A recent video segment from Chinese state media indicates that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has deployed yet another short-range air defence system, the HQ-13. The HQ-13 system displayed in the video segment is operated by the 90th Combined Arms Brigade of the 72nd Group Army, which is subordinate to Eastern Theater Command. The 90th Combined Arms brigade is one of the PLA Ground Force’s (PLAGF) “light” brigades, which are equipped with large numbers of lightly armoured and unarmoured wheeled vehicles. The HQ-13 system displayed in the video segment is mounted on 6×6 Mengshi wheeled vehicle that can carry up to eight ready-to-launch surface-to-air missiles. Each launch vehicle is equipped with a small radar and an electro-optical sensor, which suggests that a single vehicle can be employed on a standalone basis if required. A complete HQ-13 battery does, however, include multiple launcher vehicles and a dedicated acquisition radar mounted on another 6×6 Mengshi vehicle.
The HQ-13 appears to be related to a Chinese system that has been offered to prospective export customers under the industry/export designation FB-10A. Marketing material for the FB-10A suggests that the HQ-13 has a nominal maximum range of 17 kilometers, which makes it a somewhat high-end short-range air defence system and a major improvement over rudimentary short-range air defence systems that rely on vehicle-mounted but otherwise shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles. Marketing materials for the FB-10A suggest that the HQ-13 employs both radio frequency command guidance and an imaging infrared seeker.
While the long-range surface-to-air missile systems and other Chinese air defence systems operated by the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) receive the most attention, the PLAGF operates the bulk of the PLA’s short-range and medium-range air defence systems. These air defence systems are operated by the air defence brigades assigned to each of the PLAGF’s thirteen group armies, as well as the air defence battalions that are part of each of the PLAGF’s combined arms brigades. The peacetime division of resources and responsibilities suggests that the PLAAF will be responsible for territorial air defence in wartime, while the PLAGF’s air defence systems will be primarily deployed to forward locations in support of the PLAGF’s ground combat formations. It is, however, possible that China’s joint theater commands will use some of the PLAGF’s air defence capabilities to bolster the PLAAF’s air defence capabilities. The single most important sector in which such a dynamic is likely to transpire is the Fujian coastline, where PLAGF formations will have to concentrate so as to undertake amphibious landings and/or heliborne air assaults on the island of Taiwan. PLAGF staging areas along the Fujian coastline are likely to be high priority and very lucrative targets for not just Taiwan but also the United States.
One of the many consequential quirks of the PLA is that there is very little overlap between the air defence systems employed by the PLAGF and the PLAAF. This includes short-range air defence systems that China will likely have to deploy in extremely large numbers in wartime. As with so many other areas, China and the PLA have their own particularistic inefficiencies alongside the usual inefficiencies that are common to militaries worldwide.
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