In Fighter Aircraft Technology, As With Other Areas, China And United States Leave Others Behind In The Dust
🇨🇳 Analysis
In two recent posts, I explained how major developments in China’s maritime strike capabilities, which are exemplified by the recent unveiling of six anti-ship munitions at the 3 September military parade in Beijing, leave most of China’s neighbours unable to keep up and deploy credible naval forces for the foreseeable future.
A very similar dynamic is currently underway in the critically important area of air combat capabilities. In late 2024, China informally unveiled what appear to be prototypes of two new, very distinctive, and, in terms of air combat capabilities vis-a-vis every country not named the United States of America—very consequential combat aircraft designs with the provisional and unofficial designations J-36 and J-50. Much has already been said of these two new Chinese combat aircraft designs, and will not be repeated here. This post focuses on the same dynamic that I highlighted in recent posts with respect to China’s maritime strike capabilities. To paraphrase, observers should recognize that the widespread fixation on whether Chinese combat aircraft technology has matched or surpassed American combat aircraft technology misses a crucially important point: the military capabilities—combat aircraft—of most other countries in the Western Pacific are increasingly irrelevant in the head-to-head clash between the two leading military powers.
The provisionally and unofficially designated J-36 and J-50 constitute the second generation of Chinese low-observable—“stealth”—combat aircraft that follows the first generation, namely the J-20 and the J-35/J-35A—the J-35A being the land-based version of the J-35, which is designed to operate from catapult-equipped aircraft carriers. However the J-20 and J-35/J-35A may compare with and fare against the low-observable American F-22 and F-35, these Chinese low-observable combat aircraft outclass most, if not all, of the combat aircraft operated by China’s neighbours and nearby countries that are not named the F-35. As a result, China already has a clear-cut qualitative (technological) edge in air combat capabilities vis-a-vis other countries in its region (i.e., excluding the United States). The J-20 and J-35A are, moreover, supported by a very large and still expanding fleet of non-low-observable J-16 and J-10C fighters, which compare very favourably with and in many classes outclass most of the combat aircraft operated by China’s neighbours and nearby countries that are not named the F-35. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Navy Air Force (PLANAF), therefore, already enjoy a qualitative (technological) edge in air combat capabilities over any air force that does not operate the American-built F-35 fighters. With the J-36 and J-50 and future crewed and uncrewed combat aircraft more generally, China is on a trajectory in which it and the United States are likely to leave essentially every other country in the dust in air combat capabilities and other areas of military capability more generally.
One of the most important but widely overlooked effects of the intensifying military-technological competition between China and the United States—two countries that can harness incomparable financial, industrial, and technological resources—is that most countries are not remotely close to being in any position to keep up, not least if and when their modernization cycles are not in sync with those of the United States and, to a lesser but increasing degree, China. Consider the following. The Philippines is currently in the market for a fairly small fleet of non-low-observable fighter aircraft. Candidate aircraft include the American F-16, Swedish Gripen, European Eurofighter, and the French Rafale. Taiwan is set to receive 66 new-build F-16V fighter aircraft and is upgrading 139 of its existing older F-16 aircraft. Thailand recently placed a small order for additional Gripen fighter aircraft. Indonesia is set to receive 42 Rafale fighter aircraft. Cash-strapped Malaysia is looking to acquire quite old Kuwait Air Force F/A-18C/D fighter aircraft to significantly expand its existing fleet of old F/A-18C/D fighter aircraft. India is reportedly planning to order additional Rafale fighter aircraft alongside additional Indian-built Tejas fighter aircraft.
It is important to recognize that fighter aircraft are very expensive—we are generally dealing with aircraft that cost at least US$50 million per airframe, excluding spare parts/a logistical support package and armament—to procure, let alone operate (including a mid-life upgrade). While the service life of fighter aircraft is ultimately determined by remaining flight hours, flight cycles, as well as maintenance challenges and spare parts availability more generally, a service life of 30 or so years is typical. Such a lengthy service life is also, in practice, the only way that the vast majority of countries can afford to undertake such immense capital expenditures, given the very long list of other types of expensive military equipment that must be procured on an ongoing basis alongside fighter aircraft.
Given the above, many of China’s neighbours, some of which are counted among China’s lower-ranking adversaries, are currently receiving, are set to receive, or are planning to receive at a much later date non-low-observable aircraft that are likely to remain in service well into the 2050s, if not well into the 2060s. The aforementioned non-Chinese non-low-observable aircraft are already outclassed by the likes of the Chinese J-20 and J-35/J-35A. If and when China’s second generation of low-observable combat aircraft, such as the J-36 and J-50, become operational, by the mid-2030s if not significantly earlier, most of China’s neighbours and several of its lower-ranking adversaries are likely to encounter an increasingly hopeless situation in terms of air combat capabilities, a situation that can only be partially ameliorated by acquiring new aircraft in the vein of the American F-35, a design that is itself likely to become increasingly outdated in a context of ever-intensifying military-technological competition from the mid-2030s onward.
As things stand, China’s pursuit of a second generation of low-observable combat aircraft, and other air combat systems and supporting systems more generally, is resulting in a situation in which most of China’s neighbours cannot keep up and deploy credible air combat capabilities for the foreseeable future. It is important to recognize that this is not a new dynamic in the world of military affairs. For much of the post-Cold War period, this is essentially what adversaries of the United States—China included—experienced every day. What has changed is that there are now two countries, the United States and China, that are capable of leaving essentially everyone else behind in the dust.
While burgeoning military spending in Europe is likely to somewhat change this situation going forward, major breakthroughs in non-American and non-Chinese air combat capabilities cannot be realistically expected until the mid to late 2030s at the earliest. It simply takes far too much time and effort to develop new combat aircraft. It also bears emphasis that the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), which involves Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and the currently troubled Future Combat Air System (FCAS), which involves France, Germany, and Spain, are being developed at a time of ever-intensifying military-technological competition between China and the United States. It remains to be seen how competitive the aircraft resulting from GCAP and FCAS will be relative to the as-yet veiled American F-47, the production standard configurations of the Chinese J-36 and J-50, and whatever else China and the United States may have in store. Given these timeframes, China’s neighbours and lower-ranking adversaries have very poor prospects of fundamentally transforming their lot until the mid to late 2030s, if not later, given how deliveries to partner nations will likely be prioritized in the case of FCAS and GCAP. The American F-47 is reported to be an exceptionally expensive aircraft featuring exquisite and, therefore, very sensitive technology. Even if the United States decides to export the F-47 to select countries, which was not the case with the F-22, it too will likely be unavailable for export customers until the mid to late 2030s.
As I explained in the context of China’s recently unveiled anti-ship munitions, the likes of the J-36 and J-50, as well as the impressively diverse array of extravagantly developed uncrewed combat aircraft on display at the 3 September 2025 military parade, are likely to amount to just the tip of the iceberg as to what is to come over the coming decade or so. While the J-36 and J-50 are likely to be prototypes that may result in operational production configuration airframes within a decade or so, some of the involved designers are likely to be already actively engaged in research and development activity that will lead to the next generation of Chinese combat aircraft, whether crewed or uncrewed, and related systems. Collectively, Chinese research and development activity in the area of combat aircraft technology and the large-scale production of new combat aircraft and associated systems are profoundly reshaping the ex-United States regional military balance.