirotor drone that is equipped with a spool of FO cable that is laid onto the ground as the drone moves in flight. If this second video does not feature an FO “FPV” multirotor drone, the video will feature the use of an RF “FPV” multirotor drone employing a higher than typical—in the Russia-Ukraine War—bandwidth digital RF datalink via an airborne repeater/radio relay drone. FO “FPV” multirotor drones are, in effect, wire-guided drones analogous to both anti-tank missiles equipped with copper wire cables, which are LOS munitions, and anti-tank missiles equipped with FO cables, which can be used as either LOS or non-LOS (NLOS) munitions. It is important to note that the FO cable simply descends to the ground and that no tension is applied to the FO cable as would be the case if the FO cable spool remained stationary at the launch site.
One of the great advantages of FO “FPV” multirotor drones is that the FO communications link facilitates the full exploitation of the inherent maneuverability of all “FPV” multirotor drones, irrespective of LOS obstacles to two-way RF transmissions. In the video, the apparent FO “FPV” multirotor drone is carefully maneuvered—at a fairly slow speed—by the remote human operator so as to directly fly into the electric transmission equipment. This particular “FPV” multirotor drone did, however, crash before impacting the apparent intended target due to the presence of a thin wire. It is important to note that such “FPV” multirotor drones are equipped with small high explosive-fragmentation warheads that typically weigh no more than two to three kilograms. The destructive radius of such warheads against matter other than soft tissue and similar materials is quite limited. A direct hit is, therefore, typically required to significantly damage, let alone destroy, many structures, but certain types of targets are more readily subjected to damage and can be more susceptible to combustion.
It is also important to note that neither of these two videos offers clear-cut evidence that these two particular “FPV” multirotor drones caused the damage that resulted in the fires recorded by (other)—almost certainly unarmed—Russian ISR drones. In contrast, there are many thousands of publicly accessbile videos recording the final moments of flight from both the perspective of armed “FPV” multirotor drones and external sensors of the employment of armed “FPV” multirotor drones against a wide range of mobile targets, such as vehicles of various types, as well as stationary targets, including buildings and antenna structures. Simply put, it is possible that the fires seen in these two videos were caused by some other munition, including perhaps some other armed “FPV” multirotor drones used in subsequent strikes. Nevertheless, both videos offer clear-cut evidence that low-cost and plentiful Russian armed “FPV” multirotors drones were deliberately used to undertake highly surgical strikes on critically important nodes of electricity transmission infrastructure in the Kherson area.
Although these two videos and many analagous videos released by both Russian and Ukrainian combatants highlight the impressive potential of the very surgical micro-targeting of fixed—stationary—targets, it nevertheless bears emphasis that these two particular strikes against Ukrainian electricity transmission infrastructure amount to a waste of time and resources—armed “FPV” multirotor drones—which could have been used to attack different targets. If the objective was to render the Kherson thermal power plant fully offline and, in so doing, render immaterial the operating status of its electricity transmission infrastructure, the Russian military could have employed guided glide bombs and/or other strike munitions that are equipped with much larger warheads and which can, as a result, engender much greater—permanent—destructive effects on the Kherson thermal power plant and nearby electricity transmission infrastructure. Instead, the operators of these armed “FPV” multirotor drones reportedly associated with the Russian Army’s 18th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade used at least two—quite possibly more—armed “FPV” multirotor drones equipped with small warheads that likely weighed no more than 2-3 kilograms for this purpose.
It is important to note that the Russian Air Force regularly employs FAB-500 series unguided bombs—500 refers to the nominal weight of 500 kilograms—equipped with the UMPK guidance and wing assembly, and Russia regularly employs large numbers of Shahed-136/Geran-2/Garpiya single-use propeller-driven fixed-wing strike drones, which are generally equipped with either a 50-kilogram or a 90-kilogram class warhead. While thermal power plants and other large industrial facilities can be quite resilient to damage absent the highly surgical targeting of critical nodes—which requires a high level of finesse in weaponeering as well as highly accurate and highly precise munitions capable of engendering the appropriate destructive effects—armed “FPV” multirotor drones equipped with 2-3 kilogram-class warheads are wholly unsuited for use against attacking such targets provided that the objective is to destroy a target thermal power plant and adjacent electricity transmission infrastructure or at least render it unusuable for the forseeable future. Lower levels of damage can be repaired, and the use of the small warheads to which armed “FPV” multirotor drones are inherently limited makes high levels of damage unlikely against many types of structure.
Given the above and notwithstanding the conceptually innovative employment of low-cost and plentiful armed “FPV” multirotor drones to undertake highly surgical micro-level targeting of a fixed—stationary—critical infrastructure site, there is a case to be made that such attacks can be a waste of time—skilled and experienced “FPV” multirotor drone operators are limited in supply and can only undertake so many sorties per day—and of armed “FPV” multirotor drones notwithstanding the low unit cost and widespread availabiltiy of such uncrewed aircraft-turned-munitions. If Russia truly wants to take the Khermon thermal power plant offline, it can make use of other, much larger and heavier munitions that have greater—and more permanent—destructive effects. That said, "armed “FPV” multirotor drones have two redeeming qualities for use against such target types.
First, low unit costs and widespread availability facilitate sustained harassment strikes in which quantity can have a quality all of its own. When it comes to harassment strikes, the low level of damage that can be inflicted is, after all, a feature, not a bug. While Ukraine is well-positioned to repair electricity generation and transmission facilities that are attacked by munitions equipped with small warheads, harassment strikes can tie up much of the trained manpower and relevant equipment, including spare parts, that are available to Ukraine’s electric industry and operators. This can, in turn, diminish Ukraine’s capacity to repair electricity generation and transmission facilities that are subject to more consequential attacks by larger, heavier, and more destructive munitions.
Second, the high maneuverability of “FPV” multirotor drones in general and FO “FPV” multirotor drones in particular offers the option of targeting very specific critical equipment at a given facility. The second video included in this video is particularly instructive in that the apparent FO “FPV” multirotor drone could have been used to target the interior of one of the buildings at the Kherson thermal power plant. In so doing, the apparent FO “FPV” multirotor drone could have been used to attack a critical piece of machinery, set fire to a combustible object inside one of the buildings, such as a fuel tank or similar, target a key computer system or key piece of machinery, and even target the skilled and experienced technicians who not only operate such a facility but also repair it following a Russian attack.
That is, concentrated and/or sustained unguided artillery fire amounts to a form of range-limited strike capability alongside the likes of fixed-wing aircraft equipped with bombs, guided and unguided artillery rockets, and both ballistic missiles and land-attack cruise missiles