Legislator Discloses Low Staffing Levels In Taiwanese Military, Draws Attention To Importance of Reserves
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A Taiwanese legislator recently disclosed figures that suggest the Taiwanese military’s readiness, in terms of staffing levels, is significantly lower than previously known. Some highlights include the overall figures of:
78% staffing for Taiwanese army units garrisoned on Taiwan’s western outlying islands, some of which are located within 10 or so kilometers of the Chinese coastline.
74% staffing for Taiwanese army air defence units.
76% staffing for the Taiwanese navy and 73% staffing for the Taiwanese marine corps, which requires the Taiwanese navy’s support to reinforce Taiwan’s western outlying islands in times of crisis and war.
82% staffing for the Taiwanese air force’s flying units.
69% staffing for the Taiwanese air force’s surface-to-air missile units.
While less than 100% staffing levels are the norm for militaries worldwide, other than in a handful of high-readiness units that are, in effect, overstaffed (i.e., 100%-110% staffing) to account for personnel on leave, engaged in off-site training, injuries, and so forth, Taiwan needs a military that operates at a very high rate of readiness. This is particularly the case with the likes of air defence units, which must be as close to 100% staffing and readiness as possible at any given time, and the Taiwanese air force and navy, which will likely have a very small window to leaves their mark on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) before being largely suppressed by China’s terestrial strike and maritime strike capabilities, as well as China’s air combat ccapabilities.
Low staffing levels for the bulk of the Taiwanese army’s units, in contrast, are not much of a problem given how Taiwan will likely have at least several weeks, if not several months, depending on seasonal environmental factors, to mobilize reservists to fully staff its ground combat units before the PLA can undertake a large-scale amphibious landing in most plausible scenarios. The apparent very low staffing of the Taiwanese army’s garrisons on Taiwan’s western outlying islands is, however, a major problem for Taipei, given how difficult most of these islands are to reinforce and resupply in times of crisis, let alone in war. It bears emphasis that these small islands have a quite small local civilian population from which to mobilize manpower for territorial defence units at a time in which the PLA is increasingly very well positioned to inflict extremely heavy casualties on the Taiwanese garrisons at these small, heavily exposed, and, all things considered, increasingly untenable forward positions.
In a recent post, I discussed why Taiwan requires a more fundamental reorientation of its military reserves so as to, among other things, fully staff its regular formations in times of crisis and war. The recent disclosure from a Taiwanese legislator suggests that Taiwan has a lot of work to do in this department beyond increasing the staffing and, as such, the readiness of its manpower-intensive ground combat units.
