Multiple Incidents Highlight Growing Multirotor Drone Threat To Zaporizhzhia, Other Ukrainian Cities

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In a recent post, I discussed the somewhat unexpected crash of a seemingly Russian “first person video” (“FPV”) multirotor drone in/around the southern Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia, which has to date never been closely approached, let alone occupied, by the Russian Army. The text from my recent post remains relevant and will be copied below. The remainder of this post will feature a new video and new analysis.

A (seemingly Russian) armed multirotor drone is reported to have recently crashed somewhere in/near the southern Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia. While the frontlines have hardly shifted in the sector along what used to be the Kakhovka Reservoir, the frontlines are now some 25 km from the outskirts of the Ukrainian-controlled city, and the practical range-endurance of armed multirotor drones keeps increasing. This notably includes the use of fixed-wing uncrewed aircraft/drones, which can serve as both "motherships" and aerial repeaters/radio relays for armed multirotor drones of the radio frequency communication uplink/downlink variety (those of the fiber optic variety are not well suited for use with fixed-wing uncrewed aircraft).

While the Kherson metropolitan area has been subject to sustained Russian attacks involving the use of armed multirotor drones, other large Ukrainian cities located near the frontlines, namely Kharkhiv, Sumy, and, to a much lesser degree, Zaporizhia, have not yet been subjected to regular and large-scale attacks involving the use of armed multirotor drones in the manner of smaller towns located close to/along the frontlines. If and when a large city comes within the practical range-endurance of armed multirotor drones, we are likely to witness a fundamentally new approach to urban warfare that will likely make the use of armed multirotor drones in battlefields characterized by open terrain look banal. Recent developments in the Kherson metropolitan area may offer a preview of what is to come in the Russia-Ukraine War and beyond.

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On 4 September 2025, a seemingly Russian armed “FPV” multirotor drone of the fiber-optic communication uplink/downlink variety was spotted in daylight over Zaoprizhzhia prior to detonating upon impact with an apartment building, which may or may not have been the intended target. The circumstances behind this incident remain uncertain, and the use of armed “FPV” multirotor drones in large urban areas remains rare outside of the Kherson metropolitan area, which is best understood in somewhat different terms than any such operations in Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Sumy, or any other large Ukrainian population center.

It is important to note that Zaporizhzhia is within the range of armed “FPV” multirotor drones, among other Russian strike munitions. While Ukraine may be intercepting most, if not all, of any Russian multirotor drones, as well as armed “FPV” drones of the fixed-wing variety, being directed toward Zaporizhzhia, we are likely dealing with a situation in which such strikes have not—perhaps not yet—been prioritized by the Russian military. This may change in the coming months if Russia initiates another campaign targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. The expanding reach of armed “FPV” multirotor drones and armed “FPV” fixed-wing drones, including those controlled via an aerial relay/radio repeater, allows Russia to methodically target local electricity generation and transmission infrastructure—as well as local energy storage and distribution infrastructure—in a manner that has never before been seen. Should it decide to do so, Russia will have additional tools—not limited to armed “FPV” drones—at its disposal, including systems that were not available six months ago, let alone twelve months ago.