While Limited In Terms Of Proxies Through Which To Retaliate, Russia Is Not Toothless When It Comes To A Proxy Conflict With America
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One of the more consequential but oft-overlooked aspects of the Russia-Ukraine War is that it has taken on the form of a one-sided proxy conflict. While Kyiv undoubtedly has agency—states and non-state actors alike can be willing proxies of third parties and can be motivated by, among other things, perceived self-interest and preference alignment, the United States in particular and European countries more generally are, in effect, using Ukraine as a proxy through which to indirectly wage war against Russia—in retaliation for, of course, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. There are countless manifestations of this proxy war dynamic, including regular reports of the provisioning of targeting intelligence to the Ukrainian military and, most recently, high-level discussions concerning the transfer of American Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles to Ukraine. The case of the reported possibly forthcoming transfer of Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles to Ukraine is particularly notable in that media reports indicate that these missiles may be operated in Ukraine by American military contractors—i.e., American citizens who were formerly part of the American military—who will be officially subordinate to Kyiv in a context in whcih the Ukrainian military would not—and could not—independently operate the Tomahawk missiles and associated launchers.
As indicated in the above paragraph, the notion that one country or another is a proxy for one or more countries that are not formally involved in a two-party conflict concerns statements of fact—the term proxy is not pejorative and says nothing about the validity and legitimacy of one armed struggle for another. There is a case to be made that one of the reasons for the widespread reluctance to recognize that the Russia-Ukraine War is—at once—Ukraine’s war for national political survival and a proxy conflict between the United States and Russia is that it is a one-sided proxy war. That is, Russia has done relatively very little in terms of cultivating and employing one or more proxies against the United States and European countries more generally since February 2022. The recent and ongoing discussion of the possible transfer of Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles is a case in point—there is little in the way of serious public discussion that Russia may, for example, retaliate by transferring conventionally armed strike munitions to, for example, Venezuela, which is currently engaged in an ongoing American-initiated military standoff with the United States in the Caribbean Sea.
From September 2001 through August 2021, the tens of thousands of American military personnel deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the greater Middle East constituted exposed and highly lucrative targets for any country that sought to indirectly retaliate against the United States. The scope for a consequential Russian proxy conflict directed against the United States was, in other words, very high until August 2021, and Russia had the option of cultivating one or more proxies if the Kremlin was intent on inflicting human losses on the American military in the immediate aftermath of the Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea, including in response to American—and European—military aid in the formally undeclared Russia-Ukraine War that followed in eastern Ukraine. Since August 2021, however, Russia has not only had much reduced opportunities to undertake a proxy conflict against the United States, but any sober Russian cost-benefit analysis would have to take into account how few American military personnel remained deployed in places like Iraq and Syria. The window for a consequential Russian proxy conflict of the conventional variety had, as such, closed by February 2022.
Some reported—seemingly inconsequential—dealings with Ansarallah in Yemen notwithstanding, the Kremlin has primarily huffed and puffed about the ongoing and, in qualitative terms, escalating/deepening American and European military aid to Ukraine. It is, however, a mistake to think that Russia has no proxy through which to inflict longer-term negative military effects—not casualties—on the United States in particular. As things stand, Russia is already waging a different type of proxy “war” against the United States, one that reportedly entails both Russian technical support and material assistance to North Korea. According to statements from South Korean officials, Russia may be assisting North Korean efforts in the interrelated areas of (nuclear-armed) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology and nuclear-powered submarine technology.
The primary target of North Korean ICBMs, including those of the sea-launched variety that North Korea appears intent to eventually deploy, is, of course, the United States. Such reported Russian technical support and material assistance to North Korea may not result in the injury or death of any American citizens, including American military personnel, but it does, of course, inflict very grave long-term negative military effects—not casualties—on the United States. While the reported Russia-North Korea dynamic does not lend itself to a rapid tit-for-tat Russian retaliation via proxy for American actions such as the possibly forthcoming transfer of Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles to Ukraine, the key point to consider is that Moscow remains well-positioned to impose serious and escalating costs on the United States for American policies vis-a-vis Russia in the context of the Russia-Ukraine War. In an important sense, Russia has left the proverbial ball in America’s court—the United States decides how much Russia is willing to assist North Korea in its development and deployment of nuclear weapons that can be used against the United States.
While Russia is undoubtedly limited in terms of proxies through which to retaliate against the United States and others in conventional terms for their escalating/deepening support for Ukraine, it is important to recognize that Russia is far from toothless when it comes to waging a proxy conflict. Russia’s North Korea-centric proxy war against the United States is, moreover, likely to have long-lasting and far-reaching consequences for international security, irrespective of how and when the Russia-Ukraine War draws to a close.